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WASHINGTON CITY.

MONDAY, AUGUST 21.

After the views which we have taken of the state of our relations with G. Britain, we are the better prepared to form a dispassionate estimate of the disposition of her ministry towards us, to decide whether that ministry has at any moment of its existence intended to respect our neutral rights, and whether there is the least reason to hope that they ever will be respected by them unless compelled by adversity to respect them. Look at the rapid succession of its acts towards us, the outrage on the Chesapeake still unatoned, the insidious mission of Mr. Rose, the order of October asserting the right of impressing seamen from our merchant vessels, that of November, blockading almost the whole world, the ignominious tribute that followed in its rear, the hollow arrangements made through Mr. Erskine coupled with the order of April, the unjust advantage taken of this arrangement, and the appointment of Mr. Jackson, and say, whether it is not the determination of the ministry to monopolise by fraud or force the trade of the world, or only to allow us such a part as by her oppression and regulation shall yield her a greater profit than if exclusively enjoyed by herself.

To pass in review all these measures would be to write a volume, which, however, if ably written, would entitle its author to the gratitude of his countrymen. Such a tract ought to lie on the table of every American, and by a steady contemplation of the past admonish him of the future. It is delightful to forget injuries; but is it safe so long as the arm of enmity is constantly nerved to inflict additional wrongs? Never did a nation drink more copiously of the waters of Lethe, than we have just done with regard to the injuries of Britain. But mark the consequences! We have been duped, old wounds have been opened, and new ones inflicted. Insult is added to injury, and we are laughed at for our credulity and confidence.

For our present purpose it is not necessary to take a wide retrospect of the past. We shall limit our view within a narrow circle.

The hostility of the British ministry is evinced—

1. By their refusal to make the reparation for the outrage on the Chesapeake, stipulated by Mr. Erskine. Of the existence of this spirit, this circumstance is the most irrefragable evidence. From the occurrence of this event, Mr Canning has professed a readiness to make an ample atonement. After a public disavowal of the act, he declared to our minister at London his readiness to make a suitable reparation. Mr. Monroe, instructed in the mean time by our government, to avail himself of this occasion to obtain a recognition of our general rights on the head of impressments, required security against the future exercise of impressment. Mr. Canning refused to negociate on this ground, declaring that his government could not involve this particular case in the general subject. To detach it from the general subject, Mr. Rose was sent to the U. States, where he no sooner appeared than he demanded the previous revocation of the proclamation of the President interdicting our harbors to British armed vessels. Going as far as an independent government could go, an immediate offer was made to make the revocation of the proclamation and the rendition of reparation cotemporaneous acts. This was rejected, and Mr. Rose took his leave, expressing his deep regret at the inability of his government, under these circumstances, to make reparation for an acknowledged wrong, *to which the proclamation was the only obstacle.* This obstacle is completely removed, and still the reparation is withheld. The agreement made with Mr. Erskine is wholly disavowed. Is it possible for actions to speak a plainer language? Do they not prove unequivocally, that it was not the intention of the British government to make the reparation even if the proclamation were rescinded, that this condition was insisted upon under the conviction that it would not be conceded, and that if it had been, they would instantly have haggled about the terms of the atonement, so as to have rendered the whole negociation abortive? If this be not so, why does she now withhold, nay refuse to make an atonement for an act, which she herself declared must stand alone totally disconnected with all other acts, and which does now stand alone freed from every obstruction? The only reason can be, her wish to uphold this insurmountable barrier, so long as it exists, to the amity of the two nations.

2. This hostile spirit is further proved by the insolent tone of Mr. Canning's note of the 23d of Jan. a note, not confidential, but authorised to be shewn to the Secretary of State, and which, therefore, it is not unfair to infer was penned with this view. Every paragraph of this note is couched in the language of insult, and aims a dagger at the bosom of our government.

"*If*," says Mr. C. "there *really* exists in those individuals who are to have a leading share in the *new* administration of the U. S. a *sincere* disposition to come to a complete and cordial understanding with G. B. *of which you have received from them such positive assurances.*"

Of the sincerity of these assurances Mr. C. doubts, makes Mr. Erskine the judge, broadly intimating that this sincerity, if it really exists, is confined to the *new* administration, who, by the communication of this instruction, are told in the plainest language, that Mr. E. is sitting in judgment upon the regard which ought to be paid to their veracity.

"That system [the system of retaliation] his majesty must unquestionably continue to maintain, unless the object of it can be otherwise accomplished."

The next clause will shew us how?

"But after the *profession* on the part of so many of the leading ministers of the government of the U. S. of a *sincere desire to contribute to that object* in a manner which should render the continuance of the system adopted by the British government unnecessary, it is thought right that a fair *opportunity* should be afforded to the American government to *explain its meaning* and *give proof of its sincerity.*"

We are here insolently told (and we believe most falsely) of the *profession* of many of our leading ministers (not of President Jefferson or the then government—mark this) but of many of the leading ministers, deriving all their power from him, "*to contribute to that object*" [retaliation against the enemies of England]. Their *object* is declared to be, not so much to get rid of the British orders, as to retaliate on France, to become a party with England by contributing to it, so effectually as to render the orders unnecessary, that is, in plain terms, to do that voluntarily which England by force had for a time attempted to coerce. But even after this strong *profession*, so explicit and unqualified, it is tauntingly added "that a fair opportunity should be afforded to the American government to explain its meaning & give proof of its sincerity."

Thus is Mr. Erskine authorised to tell our government to its face, notwithstanding your professions, my government still doubts your veracity, and deigns to offer you another opportunity to explain your meaning and prove your sincerity—Gracious God! was ever such language held to an independent government. Had Mr. Pinkney handed such a note to Mr. Canning would he not have very properly thrown it into the fire, or torn it into atoms?

"The extension of the interdiction of the American harbors to the ships of war of France, as well as of G. B. is an acceptable *symptom* of a system of impartiality towards both belligerents; the *first* that has been *publicly* manifested by the American government."

The strong measure, which in the affair of the Chesapeake had raised such a clamor, is no positive evidence of impartiality, it is no more than a "symptom;" and, as if this sarcasm were not sufficiently envenomed, it is added that it is the "first" symptom publicly manifested by the American government, implying that there is a contradiction between the private and public character of the government, that it professes one thing and practices another—and this it is told to its face!

"The like extension of the *non-importation act* to other belligerents is equally proper in this view. These measures remove those *preliminary* objections, which must otherwise have precluded any useful or amicable discussion."

Not satisfied with extending the interdict of our harbors to French as well as English armed vessels, (altho' certainly differently circumstanced) the extension of the non-importation act, passed expressly to parry or countervail British aggressions, to France, who had at the time committed none such, is made a preliminary, a sine qua non even of discussion. This non-importation law, let it be recollected, consists in the prohibition of certain British manufactures, which we had an absolute right to inhibit, a right which Britain has herself steadily exercised to a much wider extent. Yet the surrender of this indisputable exercise of sovereignty, or its absurd extension to France, is made the *sine qua non*, not of a treaty, but *of treating.*

"In this state of things"—that is, after all these concessions—"*it is possible* for G. Britain to *entertain propositions*, which while *such manifest partiality was shewn to her enemies*, were not consistent either with her dignity or her interest."

Wonderful condescention! Astonishing politeness! You have heretofore behaved so partially that we would not listen to your propositions, altho' they should have gone the length of an unconditional surrender of your rights of sovereignty, but now, in this state of things, *it is possible* for us to *entertain* them. We do not say that we will even entertain them. It is not even probable that we will, but we possibly may, if all our hopes are blasted. Refuse French ships an asylum in your harbors, prohibit French goods, do this, and promise to contribute your best efforts to retaliate on our enemies the injuries they have done us, and we will assure you that *it is possible to entertain your propositions!* As to pledging ourselves to agree to them, that must depend upon circumstances. If the triumph of our arms in Spain, and our money in Austria, shall give new vigor and extent to our power, you may go and whistle for that. You must be satisfied with the possibility of entertaining your propositions! Can language be more insolent, or conduct more contumelious?

3. We have now, in the review of this note, reached the three celebrated propositions, which, Mr. Canning, with a legerdemain peculiar to himself, puts into the mouth of Messrs. Madison, Gallatin, Smith and Pinkney. These embrace the *substance* of the views of the British government. On our formal engagement to adopt them his majesty will recall the orders of January and November 1807.

We have already seen, as detailed in previous articles, that our situation would be rendered much worse by the adoption of these propositions than it would be under the orders of November. By their adoption we should have shut ourselves out from all commercial intercourse with the enemies of Great Britain, without the privilege of pursuing any portion of that trade, were we base enough to do it, under British licenses, as tolerated under the orders of Council; we should renounce during the present war, and probably forever, the colonial trade with the enemies of France; and we should sink ourselves to the lowest depths of contempt by legalising the right of British ships to capture, and of British tribunals to condemn, our vessels contravening our laws, thus, perhaps, setting the first example among civilised nations of such a vast surrender of sovereignty.

All this we should do to purchase the revocation of orders, which, *ipso facto*, by the adoption of these propositions, spring again into instantaneous effect. A more absurd offer surely could not be engendered in the brain of a lunatic!

Is then the offer of such propositions evidence of the friendship or the hostility of the ministry to us? Is the liberty given to Mr. Erskine to communicate the note, containing them, proof of any thing but a purpose on the part of the ministry to offer, in the most exceptionable shape, what it knew we could never agree to, with an avowal that this was the ground on which it was resolved forever to stand? And is not the publication of it proof of Mr. C's desire to widen the difference between the two governments so as to preclude all prospect of reconciliation?

Mr. Canning did not believe, for he has too much sense possibly to have believed, that our government could for a moment listen to the propositions offered.

But other concurring and co-temporaneous facts remain to be added. If, we had been induced to make the large sacrifices of honor, called for by these propositions, it must have been under the influence of a sordid interest; it must have been for the undisturbed enjoyment of a paltry trade. Now, what degree of trade would we have enjoyed, had the orders been revoked, and these propositions been adopted in their stead?

We should have enjoyed the direct trade to England, and, probably, that only. Every other trade would be too uncertain and precarious to reckon upon. Heretofore the French arms have triumphed wherever they have been carried; and is there any reason to doubt that they will continue to be crowned by a like success? And if they are, the direct trade to England will be our only resource.

This will be allowed to us. Let us enquire into its value. As if aware that, in certain events, this might be the result, England has fortified herself against every event calculated in the least to impinge on her total monopoly of the profits of trade. The same candid and friendly ministry have taken special care to render the trade thus benignantly allowed to the American merchant worth nothing, by the imposition of duties of which the following are specimens:

	Dols. Cts.	
On Ashes	1 18	per cwt.
Cotton	7 51	per 100 lb
Indigo	0 7	per lb.
Rice	1 32	per cwt.
Wheat	0 92	per bush.

Our other exports are taxed in the same ratio.

The inevitable effect of these duties will be to diminish the consumption of the articles on which they are levied, and to give the growers of them in England, so far as they exist there, and the growers of them in those parts of Europe or other regions with which England maintains a commercial intercourse, a decided preference over the American merchant. Our products, consequently, will be only in demand, when similar products are not to be had from any other quarter of the globe. Is this friendship, or shere hostility?

Besides these duties, there are heavy tonnage duties imposed on American vessels, as well as high additional duties laid on produce imported in American, beyond those laid on that imported in British vessels, directly tending to give to the British merchant the transportation of our produce.

In addition to all this, the exportation of our produce from England is saddled with heavy burthens, by which it is confined to England, or exported at a grievous loss.

Such are the evidences furnished by the British ministry of their friendship to this country, for which they call upon us to surrender our sovereignty, make a common cause with them against the rest of the world, involve ourselves in a war of incalculable duration, and expose ourselves to self-contempt and the derision of mankind.

Is the following infamous article an exposition of the principles on which the British Ministry mean to act towards neutral nations?

From Cobbett's Weekly Political Register.

When the ministers found, that the American government was determined not to settle the affair of the Chesapeake, unless the settlement included a renunciation on our part of the right of searching their merchant vessels for our deserters, they resolved upon sending a special envoy to offer atonement for the attack upon the Chesapeake but not to permit him to negociate upon any other point whatever; and, at the same time they issued a proclamation, in which the king declared, that he never would give up the right in question. It is, therefore, probable, that the negociation between Mr. Rose and Mr. Madison would, if it had been commenced, have soon been broken off; but, it was, as the reader will perceive, prevented from beginning by the refusal of the American government to rescind their hostile proclamation which our ministers justly considered as an act of retaliation and the rescinding of which they demanded as a step previous to their tendering any reparation at all.

The demand was refused, and of course Mr. Rose came back as he went. The reader will perceive that the Americans now chose to represent the hostile proclamation, not as an act of retaliation, but as an act of precaution. As if they were afraid that we should send in our ships to burn their towns! Believe them who will; for my part, the contrary is evident to me; and so it, at first, was to them; for they in all their news-papers, call it an act of retaliation. See the proclamation itself in page 249 of vol. 12, and say whether it be an act of mere precaution. It was the mildest measure they could adopt, Mr. Madison says; and I say it was the harshest, because they had it not in their power to injure or annoy us in any other way. It was the worst they could do. It was not a blow, for a blow they were unable to deal us; but it was spitting in our faces. It was, too, a measure still in existence, at the time when Mr. Rose arrived in America; and, therefore, to have offered reparation, until it was rescinded, would have been disgraceful to us in the highest degree—It would have been begging pardon with a cane suspended over our shoulder. It would have been going one step further than the late ministers, who entered upon a negociation touching the right of search, while the Americans had a non-importation act passed for the avowed purpose of compelling us to give up that right, and keep suspended over our heads ready to put in execution, in case we refused to accede to the terms proposed. The result of this negociation, or rather the total failure of it, proves the truth of what I told the ministers from the first; that is, that every step in the way of concession would but cause the difficulties to thicken. If they had stood firm upon the ground of MARITIME DOMINION, there would have been a loud outcry for a few weeks; but what would the Americans have done "more than they have done now?" They have now done their worst, and they could have done no more. There would have been an end, forever, of all claim and disputes about searching ships. And, to this it must come at last. IN REALITY it is now. We do exercise an absolute maritime dominion. We must exercise it, or we cannot remain independent of France. It would, therefore, be better to do it, at once, avowedly, and not encumber the thing with "orders in council," and other trappings, which only serve to rob the principle of its simplicity and dignity. The alarm of Mr. Alexander Baring and his brother wiseacre, Mr. Roscoe, that the open avowal of such a principle will rouse and unite the world against us, is curious enough at a moment when all the world is actually so roused and united. America is as much our enemy as she CAN be—Nothing can possibly make her more so.—She would declare war, but she dare not. There is no fear of "throwing her into the arms of France. She is there already as much as she can be. Our ships of war keep the two dear friends asunder. What the revolution of Spain may do, by placing the countries joining the United States, under the immediate controul of France, I know not.

If the Americans were not such miserable slaves to their envy and hatred of England, this event would, at once, produce an alliance offensive and defensive between us and them; but I am of opinion, that it will produce no such effect, until severe suffering (which is in store for them) shall have taught them justice and modesty. The Floridas are in inhabited by Spaniards and Frenchmen; the key of the Mississippi is in their hands. Without the aid of England it is impossible for the Southern and Western states of the American union to maintain themselves against France, if attacked by her; and to avoid being attacked, there is but one way