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For the National Intelligencer.

Purchase of Louisiana.

This naturally brings us to the Seventh enquiry, whether the sum paid is too great.

For the payment of fifteen millions of dollars, one fourth whereof goes to the satisfaction of the just demands of our citizens against the French government,

1. We have averted war for the present.

2. We have removed the occasion of war, so far as the possession of New-Orleans and Louisiana by another nation might have caused it, forever.

3. We have acquired the actual seat of a very extensive trade.

4. We have gained a territory of at least 200 millions, and probably 400 millions of acres.

It will already appear that this enquiry opens a large field of discussion. But for our purpose to be concise, remarks of importance might be multiplied to a great extent. We shall confine ourselves to the outlines, leaving it to the understanding of the intelligent citizen to fill them up.

We have agreed to pay fifteen millions. How? Not by immediate payment of that sum; but simply by giving certificates of the existence of our engagement, and a promise to render payment at the expiration of fifteen years, in the mean time paying six per cent interest.

It is in general sound policy to pay at the time for whatever either an individual or a nation contracts. This principle is founded on the individual or the nation in general coming into the immediate enjoyment of what is contracted for; it being equitable that he who acquires a benefit should pay the price of it. But in the present case, the reverse is in a great degree the case. The United States, consisting at present of five millions of inhabitants, acquires a territory of considerable present value, but of greater future value. She therefore immediately obtains a certain advantage; but she will hereafter obtain a much greater advantage; that is her citizens at the end of fifteen years, amounting to about eight millions, which will be the then population, will enjoy much greater advantages from this cession than are at present reaped. This will arise from the vast increase of western population and trade, and the consequent augmentation of the value of land in that region of America. Most judiciously then and equitably has our government so made the purchase, that while our present population of five millions shall pay the interest of the fifteen millions of dollars, to wit, nine hundred thousand dollars, the population of the United States, at the expiration of fifteen years, shall pay the principal, to wit, the fifteen millions of dollars. It is an arduous task so to conduct public affairs that public benefits and burthens shall be equalized, not only among all classes of the citizens at any one time, but likewise among the whole mass of the citizens at different periods. In Great Britain so systematically has this just principle been violated, that the public burthens are constantly pressing with accumulated weight upon each succeeding generation, while the public benefits are narrowed with the same systematic injustice. This effect our government has wisely avoided without sacrificing the rights of our present citizens.

Farther, of these fifteen millions payable by the government, one fourth goes to our own citizens. I will not say that this would have been otherwise lost to them; but I will say that this is my belief. There can be no doubt that, at least, immediate payment could not have been expected from France, under her present circumstances; and considering the unavoidable delays, denials of right, and expences attending the recovery, one half at least would have been lost.

Supposing the whole to have been lost to our merchants, they would have lost a capital of 3,750,000 dollars by the immediate possession of which they will be enabled, in the fifteen ensuing years, to acquire in the ordinary course of trade, estimating the annual profit at ten per cent, about eight millions of dollars, which added to the principal sum of 3,750,000 makes eleven millions seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars gained to the country, more than three fourths of the amount of the purchase money.

Supposing the half to have been lost had it not been for the treaty the benefit produced by the purchase would be proportionate.

Placing, however, this important effect of the purchase aside let us take the simple view of certain profit and loss attending it.

We shall pay 900,000 dollars a year for fifteen years, when we shall pay fifteen millions of dollars.

On the other hand by avoiding war for the present, we shall have escaped an expence, as has been seen, arising in one year of thirty millions to the government, and seven and an half millions in addition to the nation.

Calculating the war to continue five years, the expense to the government would have been 150 millions, and that in addition to the nation 37 and an half millions, independent of the interest paid for these immense sums and the expences of collecting the taxes laid to pay them, which may be computed at thirty millions, making altogether an aggregate of two hundred and seventeen millions and an half of dollars.—This vast sum would have to have been raised by taxation or loan. If by taxation, it would have operated as a tax of sixty dollars a year upon every taxable in the United States, or of three hundred dollars for each taxable for the five yeas of war.

Let us now compute the expence of the purchase to each taxable in the United States. At present there will be paid by each, reckoning the taxables at 700,000, about one dollar and twenty-eight cents a year, which sum will gradually diminish at the rate of between three and four per cent. every year as our numbers increase; so that at the arrival of the fifteenth or last year, there will be payable by each taxable about seventy-five cents; the average between the two sums makes the annual payment of each taxable about one dollar.

Such is the *present* cost of the purchase.

On the other hand the *present* gain will be the actual enjoyment of the trade of New Orleans, and the immense territory of Louisiana.

The present trade of the Mississippi is great; its future trade is destined to be immense. A moderate computation of the present population connected with the Mississippi amounts to one million of souls, whose wants would be supplied and productions conducted to market by this stream. This constitutes nearly a fifth of the whole population of the United States. The rapidity with which this population will extend is almost incalculable. An increase of fifteen per cent. will be within the truth. The present exports of the United States are about thirty-five millions, and the imports about the same. The portion of each then that ought to fall to the western country would be about seven millions. But deduct one half of this, as an allowance for the greater capital and superior convenience of the Atlantic states and an amount is left of three and a half millions. It is known that this is beyond the present trade of the Mississippi; but it may be confidently expected that it will in a year or two fall short of it. Take the trade, however, as it actually is, at about two millions in amount. The free and undisturbed enjoyment of that trade will undoubtedly be productive of great benefits national as well as individual. But this, from the numerous circumstances connected with it, is not susceptible of calculation. There is however one view susceptible of accuracy, for which these remarks have been principally made—the *duties* payable into the Treasury on goods imported.

On the above data, the importations on the Mississippi now make about a seventeenth part of the whole importations into the union. From the whole, duties are derived to the annual amount of ten millions; a seventeenth part of which will be equal to about 600,000 dollars. This will be the present immediate gain of the government independent of and in addition to the incalculable benefits derived to the citizens by an undisturbed trade.

There is every reason to believe that this trade will progress with a greater rapidity than the population of the western country, on account of the cheapness of living in the west, the great fertility of the soil, and the spirit of enterprise excited by the vastness of the field. From these combined causes we should not be surprised if in a few years that country should gain its due share of commerce; in such event her trade, according to her increasing numbers, would rise to above a fifth of that of the whole union, and would of course place in the national Treasury above two millions of dollars.

But confining our estimates within the most moderate bounds, let us take the present trade of that country as our basis, and graduate its increase for the fifteen succeeding years with the probable increase of numbers, to wit, fifteen per cent annually. Let us compare the duties on imports that will accrue during these years with the sum payable by the government for the purchase of New Orleans and Louisiana. The difference will be the present profit or loss.

	Sum payable.	Duties.	Loss.
In 1804	900,000	690,000	210,000
1805	900,000	780,000	120,000
1806	900,000	870,000	30,000
		Total loss	360,000
			Gain.
1807	900,000	960,000	60,000
1808	900,000	1,050,000	150,000
1809	900,000	1,140,000	240,000
1810	900,000	1,230,000	330,000
1811	900,000	1,320,000	420,000
1812	900,000	1,410,000	510,000
1813	900,000	1,500,000	600,000
1814	900,000	1,590,000	690,000
1815	900,000	1,680,000	780,000
1806	900,000	1,770,000	870,000
1817	900,000	1,860,000	960,000
1818	900,000	1,950,000	1,050,000
		Total gain,	6,660,000

From this view it appears that for the three first years the government will have to pay 360,000 dollars more than they receive by the purchase. Add the interest on these sums, and you will have the sum of about 380,000 dollars.

It further appears that for the twelve succeeding years, besides paying the 900,000 dollars annually as contracted, they will gain 6,660,000 dollars. Add the interest on the above sums, annually accruing, and in the aggregate amounting to this sum, you will have the sum of 8,149,000.

Take the loss of the three first years from the profit of the twelve last, viz.

	8,149,000
	380,000
You have the clear profit of,	7,769,000

This sum will have been acquired by the government at the expiration of fifteen years, when the period shall have arrived for the payment of fifteen millions. Taking it from that sum, there will remain to be paid about seven millions three hundred thousand dollars.—This sum will, according to the above estimate, come into the treasury in the shape of duties in a period something short of six years. After which period all the accruing duties will be a clear gain, producing annually at least between one and two millions.

One consideration has not been yet dwelt upon—the actual value of the land acquired. This is almost incalculable. The quantity may be fairly estimated between two and four hundred millions of acres; and the soil of a considerable portion is acknowledged on all hands to be equal in fertility to any lands in the world. The remainder is probably, like all the large tracts elsewhere explored, made up of all qualities of lands. If kept from market until our other territory is settled it may undoubtedly average the value of two dollars an acre; amounting, say to the sum of six hundred millions of dollars.

When this great eventual value is considered, and the immense sacrifice of treasure avoided by escaping the expences of war, can it admit of a doubt that the government have made a good bargain.

MECHANICS HALL.

THE subscriber respectfully informs his friends and the public, that he has opened a House of Entertainment, on the causeway in George-Town, at the sign of the Golden Square and Compass, for the accommodation of travellers and others, entitled the Mechanics Hall.

All those who do not think themselves above a mechanic, will find it their interest to call on him, as he pledges himself to the public to be moderate in his charges, and to keep a supply of the best of every article in his line of business. Having several genteel rooms with fire places in each, parties on business can have private rooms. Oyster suppers while in season will be prepared on the shortest notice. Beer and porter. Also, newspapers of different politics, regularly filed in the bar room.

He also keeps a small assortment of Groceries, of the best quality, which he sells low. Any favor in either line will be gratefully acknowledged, by the public's humble, servant,

ANDREW M'DONALD.

☞ A few genteel persons may be accommodated on moderate terms with boarding by the week, month or year.

A woman, well acquainted with cooking, and of good character, is wanted, to whom liberal wages will be given.

August 3. 2awif

Having found amusement ourselves in the following *federal* pourtrait of the British Ministry, and encomium upon the private vices of public men, we offer it for the amusement of our readers.

From the Charleston Courier.

From the general color of the debates in the British Parliament, and the whole aspect of the public opinion as disclosed in the detached writings of the public prints, it is clear that the ministers of the St. James's cabinet have, so far as they have gone, fulfilled the expectations or rather fears of those who knew them, and accomplished the predictions grounded on their acknowledged feebleness.

It appears from the speeches of the most able and distinguished men in the kingdom, that these persons, on whose exertions the independence perhaps of no inconsiderable part of the civilized world at this moment rests, have already been guilty of most dangerous and criminal weakness and delay. In any case, procrastination (the thief of time, as it has been well called) is dangerous—in warfare still more so—but in warfare with an enemy whose energetic celerity has absolutely borne away before it like a torrent, all the old established arts of war, and all scientific military tactics, it can scarcely fail to be ruinous. In the most active and vigorous administration of affairs, accident and difficulty may occasion delays, but the mischief will again be retrieved by redoubled efforts. In the present case it is otherwise—the highest speed of the present set of men could not keep pace with the lazy dog-trot of a good peace administration. If they stop only to take up their hat or whip, they are completely thrown out of the chase—for they have not speed to recover what they have lost. Not only the whole Grenville party in the mass, but Mr. Pitt, Earl Moira, and many others, who have not agreed with the general opinions of that party, all concur in censuring the tardiness of the British ministers. Many acquiesce, and affect to consider them as having done enough—and these found their opinions upon an internal persuasion that an invasion will not be attempted, without ever recollecting that if there were in the mind of Bonaparte a doubt respecting invasion, the decision upon that doubt would depend upon the preparation made in England for his reception. In this point of view alone the mischief of having such an administration is very great. It is of itself sufficient temptation to the French to hazard an invasion. Were old Wm. Pitt, (Lord Chatham) at the head of affairs, Bonaparte would as soon think of trying, like the fabled Titans of old, to scale heaven, as of attempting to invade England. But while the safety of that country is committed to the care of that court nursling, lord Hawkesbury, who has been laid, hatched, reared up and trained in the worst puddle of court corruption—and of the grave, pompous, snail-slow Addington, in whom a good preacher was spoiled to make a bad minister, there is every inducement which a feeble cabinet can hold out, to Bonaparte, to attempt an invasion.

Nothing but a retrospect of his Britannic majesty's reign could render it credible that while a world await with painful anxiety and apprehension the conduct of Great Britain in this eventful moment, he would be so blind to the honor and interests of the country, so blind to the gulph and precipice that gape before him, so insensible to his danger, and so deaf to all the suggestions of sound policy; even of common sense; and above all, so lost to the recollection of the past, as to rest the whole fate of himself, his crown, and his country, upon the exertions of a set of men, eminent for incapacity, to the exclusion of all the talents of the country.

It must afford but a melancholy scope for consideration, to the people of England, to look back upon the reign of their present sovereign, to see that it has been but one tissue of error and impolicy; that of forty-three years in which he has reigned, for thirty at least, the government of the country has been devoted to the counsels of the weak and the corrupt, and that now, at the close of that time, when experience might be supposed to supply the wisdom which nature denied; and the awful, the tremendous danger of the times, to correct and conquer obstinacy; they should still see the same perverse attachment to the pernicious lessons which first marred his reign; the same distempered firmness which excluded from his cabinet, as it by general proscription, all virtue and talent, and which, at the expence of one hundred millions of money, and the expenditure of oceans of blood, split the empire asunder, and separated for ever one part of it from the other.

The virtues of the private man are often dangerous vices in a prince. So says a great author. We believe it is Junius. The private virtues of the king of England have rendered him so dear to the people, while they are aware of the injuries his choice of ministers has done the country, that it may fairly be questioned whether there ever was a monarch so beloved. At this awful crisis, the private virtues which impair the public strength, might be spared.—The benevolence of Henry IV. and the chastity of Scipio, rendered them illustrious, because they served to throw their *brilliant talents and heroic actions* into higher relief. But had Henry been only benevolent, and had Scipio no other virtue but chastity, they would be as useless to their country as so many empty bottles; perhaps pernicious, by occupying the space which great men should fill. In short, the talents of one Pitt, one Windham, one Fox, or one Sheridan, at this exigent moment, would be worth a thousand synagogues of piety, and all the chastity that ever was *immured* in all the convents of the world. One Peter, drunk as a Muscovite boor, would be worth all the water drinkers upon earth to confront Bonaparte.

FROM MARTINIQUE.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Fort de France, 26th Thermidor
(3d of August) 11th year.

Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, captain genl. of Martinique and its dependencies.

To his excellency the governor of St. Thomas's, and to the other governors of neutral islands

Sir,

I am informed by commodore Samuel Hood, commanding the naval forces of England, of the notification which he has made to the neutral governments, concerning the blockade of the ports of this colony, which he has thought himself able to undertake pretending to shut them against strangers, to whom he goes so far as to declare that it is his intention to capture them even on their going out.

A measure so opposite to the laws of nations and to the rights of neutrality has doubtless astonished your excellency no less than me. It is to be presumed that that officer, perceiving the advantages assured to strangers by my proclamation of the 1st Messidor; struck with the spectacle of the field offered to their industry by the opening of all the ports of a colony so interesting as Martinique; persuaded of the advantages which the French government would thence reciprocally derive, was sensible that the enterprising spirit of speculation could not be repressed by ordinary obstacles. But in casting your eyes on the chart of this colony, your excellency cannot but perceive, and convince such owners of vessels as may be inclined to make shipments for our ports, how illusory is such a blockade, undertaken by a single ship and one or two sloops of war (for this is all the force at present appears on our coast) since there is not a road nor a creek of the colony which is not open to strangers, and where they do not enjoy the protection of our batteries, at which the inhabitants of the colony do duty with a zeal beyond all praise, finding daily their reward in the almost uninterrupted arrival of the necessary supplies; while they who bring them those supplies are in their turn rewarded by the profitable markets occasioned by the present state of affairs.

To the means which I owe to local circumstances I hope soon to add those which are announced to me from France, whence I shortly expect a division perhaps strong enough to give me for some time the superiority, but at all events fully sufficient to enable me to protect, by sea, vessels arriving on our coasts.

Nor can the English hope for success from a permanent cruise during the hurricane months, as to be induced constantly to expose their ships in that season. Thus every thing concurs to shew that all physical causes oppose the practicability of continuing a blockade thus undertaken.

Your merchants being relieved from uneasiness on this score, need not be alarmed concerning the motives which commodore Hood may pretend for the acts of hostility with which he menaces