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DEBATE on the resolution offered by Mr. NEWTON, to repeal the BANKRUPT LAW.

In the House of Representatives on Tuesday, and Wednesday, the 22nd and 23rd days of November.

The resolution was advocated by Messrs. Newton, Elliot, Stanford, Hastings, Stanford, and Randolph; and opposed by Messrs. Jackson, Early, Skinner, and Elliot.

The advocates of the repeal observed, that though the resolution had laid on the table for a considerable time, purposely with a view to collect public opinion, no remonstrance hostile to it had been received from any part of the union, and that this circumstance indicated the unfavorable sentiment entertained of the bankrupt system; and that ever since it was found materially interfering with its provisions, a dead silence prevailed. Some gentlemen were averse to the repeal, insofar as the law would expire by its own limitation, in a few years; but the house should recollect that this would mean time they were responsible for all the evils and iniquities. If not to be suffered to die a natural death, the inevitable effect would be that those who are now struggling to avoid bankruptcy will precipitate themselves into such a situation as to avail themselves of its benefits.

With regard to the principle of the present bankrupt system, and possibly of any other bankrupt system that could be devised, it was unjust, inadmissible, it favored one class of citizens, the merchants, at the expence of all other classes; it advances the interest of the first it sacrificed the interests of all the other members of the community. To prove this it was only necessary to contrast the situation of the merchant or the farmer who applies his creditors, and of the same individual mechanic or farmer, the debtors of another merchant, remaining in the debtor's with their property right to any period of their life to his failures. In the case of the individual merchant his debts were totally discharged; whereas in the case of the insolvent mechanic and farmer, they were still general obligation. The preferable system was that established by the several states, which enabled before the bankrupt system, and which still existed, extending to all insolvent debtors the same relief.

It was contended that the partial operation of the bankrupt system had the most pernicious influence on the morals of the mercantile world. That it operated as an impunity to fraud and negligence; that it created extensive credits, and excited a spirit of the most profligate speculation; that although the American merchants were probably the most honest, and certainly the most able and enterprising in the world, the facility with which credits were obtained, and the impunity with which losses were incurred, laid, under the auspices of this law, introduced into this private speculation a reckless and desperate gamble; and that nothing was more common than to see a merchant, of little capital, living at an expence disproportionate to that of the European traders who had established his plants, and at an expence which flamed the frugal deportments of the affluent planters. What were the effects? The fatal luxury and folshness was enjoyed for a few years, and was succeeded by misfortune. Did it become the legislature to encourage, or repeal this spirit?

The principle of the bankrupt system was inequitable as it regarded the relation of debtor and creditor. Insolvency might be averted to the contrary, it was a truth. Statute provisions operated to the advantage of the debtor, and of courts to the detriment of the creditor. There was no weight in the remark that the consideration was taken out of the ignorance of the creditor, as that was merely a nominal act, a creditor totally from trade cite of who was the friend of the bankrupt. That it operated to the benefit of the debtor was also a fallacy, liberating all his future acquisitions, after avoiding himself of the benefit of a commission, from himself; whereas under an insolvent law the person alone was relieved. That hence sprang up a two fold temptation to fraud under this act, over that which existed under the common insolvent laws. For that assures the latter an insolvent debtor, if guilty of a fraudulent concealment of property, could at any future period be called upon to satisfy the claims of his creditors by a delivery of his visible property; whilst, under this law, the bankrupt might be so greatly relieved, nay, even effectually displaying his property, without rendering it liable to losses. Fraud once successfully perpetrated and concealed, every restraint is removed; and to deliverance had this effect been that it had manifestly inflicted a deep wound upon the confidence of man with man in the ordinary transactions of life.

It was further contended that while justice and humanity dictated the liberation from arrest of the body of the insolvent debtor, it was inhibited the exoneration of property from going to satisfy just debts; that the obligation, wherever the ability exists, to pay honest debts was eternal; and that this law in having a non-active effect, was unjust. Evils infinitely greater had been inflicted by transcendental fraudulent debtors taking refuge in the provisions of the bankrupt law than from all the misfortunes accidentally incurred by creditors over unfortunate debtors. That the principle of the bankrupt law was also inexplicable, inasmuch as it dethroned the grade of dignity, exalting the grade of the debtor by which a bankrupt debt obtained a legal preference over an open account; that it abhorently immolated the holding contract between the person holding and the person signing the bond.

It was remarked that the principle of the bankrupt law, however good in itself, could not be carried into effect, fetters, as had been proved by a long course of British experience, were a reference to those languiancy laws, which they had introduced for the prevention of bankruptcies, and that these fetters were to abstrement to our code of laws that public opinion could not tolerate for a time.

The expences of going through the bankrupt system, was finally stated to be considerable objection to the system. The appointment of a commissioner was considered as a thing not finally good, creative, and the various proceedings through the commissioner, commencing with the ex parte, reduced the little property he had left, to a mere fleet left. Indeed the commissioner officer of the bankrupt it would appear that it had been sometimes the condition of the commissioner fitter than for the benefit of the creditors.

However necessary this system might be in England, who owed almost the whole of her prosperity to trade, it behoved the American, the leading feature of whose character was agriculture, to adopt a system which was in fact, on the contrary to avert rather than to hasten the period when such a system would be rendered necessary; that, whatever the spirit of trade in this country, was fullocently vigorous, and only required the concentration given to all other occupations, to prepare to every benefit and advantage.

In the commercial world, the honest, though unfortunate merchant, and not the fraud, was the sufferer. Long experience had proved that the operation of the bankrupt system had introduced with symptoms of the most alarming character, the most pernicious influence on the morals of the commercial world." That it operated as an impunity to fraud and negligence; that it created extensive credits, and excited a spirit of the most profligate speculation; that although the American merchants were probably the most honest, and certainly the most able and enterprising in the world, the facility with which credits were obtained, and the impunity with which losses were incurred, laid, under the auspices of this law, introduced into this private speculation a reckless and desperate gamble; and that nothing was more common than to see a merchant, of little capital, living at an expence disproportionate to that of the European traders who had established his plants, and at an expence which flamed the frugal deportments of the affluent planters. What were the effects? The fatal luxury and folshness was enjoyed for a few years, and was succeeded by misfortune. Did it become the legislature to encourage, or repeal this spirit?

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