NEW-YORK, July 13.

Paris papers to the 24th May, inclusive, are received at the office of the Mercantile Advertiser by the brig Enterprize, from Havre-de-Grace. From one of that date, printed in the English language, we copy the following important state paper: the counter declaration of the French government on the subject of the late negociations.

We have also seen letters from a source of high respectability in Paris, which mention that Louisiana is ceded to the United States for eighty millions of Livres (about 15 millions of dollars); one-fourth payable in debts due to the citizens of the United States from France, to be liquidated at Paris, and [illegible] the remainder in six per cent stock.

The Enterprize left Havre on the 23d, and was boarded the day following by an English frigate, who (as reported by her officers) had captured six French vessels, and sent them into British ports.

Came passengers, Mr. Fleuton [?], and Mr. G. A. Hughes of Baltimore. The latter is the bearer of the treaty respecting Louisiana, and proceeded immediately for the seat of government.

PARIS, May 21.

CONSERVATIVE SENATE.

Sitting of the 24 Floreal.

The counsellors of State Bigot-Preameneu, Dessolles and Fleurieu, orators of the government, made a communication to the senate, of the note, addressed on the 23d of the month, to the ambassador of his Britannic majesty, by the minister for foreign affairs.

23 Floreal, (13th May.)

In the important and serious circumstances, in which the two nations find themselves, the undersigned the minister for foreign affairs of the French Republic, has received an order to place under the eyes of the British government the following note.

The 17 Ventose, his Britannic majesty caused to be communicated to his parliament, by a special message that formidable armaments were preparing in the ports of France and Holland, and that important negociations, the result of which were doubtful, divided the two governments.

This extraordinary and unexpected declaration excited a general astonishment; but the maritime situation of France was obvious. England and Europe knew that there were no formidable armaments either in the ports of France, or in the ports of Holland.

The undersigned will not call to the recollection of his excellency, lord Whitworth, every thing which was said at that time. It was demanded from what source could spring informations so ill-founded? The personal discernment of lord Whitworth, the loyalty of his character, could not be for a moment suspected.

The assertion that France was making hostile armaments, was manifestly a supposition, and one which could not impose on any person. Its natural effect, must tend to create a belief, that it was a means, of which men signalized by their turbulent opinions, wished to avail themselves, and who sought with eagerness a pretext for exciting troubles, for enflaming the passions of the British nation, for exciting defiance, hatred and alarm.

With respect to the English government; it ought to be believed that, if by false reports it had been led into an error, with respect to the existence of armaments, it could not have been equally so with respect to the existence of negociations.

The ambassador of the Republic at London, was no sooner informed of the message of his Britannic majesty, than, astonished that it announced a negociation, of which he was unacquainted, he immediately waited upon his excellency, lord Hawkesbury, and before, at that time, expecting that an appeal to arms, founded upon false suppositions, could cover the project to violate the treaty of Amiens, with respect to the clauses, which were not yet carried into execution, he presented to the minister of his Britannic majesty, on the 19th Ventose, a note demanding of him explanations.

At the same period the undersigned had orders to address his excellency, lord Whitworth, relative to the motives which could have determined the English government to authorise, in its message, two assertions, both equally false, in order to call its nation to arms, and to break the bond of peace, which united the two states.

His excellency, lord Hawkesbury, remitted on the 24th Ventose, to general Andreossi, a vague, aggressive and imperious note. This note, far from throwing any light on the subject of the discussion, on the contrary involved it in additional obscurity. It scarcely held out the least hope of the possibility of arriving at a discussion, and still less the hope of seeing it terminate in an auspicious manner.

The reply of the French government, under date of the 8th Germinal, was equally as pacific and moderate, as the note of the British ministry had been hostile.

The first consul declared that he should not bring in question the defiance of war, thrown out by England, that he abstained from laying any stress upon expressions, the meaning of which might bear an aggressive character; and that, finally, he could not bring himself to believe, that his Britannic majesty wished to violate the sacredness of a treaty, upon which reposed the safety of all nations.

The declaration, made by order of the first consul, produced on the 17th Germinal, a new note, in which the French government did not see without surprise, that an indeterminate demand of *satisfactions* was addressed to it. The absurdity of the demand, expressed without motives, and without objects, leaves nothing to be distinctly perceived, but the inconsistency of its expressions.

The intention of violating the treaty of Amiens was manifested in this note, by refusing to evacuate Malta. It should seem the English government flattered itself, that the French people would consent to give *satisfaction* upon two supposed acts, on the allegation of which they, perhaps, had equally the same right to demand satisfaction themselves.

In waving for the present this office, lord Whitworth demanded that an arrangement should be *immediately* made, upon the basis which is going to be exposed to view, and at the same time he gave it to be understood, that in case of a refusal, he feared he should be obliged, by the orders of his government, to quit Paris instantly, and to put a termination to his mission.

What reply could the French government give to overtures so abrupt and strange? Nothing but a strong and ardent desire for peace, could have gained the ascendency over indignation.

To confine one's self to a cool and calm decision, which leaves to reason and to justice time to triumph over the passions, it is necessary to be deeply penetrated with the idea, that the numberless victims of the discords of governments, have nothing whatever to do with the insults which menaces them; that so many millions of brave citizens who, in the ardour of their heroic attachment to their country, shed their blood solely for its good, never harbour the wish to affront a neighbouring and powerful people; that they take no interest in the measures pursued by pride, and in the vain pretensions of supremacy. Not only must this idea be deeply impressed upon the mind; it must possess and engross it solely without cessation.

His excellency lord Whitworth agreed to write to his court, that the first consul could not consent to the violation of a solemn treaty: but that he wished for peace, that, if the English government was desirous that a convention should be made, with a view to arrangements foreign to the treaty of Amiens, he would not refuse it, and that the motives of this convention might be drawn from reciprocal grievances.

These views were just and moderate. It was impossible to propose a negociation upon a more liberal basis. It will not be irrelevent to observe here, that it was six weeks after the message, in which the existence of a negociation of a difficult nature, of most furious interest, and of uncertain but near issue, was positively asserted and announced, that the ministers of the two governments were not able to come even to the opening of an actual negociation.

Lord Whitworth received new orders; he presented successively two projects of a convention.

By the first, it was proposed that Malta should remain under the sovereignty of the king of England; and the clause being adopted, his Britannic majesty offered to recognize all that had taken place in Europe, since the treaty of Amiens.

His majesty, the king of England, further promised to take measures, in order that those men who in different parts of England are hatching plots against France, should be effectually suppressed.

The undersigned has the honour to remark to his excellency, lord Whitworth, that the first project of the convention was a palpable violation of the treaty of Amiens, and subversive of the basis of the negociation which his excellency was charged to present to his court; that with respect to the recognizance offered by his Britannic majesty there in fact existed no objects to which it could apply, that no change has taken place in Europe since the treaty of Amiens; unless it be on the organization of the empire, in which the king of England had coincided with his note, as elector of Hanover; and that even this was no more than a necessary consequence of the treaty of Luneville, which is much anterior to the treaty of Amiens.

That the events relative to the political existence of piedmont, of the kingdom of Etruria, and of the Italian and Ligurian republics, had their date prior to the treaty of Amiens; that in the negociation of this treaty, France had desired that England should recognize these three powers; but as they could not accord upon this point, as well as upon the affairs of India, in as far as concerns the destruction of some of the principal states, and the incalculable acquisitions made by England in this country; it was agreed to consider the discussion of these objects as not appertaining to the execution of the preliminary articles, and to the fundamental object of the pacification of the two states: The undersigned finally observes, that the French government does not demand, on this point, any approbation or recognizing from his Britannic majesty.

The undersigned adds that, with respect to the Batavian republic, it had been recognized by the king of England, in as much as he had treated with it, and that by the existing treaties between this republic and France, the rear-guard of the French troops are bound to evacuate this country, on receiving the news of the entire execution of the treaty of Amiens.

With respect to the criminals, who have sought refuge in London, and in Jersey, where they give themselves up to all their perverse inclinations, and where, far from being restrained, they are supported and pensioned by England, the French government conceives that, in the actual state of the negociations, it ought not to attach any importance to this point.

His Excellency, lord Whitworth, proposed a second project. England demanded that the civil government of Malta being left with the grand master, the British garrison should continue to occupy the fortifications of the Island. This proposition was impracticable and unheard of. Like that of the first project, it was contrary to the treaty of Amiens, offered by the First Consul: it was besides attended with the irremediable inconvenience of placing an order of Knights, appertaining to all the powers of Europe, under the authority and arbitrary Tutellage of a single power; it was finaly, in its very self, an offence to the honor and to the religion of an order, allied by all its elements to the honor and to the religion of all Europe.

Thus, in every step of this negociation, the government of the republic was obliged to perceive that the English government had but one desire, one sole object in view, to wit, the non-fulfilment of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, & to retain Malta, for this sole reason, because Malta suited its convenience, and that it called this acquisition a sufficient guarantee.

But which is the power of Europe, were it even obliged to acknowledge itself unequal, that could suffer to submit itself to the will of another, without a discussion of its rights, without an appeal to the principles of justice? Where above all is the power, which placed in the predicament France finds herself, in the course of this discussion, could have subscribed to conditions, dictated from the very opening of a negociation, and rather announced with the noise of menaces of war, by preparations and armaments, than proposed as the means of according the rights and the interests of two states.

In circumstances, in some respect analogous, a nation feeble, not as to its courage, but with respect to the extent and population of its provinces, dared to brave the English power, and menaced in its capital, to expose the residence of its kings, to endanger its sole riches, the result of a century of peace, and of an industrious economy, rather than subscribe to unjust conditions, proposed at that time, the same as on the present occasion, from motives of convenience to England; and backed by the equipment of a considerable armament. Many gallant heroes perished; the Danish Colonies were usurped; but however unequal as was the struggle, honor did not leave to this generous Nation the choice of the part which it ought to take.

In the present discussion, policy speaks the same language as honor. If the British government is at liberty to conform, or not conform, to its engagements; if it is permitted to the British government, to make a distinction, in the treaties, which it concludes, between the spirit and the letter: if mental restrictions are allowed, as authorised exceptions; if whatever constitutes an object of convenience to England, is to be the umpire of the meaning of political conventions, where will be the end, the termination of the concessions, which the British government flatters itself that it can rest from the weakness of France; What will be the measure of the sacrifices and humiliations, which one may dare to impose upon her? To day the convenience of England exacts a guarrantee against France, and England retains Malta. In former times, the convenience of England required a guarantee against France, and Dunkirk was destroyed! and an English Commissary dictated the law in a country, in which the French flag waved! To-morrow, the convenience of England may demand a guarrantee against the progress of French industry, and a proposal may be made for a Tarif of commerce, to arrest and check the progress of our industry.

If we repair our ports: if we construct a mole; if we dig a canal; if, by any mode of encouragement, we improve our manufactures, &c. a demand is made upon us, to degrade our ports; that our canals shall be choaked up, and our Manufactures ruined. It is demanded, that France shall become poor; that it shall be disarmed to suit the convenience of England, and that it shall give a sufficient guarantee to its government.

Whether we consider the principles, or examine the consequences, we are equally struck with suprize at the injustice and the scandal of these pretensions. Supposing, that such a demand were submitted even to the verdict of an English jury, would they hesitate a single moment to reject it unanimously?

The government of the Republic has the right to feel surprised, that the British ministry should deem itself authorised to suppose that France would submit to such a degree of humiliation. On what ground has it believed, that the actual and existing government of France would in inglorious repose, lose sight at once of the remembrance of what it had atchieved, and of all its duties.

Are our provinces less extensive, or is our population decreased? Are we no longer the same nation, which made a sacrifice of every thing to our just and indispensable interests. And if, after our success, we have displayed an extraordinary moderation to what other source can this moderation, be imputed than to the justice of our cause, and the conviction of our force.

The undersigned in laying before his excellency Lord Whitworth, these observations, conceives himself authorised in making the remark, that the moderate conduct of the whole of the French administration, during two entire months, which constitute one series of provocation and offence, and notwithstanding the deep impression which such conduct cannot fail to make, ought to cause him to appreciate the real character of the French government. Yet, under all these circumstances, at the very time, that, in consequence of its profound silence after re-iterated insults, the government of the Republic had the right to expect that reparation would be given, or at least, that a termination would be made to insult—at a time when abstaining from pre-judging the final and ultimate result which affairs might take it has manifested nothing but affection and eagerness to investigate the means, which were capable of being proposed, in order to conciliate and satisfy the English government; at this very time, and under these peculiar circumstances, his excellency, Lord Whitworth, by order of his government, made verbally, and without consenting to give any written declaration, the following demands to the undersigned, viz

1. That England should retain Malta for 10 years.
2. That England should be put in possession of Lampedosa.
3. That Holland should be evacuated by the French troops.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, further declared, that these propositions formed the ultimatum of his court, and that, in case of a refusal he had instructions to leave Paris, in the course of seven days.

The undersigned has no hesitation to declare, that there is no precedent of such form being given to so imperious an ultimatum.

And on what ground? Is war attended with no inconveniences to any other power than us? Does the English ministry believe the French nation to be so feeble, that in circumstances where points of the utmost importance are under consideration it does not think itself bound to conform, on its part, to the usages which obtain among the governments of all civilized nations?

Or is it not rather, that the sentiment of injustice which weighs upon the conscience of public alarm as upon that of a private man, has to prevent the British government from signing the demand which it made, and that it has endeavoured, by a less decisive step, to reserve to itself, at a future opportunity, the capability of effacing the traits of its real pretensions, and to deceive and mislead the public opinion, as to the cause and origin of the rupture?

Or lastly, is it, that the ministers of his Britannic Majesty have ill appreciated the character of the First Consul? Have they flattered themselves with the hope, that they should be able, by dint of provocation, to exasperate, or to intimidate him; to cause him to forget the interest of the nation, or to goad him to any act of eclat, which they might afterwards be able to parody and misrepresent to Europe, as the initiative of war.

The First Consul, more than any man that exists, knows the evils of war, because he is better acquainted than any man, with its calculations and its chances. He is of opinion, that in circumstances in which we are at present placed, the first care of a government ought to be directed to the catastrophe and the calamities, which may result from a new war; he is of opinion, that it is the primary duty not only not to give way to the impulse of irritation but to make use of every means to enlighten, to moderate the impetuous passions of the multitude. The undersigned, confining himself to the form of his communication on the part of his excellency Lord Whitworth, requests of him to observe, that verbal and fugitive observations are insufficient for the discussion of such immense interests, all the motives of which it is customary to discuss in the councils of nations, after the most mature deliberation. In these councils, and under such circumstances, nothing is judged indifferent; the forms, nay the very expressions are weighed, examined, debated, canvassed, appreciated, and served always, as well to determine, as to justify the part, which it becomes necessary to take.

If such an imprudent, such an indecent violation of all forms had been committed by France, what would not have been written by England? There is not a single orator in the two houses of Parliament, who would not have declared, that this deviation from the rules generally established between nations, in important circumstances, was an outrage offered to the English nation. In the opinion of all, an offence of this kind would be regarded as an adequate motive to break off all further negociation.

With respect to the basis of the proposed ultimatum, the undersigned has the honor to call to the recollection of his excellency Lord Whitworth, that he was charged to specify by a note, which was remitted to him on the 12th Floreal, that the First Consul was as little to be worked upon by menaces, as by injuries, and that he was ready to overlook the neglect of forms, of which a parallel is not to be found in the history of any nation, in circumstances of equal importance.

That the Island of Lampedosa did not belong to France; that it was under the sovereignty of a foreign power, and that, with respect to the wish of his Britannic Majesty to have possession of it, the First Consul had no right to specify, either his consent or refusal.

That the independence of the order, and the Isle of Malta was the result of an especial article of the treaty of Amiens; that the First Consul is not competent to take, in this respect, any new determination, without the concurrence of the two other contracting powers to the treaty, his Majesty, the King of Spain, and the Batavian Republic.

That the Independance of the Island of Malta had been guaranteed by His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and that the ratifications of this guarantee were exchanged; that their Majesties, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had guaranteed the independence of the Order & Malta, that these guarantees were demanded of these powers, by England as well as by France; that it was the duty of the First Consul to accept of them, that the First Consul could not, in consequence, give ear to any proposition, relative to the Independance of the Order of the Island of Malta, without previously being apprized with respect to this Independance, of the intentions of the Governments, which had authentically guaranteed it.

That a small Corps of French was still, at the time of the message, stationed in Holland, in virtue of a convention concluded between that Republic and France; and that the First Consul had not the least hesitation in saying, he would cause Holland to be evacuated, the moment the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens were carried into effect, on the part of England.

To this note which, in expressions and exactitude, and above all in the precision of its movements, breathed nothing but justice, peace and moderation. His Excellency, Lord Whitworth, replied, by a peremptory demand of passports; stating, at the same time, that he intended leaving Paris on Wednesday, the 4th of May, at five o'clock in the morning.

The French Government deeply feels the contrast which a determination, so absolute, presents to the character of decorum, of justice and of conciliation, which in all circumstances, and principally in the last, it has made a point of giving to all its measures. Nevertheless it deemed it incumbent upon itself to make a sacrifice to the Interests of humanity. It was not willing to abandon till the last moment all hopes of Peace, and the Undersigned transmitted to his excellency, Lord Whitworth, a new Note, in which France made the offer to give its assent, that Malta should be placed under the guardianship of one of the three guaranteeing powers, viz. Austria, Russia, and Prussia.

This proposition appeared to Lord Whitworth himself such as ought to satisfy the pretensions of his Court; he suspended his departure, and received the Note *ad referendum*.

At the same time the Ambassador of the Republic, at London, being apprized of the demand, which his Excellency Lord Whitworth, had made at Paris for his passports to return to England, received orders to hold himself in readiness to depart. He accordingly demanded his passports which were instantly granted.

The *mezzeo termino*, proposed by the French Government, was a deviation from the *letter* of the Treaty of Amiens but it had the double advantage to assimilate, to the greatest degree possible, with its spirit, that is to say, to place Malta in the independence of the two nations, and to offer this guarantee so much insisted upon, and which the British Ministry pretended constituted the sole object of its alarms.

The British government comprehended the force of these reasons, and the unhappy fatality which induced it to war, offered to it no other reply, than a false allegation. The 21st of this month Lord Whitworth transmitted a note, in which he declared, that Russia had refused to accede to what was required of her.