explicitly done away." I have shewn you that these are pretensions which Great Britain does not set up and that she has virtually abandoned them.—I leave you to determine what character belongs to an American, who runs the risk of giving so dangerous and improper a cast to the politics of his country, or if he does not succeed in that, of reviving pretensions in G. B. which has cost us as much to subdue.

It may now be asked what G. Britain has obtained in all her struggle with us. Try the success of the orders in council by Mr. Canning's letter.——Then he said it was not necessary to retain them except for certain honorary purposes—that the combination against Great Britain had been made perfectly harmless by the then late events in Europe. Now what he calls the vital principles of the blockade of the continent against Great Britain "extent and continuity" are almost perfectly restored, and at a moment when, if ever they were proper, they should have been reinforced, they are abandoned as to the United States, with an admission of our own construction of the law of nations as to our neutral duties. This has been done, satisfaction has been made for the Chesapeake and a voluntary offer of sending an Envoy to negociate on all matters of difference without a *single concession* to Great Britain on our part to produce it. I have considered every thing which is done on our part and shewn that there is less done than we had always been willing to do. To concession there is no intention necessary, which the federalists are witnesses never existed. Through the session of Congress they branded every measure to which they now attribute peace with Great Britain not only as promising hostility but as intended to produce it. In carving for themselves they find it convenient to the present time to deny any intention of conciliating Great Britain. They attribute the measure to accident, ignorance and every thing but good will to Britain. It would seem as if there was something depending on it, something which is to be gained by pursuading G. B. of an attachment & that they are afraid we should be competitors. We wish to persuade G. Britain that we are not her enemies, that we enjoy peace with her as much as we ought, but that we can forego it if she makes it our duty.

Having by the examination I have gone through, (of which I dare say you, as well as I, are heartily tired) shewn that the accommodation we have made with Britain has in it an abandonment of every thing about which we have contended, I consider the assertion which is whispered into every credulous ear, "that Great Britain would have long ago settled on the same terms, and that our government would not," is perfectly at rest, and I might safely quit it, but I cannot deny myself some conversation with its authors. I would ask of them when they made the discovery, that the non-intercourse law was what she wanted? Did they make the discovery before the last session of Congress? Why then did they not only neglect to propose such a law, but actually oppose it when brought forward? Have they discovered it since? If so, do they not discover that while they affected to talk of the interests of their country to enter into the feelings of Britain, and tell what she would bear, that they were wholly inattentive to these concerns, and really contented themselves with humbling, by their abuse, the government till it should be brought low enough to accept the terms of Great Britain? They were charged with standing still and not aiding the government, by proposing something as a substitute for the measures adopted, but on their own representation it results that they either mischievously opposed what was calculated to do good or had not given themselves the trouble to enquire what would do good, and sat down contented, if they did their best to degrade the government in the eyes of the world. They say that the change in public opinion produced by them, produced measures which induced G. Britain to make her offers. If this is true we are under very great obligations to Great Britain for not waiting till the change in public opinion which they were struggling for was complete, for she certainly had a right to expect much better terms when that should happen. There has not been a federal opinion given the United States in public debate, in newspapers or in private, I will venture to say, which stints Great Britain to so little as she has got of our government. What moderation is here? Surely we have mistaken this nation. What, give our government it's own terms when it was tottering to the ground under the throes of a party which would give so much more, nay, I may say, would give her own terms. May I not say so after a deliberate proposal of one branch at least of the legislature of a great state, governed by this party, recommending our going to war on the side of Great Britain. There is another feature in this business which discovers great delicacy in Great Britain. She might have managed this business in such a way as to give her partizans an opportunity of claiming the credit of the settlement with a better grace; if they had been consulted they could have shaped it, and prepared the minds of the public in such a way as to make them believe it to spring from causes which they liked. This she did not do, but left them without an antimation of what was going on, insomuch that in this state, to save all the exertion they had made for the pending election, they were compelled without any preparation, to march in procession, for what is undoubtedly a death blow to all their hopes.

But to be serious, this last feature in the conduct of Britain is a most gratifying one, and, to adopt the style of Mr. Canning, is a pledge of a long continuance to our amity when they give up all connection with the calumniators of the government as well as cease to encourage the breakers of its laws.

That they have been abandoned by the British government in every assertion they have made, and finally, in the settlement of the contest, is unquestionably the result of this enquiry, and conveys the useful lesson to them, and all others, never to rely on the conduct of foreign nations.

It may be expected that I should say something of the affair of the Chesapeake. It has sometimes been artfully represented as the great dispute between this country and G. B. Although I felt the indignity to my country in this affair, since the orders in council I have always considered it as a subordinate business, which was kept up by Britain to play upon. The settlement which has taken place has confirmed my conjecture. It is now clear to me that Mr. Rose's mission was planned in connection with the order of council of November. This order had been meditated from the coming in of the new ministry, but it would not do to issue it while the feeling of the U. S. was at its height, on account of the attack on the Chesapeake. The mission was announced to our minister and yet delayed a great while (as much as two months, I think) that the ferment might subside, under the expectation such a mission would naturally raise. The order in council was delayed till Mr. Rose had actually sailed, that the envoy might be on the spot when the orders reached this country, and that the irritation it was calculated to produce might be kept down by the expectation that he was charged to negociate on this subject. His instructions were, I have no doubt, to give the government satisfaction, if it was not disposed to quarrel on the subject of the orders, and if it was, to save the humiliation of his country on some ground which their partizans here would support. I was convinced of all this by the flimsy pretence on which the business was broken off. It would have been thought impossible that any portion of a sensible people should have been the dupes. An insult was coupled with an injury, and a reparation of the injury was absolutely necessary to wipe away the indignity. The aggressor comes and tells you that the injury was unintentional, and that he designs to make you amends, but goes on and says, you must trust me to make this reparation full and ample and remove all the precautions you have adopted against the like injuries, and give up all the measures for obtaining reparation, before I will tell you what I mean to do. The other replies the wound to my honor will not be cured unless I receive certain satisfaction for the injuries, and lest we should differ, and I should be rendered ridiculous by putting trust where I could have certainty and be obliged to publish my shame to the world, by putting in force my former measures, I ask you to tell me what your reparation will be, and that it may appear that this accommodation was equally desired by us, our acts shall come out at the same instant. Mr. Rose could not have hesitated a moment if he had not found that his country had to go through a struggle with us, and that the business of the Chesapeake might as well be kept for a make weight in the negociation. This construction is absolutely confirmed by the issue. If they were right they had cancelled the obligation to do any thing, and yet, when they were prepared to give up their orders, they renewed the offer of satisfaction without the removal of the exclusion for which they had contended, merely under the pretence of the same exclusion being extended to her enemy, although it was done for the misdeeds of that enemy and without the least complaisance to herself. Here I might be told that the President himself, has admitted in his message to Congress that it was because of the equality of the restriction to her and her enemy that they had instructed their minister. The President has used their own declaration and has very properly avoided the examination which in my very different situation may be allowed to me. He could not have enquired into the sufficiency of the motive or whether it was only seized as a cover.

The result of all this enquiry is, that the embargo system has brought G. Britain to a sense of justice and that to it we owe our present peaceful prospect. Its effects were delayed by the events in Spain and party struggles in this country, but as soon as the British army was driven home and it had been ascertained by our Presidential election and by the "early proceedings of Congress" that they had nothing to hope from the instability of our councils, as soon as the clogs on our measures were removed they operated as their authors expected and designed they should.

And now, my fellow citizens, I congratulate you most heartily on our country having found effectual, and at the same time peaceable means of extorting justice from the nations of the world with which she will be most likely to clash. Let us always remember, however, that they have been tried in a case of unquestionable justice, and that they will want the sanction which gives them all the strength when they are used to promote the purposes of pride or ambition.

I congratulate you that there is no longer room for division among us, as to the means of resisting foreign injury, and that the designing will no longer have it in their power to turn our embarrassments to their own advantage. The unpopularity of the embargo has not been so much owing to an unwillingness in the people to resist the injuries of foreign nations, or to bear the sufferings produced by the struggle, as to a belief produced by various artifices that our measures did not affect those against whom they were designed and were injurious only to ourselves.

This question will never be stirred after the mortified pride of the opponents of government shall be at rest; then the experience of the present day will obtain its full influence and the measures we have seen tried will command universal confidence.

I congratulate you fellow-citizens, that experience of the benefits of the Union, will strengthen so much the bands which keep these states together. If we owe the blessings now in prospect, to the denial of our commerce to Great Britain and France, it is to the extent and population of our country and to the variety of our productions, that we owe the coercive influence of that commerce. Our importance as consumers of British manufactures, is at all times very great and incalculably so under her present circumstances, but this would be frittered to nothing by a division of the Union. The cotton and naval stores of the Southern country, and occasionally the bread of the middle states are so indispensably necessary to Great Britain that all their jealousy of the growth of our navigation must yield to the want of them, and this jealousy (whatever appearances the world may assume at present) is at the bottom of all our difficulties with that country. While the navigating parts of the U. S. derive this protection from our general consumption and the particular products of their Southern brethren, they maintain an equal importance as navigators in another respect. If peace is restored with France it will be from the almost indispensible necessity in their present situation of employing our navigation. In every conflict of European nations, if we maintain our neutral character and give no just cause of offence, we may with confidence rely on the interests of the belligerents to make them respect our rights, if they do but believe they can retain our commerce only by doing so.

The subject on which I have spoken would naturally have embraced many other topics relating to party character and party policy, but the time for which I could ask your attention is clearly at an end. Nor do I regret that I can leave this part of my subject without a neglect of duty. I am fully satisfied that the great body of both parties intend the same thing, the good of their country, and it is therefore painful to me to search for their errors. I have not the same charity for individuals nor do at all doubt that there has been constantly an influence exercised by Great Britain over the affairs of this country by the agency of men who have obtained general confidence among the opponents of government. It is impossible to attribute the uniform efforts which have been made to embark this country in the war on the side of Great Britain to any thing less than the loss of integrity or a political corruption still more dangerous. When we recollect the conduct of many of the same persons who have embarrassed government in her late struggles, at the time Mr. Adams was forced by the overtures of France into the negociation, which produced a reconciliation; how he was thwarted and resisted by them, how he was abused for persevering, and how much animosity against him continues to the present time, on that account, it will be impossible to believe that they were actuated by a pure American spirit, whose first object is to cherish our simple and happy government. The letters of Mr. Adams, which have been drawn from him, by some new expression of this ancient animosity, and are now publishing, are a very important part of American history and should be strictly attended to as the best means of ascertaining the motives of men who have obtained such ascendancy in a large part of the community. That they should preserve in their course after experience in that instance had done so much to correct it, that in the late important crisis they should clog the government a second time and work with their whole strength against the only measures our situation left in our power, and finally that they should after those measures have completely effected their purpose, endeavor to blind the people as to the causes of their deliverance and by misleading them in this important enquiry, leave them as unprepared to resist G. Britain as they have ever been, justly excites a suspicion of their integrity. Such uniform error cannot safely be attributed to the head, an evil heart must be at the bottom.

But it is not necessary to press this enquiry further. The force of truth will satisfy every man about the character of our late measures and when the opponents of government are deprived of the support of Great Britain as they will be by her own sense of her interest and by the confidence our people will feel in their ability to resist her injustice, they will become perfectly harmless. They have always gained more strength from our fears of G. Britain and a belief that we had no power of extorting justice from her and of course that we must put up with that that share of commerce she would allow us than from any other source. But these delusions are at an end, & even the love of gain will hereafter be on the side of our country and insist that our rights shall be respected, as an unshackled commerce will be so much more lucrative than that she would chuse to allow us.

Notwithstanding the measures the federalists have generally pursued under the influence of their leaders are extremely unworthy, I would earnestly recommend that the hand of fellowship and brotherly love should be offered to them. It is more than probable that the influence which has governed them could never have continued to the present time if a practice had not obtained under our administration by which they were excluded from all the emoluments of government. I am not to learn that the principle of excluding all who do not approve the measures of government, from any participation in it, began under the reign of federalism. The principle I know was openly avowed in Mr. Adam's time and as rigidly practised on. Nor am I to learn that every outrage has been used towards the republican administration from its commencement. I sincerely believe that there never was a more patriotic or a better tempered man born than Mr. Jefferson and that none was ever more unworthily abused.—I know too that all who have supported his administration have received the same treatment. Men who ranked as foremost in society when there was no division have been degraded, with a considerable portion of the community, below the common level. All these things I know and I admit that they have merited the return they have met with; but I am fully persuaded that the public happiness would have been promoted by a sacrifice even of these just resentments. It was probably the policy of those who derived power and influence from federalism to make the quarrel between the parties as irreconcilable as possible, & the conduct of republicans has greatly contributed to it. This consideration and the belief that the great body of federalists are actuated by the same motives that I am, would make me adopt a different policy. There are few offices where their opinions would interfere with their duties. To all except them I would freely admit them. To us who do not want offices, it is immaterial who fills them, provided the duties are faithfully discharged and there are some great and growing evils which would be stopped by the throwing them open to all classes.

There is but one subject more on which I shall take the liberty of giving an opinion which is the feeling which is proper for us in relation to the affairs of Europe. The people of this country have lately suffered a sympathy to be artfully excited in the struggles of the Spaniards. This people are sunk in as great wretchedness as government can produce, and yet we suffered ourselves to be persuaded that it was of the utmost importance that they should retain their governors; it passed for the cause of freedom when it was only a question who should be their master. It might be an interesting affair to crowned heads; but the privilege of keeping a most arbitrary government and all the restraints, even on the service of their God, which the Inquisition practises, could never have interested the people. You have seen how little we were interested in their success or rather the success of G. Britain. The hopes excited by the revolt of Spain retarded our settlement with that nation, and it took place as soon as those hopes came to an end; her treatment of us has been influenced at all times by the state of her continental affairs. When the revolution in France was likely to be crushed she issued secret orders which almost ruined the U. States; so soon as Toulon was retaken and a reverse took place in the war, she revoked those orders and made us satisfaction. This was in 1793–4. In 1805 when she was big with expectation from the coalition of the Emperors of Austria and Russia, she issued the secret instructions to her admiralty cruizers which I have before noticed, and after the battle of Austerlitz formed a treaty with us; and in the instance under our examination, her injuries have been regulated by her continental prospects. These instances are sufficient to shew you, that however monstrous the power of Bonaparte, it is but sufficient to counteract the pride and power of G. Britain and her enmity against this country. On the other hand let us remember that without the navy of G. B. there would be no barrier to the strides of the tyrant of Europe and that he would become the tyrant of the world. We see here additional cause for gratitude to God that as to us he has made a balance between these formidable powers. Since my country has found means of enforcing respect from G. B. I can heartily rejoice in her maritime successes. I wish her naval power may be cherished to the utmost, that she may be able to reduce every French colony and that she may never permit France to float one ship of war.—These nations while thus situated will always balance the power of each other and feel a dependance on us which will insure us peace and prosperity.

And now, fellow-citizens, I have done, after thanking you for the patient attention you have shewn me, and hoping that in any thing I may have been of service to you.

WASHINGTON CITY.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 18.

The *Secretary of State* left the city yesterday for Baltimore.

The *Secretary of the Treasury* departed from the city on Wednesday.

The *Secretary of War* left this place for Boston on Sunday.

Mr. *Erskine*, the British Minister, departed for Philadelphia on Wednesday.

ERRATUM—By the connection in our minds between Mr. Canning's note to Mr. Erskine of Jan. 23 and the Order in Council of May 24, we have, in our two last impressions, inadvertently spoken of Mr. Canning's note of *the 24th of May* instead of *the 23d of January*—an error which our readers will readily have detected.

*** The article under the head of *Law Case* requires alteration in point of style before it can be inserted.

The Election for Governor of the state of Tennessee has lately taken place. We have heard but from Knox county, in which the votes were

For Willie Blount	1026
William Cocke	69

It is presumed that Mr. Blount is elected.

The assurances alleged by Mr. Canning to have been made by Messrs. Madison, Gallatin, Smith and Pinkney, are so ludicrously absurd as to bear on their very face the most conclusive proof that they were never made. They are proposed, as the conditions, to be complied with on our part, for the revocation of the orders of Council of January and November 1807. Now, on an analysis of those orders it will be found that they do not go the injurious lengths of the very propositions said to be offered by us as an equivalent for them. This then is a most curious demonstration of the subtility of diplomacy, which, to get rid of one grievance, so loudly complained of, proposes the imposition of another still more grievous. He who can believe that such propositions ever were made must indeed possess the faith of him who believed that a Camel could go through the eye of a needle. The propositions alleged by Mr. Canning to have been offered are:

1. The withdrawal of all interdiction of our harbors to ships of war and all non-intercourse and non-importation acts, so far as respects Great Britain, keeping them in force with respect to France and the powers which adopt or act under her decrees.

2. Our renunciation, during the present war, of all trade with the enemy's colonies from which we were excluded during peace.

3. Liberty to Great Britain to capture all such American vessels as may be found attempting to trade with the ports of France and the powers adopting and acting under her decrees.

These are the *price* said to have been offered for a revocation of the orders of January and November. Let us now inquire what that revocation would have been worth.

In the *first place*, the orders permitted a direct trade between the U. States and the enemy colonies, and between the British colonies and the colonies of the enemy.

This important privilege by the 1st and 2d propositions is cut off.

In the *second place*, the orders allowed the direct trade, under certain regulations and the payment of duties, from a British port, or the port of an ally, to any port whatever.

This, by the first proposition, is totally lost.

In the *third place*, under the orders Britain took our vessels attempting to contravene them, thereby perpetrating a deed against which we protested, and for the injury accruing from which we had a moral claim for redress. By the third proposition, we make her the Executor of our laws, legalise the capture of our vessels, and cancel all right to an indemnity. On the right of capture would no doubt be consequent the power of condemnation, by which the avarice and cupidity of her cruisers would be whetted to the commission of every species of outrage on our property. Her cruizers would seize it on the idlest pretence, would carry it whither they pleased, expose it to the condemnation of the most worthless tribunals, and thus exercise, with our sanction, an entire sovereignty over every thing committed to the ocean, reducing us to a state of the most unqualified vassalage. Base, indeed, must Mr. Canning have deemed the American character, if he for a moment conceived it possible that such a suggestion would have been tolerated by our government, a proposition which he in the plenitude of his arrogance had never dared to make. How much baser must he have deemed that character which could itself voluntarily submit such a proposition, a proposition which even federalism has scouted as totally inadmissable. Even Coleman, too often the advocate of Britain, on this head says—

"The third condition recognises a claim on the part of Great-Britain to