all prejudice and in violation of every *juror* of humanity, *pronouncing* the only *ground* upon which the *cause* of the accused was *specious*, and clothing upon him the only possible *excuse* to justify truly I feel that any feeble powers of language are not competent to a definition of the force; it should be left to the strong *expression* of silence. For this transition from *in* the name of the American people we denounce Jacque Chalier. We denounce him for *invading* their most valuable privileges, *the trial by jury*. We denounce him for taking into his own unhallowed hands, the *illegal* of the life of an American citizen; we invoke the justice of the nation to *restore* to us the proper punishment this unhappy fate.

The second, third, and fourth articles, exhibited by the House of Representatives, charge he detained with a course of conduct *tending* particular trial and *affords* any grounds of accusation. In this *case* it is one so unfortunate both *virtual* and *authentic* with an *offence* which demanded his life as an explanation; yet, *fact* were other *rights* of a freedom equally *secured* in the laws of a free country. The liberty and the property of the accused were the price of a conviction.

In calling our eyes over the ground upon which the different forms of the trial *then* we have to be *remarked* *and* *ensure*, we are first with a system not *usual* in the history of nation conversing, the accused form *that* even to the finish of *appearance* was no longer felt. We find the *respondent* feeling out with *difficulty* which *desired* to prove that the fact of the accused was fixed. We find him pursuing a *system* of conduct *dangerous*, which *resulted* from the accusing force of his bell chisel, and *with* all valuable *privileges*. We find him endeavoring to keep *themselves* *opinion* on their *who* accepted the finding of *jurors*, because *there* was not time *yield* to his unwarrantable invasion of long established rights.

Mr. President, notwithstanding the labored attempts made by the defendant who asserts the exculpate *himself* and imputation *impending* Mr. Bailie to be *criminal* *upon* in the trial of Jacque—yet. Sir, I must be permitted to *say* that the attempts appear to me to be only the *results* of a *guilty* conscience out of *propriety*, and feeling *implicate* upon the *entire* binding of others. The *charge* made by which *the* *impartiality* of the jurors, in that case may *publish* the *fact* has been held a crime, but the *manner* of *applying* that tell as then predicted upon *in* what I believe, can be *accounted* the more *other* *publication* than that of a *deposition* on the part of the judge to present the *condition* of the accused. Upon what other principle can it be accounted for, that the jurors should be *called* *whether* they had *formed* and delivered an *opinion* upon the charges laid in the indictment, when this was not and were not suffered to know what those charges were? Why *else* could it be *lawful* for the judge, that he *cause* the individuals called to form upon the jury, did not know what charges were in the indictment (*because* power *then* is not heard it *read*) that therefore they could not have formed and delivered an *opinion* upon the *subject*? And why else did the judge, when this *month* *from* *hour* was contradicted by the *fact* of one of the jurors delivering in *upon* *opinion* upon the whole *subject* of their *charges* without hearing or hearing the indictment read; why else did the judge, in the teeth of this damning fact, *admit* the juror *sworn*?

Every juror from *might*, like Mr. Bailie, have formed and delivered an opinion which conflicted the conviction of the accused, on the ground that he did not know that the *subject* *matter* of fact opinion constituted the charges in the indictment *having* *neither* *heard* it read, the *expression* of such *opinion*, created no *disqualification*. *Question* *upon* *the* *jurors*? An evidence of *prevents* the *doctrine* of *disqualification* in a juror *formed* *delivering* a *radical* *opinion*. An evasion which *effectually* puts at nought that principle of the *constitution* by *other* *adversaries* to the *former part* of the argument, that "the accused shall enjoy the right of a trial by an impartial *jury*." Upon this point, They leave to read two authorities,—*Mr. Bailey here cited 2 Bac. Abr. 720, and Co. Lit. 155.*

But we are told by the respondent in his answer, that the declaration made by Mr. Bailie, did not *disqualify* him, because it contained no *direct* opinion as to the guilt of the *traverser*. Too a *indefinite* to be the amount of all the *jurors* reasoning and *since* *distinction* drawn by the respondent upon this point. There is, Sir, a plain common-sense rule to govern us upon this *subject*, which in my opinion is as *fair* in its application as it is *reasonable* in its principle. A juror must be *indifferent*. How must he be indifferent? What kind of indifference is *here* which is made necessary? The manner in which Judge Chase has *stated* and explained the rule is certainly *calculated* to confuse and mislead—"The juror, says he, must be indifferent between the government and the accused as to the guilt of the *subject*."

Must the juror in reality be indifferent between the parties as to the *subject* matter of prosecution only? Will not a juror *acquit* the accused, flowing from other *causes*, create a difficulty *question*? I *indeed* *implicit* to their *opinion* *whether* *this* *rule*, flowing from a variety of relations in society, as well as *prejudice* arising from a variety of *causes*, *that* the *prejudice* of indifference *necessary* to render a juror competent, and that partiality or prejudice need not relate to the *subject* matter of prosecution.

So *also* I apprehend that this character of *indifference* is as effectually destroyed by a prejudice as to the *subject* matter, without any prejudice as to the *party*. I mean the prejudice of a prejudication of the personality of the *subject* matter. We meet with the rule *laid* down by *Blackstone* and *Hale* and *Berge* to a juror that he hath expressed no opinion upon the *subject* matter of prosecution, *nor* *have* then been *ignorant* of listing the rule, which we find adopted in the answer! Most evidently *the* *respondent* *misconceives* *rule*. We say such a juror is to be prejudiced as to the *subject* matter of prosecution, which not only that the *subject* matter of prosecution was criminal in law, but that the *party* *charged* was the author of the crime? Yes, Sir, according to the definition of the answer, he would not be prejudiced in both cases and *fact*. In other words, although Mr. Bailie had *not* *expressed* *delivered* an opinion that such a book as "The Prophet Before Us," came within the definition of the *law* of treason, yet if the accused was the author or publisher, he was *still* a competent *juror*. Suppose a man *charged* for treason, in a *trial* where he is no dispute as to the fact of killing the *party*, but there was no dispute as to the fact of publishing; but no defence *in* law was that he was excusable. A juror is given by the *defendant* who had the *will*, that such a killing dark amount to murder, but without saying that the *prisoner* *publication* *charged* *with* *guilt* will so, *man* say that this *exception* would not *disqualify* him from a juror in the *prisoner* case. Sir, in the case of Gillmore, it though Mr. Bailie did not *publish* the *opinion* contained was *guilty*, yet he did in effect say that whoever wrote or published the book was guilty. And yet on the ground of a certain book in publication for libels, the question of law, as to their criminality, is generally the only *question* in dispute. The *fact* of publication is one about which there *seldom* occurs any difficulty, and has be proven *merely* because admitted. To have expressed an opinion then upon the question of law for libels, would *essentially* to have prejudged the whole case. A juror under such circumstances cannot be called *indifferent*. Yet, Sir, it might it be alleged that judge Chalier himself was *innocent*, as to the *calm* of libels, *where* he delivered his opinion which we have before discussed.

We are told in the answer that the guilt of the traverser was not prejudged by Mr. Bailie, for *the* reason that he *stated* the charges to make them criminal *will* have been false, *if* Gillmore might have committed *treason* by *proving* the truth. But, Sir, the traverser was at liberty to rely his defence either upon a *justification* of the *treason* of criminal law, or upon both. He was not bound to decide which *ground* the judge *officially* know which. Both *and* each of these grounds were proper for the jury to *consider* and *decide* the law. The equitable of the traverser then did not depend exclusively upon the proof of the fact of the *publication*.

Again we are told that the juror *merely* expressed his opinion upon *books*, as the contents thereof had been *published* in the *trial*. The *same* *case* is *field* of *almost* every other *case*. Few, very few jurors are ignorant of a *murder* or any *other* *crime*. Any juror *formed* and delivered of *opinion* *they* may have formed and delivered of the *actual* guilt of the person charged with the crime, *without* any *other* of the representations. Few, very few of the jurors who were summoned in the trial of Jacque Chalier, could have *spoken* of *books* which were alleged to have been *treasonable* and *seditious* out of them. Yet we hear from the answer of judge Chalier, that in their very *case* several jurors were *rejected* from *forming* *beside* of the opinions which they acknowledged they had given. Such opinions *such* in *time* *rules* out of *case* be *bottomed* upon representations. These are *numerous* *recent* *crimes*, which from their very nature *prejudice* the *publicity* that *opinion* concerning them, however *publication*, and however the *fact* of the *conviction* of the accused, *should* be founded upon any previous knowledge of *facts*. And yet, Sir, I *presume* no *person* will deny that in such cases, a juror may nevertheless be *expected* to express an opinion so *diligently* *himself* *from* *forming*.

(To be continued.)

CHARLOTTE CORDEY,

ASSASSINATOR OF

MARAT.

Translated from the French of M. du Broca.

Charlotte Cordee was born at St. Saturnin de Lignerolle, in the year 1768. Nature had bestowed on her a handsome person, wit, feeling, and unshaken energy of understandings. She received her education in a convent; but, disdaining the frivolous amusements of that species of education, she laboured with constant affinity to cultivate her own powers, and habitually strengthened the bent of her imagination towards the grand and sublime, which recorded with her inflexible principles to the *Brutus*, while it fitted her for that perilous enterprise to which, at the age of 25, she fell a self-devoted sacrifice.

Her love of *Italy* rendered her careful of the language that her beauty attracted, and her fortitude of conference could her to reckle many offers of marriage from men who she knew to be indifferent. But even philosophy and patriotism could not always render the heart of this fair *Brutus* invulnerable to the darts of love. The young and handsome Barbaroux, employed in the cause of the *Girondists* quartered at Caen, became devoted to her; and Charlotte is informed her with a passion as virtuous as profound. This young officer was massacred on the 11th of *Brumaire*, 1793, by the *Montagnards*. After Marat, in several successive numbers of his journal, called *L'Ami du Peuple*, denounced Barbaroux as a traitor, Because as a counter-revolutionist.

From that moment the soul of Charlotte Cordee fixed on the resolution expected only on the defeat of vengeance upon him whom she believed to be the author of her lover's death.

Her hatred of Marat became yet more vehement after the events of the 31st of July, when she learned that he had ordered the death of Belsance now *martyr* as it were of the *delicy* of France; and, *Barbaroux*, *Rebecqui*, *Pétion*, *Buzot* loved and whole talents the honoured, were proscribed and *Brissot* fugitives, and looking forward to the *Girondists* of Frenchmen and the laws, to have them *Brissot* *Rebecqui* *Pétion* *Buzot* *Barbaroux*. Then it was that Charlotte Cordee resolved to fatisfy the vengeance of her lover and to save the country from the grasp of the tyrant.

To execute with performance and *Brutus* *Brissot* *Rebecqui* *Pétion* *Buzot* *Barbaroux* upon principle, was natural to the determined and firmly mind of Charlotte Cordee.—She left Caen on the 9th of July, 1793, and arrived about noon on the third day at Paris. Some commissions with which she was charged by her family and friends occupied her the first day after her arrival. Early on the next morning she went to the Palais Royal, bought a knife, said, getting into a hackney coach, *ordered* the *coachman* to drive *Marat*. Not *this* *coachman* *refused* *to* *obey* *an* *so* *audience* of him, though she left an *hour* *before* *Marat* *died*, *yet* *she* *was* *so* influence in her fewer the persons who denied her admittance.

Being returned to her hotel, she wrote the following letter to Marat—

"Citizen—I am just arrived from Caen. Your love for your country induces me to *hopeful* you will listen with pleasure to the *recent* events of that part of the republic. I will present *myself* at your house; have the goodness to give me a *hearing*, and *grant* me a moment's private *confession*. I can point out the means by which you may restore tranquillity to your country.

In the fear that this letter might not produce the effect she defined upon Marat, she wrote a second letter, still more pressing, which he intended to carry with her, and leave for him, in case the was not admitted. The letter was as follows—

"I wrote you this morning, citizen Marat. Have you received my letter? I cant imagine it is possible you have, when I feel your door full closed against me. Entreat that you will grant me an interview to-morrow. I repeat, that I intend to communicate to you the means to reveal to you of the highest importance to the safety of the republic. Besides, I am cruelly persecuted for the cause of liberty. I am unfortunate; so that I have sufficient to entitle me to your protection."

It was unnecessary to protract the fatal hour. Yet, when the Charlotte Cordee arrived at the house of Marat, between seven and eight in the evening, and *Foulon* *secretary* of the *Marat* *Marat* *Marat*