Interview with Ronald I. Spiers

Q: I would like to focus today on your experiences in the management field of the Department of State. You served as Under Secretary of Management from November 1983 to May 1989. How did that assignment come about?

SPIERS: I remember that very well. I was in Vermont on leave from my post as Ambassador to Pakistan during the Summer of 1983 when one morning I received a call from George Shultz. I was still getting dressed. He reminded me of a conversation that we had had several months earlier in Islamabad. During the ride from the airport in Rawalpindi to Shultz’ hotel in Islamabad, the subject of management of the State Department arose. I told the Secretary that I was very critical of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. He listened quietly and didn't really respond.

A few months later, he called me. He thought I was still in Islamabad and chose a time to call which would have been very convenient for me had I been in Islamabad. Unfortunately, I was in Vermont on leave. In any case, he told me that he had talked to the President about the position of Under Secretary for Management and that he would like me to come to Washington to fill it. I told him that I really had not had any management experience and had not had any training in the subject. Shultz said that that was just the
kind of person he was looking for; he wanted a Foreign Service officer who had had broad experience both in Washington and abroad; he had well remembered our discussions in the car in Islamabad. He added that his choice was a deliberate one.

Q: When you got to the Department, what did you expect to find in the management area?

SPIERS: I didn't really have any particular expectations. The Secretary had already hired what he called a “completely new management team”. He assigned Bill Harrop to be Inspector General, Bob Lamb to be Assistant Secretary for Administration and Roy Atherton to be Director General. These appointments were made at the same time mine was and I was therefore not involved. He was depending on the four of us, he said, to review thoroughly the management side of the Department. Shultz was himself very interested in management; he thought that none of his predecessors had paid much attention to this aspect of State's responsibilities.

To return to my comments about the 1980 Act, I believed that it was too mechanical, particularly in its implementation. I believed that the Foreign Service had been “bought off”; that is to say, that there were many who had reservations about the Act, but had accepted its provisions because it also included pay increases for a lot of people. I felt that the Act would eventually damage the morale of the Foreign Service, with particular reference to the new “selection-out” process, which could have been applied without going to the extent that the Act demanded. The Act was too detailed on some aspects of the Department's management operations.

When I was Under Secretary, I was subjected to a lot of criticism because I insisted that the Act of 1980 was the law of the land and therefore would be applied as intended. There may have been a lot of people who had hoped that we could find some ways around the more onerous provisions of the Act—"have our cake and eat it too". Those people would have wished to take the pay increases, but would have preferred to find some ways around the “selection-out” aspects, as the Act had mandated. I set up a Management
Council within the first few weeks after assuming office; it was intended to bring together, in a collegiate manner, all the senior people in the management area—the Comptroller, the Director General, the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Director of Management Operations and the Inspector General, even though he was not my subordinate. The Council was a device to discuss the various issues facing us, including all those that had been created by the 1980 Act.

We had no choice but to follow the dictates of the 1980 Act. We thereby lost a lot of good officers through “selection-out”, although I admit that I did not have a very good alternative. The Foreign Service had not been successful in administering the “selection out” provisions which had been included in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and subsequent amendments. It was clear to me from my initial consultations with both members and staff that Congress was expecting the Department to be strictly faithful to the requirements of the Act. There was a general feeling in Congress that there were just too many senior people in the Foreign Service. There was a similar feeling in the White House. Soon after my appointment, I discussed this issue with John Herrington, then the President’s personnel chief. We had just sent to the White House the first promotion list to be reviewed by the Reagan Administration. Harrington called in high dudgeon and said that the Foreign Service was already overstaffed with senior people and that the promotion list would only make matters worst. He said that he would have preferred not to have a promotion list in 1983/84. I was finally able to change his views and he agreed to proceed with the promotion list, but it was clear to me that there would have to be a trade-off in the future—rigorous application of the “selection-out” principles included in the 1980 Act without any effort to be made to soften the results, even if many of our colleagues were to be hurt.

Q: Did you have any sympathy with the perception that the Service was over-flowing with senior officials?

SPIERS: I thought that the Service should have had more of a pyramidical structure.
Q: You were appointed to the position of Under Secretary without having much of a background in management and administration. Did anything surprise you in the first few months?

SPIERS: I was surprised by the time and attention that Secretary Shultz devoted to it. My previous departmental assignments had been only in political areas; I had had very little contact with anyone in management. Most of the people I knew were dismissive of management and administration; personnel in those areas were not “mainstream”. All of a sudden, the Department had a Secretary who took management and administration very seriously. I probably had more meetings with him than any other senior person in the Department with the possible exception of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Every morning, I not only went to the Secretary’s regular staff meeting, but we also had a separate staff meeting every morning just on management. We would take up a management issue, brief the Secretary on it and then discuss it. He was on the phone with me frequently. The Secretary's interest was a surprising experience.

One of his major interests was training. He readily agreed to the development of an area in Arlington off Route 50 for a new Foreign Service Institute site. He became one of the strongest proponents of the idea. He told me that was one of the programs he insisted be brought to fruition regardless of the budget situation. He was also very interested in the budget, having been a Director of the Bureau of Management and Budget. The Department had been severely cut by OMB and he and I went over to meet with Director Stockman and the budget review panel. Shultz made a very strong case and miraculously obtained support for an increase in personnel for the “reporting and analysis” function. I had pointed out to him, based on my previous experience as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, that most of what he read every morning in the National Intelligence Daily and the Secretary's Morning Summary was produced by Foreign Service officers. Our ability to produce these products were being diminished rapidly through a succession of budget reductions. Shultz got very excited about this and was well prepared
for his meeting with Stockman. He was able to get an increase in those positions. In general, Shultz was very protean in his interests; everything interested him. Later, while the Moscow chancery fiasco was ongoing, he was very interested in that; as a matter of fact, the whole foreign buildings program interested him in light of his experiences as a former executive of the Bechtel Company. He was very interested in the problems of Foreign Service families and the work of the Family Liaison Office. There was nothing in the management/administrative area in which he was not interested.

Shultz had had a wide range of experiences unmatched by most of his predecessors. The Department, up to that point, had been run mainly by academics or lawyers, who have an entirely different management style. They don’t really pay any attention to it. So it was quite a shock to the Department when its chief became as interested in management issues as he was in the traditional substantive ones.

Shultz’ interest was very helpful to me. I had almost immediate access to him. The morning meetings were attended just by him, the Deputy Secretary and the senior management people in the Department. He gave management a position in the Department which we would not have otherwise had. One of the first things that we did was to hold a management conference at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. Shultz had strongly urged that we proceed with that meeting. Many of us met there for a long weekend “think” session. The purpose of the meeting, which stemmed from a conversation that Roy Atherton, the Director General, and I had soon after I became Under Secretary, was to focus on the major issues that were and would be confronting the new management, team which consisted almost entirely of political officers except for Bob Lamb who was a professional in administration. Sheldon Krys was my executive assistant and he was very important to the Wye conference. He is now the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. My objective for the conference was to have serious and prolonged discussion about the management and administrative of the Department, uninterrupted by telephone calls, meetings and other urgent activities. We discussed what the Foreign Service might look like five and ten years later; the problems of getting families
overseas; the issue of spouse employment; etc. The solutions that we discussed were not as important as the process itself.

The meeting was helpful to me because it started the development of an agenda of things I wanted to tackle and resolve, if possible. I became particularly interested in the problem of political appointments to Ambassadors posi-tions; i.e increasing the proportion of career officers in the Ambassadorial ranks. I wanted to reverse the trend towards an increasing number of political appointees. I also became interested in the spouse employment problem. The structure of the Foreign Service also became a challenge revolving around the question of whether there were too many senior officers in the Service and if so, what could be done about it. I was already aware at the time of the perception of Congress and the White House on this question, as I mentioned earlier. The arguments, even at Wye, were about whether the Foreign Service was more like a law partnership or a military service. In a law firm, there are many senior people—the partners whereas the military is a hierarchical structure. We discussed training at great length at Wye and the role of the Foreign Service Institute. There was one subject which was not discussed at any great length and that is the security problems. Those hit my desk later with a vengeance.

Q: Let me ask you a question about the issue of political appointees. What were your views and what were you able to accomplish during your stewardship?

SPIERS: I am not sure that we accomplished much. Initially, I tried to develop a good working relationship with John Herrington, President Reagan's personnel chief, and that worked out well. I can remember very vividly the first time I went to his office. Herrington was very rough on me and the Foreign Service. He was almost rude. It became quite clear to me within minutes that he regarded my position as one to be occupied by a political appointee. He thought that Shultz had made a great mistake by not going outside the system to fill the Under Secretary's position. I was the first Under Secretary for Management who was not a political appointee. My immediate predecessor had been a Chicago businessman who had in fact thrown up his hands in disgust and had
decided that the job was impossible. But after this rough start, we worked well together; although I was not his man in the Department, we spoke the same language. I liked him a lot. I found that he was someone with whom you could do business. He would tell me quite candidly whom they had find jobs for and I would tell him whom we had that had to be placed. We worked out these problems in a cooperative way. We did not have an adversarial relationship as there was after he moved on to become Secretary of Energy. Then the relationship became extremely adversarial. But while Harrington was in the personnel job, I was able to discuss with him the concept of a career service and what my preoccupations were, such as my concerns for attracting and keeping first-rate people, if they felt that as they reached the zenith of their careers, they would be preempted for the most desirable assignments by less capable or experienced people. I told him that I had worked in London for political ambassadors, such as David Bruce, Elliot Richardson and Ann Armstrong, all of whom I found very good, but they were, unfortunately, not representative of the political appointees.

Political appointees to ambassadorial positions present both a qualitative and quantitative problem. I firmly believe that a modicum of good political appointees is good for the Foreign Service. Harrington, in the final analysis, admitted that the White House had made a number of marginal appointments to Ambassadorial positions because they did not consider them to be very important. In essence, if the party owed someone a political debt, that could be paid off with an ambassadorial appointment because ambassadors “didn't do anything”. We had long dialogues about what an Ambassador really does and why he or she was important to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy as well as the President's success. It was a role that required quality people. Several times, I was able to tell Harrington that the person he wanted to place was not going to measure up and meet the requirements of the job. In those instances, he looked around the rest of the federal bureaucracies and found other assignments for those people. In summary, I think Harrington and I had a very good and productive relationship, but unfortunately it only lasted for a brief time because he was soon promoted to be Secretary of Energy.
Harrington was replaced by Bob Tuttle, with whom I could not have the same relationship. It was a very difficult time. Don Regan replaced Jim Baker as White House Chief of Staff beginning in 1985. He was also very difficult and was very angry with me at one point because I had made a speech to the National Association for Public Administration, parts of which had been quoted in an article. The speech was supposed to be off-the-record, but Bernie Gwertzman, I believe, had obtained a copy and wrote an article from it. That so incited Regan that he forbid me to attend White House meetings on Ambassadorial appointments. These were periodic meetings in which the State Department was represented by the Deputy Secretary—first Ken Damm and later John Whitehead—and myself. The meetings were intended to be negotiating sessions for the allocation of Ambassadorial appointments between political appointees and career officers. That storm blew over after a brief time and after Howard Baker succeeded Regan, there was no further problem. Tuttle was the son of a California car dealer who was a member of the Reagan “Kitchen Cabinet”. He was complete political animal and had no comprehension of the operations of the Department that Herrington had shown. He took a very mechanical approach to the placement of political appointees. In one instance, for example, I had succeeded in obtaining approval of a career officer as our Ambassador to Canada. Tuttle had wanted to send a political appointee. At the meeting with Regan, I said that Tuttle's man just was not appropriate and suggested a career officer—Tom Niles. The White House said OK, but wanted in exchange another Ambassadorial post. I suggested Equatorial Guinea which they readily accepted. So we “traded” Canada for Equatorial Guinea, which is a commentary on the White House’s approach to placement of political appointees.

The White House was primarily interested in two matters: the placement of their supporters and a rigorous “up and out” personnel system for the Foreign Service.
Q: Let me ask you about your relationship with Congress. You mentioned that one of your first actions after being nominated for the Under Secretary position, you paid a visit to many Congressmen and Senators. Who did you see in particular?

SPIERS: I went right away to see almost all of the members of the Appropriations subcommittees that had jurisdiction over State's budget. The most important person on the Hill for the Department was Neil Smith (D-Iowa), who was the chairman of the House Appropriation subcommittee on State-Justice-Commerce appropriations. He was clearly the most important man in Congress from State's point of view. I tried to develop a close relationship with him. I travelled with him quite frequently—I probably made a dozen trips with him during my five years as Under Secretary. Shultz strongly encouraged me to do that and I think the trips were very useful from State's perspective. We became friends in as far as a kind of crusty, old country lawyer has friends. My relations with all the members of the both Senate and House Appropriations Committees were quite good. The staffs of both committees were very good and we had a good relationship with them. John Osthaus was the staff director on the House committee and Jimmy Fairchild was the minority director. I worked with them very easily.

Q: The relationship that you developed with Chairman Smith was somewhat contrary of the practices that had been in effect during the tenure of your immediate predecessors and returned the Department to a practice that had been in effect ten years earlier. Was there any particular reason for this change?

SPIERS: It was a practice that I had always followed when I was in other positions such as head of Politico-Military Affairs, of the Regional Politico-Military Office in EUR or of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. When I was an Ambassador, I always paid attention to the Congress. I didn't travel with any members because there were no direct relationships between a committee chairman and INR. I testified often when in INR as I
did when I was in PM. While Ambassador in Turkey, I spent a whole summer's vacation lobbying for the lifting of the arms embargo that had been imposed on the Turks.

I found that travelling with Chairman Smith very valuable because much of the Executive-Legislative Branches relationships are built on personal relationships. It was important to the State Department that I would have good personal relationships with Chairman Smith and others. The trips provided an opportunity for Smith to see our staffs abroad; the travel between stops gave me an opportunity to talk to him and give him our side of the picture. Of course, in some respects, these trips were boondoggles. Smith was a very serious person and very knowledgeable. When I first met him, it soon became clear to me that he had been to a lot of places that I had never seen and that he knew a lot about the operations of the State Department that I didn't know. I was determined that I would do something to change that situation. I felt that it was worthwhile to be as close to Members of Congress, particularly those that had some say over the Department, as possible.

The Foreign Affairs and Relations committees were a little different from the Appropriations Committees. I had good relations with all members and staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations committee with the exception of Jesse Helms' people. Helms himself was always very courteous and courtly, but his staff was very difficult. Phil Christenson, Deborah DeMoss and others seemed to have a vicious and punitive attitude toward the State Department and especially the Foreign Service. Once, Christenson made a comment to the press about the Management Council—he considered it to be filled with Ivy League dilettantes. Somehow, he managed to receive a lot of State Department documents, many of which were very sensitive and private. There would be drafts of papers which would be discussed in the Management Council and before the week was up, he would have a copy. There was some suspicion that his mother, who worked in the Department, might have been the channel. Phil Christenson had an anti-State mind set. He had been in the Foreign Service, but apparently had not been able to meet the requirements for tenure in the Service and therefore had to leave. Whenever possible, he would make matters difficult for the Secretary and the Department as a whole. This
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is a good example of a situation where ideological differences create management problems. The Helms group was dissatisfied with some of the foreign policy positions taken by the administration—e.g. Central America—and furthermore, disliked the Foreign Service intensely. They viewed the Service as an Eastern liberal establishment and soft on communism. So our relationship with Helms' staff was very difficult. But once, during some hearings about the establishment of a new Assistant Secretaryship for South Asian Affairs, Jesse Helms, surprising me, asked for my views, saying that he had a lot of respect for my opinions. I testified that there were already too many Assistant Secretaries; that Congress kept creating them without a departmental request; and that this made the management of the Department even more difficult. This particular idea was the brain child of Congressman Steve Solarz, with whom I always had good relationships—I liked him a lot and spent many hours with him. This idea happened to be a bad one.

We had good relations with the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dante Fascell and Dan Mica, who was the head of the subcommittee which had oversight of the Department. We brought Mica to the Department and gave him a set of briefings. My relationships with that committee deteriorated and became difficult later in my term. It held me, Art Hartman and Bob Lamb personally responsible for the Moscow Embassy imbroglio; that was especially true of Congresswoman Olympia Snow (R-Maine).

We held periodic meetings with the committee members at the Department. Shultz would host them for a breakfast or a lunch. It was arrangement that we had worked out. As is often true, there were tensions between members of the authorizing and appropriations committees. Is an age old problem. I remember at one breakfast, Senator Dick Lugar saying that we should just proceed with some program by adding to the appropriation act a provision which would eviscerate any authorization requirement. I think that Olympia Snow thought that I had suggested to Lugar that this process be followed because a few days later, at a White House reception, I ran into Dante Fascell who asked what I had done to so upset some of his committee members. He said that some of members were “out to get me”, while making a cutting-across-the-throat motion. I tied to contact Snow
to discuss her unhappiness, but she wouldn't talk to me. It was said that Olympia Snow had sworn that I would never get another Presidential appointment. Unfortunately, she just had misunderstood the situation. The irony was that the original suggestion to eliminate the authorization was made by Senator Lugar, himself a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. His suggestion was made in good faith as way around a bottle-neck that had developed in the authorization process. The members of the appropriations committees were delighted of course because they had a scathing view of authorizing committees in any case.

It was, of course, not all clear sailing with Congress. We had difficult relations with Senator Jesse Helms' staff. Their problems with us were essentially in the personnel field. By the time I left the position of Under Secretary, I felt good about all of my Congressional relationships except those with Snow and with Helms' staff. I had very little to do with Helms himself and when I had to deal with him, it was generally pleasant. But every time I made a speech—and I made many in the six years as Under Secretary—Helms' staff would review them word by word. I tended to be fairly candid in my remarks about issues. More often than not, Helms' staff would complain about some remark or another. Early in my tenure, I received one of these letters of complaint—I think this was signed by the Senator himself—which included something like 100 questions ranging from “Why we let foreigners into the Embassy Club in Islamabad” to policy issues.

Q: You have already mentioned Secretary Shultz' positive involvement in the management of the Department. What about other senior officials?

SPIERS: None of the other were really involved in management issues, except the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. The Secretary, my staff and I would testify on management issues. The other Under Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries spoke to policy issues. Roger Feldman, who was our Comptroller handled the day-to-day liaison on budget matters with the Hill.
Q: Did you feel while Under Secretary any need for a Foreign Service system that covered all civilian personnel overseas?

SPIERS: We had an inter-departmental steering group in which all major foreign affairs agencies were included. We used that mechanism to attempt to standardize personnel policies as they related to overseas service. Technically, of course, AID, USIA and Commerce personnel are part of the Foreign Service.

The question of standard treatment of all personnel overseas was not really much of a problem, either when I was Under Secretary or during my ambassadorial assignments. The most difficult relationships were those between the Embassy's Economic Section and the AID staff because the latter always seemed to have more financial resources for representation activities, for furniture and housing, etc. But it never became a big preoccupation for me in any of my assignments.

I met periodically with my counterparts in USIA and AID, but most of the detailed issues were handled by the Assistant Secretary for Administration, since the problems were primarily in that area. I became involved when major security issues arose.

Q: How were the relationships with other Cabinet Departments and Agencies?

SPIERS: Most of my relations were with the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly after the bugging of the Moscow Embassy was discovered. I made a trip to Moscow in 1985 and was aghast by what I saw. Bob Lamb and I decided right then and there that we would halt construction. The Moscow Embassy problems brought us in close contact with the CIA and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

The Moscow Embassy construction problem became a very hot political issue. A week or two after I reported for duty, I found that CIA or the intelligence people who worked for Bud McFarlane, the NSC Advisor, had come to the Department and had briefed Larry Eagleburger, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, on the typewriter bugging. Larry
had not mentioned the problem or the meeting to me, even though I was organizationally responsible for security. I was quite angry. So the Moscow Embassy episode started on a bad footing. After I found out about it, I asked the same group to come back to the Department to brief me and my security people.

The typewriters had, for a brief period of time, been sent by mistake to a bonded warehouse in Moscow, unprotected by diplomatic immunity. Initially, the French had discovered that one of their code machines had been bugged and had so informed the CIA. Bob Lamb, as Assistant Secretary for Administration and then responsible for security matter in the Department, began a program of X-raying our typewriters; the actual work was done jointly with CIA. The program surfaced the clandestine adaptations that the Russians had made to our machines.

I mentioned earlier that Bob Lamb and I made a trip to Moscow in 1985. I was very upset and disgusted with the construction operation. The Russian workmen arrived late and left early; they were lazy and many were obviously drunk. I insisted that these work practices be changed and that there be better control over the workmen. Then people began to notice strange things about the new chancery. So we started a joint State-CIA program to X-ray the whole building. We developed some new tomograph instruments; they were very expensive. We ended up probably spending twice as much on security examination of the building than we did on the actual construction.

We also had a problem with the foreign nationals. The FBI and the White House staff made a crusade out of this issue. A couple of the Russians who worked for us had been identified as high-level KGB agents; everyone around Washington was briefed by the FBI and the White House, making it a major issue. These various incidents suggested to people around town that the Department was lax and incompetent in its security measures. Art Hartman, our Ambassador in Moscow, was pilloried and later resigned. It is clear in retrospect that Art, Bob Lamb and I ran into a buzz-saw in the press and in the Congress on the Moscow Embassy security problems. Shultz felt very badly about
the situation. One day, he invited Bob Lamb and me to lunch with him because he was clearly upset by the treatment we were receiving. My own personal involvement became highlighted when one day my picture appeared on the cover of the “Foreign Service Journal”. Unfortunately, the picture was taken when I was reading the National Intelligence Daily, which although well covered up in the photograph, gave rise to additional comments about security practices. The photo did not breach security; the text of the Daily had been covered up, but immediately there were big stories in the “New York Times”, undoubtedly stimulated by Helms' staff. The Congress' involvement in these various Moscow security problems was essentially a partisan issue, at least in the beginning. By that I mean that the various security problems were used by people who were anti-State Department, especially that little group of people that I have mentioned before who worked for Senator Helms. As soon as I saw the magnitude of the current and potential problems, I suggested establishing a panel of outside experts, chaired by Bobby Inman, former Director of the National Security Agency and later Deputy Director of CIA. I had known him pretty well when he was in that job and I was the head of INR and had great respect for him. So Lamb and I set up the panel which consisted of Senator Rudman, some Congressmen and Larry Eagleburger, who had retired by then. The panel made a major study of the whole problem of providing adequate security for our overseas establishments. That panel devised a program that would have cost about $5 billion to implement. The panel recommended among many other suggestions that the Department establish a Diplomatic Security Service which we did.

We stopped construction on the new Moscow chancery. We examined the building. We sent teams to Moscow. We conducted very elaborate computer studies to try to identify what the Russians had implanted in the concrete walls. My view was that in fact we had discovered the devices before the Russians were able to hook the system up. I suspect that the Russians didn't believe that we would discover the microphones and other devices and that therefore they had decided to postpone the activation of the system until they had gotten further along. But that was a surmise.
You have to understand that the Moscow construction program had started many years earlier when the U.S. government had agreed with the USSR that both countries would follow normal national construction practices. In the USSR, that meant the use of precast concrete which is what was used for construction of the chancery. The agreement between the two countries was signed during Nixon's days by Walt Stoessel. The day the story of the bugging of the Moscow chancery broke in the press, I got calls from three former Secretaries of State—Kissinger, Bill Rogers and Cy Vance—;each wanted to explain to me their knowledge of and involvement in the Moscow construction program. I understood that during one of Gromyko's visits to Washington, Kissinger had called Stoessel and told him to finalize the agreement before the Russian Foreign Minister left town. I doubt whether anybody thought of these potential security problems at the time; it was not a time when people were very conscious about security issues. But when the problems became well known, everybody was looking for someone else to blame. Naturally, blame fell on the three most involved at the time: Bob Lamb, myself and Art Hartman, who had fought a rear-guard action against the replacement of local employees by American staff. In the first place, it was a very expensive program; secondly the locals in Moscow were pretty well isolated and did not have access to floors that might have contained classified or sensitive material, but the thesis was, as propounded particularly by the FBI, that the locals could spot weaknesses among American employees and could therefore be helpful in devising ways to exploit their vulnerabilities. Hartman opposed the substitution. Shultz, who had originally supported Hartman, finally came to the conclusion that the political heat was too great and that the substitutions had to be made. He asked me to develop a program for that purpose. All of these factors added up to a very difficult situation for the three of us, although all of us had inherited the Moscow chancery problem. We did make a mistake on the typewriters, but that was quickly fixed. We set up a special unit together with CIA on a military base which examined all equipment destined for Moscow. All equipment then was sent to Moscow with diplomatic escort. Essentially, the typewriter episode was the result of a clerical error; nevertheless it was fodder for the anti-State and anti-Shultz groups; it enabled them to take a clerical error and turn into a
major illustration of the Department's incompetence in managing security issues. From that
day on until I left, we fought a bureaucratic battle over whether CIA should be assigned
responsibility for the security responsibilities of the Department of State.

Just before I left the job as Under Secretary, we made a proposal to Congress that would
have resolved the Moscow chancery issue. But it became involved in a Congressional
grid-lock, with Senator Hollings, who wanted to tear the whole building down, on one
side and Congressman Smith, who didn't want to do that, on the other. Smith had been
in Moscow; he and I had gone together to look at the situation. But Hollings and Smith
couldn't agree and therefore nothing was done. The half-finished building just sat there;
I gather that recently some kind of agreement has been reached—two years after my
departure—to let the Department do what it considers best. It was a problem of both
personality clashes and substance.

The Moscow construction program enabled everybody to point fingers at someone else.
We had to justify why we let the Soviets build their chancery here in Washington on Mount
Alto on Wisconsin Avenue. Their building was on a hill and some people were concerned
that the Russians could beam down on the White House and the State Department. In
fact, history showed that we made the Russians take that land; their preference was for
another place. The reverse was true in Moscow. We built on a swamp after turning down
a Russian offer for a lot on Lenin Hills. We rejected it because it was too far away. These
are just two illustrations of probably two decades of a process of negotiations and building
which by the time I arrived was filled with mythology.

Q: Were there any management lessons to be drawn from the Moscow experience?

SPIERS: I think we probably over-reacted to the Russian penetration. We spent a lot of
money to develop a degree of security for our overseas establishments. Our Embassy
in Somalia cost us millions and millions of dollars to enhance its security and now it is all
over. There were a lot of comments about turning Embassies into fortresses; our people
didn't like it, the public didn't like it. During my tour as Under Secretary, I probably visited about 70 countries; much of that was due to the security concerns. We just had to do that.

*Q: You earlier mentioned the spouse issue. Could you elaborate on that please?*

SPIERS: It was clear that there was a lot of restiveness in the Foreign Service. There was an increasing number of officers whose wives did not wish to serve overseas. This was a reflection of the cultural change that was taking place in the United States with the two-wage earner family. The spouses of the officers just didn't want to leave their jobs; other couples just didn't want to split up. We identified this new development as a major challenge at the Wye Plantation meeting. We developed a number of devices—American Family Member program, special efforts to get employment for the spouse at overseas posts. We only were able to deal at the margins of the problem; there was no way to tackle the central problem. Spouses face a lot of problems overseas; our ability to ease their burdens was seriously undermined by budget reductions aimed at the programs we were trying to develop.

I have mixed feelings about the societal changes. I remember when the 1972 directive was issued which stated that wives could not be treated as employees and that therefore they couldn't be requested to volunteer their time. We had just returned from an assignment to London. We were accustomed to having Mrs. Bruce, the wife of the Ambassador, call on my wife to help her on chores of one kind or another. That kind of thing was no longer acceptable to the younger generation. I remember when I was in my first Ambassadorial assignment in the Bahamas there were a couple of wives there who had a great chip on their shoulders and were not about to be asked to take on some responsibilities, placing the whole work-load on my wife's shoulders. The Deputy Chief of Mission was Roz Ridgway, who did not have a spouse at the time. In some ways, the lack of participation in Embassy activities by spouses is a loss; the concept that the family had as much as a role in an Embassy's life as did the employee was a useful one. On the other hand, it is no longer acceptable to treat spouses as employees. So I have mixed feelings about the new
Foreign Service. The new attitudes may have been somewhat detrimental, but there is no way that the Foreign Service could act in a vacuum. It is true that in some instances that junior spouses were treated as servants by the wives of senior officers; we have all heard the traditional stories about Mrs. MacArthur and Mrs. Loy Henderson, who were allegedly nasty, dictatorial and demanding. There were undoubtedly instances of that; on the other hand, we never found Mrs. Bruce that way. My wife always responded positively to any requests that Mrs. Bruce might make; she never felt outraged by them. Obviously other people did.

The societal changes had an impact on the character of the Foreign Service. I don't pass judgement on the merits of the change; it was inevitable. When I first joined the Department of State, the new Foreign Service officers were very young, right out of college; they were prepared to make a career commitment; it was similar to joining a Japanese company. Today, that is not the case. The new officers are older; they may be starting a second or perhaps even a third career—they may have decided that they didn't want to be a lawyer or a teacher or a journalist. If the foreign affairs field didn't suit them, they were always prepared to seek other pastures. The whole ethos of the Service has changed. Whether it is bad or good is immaterial; it was inevitable. It considerably increases the management difficulties; there is far less discipline in the system—if an employee does not want to take a certain assignment, he or she will just quit.

Q: How were your relationships with the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA)?

SPIERS: The first President, Dennis Hays, was very good. We used to see him quite frequently to discuss various questions. After he left, as the 1980 Act began to take effect, an adversarial relationship developed. The Act itself did not really begin to effect policies and operations until after I had been on the job for a year or more. That gave the perception to some people that our new management team was responsible for the “bad” policies, rather than the implementation of the Act, which had been passed several years earlier. When the Act of 1980 began to bite, then AFSA became very unhappy. It did
represent the officers who had to retire under the terms of the Act. Of course, people were hurt; they didn't get promoted and were subject to “time in class” and had to retire; that is very painful for all concerned. AFSA began to regard Director General Atherton and myself as the responsible officials for the retirements, although Roy was leaving at about this time and George Vest had been chosen to replace him.

Bill Harrop, who was then the Inspector General and had been one of the original AFSA “Young Turks”, was very much involved in the development of our personnel policies. In fact, he was probably the most militant defender of the 1980 Act and the most militant in insisting that it be applied stringently. People used to suggest ways to soften the Act's impact. When we used to discuss these ideas in the Management Council, Bill was always the strongest voice for applying the Act as its authors intended. He had been involved in the drafting of the legislation while I had been overseas during the period and only had a distant unease, which, as I mentioned earlier, I discussed with the Secretary.

Q: As a philosophical matter, do you have sympathy with the “up or out” concept?

SPIERS: Yes, I do. Being at the United Nations now, I have become more and more convinced of its utility and I am committed to it. I can see here the consequences of not having such a program in the staffing at the UN which does not have a competitive promotion system. The organization has too much “dead-wood”. For the Foreign Service, the time had come to have a rigorous system; the Department had always given lip service to the concept, which stemmed from the Rogers Act, but which had never been applied. The Foreign Service always shied away from being tough on its own; it was its own delinquencies and inadequacies which were very much understood in the White House and in Congress which created the atmosphere that led to the passage of the 1980 Act. I have already mentioned the first conversation I had with James Harrington, which I will never forget, during which I had to accept the view of a Service overstaffed by senior officers in exchange for the White House acceptance of the promotion list. I tended to
agree that the Service needed to be more of a pyramid, as is the military, and that you do not have to make general to have an honorable career.

Q: Did the argument of “specialist versus generalist” rise very much during your tenure?

SPIERS: I am not sure that there was a problem. We had seventeen categories of specialists. The issue would arise when I had to determine the number of people who could be promoted. There was a lot of discussion about the “cone” system, which is different from the “generalist vs. specialist”. I have never been certain whether I favored the “cone” system. I probably didn't. But early in my assignment, I had a conversation with Secretary Shultz; interestingly enough, he was concerned by the quality of the economic officers. As an economist himself, Shultz felt that there weren't really any economists in the Department. It was true that we had many “economic” officers, but he didn't believe that they really knew economics. At the beginning of my assignment, we were trying to downplay the “cone” system and perhaps even to escape from it. I thought that it was too rigid, both in its conception and in its application. I did not think it was the best way to bring people into the Foreign Service. I thought that the Foreign Service officers should be “generalists' who could perform satisfactorily in any Foreign Service position and therefore could be assigned where needed. I would have selected those applicants with the highest scores, then assigned them to a consular section for the first tour. There are some people who enjoy consular work more than anything else. I never did accept the view and I am still uneasy about selecting people as consular or administrative specialists and then having the major portion of their career spent in those “cones”. I much prefer the “generalist” approach.

But we ran right up against the Secretary, who wanted the entrance examination process to be much more discriminating. He didn't want anyone joining the Foreign Service as an economic officer who wasn't sufficiently skilled in the discipline. I am not sure that the Foreign Service needs highly skilled economists; it needs some people who are literate in the subject, but not necessarily the PhDs that Shultz I think really wanted.
But the Secretary's view forced us to stick with the "cone" system. The consular people always felt discriminated against; the administrative people always felt discriminated against; there was a widely held perception that the royalty of the Foreign Service were the political officers. I thought, that having been a political officer, I could do something about this sense of inequality; I might even have been considered as a traitor to my own "cone" because I insisted that more and more economic officers or consular officers be assigned to promotion-enhancing positions, such as Deputy Chief of Mission and even as Ambassadors. I remember making many arguments in the Ambassadorial selection committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, for selection of non-political officers.

I did have some sympathy with the view of the consular and administrative people that they were being treated as "second class" citizens.

Q: This discussion leads me to the question of the role of the Foreign Service? What is your view on this question?

SPIERS: I believe first of all that being a U.S. representative overseas is important. An Ambassador is important as is his or her staff. They do things which otherwise could not be done. They develop contacts and first hand information and learn what buttons to push. There is a level of intelligence and inter-personal skill that is required which is as needed for an administrative officer as it is for a political one. I wouldn't wish to have a political officer who is a bad manager nor an administrative officer with bad political judgement. With the exception of the economist problem, I don't think that it makes sense to recruit individuals having pre-determined a rigid career pattern for them. I had an officer in Turkey, who had joined the Service as an administrative officer, but who unfortunately was not a very good one. But he was a brilliant political officer. Ten or fifteen years later, I heard of the resistance he had encountered when he wanted to change his "cones"; i.e. career field. That is ridiculous.
Q: Have today's diplomatic practices changed the concept of a Foreign Service? For example, what does the rise of the UN or multilateralism in general mean to a Foreign Service? What of the advent of communications capabilities which permit senior government officials to discuss issues among themselves without the knowledge of their diplomats?

SPIERS: There is no way of avoiding the latter. We now have a president of the United States—he once told me that he was frustrated Foreign Service officer—who deals personally on key foreign policy issues with other heads of government. Reagan was not that kind of a president. The personalities of the individual presidents and secretaries will dictate the conduct of foreign relations. Today, the pure old fashioned collection of information by the Foreign Service is not as important as it used to be. You can watch CNN as we did constantly during the Iraq crisis. What is important is the ability to know people. There is no way that this can be done by people sitting in Washington. Being overseas provides the opportunity to know what each foreign leader thinks and why; you know the government's structure and who has influence on which subjects. You need people on site for that capability. It is important and there is no substitute. The Foreign Service should not compete with the media, but it must be in a position to analyze situations, which only a few good journalist can do because they are also stationed overseas and have the contacts. Some one like Tom Friedman is as good as anybody we might have in a Middle East Embassy. But the U.S. needs people who know whom to contact and who can make good prognostications.

Q: Did the role of the UN when you were the Under Secretary for Management loom large?

SPIERS: No. In fact, for me at the time, the UN was a problem because it was a competitor for scarce financial resources. Naturally, as Under Secretary, I was more interested in obtaining resources for the Department. The U.S. dues to the United Nations and its agencies are part of the Department's budget; therefore there were always tensions.
in the allocation of the resources because essentially the total was immutable and we could only consider shifting resources within it. I didn't think much about the UN; I didn't know much about it and furthermore, during the '80s, the UN was not very highly regarded in Washington. Now I have a different perspective, but while Under Secretary, my views then were valid in light of my responsibilities at the time.

It occurs to me that I have not mentioned the issue of the closing of posts, which was very much related to the question of availability and allocation of resources. The issue was also very important to Congress-Department relationships. I am referring to what we call “constituent” posts; i.e. Consulates General or Consulates. This was a very, very controversial subject. We were interested in closing these posts to save resources that we could then apply to higher priority programs. We identified a number of posts that could be closed, especially in Europe, where the consulate structure was established in the days before rapid communications. Did we really need establishments in both Marseille and Nice, for example, or Hamburg and Bremen. Immediately, we encountered special interests. The Prince of Monaco considered Nice as “his consulate”. He would call the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, who was his wife's—Grace Kelly—cousin. Lehman then would call to complain about closing of Nice because his Navy used it as a port for naval visits. Of course, I knew the family relationship. That was typical. We thought we could close Salzburg, but there was some Congressional staffer who has spent his honeymoon in Salzburg and he managed to get his principal, a Senator, to block the closing of that post. There were always pressures from Members of Congress representing their ethnic constituencies. Ed Derwinski, who was then the Under Secretary for Security Assistance in the Department, was one of the major objectors to some of these closing proposals. We did close Bremen, although an important North German Parliamentarian visited me and said that they would put up a sign in front of the building: OPENED BY GEORGE WASHINGTON. CLOSED BY RONALD SPIERS. There were vigorous letter-writing campaigns when we tried to close any post.
I don't know what the Department will do today. It has to open embassies in Tirana (Albania), Vilnius (Lithuania), Riga (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia), Kiev (Ukraine), perhaps in other republics of the former USSR, then there is the probability of Hanoi (Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia). We have recently opened an Embassy in Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia). I thought that these new establishments were more important than the old consulates. Of course, someone can always make an arguments that Brest or Bordeaux or Strasbourg or Dusseldorf are vital. I won't deny that they perform important functions; they are the capillaries of the Foreign Service system. But Mongolia is a separate nation; we don't need a large embassy there, but its probably more important to have representation in Ulaanbaatar than to keep the Consulate in Bremen. I had to make those choices; no one else in the Department had that responsibility. Shultz was always very supportive. He always told me to proceed and that he would back me up.

Q: How did you find the status of minorities and women in the Department and the Foreign Service when you became Under Secretary?

SPIERS: I thought that the issues of minority and women employment, assignment and promotion would be a self-correcting process. We did not have many senior women—the two most senior were Joan Clark and Roz Ridgway. I personally persuaded Secretary Shultz to nominate Ridgway as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He did not know her very well; she was our ambassador to East Germany. He was reluctant, but I told him that Ridgway had worked for me twice and she was an outstanding officer and that he could not make a better choice. I think finally to stop me from nagging him, he selected her and was never sorry for his choice. There is an increasing number of women coming into the Foreign Service at the bottom so that the problem of women in the senior ranks will be solve itself.

The problem of the African-Americans was a more frustrating one because the blacks who could pass the entrance examination had so many alternative opportunities that few gravitated to the Foreign Service. We did a lot of work with the Black Caucus.
Congressman Crockett, with whom I became pretty well acquainted through some of the trips we made together with Neil Smith, was very helpful in this area. One of my fondest memories was that when my retirement was announced, he called me and asked: “What are we going to do now without you there?”. He must have felt that we were serious about increasing the number of African-Americans in the Foreign Service. I got into a shouting match once with Bill Gray, the Congressman from Pennsylvania, because I wanted him to “stop cursing the darkness and to light a candle”. I wanted his help, rather than his constant complaints. We were making an effort, but the Foreign Service was not the first choice of the best and brightest of the African-Americans. I did a lot of work with George Vest to identify black officers and to make sure that they received assignments that might lead to promotions. The best selection I ever made was when I selected George Moose to head Management Operations. He was a super-star who gave the Foreign Service the image it needs in the black community where most likely the perception of a white Eastern establishment still is held.

Q: Did you encounter any overt or covert sabotage of your efforts?

SPIERS: I never felt that anyone opposed our policies. Unfortunately, we had an Equal Employment Opportunities officer who was almost incompetent. Vest, Bill Swing and Hank Cohen—the people with I worked most closely on these questions—were determined to improve the situation; I never noticed any opposition in the State Department. Most people accepted that in order for the Foreign Service to perform as the public wished it to, it had to include broad ethnic, gender and racial diversity. I am personally dedicated to the proposition that if the Foreign Service is to perform effectively, it must be broadly representative of the American people in all its variety. This does not mean that I wanted to see the entrance requirements distorted. I would rather make a major effort to interest qualified minorities and women to accept the Foreign service as a career.

We made some progress; we got more blacks into the senior Foreign Service ranks; they were assigned to positions where they could be role models.
Q: Let me shift now to the question of the assignment process. How did you view it when you began your tour as Under Secretary and how did you feel about it when you left it?

SPIERS: I did not see any major problems with it when I became Under Secretary or when I left. George Vest of course was the responsible officer for that process and I know that he had problems. I worked primarily on the Ambassadors and Deputy Chief of Mission assignments. We set up a DCM committee that had the same responsibilities as the Ambassadorial committee which was chaired the Deputy secretary. I headed the DCM committee, which also took responsibility for assignments of major Consuls General. We tried to establish the principle that a DCM assignment was a stepping stone to an Ambassadorial appointment. We didn't want anyone as DCM who couldn't serve as Chief of Mission; we used this process to advance minorities and women.

I thought the open assignment system, in which people made their wishes for next assignment known, was an improvement over the kind of system that had run my career. The open assignment process was not 100% successful; on the other hand, when I was assigned as Counselor for Political Affairs in London, that was a closed process; I was assigned before anyone really knew that a vacancy would exist. The assignment was worked out by the EUR Assistant Secretary directly with some principal on the Seventh Floor. I thought that this was not an appropriate personnel system. That kind of system can work against you as well. I was unhappy when I was recalled from Turkey to become the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research(INR). That Bureau did not have the reputation of being in the main stream, but I must confess that that assignment was probably the most useful and interesting one that I had in my whole career. I was not very happy about leaving Pakistan after only two years to return to Washington to take the Under Secretary for Management position. But when the Secretary of State calls and says that he has talked to the President, you say: “Yes, sir” and you move. One of the reasons why I was unhappy with that assignment is because I feared that it would bar me from ever being considered for the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, which was job I
Q: Did the issue of a single Foreign Service personnel system arise during your tenure?

SPIERS: Not really. If it did, it was a marginal issue; it was not something that was at the center of our attention. In fact, the security issue was the all-consuming one. Then there was the question of political appointees to ambassadorial positions, which I have already discussed. The implementation of the 1980 Act, following its demands closely and to the letter, was a major topic on my agenda. Reinvigorating the Foreign Service Institute to make it the best possible institution was very time consuming; in that topic, I include the planning for a new campus in Arlington. High on my agenda was also the enhancement and improvement of our use of modern technology—computers and communications especially. We for example introduced electronic mail. That was the agenda that preoccupied me and the Management Council, which I understand was abolished after my departure.

Q: Let me pursue a couple of the agenda items you mentioned, starting with training. Amplify a little on that problem, if you will.

SPIERS: The Foreign Service Institute was kind of a disgrace when I became Under Secretary. It consisted of a number of rabbit warrens scattered over several buildings in Rosslyn. I wanted to develop an institution that would give the Foreign Service a sense of community. The FSI facilities at the time were not conducive to that. One day, someone mentioned that the Defense Intelligence Agency was vacating its home in Arlington. I went to look at the site and discussed it with Shultz. I told him that I thought that this was an opportunity for him to leave a permanent legacy to the Foreign Service and the Department. He became a passionate supporter; he was most enthusiastic about the idea. He was interested in the building design; he always asked about progress. We had a number of political problems with this proposition because a number of Members
of Congress and staffers thought it was outrageous to spend the money that would be required for a bunch of Foreign Service officers. We engaged Congressman Wolfe, whose district this facility was in, in the discussion; we got the support of the other Northern Virginia congressman. The Arlington community supported the idea, but without Shultz personal and persistent support, the project would not have gotten off the ground. I understand that construction is now well under way.

I was also not entirely satisfied with the training being provided by FSI. It should have had greater integrated, career related, comprehensive programs. I was very interested in the Senior Seminar, which was supposed to be a course for officers about to undertake very senior assignments. It had become in effect a convenient assignment for personnel which couldn't be sent anywhere else. During the Management Council discussions, we agreed that no one could go to the Senior Seminar who was not in the top 10% of the last promotion list. So we up-graded considerably the student population in the Senior Seminar. Assignment to the Seminar became a prestigious one.

As a general tenet, I believed that throughout an officer's career, there should have be training opportunities. For example, I had never had a training or education assignment at FSI. There was a Center at FSI, headed by Hans Binnendijk, which was sponsoring political “war games” that I thought was very useful and fully supported, since I had participated in a number of war games conducted by the military. I thought the Department could do a much better job. But, as I said, as long as FSI was occupying such unattractive quarters—expensive, but totally inadequate—an opportunity for positive training and education was being missed. I hope that when the new FSI is inaugurated it contains an auditorium named after George Shultz.

*Q: Please discuss the issue of security a little more. You have mentioned it on a couple of occasions and it must have weighed heavily on your mind.*
SPIERS: The magnitude of the issue came out of the clear blue. It was not on my agenda or anyone else’s as far as I know when I became Under Secretary in 1983. It became all-consuming in the last half of my term. We convened the Inman Panel and established a Diplomatic Security Bureau. We had to deal with political problems that events such as the Marine Guard penetrations in Moscow and the Moscow Embassy created. We had to deal with a world-wide building program, both for new and existing facilities. We had to face the problem of world-wide information security. We spent a lot of time on these issues including prolonged and exhaustive meetings with Congress. Unlike some of the earlier security issues, our concerns were with physical security, both of employees and facilities, and information security.

We developed a major building program for which we got Congressional support; in fact, it was Congressional insistence that forced us to pay increased attention to the security issue. In later years, Congress became somewhat disenchanted with the program because of its costs. We made major changes in the Foreign Building Office (FBO) and instituted a building program that paid considerable attention to the physical security requirements. There was a lot of resistance in the Foreign Service to our new direction; the strongest proponent of the new program was George Shultz who was concerned that an inadequate security program, whether real or perceived, could become a domestic political issue which might have had a major impact on Reagan’s reelection chances. He felt that the administration was viewed as unblemished except for this kind of an issue which would have focused specifically on the State Department.

**Q:** There were some attacks on American buildings and personnel, but you suggested earlier that perhaps the problem was overblown. Why did you feel that way?

SPIERS: Soon after I became Under Secretary, the Embassies in Kuwait and Beirut were bombed. The Beirut Embassy became a cause celebre in Congress. A security project had been let lapse when Reggie Bartholomew had been our Ambassador. I had to testify before Congressional committees and defend Reggie from accusation of
laxity. I think I saved his career because there had been criticism he had not pushed hard enough to have a Delta barrier installed at the Embassy entrance. That contributed to a feeling that the Department was inert in enforcing security safeguards. Then the Moscow typewriters came along and the whole Embassy bugging case and the Marine penetration scandal. Then there were stories about our Embassy in Madagascar being targeted by communications intelligence activities; there were also stories about other U.S. Embassies' penetrations by KBG operations. All these stories made Shultz very nervous. The Secretary called me to his office and said that unless counter-measures were taken, the perception of lax security practices could become a major political issue. That is when I conceived the idea of the Inman panel, which Shultz strongly supported. The panel recommended, as I have already mentioned, a massive program costing approximately $5 billion. There was a lot of resistance to it in the Foreign Service. Many officers felt that their job was to make contacts with the local people and not be isolated in a U.S. fortress. There was a clash of views. I had some sympathy with the views of my colleagues. Shultz, as a political animal, was more concerned about the potential domestic fall-out and the growing problem with Congress on the charges of State Department laxity.

We began to have architects draw plans for buildings that were secure, but didn't look like fortresses. Bob Lamb deserves a lot of credit for that effort. The chancery in Lisbon was one of the first that met both security and aesthetic requirements. The Inman panel pointed to 300 plus State buildings around the world that didn't meet minimum security standards and were vulnerable. Shultz kept saying that the “chain was no stronger than its weakest link”; he insisted that we not only worry about the Embassies in Moscow and Eastern Europe, but all facilities because they were all vulnerable. The costs didn't concern him, but we had to improve the situation in major ways. That is why we spent so much money on the security program. There was a right-wing element in Congress—e.g. Trent Lott, Jesse Helms and his staff—that were anti-Shultz. They viewed him as being responsible for moving Reagan away from Reaganism. Shultz was also perceived by this group as a
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captive of the Foreign Service—a ridiculous charge, but firmly held by those people. The Secretary was very sensitive to those charges,

In retrospect, of course, the program was probably overdone. The Soviet Union has collapsed, reducing the possibility of attacks. The KGB is being reduced by fifty percent; its penetration capabilities seriously diminished. Terrorism seems to have burned itself out; there have not been any recent bombings of Embassies. I went to Pakistan shortly after that Embassy had been burned down. That could have been prevented by the security innovations we installed later. Now the Embassy looks like a fortress and is probably not facing a threat today, although no one can say with any certainty that two months from now there won't be an attack. No one wanted to take the onus for not taking some action if he or she might be embarrassed later.

Q: Is the image of an Embassy structure such as the one at Islamabad an impediment to good U.S.-Pakistan relations?

SPIERS: I think so because it makes the United States appear as a frightened nation, hiding its people in a fort-like facility. These establishments could be a problem for our diplomats, but there is no way of guaranteeing that new security threats are not going to arise. I am sure that today neither the Administration or Congress would be willing to devote the resources to a security program they both insisted on seven or eight years ago.

Q: I would like to pursue some of the comments you have made about Congressional perceptions of the Foreign Service. How did it arise?

SPIERS: I don't think that the perception is by any means generally accepted in Congress. There are many that have a lot of respect for the Foreign Service; there are some who don't. When I joined the Department in 1951, the image was that of a homogeneous group of Ivy Leaguers, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant; in other words, a club of people from a privileged sector of American society. While the reality of that image has evaporated, unfortunately it lingers on with some people. Nixon had that image. I remember that during
my first year in the Department, when I was working for John Foster Dulles, Vice President Nixon would come to the Department occasionally for meetings, particularly on arms control issues. These meetings were held on the Fifth Floor of State, across from the Secretary's office. Dulles treated him almost as an after-thought. After everybody had spoken their minds, Dulles would turn to Nixon with a slight disdain in his voice to ask whether the “Vice President had anything to say?”. I can remember thinking at the time, while sitting in the back row as a note-taker, that Nixon would resent the Department, in light of the treatment he was getting. When he was President, he was very anti-Foreign Service; he made sure he selected a Secretary of State who would not offer any competition. Nixon had a negative image of the Foreign Service and I suspect that there are still people in Congress, like Lott and Helms, who share his views, although I think it is, by and large, disappearing.

Olympia Snow was always friendly and cordial to me, up to the incident I described earlier. She felt that I had deliberately undermined the House Foreign Affairs Committee and specifically the subcommittee of which she was the ranking Republican member. She felt that I had betrayed her and Dan Mica by maneuvering to have the House Appropriations Committee ignore the Foreign Affairs Committee. The latter had worked hard on the Department's authorization legislation, but there were elements of the legislation that we didn't like and that the Secretary would never have accepted. The members of the Appropriations Committee had of course no sympathy with the authorizing committee and were delighted to add to their legislation a provision which stated that “nothing in this appropriations act requires authorization”; from that time on, Olympia Snow would never speak to me. It was Dante Fascell, with whom I had a cordial relationship, who finally told me what her problem was. Her concern may still linger and be sometimes reflected in anti-State sentiments. She was also very upset with Bob Oakley, when he was the Director of the Anti-terrorism Office because she felt that he had been less than candid with the Committee. Some members of that Committee were also upset by Faith Whittlesey, who was our Ambassador in Switzerland. She had gotten into a fight with some members of the
Embassy staff, who had blown the whistle and had gone to Congress with some stories. She was summoned to return to Washington to testify; both George Vest and I were asked to also testify. The Committee was obviously intent on damaging her reputation. Although I was not a devotee of Whittlesey, neither George or I testified as the Committee wished; I think they were greatly disappointed by what we had to say, which added to Olympia Snow's unhappiness with me and perhaps even the Department. This is not say that I fully understand Congresswoman Snow; I am just speculating about her unhappiness. I knew her fairly well before all these issues arose and I had not detected any hostility; on the contrary she was quite supportive until these irritants arose. I have been told by someone on the Hill that she personally campaigned against me when my name was being discussed for the Ambassadorship to Canada. This was during the Reagan administration. When I heard that story, I called her because I wanted to find out whether she had in fact done that and, if so, why; she would not, however, speak to me either personally or on the phone. This was a 180 degree turn from our earlier relationship when she would graciously see me whenever necessary.

Q: Ron, you were in the Under Secretary job longer than almost all other incumbents. Did you come to any conclusions about the management of the Department?

SPIERS: I left feeling relatively good about it; I had some satisfaction with my accomplishments. I had not sought the job; I never imagined that I would be offered it. I had hoped that some of the Reagan administration trends would be reversed. When I compare the Foreign Service under Shultz to that of today under Baker, I conclude that it was in better shape then. Baker brought in a small coterie with whom he has most of his contacts; Larry Eagleburger is left to run those parts of the Department in which he is not interested. It is a little like Kissinger—only worse. There is a general unhappiness in the Department today except for those who deal with matters that are of no interest to the Secretary. There seems to have been some progress on Ambassadorial appointments from the Reagan days. I wrote a piece on this subject sometime ago which was published by the Washington Post. It was written after I had left the Department; I was told that
it angered Baker. He told me that he thought it was outrageous. The Post made a few changes in it to give it added emphasis, which made it look more critical than it had been.

Now that I am at the UN, I view the Department as a model of rational organization. I have taken a very active role in efforts to reform the UN. I would like to introduce into this organization a number of the processes that the Department takes for granted.

I mentioned earlier that my ambition had been to become Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Shortly after coming to M, Larry Eagleburger retired from the Political Affairs job and Shultz discussed it with me, saying that he hoped that I would not declare myself as a candidate; he wanted me stay in the management job. I was disappointed, but Shultz’ position made eminent sense.

Q: Ron, many thanks for this fascinating insight. I look forward to reviewing the rest of your career in the not too distant future.

Continuation of interview: June 3, 1992

Q: Ron, on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, I want to thank you for giving us your time for this important oral history. As usual in these histories, we like to start with a brief summary of your background.

SPIERS: I had been interested in foreign affairs since I was about twelve years old. I wanted to enter the diplomatic service since that time. All of my education therefore became oriented towards international relations; I majored in international relations as an undergraduate at Dartmouth College. Then I went on to the Woodrow Wilson graduate school at Princeton University where I also concentrated on international relations. My degree was actually a Master in Public Affairs. Woodrow Wilson had actually two curricula: one which emphasized domestic matters and one which specialized in foreign affairs. I took most of my courses in the latter.
I don't really know what first really interested me in the subject. I had lived overseas a lot when I was a child. My father was a banker who worked in international banking for the then National City Bank, now Citicorp. We lived in Latin America and Europe. So my interest in what was going on in other countries developed naturally. When I was in high school, I was probably the only kid who kept up with current events.

Later, I joined the Navy during World War II. I never got in combat because I went overseas just as the war was winding down in the Pacific. But I did have a number of friends who were killed in combat and that probably further stimulated an idealistic interest in foreign affairs.

I wanted to join the State Department when I finished with my academic studies. But at the time, the Wriston program was in full swing and although I had a job offer extended to me in the Office of Regional Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs—the same Office of which some years later I became the Director— the Department imposed a job freeze. I was newly married and my wife was pregnant with our first child. So during a visit to Washington, I went to the Atomic Energy Commission, which then was a recently established agency. I was of course in some desperation; I needed a job, at least a temporary one while the Department sorted out its personnel policies. Lo and behold, AEC hired me although it did take eight months to get through their security clearance process. AEC was exempted from civil service rules and regulations; it had its own employment standards and personnel regulations. It had a very rigorous security process. I think they were somewhat surprised that some one with my background, whose ambition was to join the Foreign Service, would seek employment with the Commission. I was surprised by the alacrity they displayed in hiring me, It took them about ten minutes to offer me a job. I must confess that I didn't really know what the AEC did. I started as a GS-5 which I believe in those days paid the munificent salary of $3,100.

That job was probably the luckiest thing that ever happened to me because I developed an expertise in a field that, certainly then, not many people were familiar with. My work at
the AEC was in the international field. The Commission had an Office of Special Projects, which dealt with the international aspects of atomic energy issues. I had of course never heard of that Office, whose title was somewhat of a “cover”. In those days, there was a Combined Policy Committee and a Combined Development Agency. The combined policy committee, consisting of the Canada, the U.K and the U.S., was a joint policy making body in the atomic energy area. It developed policy on all issues related to atomic and nuclear problems. The Combined Development Agency, on whose staff I actually worked, was responsible for the joint uranium procurement. So I became involved in such problems as negotiating with uranium sources as well as more policy oriented issues such as international control of atomic energy. My experience with the AEC turned out to be absolutely fascinating and gave me entree to relatively high level government officials.

When I joined the AEC, Gordon Dean was the chairman of the Commission. The Office of Special Projects had only three or four professionals on its staff. The director was a former State Department official, a Harvard PhD by the name of John Hall who had left the Department for what he perceived to be “greener pastures”. The job was very interesting, as I said. I had an opportunity to work on issues that I would never have encountered in the State Department. One of our functions was to be the liaison channel between the AEC and State. In the Department, our counterparts worked for the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy (S/AE). I later joined that staff. While I was in the AEC, the Special Assistant was first Ed Gullion, a senior Foreign Service officer and later Gordon Arneson. I worked later with Gullion on disarmament and arms control issues.

At one stage, I wrote a memorandum to the Commissioners—Hall was away—which proposed an international program in atomic energy. Lewis Straus was the chairman at the time. I think he became somewhat upset at my presumption—a junior staff member submitting directly a major proposal to the Commission. One of the Commissioners, Harry Smythe, who had been a Princeton physics professor and the author of the Smythe report after World War II, became interested in my proposal. He took it over to the White
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House and it ultimately landed on President Eisenhower's desk. I was told that the President found it very enticing; it led to the “Atoms for Peace” program and ultimately to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I later participated in the negotiations to establish the IAEA.

In late 1951 or early 1952, I wrote the first memorandum outlining the IAEA's proposed functions and responsibilities. Of all of the matters I worked on during my career in the government, I am probably the proudest of having a key part in the IAEA's birth because it has turned out to be an increasingly important part of the world's attempts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. My memo led to Eisenhower's speech at the UN in December 1953. I didn't write the speech, but a lot of my ideas showed up in it.

So my AEC experience was rather heady, particularly for someone still in his twenties. I stayed with the Commission for over four years. I could easily see that I was involved in issues that I would never have gotten near as a junior officer in the State Department. But finally, at the end of 1954, the people in the Bureau of International Organizations (IO) in the Department came to the conclusion that they didn't have the expertise to play a major role in the international atomic game. So at that point, I was approached by IO and asked whether I would be interested in transferring to State. Since that had always been my objective, I readily agreed and in January 1955 I became an employee of the Department of State. I was given a Foreign Service Reserve appointment at a pay level equivalent to my AEC salary of a GS-13. My career in the AEC had been very rewarding because I had been promoted almost like clock work every six months.

My State Department position was in the Office of UN Political Affairs (UNP) then headed by David Popper. When I first got to IO, the Assistant Secretary was Dave McKee, a senior Foreign Service officer who had been Ambassador to Burma. He was nice but ineffectual man who didn't know much about international organizations. He was succeeded by Fran Wilcox who had been the staff director of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. He was much more knowledgeable, but Fran was not a big power either. IO, as it is today, is
the principal bureau responsible for the UN and other international organizations. But it was not considered as one of the central bureaus of the Department. The normal Foreign Service officer considered IO somewhat off-beat perhaps even irrelevant; it dealt with a lot of resolutions passed by the UN that no one read. The Bureau was not regarded as a very desirable assignment, but I found a number of very highly qualified staff members. For example, Joe Sisco was there as a staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary; Sam De Palma, Dave Popper were there. These were first class people, but they did not have the standard Foreign Service background; so they were regarded as out of the “main stream”.

I worked in a fairly narrow spectrum of IO’s general jurisdiction. I worked for Howard Meyers, who was one of the division directors. My first assignments were in the field of arms control and disarmament, including atomic energy. There were other political issues in which I became involved. For example, I was a member of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly in 1955, 1956 and 1957, working principally on arms control and disarmament. I also worked on the Suez Canal crisis, helping establish the first major UN emergency peacekeeping force. I worked on the Hungary question; Cyprus, Algeria, Morocco (the de-colonization issues). I was involved in all sorts of political issues. I got involved in the China representation issue. I can remember Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson and Ruth Bacon, then EA's UN Advisor being very excited by that issue. They were not so much interested in the IAEA as they were in keeping China out of any international bodies. I would get frantic calls from Bacon, which sounded very intimidating, threatening dire consequences to my career if I didn't follow her party line very carefully on this issue. I suppose that EA regarded IO as “soft” on the issue of Chinese representation and therefore not trustworthy. She was going to make sure that no one would deviate from keeping China out of international bodies. The “China lobby” was more of a pest because no one was going to breach our policy on that issue. EA didn't understand the IAEA's role, but since I was doing most the negotiations on setting up the organization, I was the target of their concerns.
We held a conference in 1956 in New York and I probably wrote about half of the basic statute setting up the IAEA. I must say that our hopes for IAEA were far greater than what was actually realized. The authorities which we aspired for it were greatly watered down. Nevertheless, it may still turn out to be the organization that I had initially envisaged. I was looking for an institution that could develop atomic energy in an international context while at the same time maintaining a control over the inevitable proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. I was also fascinated by the potential that IAEA represented because it was one of the first international organizations in which the Soviets and the U.S. were working together. I can remember that at this time, the Soviet desk (EUR/SOV) of the Department, which was staffed by people like Ed Freers, Mac Toon and Mac Godley who were just scathing about the process of establishing the IAEA until they realized that I was having more contact with the Soviets than they had. Generally, SOV didn't get very much involved; it took a supercilious view of the whole process; the Soviet “experts” didn't believe that the negotiations would ever be concluded successfully and in any case felt they weren't very important. The Soviet desk didn't understand atomic issues anyway; they were a big mystery to them. Both EA and SOV viewed the negotiations as a “technical” matter and therefore of little political interest.

But I met people that I still know today like Yuli Vorontsov, now the Soviet permanent representative at the UN and Douglas Hurd, now the British Foreign Minister. They were people I worked with all the time. We did reach agreement on the functions of IAEA; it was really the first complex agreement that the U.S. and the Soviet Union and many other countries (the U.K., Canada, South Africa—a major supplier of uranium) were able to reach. So I saw it as a kind of bell-weather for those sorts of negotiations. All were concerned by the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that and other reasons, we were able to conduct serious negotiations with the Soviet Union; I doubt that if our delegation had been staffed by people from the Department's regional bureaus the negotiations could have been concluded. Our chief negotiator was Jerry Wadsworth, who was Henry Cabot Lodge's deputy at the UN. Jerry, was not a heavyweight, except
physically, but he had a genius for negotiations and for getting along with people. He developed a relationship of confidence among the delegations; he kept the Soviets informed about what he was doing. Gradually, the Soviets came to trust him and began to see the negotiations were not intended to put them at any disadvantage. So they took the negotiations seriously; ultimately, after a few weeks, we did reach agreement on the basic statute, which Dulles also supported. It is true, as I mentioned earlier, that the powers of the IAEA were not as encompassing as were envisaged in the initial draft; its power over the nuclear nations was less than I had hoped for. The Soviets, represented by Igor Usachov, a Foreign Service officer and now a professor at the Russian Institute for International Studies, and I tried to give the IAEA some supervision or participation in our nuclear programs. We did get an important paragraph into the statute, which was the most we could get, which is still in force and being used today. That provision permits countries to submit their own nuclear energy facilities to international inspection. The Swiss observer, August Lindt, to the UN was a very important cog in the negotiations—he was later the Swiss Ambassador in Washington and High Commissioner for Refugees. He and I together were able to reach agreement with the Soviets on the composition of the Board of Governors of the IAEA which was a sticky issue. This negotiation was a very interesting experience in part because it was the only negotiations up to that time that the Soviets and we were involved in which had a successful outcome. The two sides were at odds on all other issues.

I was not involved in UN economic or social affairs. Most of these nuclear and arms control questions were not of great interest to the Department as a whole, although Dulles found a number of them very interesting and sensed their importance.

One morning, in early 1956, Wilcox was unexpectedly summoned by Secretary John Foster Dulles who wanted to discuss disarmament and arms control negotiations. Wilcox wanted Popper and/or Meyers to go with him, but neither were available. Finally, in desperation, he asked me to go with him. So I met Dulles for the first time. The Secretary began to ask questions that Wilcox couldn't answer, but which I could; Howard Meyers,
had he been there, could also have answered them. I guess I must have made a favorable impression on Dulles because the next day, when I arrived at my IO office, I was told that I had been transferred to the Secretary's office as a special assistant. To say the least, all of us were very surprised. For organizational purposes, I was assigned to the Office of the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy (S/AE). My main responsibilities were in the field of disarmament and arms control, which were removed from IO. However, Dulles was very interested at the time in the question of nuclear testing and the fuss over radioactive fall-out. It was a big issue at the UN as well as for the American public and the U.S. government. I suggested that the UN establish a commission to evaluate the effects of atomic radiation. Dulles had somehow found out that I had been the originator of the proposal. Lewis Straus or John McCone, who succeeded Straus, heard about this and was furious, but Dulles liked the idea. I suggested that a group of scientists from a number countries meet to look objectively at the issue which was being clouded by a lot of emotionalism and rhetorical talk about health damage that was being caused by fall-out. There was a major worldwide onslaught on nuclear testing. The AEC, in a very parochial and self-righteous way, had announced that no damage whatsoever was being caused by testing; that line was not selling. So I proposed this international study; it was of course opposed by the AEC, the Department of Defense, but Dulles over-ruled them and decided to give the idea a trial. It was adopted unanimously by the General assembly in 1955; if nothing else, it calmed the rough waters at least for a while. My idea was that this commission would meet once and issue a report which hopefully would have been objective and credible because the authors would have been internationally recognized scientists from a range of countries. Subsequently, I had suggested that the monitoring and evaluation function would be assumed by the IAEA when it was a going concern. Much to my surprise, when I became Under Secretary General at the UN thirty-five years later, I found that commission still in existence, which gave me considerable insight into how the UN operates: no “sunset” provisions.
I got to know Dulles fairly well. We developed something of a grandfather-grandson relationship. I used to go to his house on Normanstone Drive on weekends. I think that he liked me because a) I was a Princeton graduate, b) because I was not tainted by being a long-term Foreign Service officer and c) I was very young and he may have seen something of himself as a young man in me. He, at approximately my age, had been a member of the U.S. delegation to the Versailles conference. He also had a greater interest than the Department in the UN.

I met Eisenhower once at a meeting on atomic energy issues. I didn't have the opportunity to have any relationships with Congress, although I did met some members and got to know very well Hubert Humphrey and George Aiken, the senator from Vermont, who were members of our delegation to the UN. In those days, unlike today, the Congressional representatives really participated. These delegation experiences started a long acquaintanceship with Humphrey, to which I hope we can return later.

I might just mention that in the Department of State, atomic energy was a highly classified subject which had a special mystique, probably a misplaced one. Because of that, at some point S/AE was created, even before Dulles became Secretary. The field of arms control and disarmament, which my main area of responsibility, all of sudden got a major boost in resources. I was given a staff of four or five people and everything that we needed. That was a very interesting experience. Initially a lot of my weekend meetings with Dulles were to review and work on arms control and disarmament issues that he was working on for Eisenhower. Most often Phyllis Bernau, his personal secretary was there; sometimes Bob Bowie, the director of the Planning Staff was also there. Over a period of time, these sessions went beyond arms control; we discussed other matters. For example, Dulles asked me to draft much of what became later part of the Eisenhower-Bulganin correspondence; I also worked with him on correspondence with MacMillan and other European leaders.
During this period, Harold Stassen was appointed to be the President's Special Representative on Arms Control. Although he nominally worked out of the White House, we acted as his staff and backstopped him. I well remember once when Stassen was in New York, he asked for instructions on some issue. I was with him in New York at the time. So I went back to Washington, drafted the instructions and sent them to him. He thought that was outrageous, but that was the process that was created. I had to get the instructions cleared, but in fact I worked for Stassen as well as for Dulles.

Stassen was a real loose cannon. He started to do things that really upset Dulles. I remember once when Stassen was in London for a UN Disarmament Commission meeting. I got a note in the pouch indicating that Stassen was passing certain papers to the Soviets; no one knew anything about that. Charlie Stelle was on the Policy Planning staff at the time; I worked closely with him on some issues. As a matter of fact, that staff was the only other part of the Department that was really involved in arms control and disarmament issues. Together, we took the information about Stassen to Dulles. At about the same time, Dulles received a blistering letter from Harold MacMillan about what Stassen was doing. That was part of the reason I think Dulles assigned responsibilities to me that I would not ordinarily, in light of my age and rank, have had; it was an unusual personal relationship. After getting this information, he called Stassen to his office and I was told, really read him the riot act.

Stassen had the habit in London of sending most of his messages by NIACT (NIGHT-IMMEDIATE ACTION). That was another sore point. I really didn't along very well with him. I think Dulles knew that and since he didn't like Stassen at all, that was probably another reason we got along so well together. I finally had to send Stassen a cable citing the NIACT regulations. We did not in those days have a Secretariat which could screen these messages. I lived in Parkfairfax and I used to get calls in the middle of the night from the Department's message center because NIACTS required immediate attention. I would
have to get dressed and drive down to the Department and look at the message which more often than not would be entirely inconsequential.

Q: The Dulles-Stassen antagonism went on for a long time. Was it a personality clash or where there some substantive disagreements?

SPIERS: It was both. Stassen was a strange duck. Also Dulles distrusted him in the area of arms control. He didn't trust the Soviets; he was uncomfortable in dealing with them on that issue. He recognized that the U.S. government had to be engaged in discussions on the issue for public relations reasons, if no other. But he thought that Stassen was politically ambitious and that his judgment in this vital issue might be colored by his ambitions. Stassen did pass unauthorized papers to the Soviets without consultation with Washington or any of our allies; that upset a lot of people.

Q: What made Dulles so distrustful of the Soviets?

SPIERS: I am not sure. He was a puritan, quite religious and from a very conservative background. He just didn't like Communists. He didn't trust them, he had no sympathy for them. He also didn't trust the State Department pros.

The Dulles view of the Soviets was my first encounter with an official U.S. view. But it was the same view that was held by SOV and throughout the State Department. The organization had a deep distrust and dislike of the Soviets.

Q: What impact did that view have on disarmament and arms control negotiations? Did it make those negotiations essentially just an exercise in public relations?

SPIERS: For most people, the negotiations were a public relations game. In 1958, while I was in S/AE, things really began to change; as I said by that time I had established a working relationship with Dulles which lasted until he became sick and then died. I was involved at the beginning of the test ban negotiations. I think I was instrumental in
persuading Dulles to open those discussions. We had a team of scientists meet with Soviet scientists in Geneva in 1958 to explore whether a consensus on some of the technical aspects of verifying test bans could be developed. Dulles was thoroughly convinced that bans could not be verified. I can remember being in meetings with just Dulles, McCone and myself during which McCone, then the Chairman of the AEC, would discuss verification. Dulles had a good sense of the public relations aspects of the issue. The U.S. was getting beaten up in the UN and in some of the media; the British and the Canadians were applying some pressure to get us to take a more forthcoming position and to pay more attention to public opinion. I don't remember who suggested the idea of a technical meeting, but I drafted the papers which got the ball rolling. McCone essentially picked the scientists. Jim Fisk headed our delegation; he was then the director of the Bell labs in New Jersey. Other participants were Bob Bacher, who had been a member of the AEC, Ernest Lawrence, who took ill and died during the Geneva conference, and Hans Bethe. The delegation was supported by a staff. Harold Brown—Secretary of Defense—later and I were the junior members of the delegation. Walt Stoessel was there briefly to help as an interpreter. I stayed for the duration. The negotiations did not succeed, but it was the first step to take a look at test bans from a technical point of view rather than just from a propaganda perspective.

At about the same time, we were involved in the “Surprise Attack” conference, which also took place in Geneva. That was a mess! The U.S. representative, Bill Foster—later the first Director of ACDA and former Deputy Secretary of Defense—was not very good. Although also un Successful, that conference was very useful because it began to engage a number of strategic thinkers in problems of arms control and tension reductions. People like Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahn became involved and that became very useful. That conference didn't last very long which for me was somewhat helpful because I tried to cover both conferences simultaneously by moving from one to the other.
Q: Was the fact that disarmament negotiations were handled by S/AE at all indicative that during this period the only arms control and disarmament issues were perceived to be nuclear ones?

SPIERS: There were other issues as well. We had some discussions about conventional arms controls. Ben Cohen who had been one of FDR's “brain trusters” was involved in negotiations on conventional arms. But it was IO that backstopped those negotiations. And Dulles did not trust IO. He viewed that staff as being essentially ignorant on the issues and who viewed negotiations strictly from a UN point of view. He thought they were more interested in just resolving the problem or making it go away and that they viewed the negotiations essentially as public relations exercises. He was probably concerned that IO was more interested in reaching an agreement than in making sure that the agreement was beneficial to the United States. He thought that IO was too influenced by the UN. IO was its own worst enemy. I can remember Bob Murphy, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, becoming furious in some meetings at some of the views expressed by IO staffers. He accused them as acting as if these were casual just questions rather than major U.S. security issues. Dulles wanted our negotiators to have a different orientation, which I probably had because I viewed much of the UN process as silly. More importantly, I thought that being entirely oblivious and dismissive of the potential of serious negotiations hurt the U.S. The basic problem was that the arms control/disarmament issues were being handled at the UN and in a multilateral context. The UN was the successor organization to the League of Nations where disarmament talks had taken place in the 1920s and 1930s. The negotiations at the UN were not handled by anyone who had a real understanding of strategic issues, weapon systems, national security requirements, etc.

We should not be fooled by the title “S/AE”. When I joined that staff, in fact, all disarmament and arms control negotiations responsibilities were transferred to that office so that it handled much more than just atomic energy matters, although nuclear issues were the core of disarmament talks. We had the Baruch plan which Acheson and
Lillienthal had put together; that was the first major U.S. initiative on control of atomic energy. We could not reach agreement on that plan; the Soviets reacted very negatively, but it did begin a negotiating process. As time went on, the Soviets became increasingly interested in reaching meaningful agreements.

EUR had practically no say or impact on disarmament issues. S/P had some because of Charlie Stelle, whom I mentioned earlier. He was serious person; he later became the negotiator on the “hot line” agreement and participated in some of the test ban negotiations. He died rather young, but it was he that got S/P involved in this discussions. He was very helpful to me. Charlie was the person who first gave me access to Dulles because when I noticed, for example, that Stassen was getting off the reservation I thought it should be brought to the attention of the Secretary and Charlie became the conduit for the information I collected and my thoughts on them.

Q: You mentioned the lack of knowledge and interest in the Department on arms control and disarmament issues. Was there any concern for this vacuum in 1958 among the Department's leadership?

SPIERS: I don't recall much concern.

Q: Let me then ask you about your thoughts about the problem of Departmental lack of interest in politico-military matters in general and disarmament issues in particular as you saw it over the thirty yours of service in the Department.

SPIERS: I think that interest did increase over my period in the Department. The Department did respond, albeit perhaps a little slowly, by establishing a Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The person most responsible for bringing the Department into this field was undoubtedly Alexis Johnson. He first had set up a unit in his office—G/PM—headed by Jeff Kitchen. Kitchen was succeeded by Phil Farley. Then Johnson decided that the issues were important enough to warrant a full-fledged new Bureau. At that time, I was the Political Counselor in our Embassy in London. One day, I got a call from Alex Johnson
asking me to come back to organize this new Bureau. I guess he thought of me as the official in the Department who had the most experience in this area because of the work I had done on arms control.

*Q: Let me return briefly to the question of the Department's views of the Soviet Union. You have described it as it was in the late 50s. Did it change during your career in the Department?*

*SPIERS: I don't think there was a great deal of change. I would probably held a view different than that of many of my colleagues. I did not see the Soviets as maniacal. What has happened to the Soviet Union does not surprise me. I won't say that I predicted it, but it certainly hasn't surprised me. I always viewed the Soviets as their own worst enemy. They were stuck with a system that was not going to work. I refused, unlike too many of my Departmental colleagues, to build them up to be ten feet tall. That in part was the result of having worked with them; I saw many of them just as human beings. I saw their misconceptions and fallacies, but also some of their better individual qualities. I saw the Soviets as somewhat of a baleful element in international affairs, but I also did not consider that they would ultimately develop a successful society. I never thought that the Soviets would attack the West, although I was always a strong proponent of NATO and of defense preparedness. I also strongly supported arms control negotiations, not for mere propaganda or as a public relations effort to appease public opinion. I saw it as a potentially serious avenue to establish a stable strategic balance at possibly lower levels of costs, but I was always certain that ultimately the Soviet system was just not going to succeed. I did not regard the Soviet Union as a major military threat. On all of these views, I was probably in disagreement with many State Department officials and certainly with SOV.*

I can't tell for sure why my views were so different from others. I mentioned already that I had many contacts with Soviets, probably more in the late 50s and early 60s than anyone else in the Department, including people in our Embassy in Moscow who were
pretty isolated. I dealt with Soviets daily; I had a lot of contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington and with their delegation at the UN. Some of these people became my friends. I had enough confidence in my ability and judgment to discount the possibility of being duped by them or “taken in”. I saw their weaknesses. I saw them as paranoid. I thought that a lot of Americans were paranoid as well. In retrospect, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wasted a lot of money on unnecessary armaments. I always felt strongly that deterrence was necessary because you could never be certain that the Soviets might not try to extend their power through the use of military force, but I suspect that both of us may have been able to maintain that deterrence at a lower level or arms. I remember that when I was Ambassador in Pakistan in the early 80s I had the same discussions and arguments with President Zia about his military capacities.

Q: What were your views about the “first use” of nuclear weapons and whether nuclear weapons should be targeted on military facilities only or also on large population centers?

SPIERS: I got involved in that issue when I became Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) in 1969. This was the time when John Foster in DoD was conducting his “limited option” study, which I supported fully. The issue may well have arisen before then, but I was in London from 1966 to 1969.

I was involved in a lot of these issues when I was in the Office for Regional Politico-Military Affairs (EUR/RPM), both as Deputy Director and then Director from 1962 to 1966. This was the time that France left NATO, when the Defense Planning Committee was established, when the Nuclear Planning Working Group was established, but the question of “first use” and the targets came up later under the Schlesinger/Foster regime in the Pentagon. I was involved, as I said, in the discussion of these issue and generally supportive of their approaches and conclusions, which I think really surprised Foster. I suspect that Foster had been counseled by Sey Weiss and had probably been warned about my views and those of my colleagues.
Q: How much interest did you find on the Hill on disarmament issues in these early days?

SPIERS: Very little. I have already mentioned my relationship with Hubert Humphrey. He was assisted by Betty Goetz. Both, I thought, were very naive and therefore tempted to push the process harder than I thought wise. I can remember Humphrey fulminating against the State Department for not taking these issues more seriously. I had to, of course, defend the Department. I didn't have any dealings with Scoop Jackson on disarmament issues. I did have contacts with him and his staff when I was the Ambassador to Turkey (1977-80) when I was trying to get the arms embargo lifted; I got absolutely no support for it from Jackson and his staff, including Dick Perle.

I should mention the attitude of the White House on disarmament issues. It was not very deeply involved in the pre-Kissinger era, with perhaps the exception of McGeorge Bundy during the MLF episode. I did a lot of work with him on that subject. But on arms control issues, I don't remember any one in the White House outside the Science Adviser's Office paying much attention in the 50s and 60s. Spurgeon Keeny was the exception.

Q: One has the impression that disarmament issues in the late 50s and early 60s were left in the Department to essentially experts like yourself and the rest of the Department paid little heed or cared. Is that a true picture?

SPIERS: I think that is an accurate portrayal, with the exception of Charlie Stelle, to whom I have already referred. There was very little understanding of disarmament's relevance to other political issues. And very little interest.

Q: When the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established, did you have any views on that decision?

SPIERS: Very definitely. There had been an increasing criticism toward the end of the 50s that the Department of State was permitting the increasingly important issue of disarmament to be managed by a bunch of boys. I was the director of the responsible
office and I was in my early 30s and an FSR-3. My staff consisted of Vince Baker, Bob Devecchi, Donald Morris, Jeremy Blachet, all junior to me in rank and about the same age. We provided all the support for the negotiations.

Our youth and grade level created considerable concern in Washington, including the Department. Concern increased as the disarmament issue received increasing attention. It became quite noticeable after the IAEA negotiations. I can remember meeting in the late 50s with Bob Murphy on some disarmament question. With Murphy were Johnny Haynes, a political appointee who was then a deputy assistant secretary in IO and about my age, and me. I could see Murphy's concern; here were issues which were escalating in importance being handled by inexperienced officers like Haynes and myself. Ultimately, in about 1959, the administration decided to establish a disarmament bureau. That took the issue away from S/AE. The Secretary picked Ed Gullion to head the new bureau. He was a senior Foreign Service officer, who had had some previous experience in the disarmament field. We were all transferred to the new bureau to work for Gullion, but that organizational scheme didn't last for six months because a new President, Jack Kennedy, was elected. During the second half of 1959, there was increasing attention to the arms control issue. After his election, Kennedy asked John McCloy to conduct a study on how the U.S. government should be organized to handle arms control matters. I was asked to help McCloy with this endeavor. I was strongly opposed to establishing what came to be ACDA. I didn't object to the bureau under Gullion because I also had become concerned at the level of the staff working on arms control issues. My concern had to do more with quantity than quality because I felt that we had some very good people working on the problems, but we didn't have the clout. That was particularly true after Dulles' death because when Christian Herter, Jr. was Secretary the whole issue degenerated into a blatant propaganda war, with the Soviets pushing “general and complete” disarmament. The public became increasingly interested as the test ban and “surprise attack” became subjects for negotiations. I was in favor of an organization with more bureaucratic clout than S/AE, but I opposed all ideas which would have removed the subject matter from the
Department's jurisdiction. The Secretary of State had the bureaucratic muscle necessary to move the issues along both within the Department and the government in general. I thought he would have more clout than an agency director would have had. That is one of the reasons I was opposed to the establishment of ACDA.

Furthermore, I viewed disarmament and arms control as an integral part of foreign and national security policies. I viewed the establishment of an independent agency as a bad decision because I was concerned that the very vital arms control issues would be sidelined, as they in fact became. It may well have been true that the Department of State showed insufficient interest in these issues; that was manageable. But it should have been part of the Secretary of State's mandate and a central concern of his. He had to pay attention to these issues and any organizational concept which removed the problems from his immediate focus was wrong in concept. Disarmament was of major interest to our allies and other foreign ministers. During the period of time we are discussing, there were two major issues: Germany and arms control. How could the Secretary of State really discuss arms control when the work on that issue was being done outside of his organization? His own Department had a supercilious attitude about disarmament, as I mentioned earlier, and that no doubt contributed to setting up ACDA.

The first important memos that Kennedy wanted were on the subjects of Germany and arms control. Martin Hillenbrand wrote on the first subject; I wrote on the second. It was the Secretary of State who sent the memo to the President. Had ACDA been alive at the time, the Secretary could not have responded to half of the President's request.

Nevertheless, McCoy recommended the establishment of a separate agency. The legislation to accomplish this was drafted essentially by two people: Adrian Fisher, who had been the Department's Legal Advisor under Acheson, and George Bunn, a young lawyer who Fisher brought with him. When the draft was completed, I was asked to review it. I laughed because the statute, by neglect, had left complete responsibility for negotiations on arms control and disarmament issues in the State Department. Fisher
and Bunn had never considered that aspect of the process. They then wrote another paragraph making ACDA responsible for negotiations.

The Department, in general, never paid much attention to ACDA's establishment. It still at this time did not understand the relevance of arms control to its own responsibilities. Dulles had died; Herter was ill. Rusk became Secretary of State and he was a strong Kennedy loyalist and would agree with anything that Kennedy wanted. I nevertheless continued to argue against ACDA, but lost the battle. When ACDA was established, we were all transferred to it without anyone asking us. I was transferred from the Foreign Service to the Civil Service without being consulted. I was promoted to GS-16, but I was very unhappy with the outcome.

I stayed in ACDA for a few months, long enough to have all my concerns confirmed. Bill Foster became the first Director. He seemed to be more interested in whether he was provided a government limousine and whether it had a phone in it than in the substance of the issues. He moved into Dulles' old office in the old State Department. But I was very unhappy. We did work on setting up a forum for negotiations—the ten nation Disarmament Commission. Later I worked on the negotiations to set up an eighteen member Commission, which still meets in an enlarged version. I was in Geneva for its first meetings, accompanying Rusk. It was about at this time, that I got the offer to return to the Department as deputy director of the Office of Regional Politico-Military Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/RPM). I accepted that with alacrity.

In retrospect, I still believe that the establishment of ACDA was a mistake. It would have been far preferable to have a State Department Bureau charged with responsibility for arms control and disarmament matters. Much of the progress on these issues were made when the Department became involved in them. I think I was as much involved with some arms control issues when I was in RPM as I would have been IN ACDA. The non-proliferation treaty, for example, was originally my idea. I originated the phrase “non-proliferation”. I worked on the “hot line” and on test ban negotiations when I was in RPM.
These were issues on which there were successful negotiations and in which ACDA was not very much involved. For example, Averell Harriman was selected to negotiate the test ban agreement; ACDA was marginal.

In all fairness, I must say that I think over a period of time, the Department and the Foreign Service became more cognizant of the importance of arms control issues. A whole concept was developed; it became less a matter of just appeasing a lot of pressure from the UN which continued to spew out its ineffective resolutions. The whole issue finally was essentially taken out of the UN context. The ten and eighteen nations disarmament commissions had nothing to do with the UN. The “surprise attack” conference and the test ban technical conference did not meet under UN auspices. This process started in the late 50s an early 60s. As far as I was concerned, this divorce between arms control and the UN was intentional. The staff that continue to follow the issues in IO didn’t really understand it nor really cared substantively about it. It was only interested in minimizing tensions and conflicts in New York. In any case, I saw the UN more as an impediment than a facilitator in the negotiation process. This is one of reasons that the IAEA is not a UN specialized agency; its headquarters is not in Geneva. Those were two decisions in which I was involved and I strongly supported them because it distanced the IAEA from the UN. I thought then and I still believe that much of the UN discussions are highly rhetorical and superficial and intended to serve immediate and superficial purposes. I have noticed a great improvement on that score, but I think it is still a problem.

Q: Let me ask some questions now about specific arms control issues. I would like to start with the test ban issue and ask you to describe your involvement in that matter.

SPIERS: It was started by the dialogues at the UN. There was a lot of hysteria in the UN about the effects of atomic radiation and fall-out and what the above-surface tests being conducted by a number of nations were doing to human beings. Krishna Menon, the Indian leader, was really the guru on the subject. He would attend UN sessions and soon have all the delegations in an uproar. I had a different view on testing. I never really believed
that nuclear weapons would be used. They would inflict too much damage on all to be a viable weapon. Nuclear weapons were essentially deterrents. I never contemplated the possibility of a nuclear war. I always had reservations about such plans as the SIOP and other war plans which called for the use of nuclear tactical weapons in Europe, for example. I remember discussing this issue with McNamara who interestingly enough did not differ greatly from my view on this issue.

Unfortunately, as the Soviets developed better nuclear capabilities, the nature of deterrence changed. We all moved towards a war fighting philosophy. In order to deter, the assumption had to be that use of nuclear weapons would be a rational option. I never believed it possible that there would be a rational nuclear war. There would be too much fall-out; it would slaughter too many people; governments would balk when they had to face the potential of firing a nuclear weapon. That meant that initially, I saw our nuclear weapons as a cheap way of balancing the Soviet conventional arm and manpower superiority in Europe. That was fine. But soon, the doctrine expanded to include other contingencies. So I saw the test ban as a means of inhibiting the development of new war fighting concepts on both sides.

I have had three big arguments in my career in the government. The first one, which reached President Kennedy, concerned the limited test ban idea; I opposed it because I was certain that given another six months for negotiations, we could have reached agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Once having agreed to a limited test ban, that would be the end of serious negotiations on that subject for the foreseeable future.

The second argument came later and concerned MIRV testing. We had developed MIRVs and I predicted that the Soviets would develop their own in the not too distant future. I believed that a ban on MIRV testing would have stopped Soviet developmental efforts; that would have been advantageous to us because the Soviet missile launchers had greater throw-weight and could therefore constitute a more potent weapon than we had. But my
arguments did not prevail, in part because of the opposition of conservatives wedded to “war fighting”.

The third argument related to Iran and did not involve arms control. The point I wanted to make here was that I was not in favor of a limited test ban treaty. As I suggested earlier, I favored a comprehensive ban because I felt that this was the optimal way of preventing the development of new weapons which were so costly and would never be used in any case. I never favored the concept of “no first use” because I thought that reduced the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. I thought the idea as essentially rhetorical. There were a lot of people, particularly in ACDA, who favored the “no first use” proposal and wanted to conclude an agreement with the Soviets on the issue.

There was a fellow by the name of Amrom Katz. He participated in the “surprise attack” conference. He said that “availability determines relevance”; e.g. as long as a weapon was available, a bureaucracy would develop a theory which would justify its utility. I believe that there is a lot of truth in that thesis. I used to be briefed annually on SIOP in Omaha. I thought the whole thing crazy, but it was the core of U.S. strategic policy.

Q: One of the interesting aspects of your comments is that the fundamental disagreements on U.S. arms control issues between the various factions were never reconciled and only disappeared recently essentially because of the break-up of the Soviet Union.

SPIERS: That is correct. I go back to the discussions with McNamara. We had a “Committee of Principals”—a cabinet level committee—which was a back-stopping organization for arms control negotiations. I was essentially the executive secretary of the group. This was in the pre-ACDA period. We used to meet on the Seventh Floor of the State Department in one of the big conference rooms. I used to get to the room early to make sure it was all properly set up. McNamara would also appear early and so we had a chance to talk about various issues. It was clear to me that his views were similar if not identical to mine. We had loaded Europe up with ADMs, 155 howitzers, Honest Johns,
but no one had the slightest idea how they would be used. There were there because we could, and therefore, had produced them.

There were people in the Pentagon who had developed rationales for the manufacturing and deployment of the weapons, but they were essentially technicians, not policy makers. The real reason we did not achieve a test ban is because the weapons developers did not want to be unemployed or wanted to be limited in their activities. A lot of the discussions about testing for safety reasons is nonsense; there are many ways to assure yourself of the reliability of the weapon without nuclear tests. A test ban treaty would have been of greater benefit to the U.S. than to the Soviets, although I felt that it would have certainly been in the interests of both powers. In addition to the net benefits of a test ban which I mentioned earlier, such a treaty would have been beneficial to us because it would have brought to halt the incessant propaganda that was emanating from most of the world which sincerely wanted a ban.

**Q: Much of the test ban discussions revolved around the question of verification. What were your views on the feasibility of verification?**

**SPIERS:** I was a kind of interested observer. One of my first educational experience was the Geneva conference of scientists in 1958, which I mentioned earlier. Bethe and Lawrence attended. It was clear that their scientific judgments were a product of their political orientation. I was totally disillusioned by alleged “scientific objectivity”. Bethe supported the test ban fully; Lawrence opposed it. Yet both looked at the same data. Teller was there and held strong political views which led him to oppose a ban. I realized then that you could not look to scientists for objective analysis; I had based on UN experience—the UN Committee on Scientific Radiation” and the “Test Ban Technical Talks”—, thought that might be possible. I naively had viewed scientists as immune from political prejudices and pressures, who could dispassionately produce a useable agreement. They didn't. As far as I was concerned, the most objective person at the conference was the head of our delegation and also Bob Bacher.
Even though the scientific capabilities around the world obviously improved over the thirty year period we are discussing, in the final analysis their discussions were almost scholastic. Although I was not involved in the issue in the latter part of the period, I would guess that there are people who even today would try to find technical or scientific reasons for opposing a test ban even if verification could be guaranteed. Once I talked to Harold Brown about how the Christian spiritual leaders argued for almost 300 years about homoussian vs homoiussian (whether Christ was the likeness or the substance of God). Brown would say that if people could argue for 300 years over an “i”, how long could we discuss test ban verification? The people involved in the discussion went out of control and developed a system that required 500 stations around the world. I never thought that a test ban was totally verifiable, but then I didn’t really believe that that was absolutely necessary.

It was the U.S. that raised the question of nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. That was essentially Teller’s and Lawrence’s idea. Both were friends and I liked them, but they were just opposed to test ban and I felt this issue was, at least subliminally, a way they thought up to torpedo the idea. The Soviets were scathing as the U.S. opponents talked about testing nuclear weapons behind the moon and other wild ideas. There were two brothers that were part of the Geneva delegation: Richard and Al Latter; they spent all their time trying to prove that you could not verify a test ban. Both of them were employed at the Livermore Laboratories. This was probably a case of their profession and perceived future dictating their orientation. I found this same syndrome in effect for the whole thirty year period.

Q: What can you remember of the State-Defense relationships on the subject of a test ban treaty?

SPIERS: I would guess they were not too good. My first arguments on arms control in the mid-50s were with Brigadier General Loper who was the chief of the DoD-AEC Military Advisory Committee. Later, after Rusk became Secretary of State, I remember
meeting at his house one evening with General Maxwell Taylor, Bob McNamara, Mac Bundy and some others. At that meeting, Max Taylor took a much broader view than his institutional role would normally permit. He said that he thought he would be crucified by his colleagues if they knew he was agreeing to the meeting's consensus. Rusk asked me to draft a cable after the meeting, but said that he wanted to be shown as the “drafting officer” so that I would not be made vulnerable by the decisions reached. The cable was cleared by Bundy and McNamara and the others. That was just one indication that the senior officials of the institutions were far broader than their organizations. Of course, it must be natural for the Pentagon military bureaucracy to focus on its principal responsibility which is to be able to fight and win a war if necessary. That view has to be respected. I always had good relations with the military; probably better than most of my State colleagues. That was particularly true during my PM days because then my participation in arms control issues were somewhat balanced by pro-military activities such as base negotiations and military assistance. On those matters, we were essentially on the same side.

**Q: You earlier mentioned a Geneva conference on “surprise attack”. Discuss please the issue of early warning.**

**SPIERS:** In those days, people were looking at what today are known as confidence building measures as a way to provide for early warning. But the discussions never really got off the ground primarily because of the incompetent leadership of the U.S. delegation. What that conference did do was to stimulate a lot of thinking in the strategic planning community. It generated a lot of very sophisticated thinking about arms control. For example, Don Brennen, then a young researcher at the Hudson Institute, would come to Washington frequently, sometimes once a week, to talk about these issues. We would discuss what was required for deterrence, how many deaths were acceptable before it would affect decision making, etc. Tom Schelling was one of the key participants in these strategic issues debates. The boost that the Geneva conference gave to this process was
very important to the development of a substantial body of strategic theory. The Soviets never developed it. We had to educate them.

The Geneva conference on “surprise attacks” resulted eventually in the “hot line” agreement. Years later, and this was after I left the subject, the CSCE conference and the “confidence building measures” discussions had their antecedents in that Geneva conference, not in terms of the outcome of the conference as much as the opportunity for bringing together a group of people from both sides whose interest and intelligence was engaged in bringing a more stable regime to the world. The conference became a seed for future discussions and eventually agreements.

Years later, I had a Russian by the name of Victor Sukhodrev working for me at the UN. He had been in the Foreign Office in the 50s and 60s working partly as interpreter for Khrushchev and Brezhnev when they met senior American officials. I had met him in Moscow in 1961 and subsequently at some of the SALT talks. We used to tell the Soviets some things about their own capabilities which were obviously news to the Foreign Ministry people and were embarrassing for them to hear from us. They would say that they were not cleared for the kind of information we were providing about their own military posture. We were light years ahead of the Soviets when it came to sophisticated consideration of arms control issues because, for one reason, their “thinkers” were not well informed about their own military capabilities.

The initial ABM discussions were another illustration of Soviet compartmentalization of information and the resulting paucity of clear thinking. It was very difficult to negotiate with a delegation that was ill informed. We were much more knowledgeable about military capabilities of both sides and the possible consequences and inter-actions of those capabilities. Our knowledge and ability to consider various implications cast us in a more serious and earnest mode and gave us an advantage in our negotiations with the Soviets.

Q: Were you involved in the issue of “nuclear free zones”? 

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SPIERS: Only marginally. I never took that subject very seriously. There was the treaty of Tlatelolco. We developed the original U.S. policy which as far as I know still stands today; namely, if people want to declare themselves in a nuclear free zone, that was their decision. That decision should not be imposed on them by UN resolution; their conclusions should come out of their own deliberations. But I never took the matter very seriously; the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace” was boring and irrelevant because it was a solution in search of a problem and didn't really get to the heart of any real issue.

Q: The Foreign Service has been accused of having an anti-military bias. Did you perceive that attitude?

SPIERS: Some officers did and many did not. EUR/SOV and EUR/ RPM, offices that had a lot of close contacts with our military, probably had a sympathetic point of view. There were lots of other parts of the Department that had an anti-military bias. The State-Defense exchange program assisted in improving working relations. We had some Foreign Service officers working in the Pentagon and some military officers working in State. For example, Jim Calvert, a preeminent Navy submariner, worked in State as did Jack Chain, later commander of SAC and Dick Colbert, later AFSOUTH Commander. A number of the military officers subsequently became generals and admirals.

We had a Political Advisors (POLAD) program which I thought was very useful. They became important communications links between State and various military commands.

I had been in the military for three years towards the end of World War II. That increased my appreciation for them and I didn't have any prejudice against the military.

Q: Let me ask you about State participation in Defense planning. What were your views on that process?

SPIERS: I thought a lot of that was a will of the wisp. It was of great interest to people like Sey Weiss. He used to receive Defense planning papers—draft Presidential memos,
for example. Defense would send them for comment and he used to respond in great length. I never thought that anyone paid any attention to his views. They did not have much of an impact. I favored working on more tangible and limited operational issues; that was much more pragmatic. I never found that long discussions about theoretical concepts was a worthwhile use of time; I am not sure that even within the Pentagon was there much attention paid to these large strategic concepts. It was the budget process and the resource limitations that drove decisions on weapons acquisitions. Katz’ comment, that I quoted earlier, “availability determines relevance” is most applicable to the Defense process. If you want to do something, then you will find reason for doing it. Weapon systems are usually not the product of a strategic theory; the opposite is usually true. If you have a weapon system, some one will conceive a strategic rationale for it.

Any general guidance that is provided the Pentagon should emanate from the NSC. In the 60s and 70s, we had Interagency Groups (IG) which were part of the NSC system, one of which was on politico-military affairs. The geographic IGs were more important than the functional ones. The most important decisions were made by the NSC itself—President and Cabinet officers—although I don't think that Rogers ever really became engaged. That made my life as Director of PM difficult, although I must say that Rogers' deputy, Elliot Richardson, was very decisive and supportive. Rogers was bored by politico-military issues—he didn't like them, he was interested in them, he really didn't want to get involved.

I was summoned once by Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He wanted me testify on overseas nuclear deployments. That request became a real issue in the Executive Branch. The White House was very much opposed to my appearance. I knew a considerable amount about nuclear issues and I thought I could make a respectable appearance. Defense had a lot more confidence in me than did the White House. John Lehman, later the Secretary of the Navy, was a junior member of the NSC staff at the time. He did everything he could to prevent my testimony. I really didn't care; I would have preferred not to appear because it would only be grief. Fulbright
was anti-nuclear and just wanted an opportunity to make a public display. The White House would have preferred not have any hearings at all, but certainly not from State Department. But I finally was permitted to appear, primarily because of Elliot Richardson's and Alexis Johnson's intervention. They far preferred me to defend the administration than they themselves. I spent a harrowing six hours in the witness chair. Defense was delighted with my comments and Lehman, after reading the transcript, called me to congratulate me on the session.

Q: In light of your long years of experience in politico-military affairs, what do you consider to be an appropriate relationship between the Departments of State and Defense?

SPIERS: Foreign and security policies are the opposite sides of the same coin. Ultimately, the essential strategic and tactical decisions in both fields must be made by the President. Both Departments must have an input into that decision making process although each will come at issues from a different perspective because each has different responsibility. State's responsibility is to maintain stable relationships with other countries and to resolve areas of tension at the lowest possible level of conflict. Defense's responsibility is to be ready to fight a war if that is necessary. That requires a finely honed Defense Department. It is not appropriate for Defense to impose its foreign policy views on State because generally they are very naive, very shallow and superficial; similarly, State has no business imposing its views on Defense particularly on those questions in which it has little competence. You need a dialogue and both Departments have to serve in an advisory position to the President. The major issues transcend the responsibilities of either Department and must be decided by the President and the NSC—not the staff of the NSC, but the NSC itself. One of the problems is that the NSC staff sometimes usurps the prerogatives of the NSC; the staff speaks as if it were the principals. You are sometimes told that the “White House thinks as follows”. I would always ask “Who is the White House? Houses don't speak”. And most often than not, it was just one of the NSC staffers who had put on a “White House” mantle.
Q: Let me now ask about some specific politico-military issues which loomed large when you were the PM Director. What were your views on U.S. military presence overseas and particularly bases?

SPIERS: Generally, I felt that the State Department should support Defense Department’s reasonable requirements. We did have the responsibility to review and pass judgment on base requirements. There was a disposition on the part of State Department to view the issue strictly from a political point of view. It was PM's responsibility to meld the political views and the military requirements. I was usually regarded in State as a shill for Defense and probably as a shill for State in the Pentagon. It was tight-rope.

Diego Garcia was a perfect example of the perspective problem. State didn't like the idea of a base near the Indian Ocean because it created too much furor among the countries which bordered it. The Greek bases were a major issue during the early 70s. In that case, I supported Admiral Bud Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, although in retrospect that may have been a mistake. I had known and liked Bud. We had assigned a Foreign Service officer to Zumwalt's staff—he was the only service chief who wanted a POLAD. He wanted his Mediterranean fleet to have a home port and Greece was the most convenient. My view, which I believe was supported by Rogers, was that if Defense felt strongly about this military requirement we should support it. The Greek desk was very much opposed because a vocal part of Congress was concerned that U.S. bases in Greece would be viewed as U.S. support of the Greek Colonels by the Greek population.

Our bases in Turkey were not controversial. We had negotiations with Philippines and Spain while I worked in PM. Those were more or less non-controversial, although the Spanish desk in State wanted to reduce our presence in that country. We generally supported the Defense position and tried to explain it to the rest of State Department. When the Defense views didn't prevail, then we tried to explain to the Pentagon why their
proposals didn't fly. PM was an honest (or, depending on your point of view, dishonest) broker.

In general, State's regional bureaus were not enamored of military bases. They had to face the political consequences of our presence in foreign countries. I mentioned earlier that I had three major differences with the White House during my career. The first two concerned arms control issues; the third concerned Iran. It was essentially a difference on arms sales, but with arms sales to Iran, came a major U.S. presence to teach the Iranians how to use these new weapons and to help them build the facilities necessary to base the weapon systems. We were getting ourselves in real trouble in Iran by pursuing an open ended policy which enabled the Shah to buy any weapons system he wanted because he had the resources. PM was responsible for commercial sales because they had to be licensed by our Office of Munitions Control. I made the case to Rogers that our sales would require such a massive U.S. presence in a society that was certainly not compatible with ours, that this would cause major frictions. Rogers made that argument to Nixon, but it didn't dissuade the President. He told the Secretary that the Shah could have anything he wanted. So our presence—PXs, movies, commissaries, leisure activities—became part of the Shah's difficulties because our presence appeared to the Iranians and particularly the fundamentalists to represent the most meretricious aspects of Western culture. It wasn't clear to me that the Shah was clear on where he was taking his country.

Joe Sisco, then the Assistant Secretary for Near East Bureau, and I used to have continual arguments on this subject. He kept insisting that this was “our Shah” or “our policeman” and therefore should receive whatever he asked for. I, of course, had reservations, but the “open door” policy prevailed.

Q: What were your views about the American arms sales program in general?

SPIERS: I was somewhat displeased with the pressures that McNamara and Henry Kuss applied. They used the “gold flow” argument to increase our sales efforts. By “gold flow”
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yhey referred to the balance of payments problems; arms sales balanced our payments for imports. I favored totally arms sales to all of our NATO allies; I favored sales to other countries with whom we had formal mutual defense alliances like Korea and Japan. But I had to gag at the pressures to sell to other countries in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. They were potentially destabilizing. I prefer the organic approach to political issues; let the matters develop as naturally as possible rather than to press them to take a faster pace or move too far ahead. Kuss was just out to sell; he saw that as his role—the salesman of U.S. military weapons, equipment and facilities.

The pressures for U.S. manufacturers was easier to handle because in most cases they were in competition with each other. When I was Ambassador to Turkey, all the representatives of U.S. manufacturers would come to see me. I always told them that I favored the U.S. making the sales, but that I certainly could not favor one U.S. manufacturer or product over another. That was somewhat of a cop-out, but it took me off the hook.

I really didn't have any objections to the sales of weapons systems, because no one was discussing sales of nuclear weapons. I did think that there was too great an interests in the Pentagon in selling high performance aircraft. In many cases, countries did not need the military capability of those advanced systems. I thought an F-5 would have been perfectly adequate to meet the defense requirements of many countries, but many countries were not interested because they viewed an F-5 as an inferior weapon system since the U.S. Air Force refused to buy any of them for itself. The plane began to look like an export model for the “great unwashed”. I argued that the U.S. Air Force buy a wing of F-5s, both to help foreign sales and because I thought the F-5 had performance characteristics that should have interested our military. But the Air Force wanted everything gold plated—just as an Admiral can never have enough aircraft carriers.

Q: Did you have any views about the potential for destabilization that arms sales have been alleged by some to have?
SPIERS: I can only remember that issue being raised in the case of some assistance to certain Latin American countries and Iran. We lost the argument on sales to Iran; in Latin America, we were able to limit the types of weapon system that were sold. We kept highly sophisticate systems out of the area, both because they were not militarily justifiable and were certainly economically unaffordable.

This issue was raised frequently in the India-Pakistan situation. We tilted very much in favor of Pakistan, correctly, I believed. Furthermore, the Soviets were not showing any restraints in their sales to India.

Most of the Congressional testimony on military assistance and arms sales was provided by Tom Pickering, my principal deputy. We had an informal division of labor: he dealt with military assistance issues and I dealt with arms control and disarmament and base negotiations. Tom could do anything; he could have handled disarmament issues, but we just arbitrarily divided the work load as I have described. Pickering's problem was that he so fast and so quick that he tended to do everything himself. I sometimes had real problems with the office directors who would complain to me that by the time they started to do something, Pickering had already finished it.

Q: While we are on the subject, let me pursue the military assistance a little. Did you have enough resources to do the job you thought needed to be done? Did Congress cut back sharply on the budgetary requests of the Administration?

SPIERS: We were beginning to encounter restraints. Before I got to PM, officials in Defense had made a lot of commitments and promises to foreign countries that we just couldn't fulfill. For example, John McNaughton, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in Defense, went to Turkey and implied certain levels of assistance that we couldn't possibly keep and are a problem still twenty years later. He had pulled some numbers out of his own hip pocket; no administration was ever to come close to them. It was these kinds of commitments, implied or explicit, that created problems as we tried
to allocate military assistance resources that were not particularly favored by many in Congress in the first place.

We had a lot of difficulties with the security assistance programs because people in OMB got the idea that State Department couldn't manage them. Security assistance included both military assistance, including training, and economic supporting assistance programs. That is what led, before I left PM, to the establishment of the position of Under Secretary for the Coordination of Security Assistance—that was its first title. Curtis Tarr was its first incumbent and he was there during the last few months of my tenure in PM. He was totally unable to deal with the issues, so that PM continued to do business as usual. Bill Lewis was the director of our Office for Security Assistance Planning. Security Assistance was a large budgetary account. Defense had a big bureaucratic organization to handle its military assistance responsibilities. They established a Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). State had no counterpart for that so we had a very hard time following what Defense was doing.

I established the Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC). I chaired the first meetings and then the new Under Secretary took the chair. Other Under Secretaries may have been more successful than Curtis Tarr, but the SAPRC certainly didn't live up to my expectations while I was Director of PM. I had hoped that through the mechanism of an interagency committee we could get all parties together in one room to work on our problems collegially. It is always better to develop a consensus because without it you run the risk of setting policies and no one paying any attention to them. Any successful policy must have a sustainable level of support. It is true that for about six months, Tarr had to be both the Under Secretary for Security Assistance and the Under Secretary for Management after Macomber left the latter job in early 1973. Under those circumstances, the management job will get priority.

Q: What was the rationale at the time for the security assistance program?
SPIERS: U.S. security. The program stemmed in part from our competition with the Soviets. They and the Chinese were selling and giving arms to their “friends”. We didn’t want to leave any vacuum that they could fill. There was never any controversy about sales to our NATO allies; that was a “given”. The questioning began when we sold to both Peru and Ecuador or to Brazil and Argentina or to some African countries—all areas of tensions. Where we had real alliances, there was no basic controversy.

In terms of level of assistance we provided, I generally supported the regional bureaus’ requests. I also supported the whole program of military training, which had by the early 70s become very controversial. AID was conducting a public safety program which was being disparaged on the Hill because a number of the people trained turned out to be defenders of dictatorships or autocratic regimes. Some of the military training programs became tarred with the same accusations although the bulk of the training went to allied forces. That made sense to me. Some people though the training program in the United States would help inculcate the foreign military in our democratic ways. I didn’t push that concept very far because all military, including our own, have to place limits on democratic ways in their own operations. Otherwise, I don't think they would be very effective.

We always had difficulties with the regional bureaus when it came to apportioning assistance resources because there were never enough. The bureaus, by and large, took the view that in order to maintain good relations with their “clients”, whatever the foreign country requested should be allocated. That of course was just not possible.

I had a lot of arguments with Defense and the regional bureaus on the relationship of security assistance and military bases that our troops may have used. It was always my view that in an alliance relationship the U.S. should never pay “rent” for the use of bases. By definition, an alliance calls for a mutual support arrangement; the other country provided the physical facilities and we provided resources to assist it to increase its self-defense capability. When I was Ambassador in Turkey, I completely rejected the view that we were renting our bases in Turkey. The Turks finally accepted my view, but I had great
difficulties getting the State Department to accept that point of view; it kept talking about base rentals. When I went to the Philippines in the early 70s to talk about our bases there, I said that we wouldn't pay rent. We had signed a commitment to come to that country's aid in case of aggression and that was our “compensation” for the bases. I thought that the economic benefits that the Philippines enjoyed because of the presence of the U.S. military was fine, but strictly a wind-fall. I also thought that we had an obligation to provide assistance to the Philippine military to help it in its modernization program, but we had absolutely no commitment to “rent” the bases nor should we have taken any action which might have appeared as a trade-off between use of facilities and assistance. I would have opposed moving the security assistance appropriation to Defense, as some have suggested, if that would have increased the possibility of rental payments. Any direct benefit that an alliance partner might have accrued because it made facilities available to us under a mutual assistance agreement would have been wrong and indefensible.

Q: You were working on politico-military affairs in EUR when de Gaulle decided to withdraw French troops from NATO. What are your recollections of that event?

SPIERS: A lot of material on that issue is now on deposit in the Johnson Library. De Gaulle caused a lot of problems for us, particularly in the logistic area where we had to move all our supply lines out of France and into Belgium and the Netherlands. The NATO headquarters had to be moved from Paris to Brussels.

I don't think I was surprised by de Gaulle's action; others may have been although it certainly should not have come as a surprise. De Gaulle had put out a lot of signals beforehand. During the period I was in EUR/RPM (1962-66), we had gone through the MLF tribulations, the Strategic Review in NATO, the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group, etc. The alliance's concern about the French was involved in each and every one of these major initiatives. The actual French withdrawal came towards the end of my tour in EUR/RPM.
I remember working very closely with General Burt Spivey, who was appointed to handle FRELOCK, a program to manage the supply line moves that had to be made. I was the State Department representative on Spivey’s task force.

Q: Was there anything we could or should have done to prevent the French withdrawal?

SPIERS: I don’t think there was anything we could have done. We might have offered the job of SACEUR to the French. But de Gaulle was very embittered first by the defeat of the French troops, then by the treatment he thought he got from Churchill and Roosevelt and then by his perception that NATO was an incurably Anglo-Saxon organization—controlled by the Americans and the British, responsive to the Americans and the British. Also de Gaulle’s foreign policy was essentially a kinetic one; that is one that required movement for movement’s sake. He was primarily interested in the restoration of French pride by establishing a purely French identity. I guess that the French withdrawal was probably inevitable.

A number of efforts were made to appease de Gaulle. I wrote a cable after the Nassau meeting between MacMillan and Kennedy addressed to Chip Bohlen, then our Ambassador to France, in which the U.S. offered the French cooperation in the submarine area. My draft became so watered down by the Francophobes in State—principally Bob Schaetzel and Henry Owen—as it went through the clearance process that it became a meaningless gesture and probably was viewed by de Gaulle as one more slap in the face by the Anglo Saxons.

There were a lot of unhappy people when de Gaulle withdrew, particularly in the military. They saw it as a serious weakening of NATO’s capacity, and, furthermore the Pentagon was concerned by the technical problems created by a supply line which had to be lengthened and rebuilt. Going through Belgium and Holland meant that the supply line ran more horizontally to the likely fighting front rather than heading directly at it. But basically, there wasn’t anything we or any of the allies could do about de Gaulle’s decision.
Q: We have briefly referred to the differing views that were being expressed in the U.S. about our role in NATO, e.g. the Mansfield amendment. What were your views about our role in NATO during the 1962-66 period?

SPIERS: I thought that NATO was extremely important to U.S. security because it was the organization that linked the U.S. and Europe most intimately. It was important because it wrapped the Germans in a cooperative relationship with their erstwhile enemies. The deterrence that NATO provided was important, although, as I have suggested earlier, I did not view the Soviets with the same degree of alarm and concern as others did. Despite that view, I never dismissed the Soviet as a potential threat and therefore I fully supported a cohesive Western position and NATO was the essential instrument of that coherence. I generally supported the view of our military when it came to decisions on the size and nature of our contribution to NATO. I had no sympathy for the Mansfield position; I don't really remember anyone in the Executive Branch who showed any overt support for the Mansfield view.

Q: Our senior military officer in Europe was the commander of all NATO forces, all American forces and then also had a special responsibility for Berlin under his “Live Oak” hat. Did you have any concerns for an organizational structure that depended so much on one single individual?

SPIERS: I think that was probably the only command relationship that could be devised that would have been effective. There could not have been any agreement on any one else except an American SACEUR. We certainly could not have put our nuclear-armed troops under the command of a foreign general. Although our general wore many hats and that at times became cumbersome, it was probably still more effective than having a number of commanders.

Q: Let me now turn to MLF which you mentioned earlier. Tell me first what the concept was?
SPIERS: Initially, it was a way of dealing with pressure that was being created by the British and French who wished to develop their own independent nuclear force. That concept raised a lot of problems, particularly for the Germans and some of the other European nations. So the first idea was to establish a jointly owned and commanded nuclear submarine—Polaris—force that would, hopefully, forestall the British and French from achieving their objectives. The idea came too late to accommodate the British, but the French were still at the beginning of the process. They had just started to talk about developing their own sea-based nuclear forces; they had already begun to build medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) facilities in the French Alps. I don't remember who initiated the MLF idea, but the strongest proponents in State were George Ball, the Under Secretary, Bob Bowie, the Director of the Planning Staff, Bob Schaetzel, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EUR and Henry Owen, a member of the Planning Staff.

The concept stimulated a vigorous ideological debate which in turn created major fissures in the Department. Although the idea was originally to be applied to a sea based force, it soon became a surface-based force concept because Admiral Rickover just would not accept the concept of a mixed manned submarine force. That opposition was probably the death knell of the idea since it didn't make much military sense to have surface ships with retaliatory nuclear weapons on them, or at least not as much sense as a submarine force might have had.

Bill Tyler, then Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, on balance favored MLF, but he certainly was not part of the ideologue group. Others in the Department didn't think the idea made much sense. But essentially Ball and his cabal sold President Kennedy on the idea. He sold Adenauer who said that he was very much in favor of the idea. The French opposed the idea; the British were luke-warm; the Dutch sort of favored it; the Turks and the Greeks were in favor of it. That made for enough support within NATO to try the idea. A mixed manning demonstration was performed on a destroyer. That worked relatively well. But President Johnson didn't have the commitment to the idea that his predecessor
had. When the Labor Party won in Great Britain, it opposed the concept and that put another nail in the MLF coffin.

What the proponents really hoped was to use the MLF as a way to help integrate Europe. Ball and his people were pushing the “dumbbell” theory which had a united Europe at one end of the dumbbell and the U.S. and Canada at the other. The handle that held the two ends together was NATO. That is essentially what the proponents supported. Ball, Bowie and the others were fierce advocates of a united Europe. Bob Schaetzel was a Monnet disciple. They were all totally committed to the concept and regarded de Gaulle as the “devil incarnate”. They viewed a united Europe as a more effective player on the world stage that could cooperate with the U.S. and one that could envelop Germany and prevent its earlier aggressive behavior. The British were split; they had some strong proponents and some strong opponents. When Wilson was elected Prime Minister in 1964, the Labor Party was essentially anti-nuclear and the idea of a nuclear capable force was an anathema to it. I was in a meeting with Johnson and Wilson—it was one of the more interesting meetings that I have attended in my life. That effectively brought the MLF idea to an end.

The opponents of MLF were stimulated in part, if not mainly, by the ideological fervor of the proponents. They probably weren't overly enthusiastic about the idea, but any doubts that they might have had were resolved by the constant drumbeats emanating from the “true believers” who were perceived as not entirely trustworthy. Rusk let Ball run with the ball, so to speak; I don't think the Secretary was ever very interested in the subject, although he didn't do anything to stop Ball and his allies. He also knew that Kennedy had supported the concept. Mac Bundy was luke-warm, but went along because his boss favored it. Johnson was much more pragmatic and when he saw that the achievement of the MLF would take a lot of U.S. effort and political capital, particularly in light of the new opposition from the British government and the continuing opposition from the French, he
let the whole idea drift off into oblivion. The Congress was split and I don't think it had a monolithic view on one side or another.

Within EUR, we had a lot of discussions on the issue, but the leadership was definitely pro-MLF. I tried very hard to be an honest broker. I saw its virtues and its defects. The proponents began to run into serious difficulties when the White House began to worry that the ideologues were pushing the U.S. into an undefined and unclear future. It was a very interesting situation. Dick Neustadt, from Harvard, was requested by the President to make a confidential report on the issue. Mac Bundy was still the special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Dave Klein, a State Department officer, was then on the NSC staff; he had real reservations about the concept and about the actual and potential problems that the pro-MLF crowd was creating, particularly with the British. Klein and his colleagues trusted me; they thought I had a balanced view of the concept. So when Neustadt requested that someone from the Department be assigned to work for him, Rusk and Tyler suggested me. I was still the Deputy Director in RPM; Dave Popper was the Director. I was told that I should keep Tyler informed about Neustadt's work, but no one else. I was to work directly for Neustadt and with the White House staff assigned to the project.

And that is what I did. It became increasingly uncomfortable because Popper and Schaetzel knew that I was working on something, but they didn't know what. Popper was more of a “good soldier”; Tyler had probably told him not to ask any questions and to let me go about my business without questions. But Schaetzel was furious and he was the guy who wrote my efficiency report. When it came time to write it up, Schaetzel was very vindictive. Tyler tried to mitigate it as best he could, but in the Foreign Service, as highly competitive as it is, anything derogative is bound to effect one's promotional opportunities. The promotion panels would grab anything negative and look for unblemished files. That Schaetzel efficiency report probably delayed my promotion for a year or two; it ultimately came through. Alexis Johnson, then the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, also weighed in on my behalf and that certainly helped. But even with all those mitigations,
the promotion was undoubtedly delayed. Schaetzel was very unhappy that I did not keep him posted and I think never really forgave me. What he didn't know was that I was told explicitly to make sure that he was not informed because he was regarded as part of the problem.

The Neustadt study succeeded in raising doubts about the costs that the vigorous pursuit of the MLF would entail. People were certainly willing to have the MLF develop organically and to support if that was the wish of our allies. But people like Schaetzel and Owen were such vigorous proponents that their passions distorted their sense of propriety; they twisted evidence and suppressed arguments opposed to the MLF. It was not a good example of proper policy making. And I was disturbed by their actions and lack of balance. Both of them of course reacted to Ball's leadership; he was also a strong supporter of the MLF. Although Bowie was no longer an official of the Department, Ball retained him as a consultant. So there were four smart, aggressive and knowledgeable bureaucrats who could steer policy making. It was an unusual and interesting period in the Department's life.

As I mentioned earlier, I attended the Johnson meeting with Harold Wilson; I was the note-taker. It was held in the Cabinet room. At the end of it, Johnson said that it was very important that the Germans be informed about the meeting and the decisions that had come out of it. We had found out that the German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroder, was seeing de Gaulle the next day in Paris. We were greatly concerned that the meeting could become a catastrophe if they had had the wrong impression of what undoubtedly they perceived as an Anglo-Saxon coalition. Wilson agreed that the Germans had to be briefed immediately and that it had to be done by some one that would not be recognized by the press. Since I was the only person in the room who was not a public figure—the others in the room were Hubert Humphrey, Bob McNamara, Rusk, etc—, Johnson turned to me and told me to get to Europe to brief Schroder before he met with de Gaulle. So I left the room because I had to leave immediately. I started to get plane reservations and make other arrangements. McNamara overheard me and told me that that was nonsense. He
instructed his military aide to call Andrews Air Force base to prepare a plane for me to take me to Europe. Andrews was told that the passenger would be on an important Presidential mission. As it turned out, the only aircraft available was the President's back up plane. It had a big bedroom in the back.

Hubert Humphrey, then the Vice President, was going near Andrews and gave me a ride. We were warmly met at the base by the base commander who got quite a shock when it was me that got aboard the Presidential plane and not Humphrey. I had called my wife to tell he that a White House car was on its way to pick up a suitcase, which I asked her to fill with a couple of days' necessities. When I boarded the plane, it was of course fully staffed with communicators, security people, crew, etc. I was told that I could talk to anyone I wanted to. All I could think of was to talk to my wife, who happened to be in our neighbor's house, baby sitting. The communicators found her and tried to explain what was going on. All she could think of was the cost of phone call; it didn't occur to her that it was free, so she hung up after a brief conversation. I was met at a military airport near Paris by a helicopter which flew me into the city. Then I was provided a motorcycle escort. I met Schroder at the Hotel George V about ten minutes before he was scheduled to see de Gaulle. It was my first “Walter Mitty” experience. It was unforgettable.

Q: You are recounting events that took place when you were Director of the Office of Regional Politico-Military Affairs in the Bureau for European Affairs (EUR/RPM). Who did you have on your staff?

SPIERS: We had kind of a power house in RPM. For example, David Aaron worked for me. George Vest was a Deputy Director; Roz Ridgway worked there as did Chris Van Hollen and Bill Bader.

Q: Let me now move to another issue and that is the “Sky Bolt” incident. Were you involved?
SPIERS: Yes. McNamara had reached agreement with the British to provide them with the “Sky Bolt” missile, which was a nuclear tipped, air-to-surface missile. But Defense decided to cancel procurement of the system for budgetary reasons. The British were so unhappy about that action that Kennedy had to meet with MacMillan at Nassau and it was there that the President agreed to provide the Polaris missile system to the British instead. That made the French very unhappy because it reaffirmed all their prejudices about the Anglo-Saxon hegemony in NATO. No one knew that Kennedy would make that offer; I was in George Ball's office when the word of the offer reached the Department. It really shook Ball up because he immediately saw the political implications.

The British were very unhappy about the cancellation of the “Sky Bolt” program although I suspect that it might well have been canceled under any circumstances because the system was not cost effective; a system should not be built just because the U.S. had an agreement with an ally. The Nassau solution, probably improvised on the spot, did considerable damage to the U.S.-France and the U.K.-France relationships.

Eventually, the Nassau imbroglio led to the MLF concept as a means of countering the pressures engendered by our offer to the British. That is because we then faced a choice between developing a multi-lateral nuclear force or watching the establishment of separate nuclear deterrents which might ultimately create severe pressures on Germany to go on its independent way. Our policies on Polaris, “Sky Bolt” and the MLF were perceived as anti-French, particularly by the French, although I don't want to suggest that they were purposely so. It was clear that the European integrationist were very much anti de Gaulle because they viewed him—correctly, I might say—as an obstacle to the achievement of their dream, unless it was done on his terms.

In some strange ways, that conference led to my assignment to the Embassy in London as Politico-Military Counselor. When “Sky Bolt” loomed on the horizon, people quickly realized that Defense was making deals with its British counterparts which had the profoundest foreign policy implications without any one in State knowing anything about
them. So the job of Politico-Military Counselor had been established to insure greater coordination within the U.S. government and with the British. George Newman was the first incumbent in that job.

By 1966, in light of my years in the AEC and in EUR/RPM, I was the logical candidate for the London job. George Newman was leaving, but when I was asked whether I would be interested in the job, I was very reluctant to agree because I saw Washington as the place of action and I didn't want to leave it. I was not interested in taking up a standard Foreign Service career, even if the first assignment was London. But I finally agreed and became a full fledged Foreign Service officer. Once having become a Foreign Service officer, I recognized that I would have to go overseas. It would have been very hard to make a career in the Foreign Service while staying in Washington all the time, although it has been done—e.g., Joe Sisco.

So I agreed to go to London. It was McNamara who wanted to have a politico-military man in the Embassy. I had known McNamara from my arms control work. I went under a kind of joint sponsorship. McNamara wrote to Denis Healey, then the British defense minister and told him he was sending “his” man to London. I don't think that State ever knew of that letter.

Q: You have touched on the issue of European integration on a number of occasions. Besides the Ball-Schaetzel-Owen group, was any other part of the Department engaged in this issue in the 1962-66 period?

SPIERS: There was considerable discussion of the issue in the Department. Many people were opposed to an independent Europe that might drift away from the close ties to the U.S. then existing. The consensus was that we should support a Europe in which we could play a strong role. Essentially, we all remembered the events of the 20th Century when the New World had to “step in” in order to save the Old World. The U.S. had been dragged into two world wars generated by essentially intra-European conflicts. The threat of that
involvement has never really abated and is still very much with us today. The Danish refusal to approve the Maastricht Treaty will be a problem. I favored European integration anchored by a strong alliance between Europe and the U.S. The major difference I had with some of my colleagues was not about the goal, but the methods by which we were trying to force the process. I felt that integration had to develop organically among the Europeans and the U.S. should not try to accelerate the pace lest the concept be lost entirely. I favored the MLF if it developed in the natural course of events and not as a product of American manipulation, which the Ball group was always tempted to try.

I favored a U.S. presence in Europe as long as the Europeans wanted it. And the Europeans did want it. If they had ever told us “goodbye” then I would have supported withdrawal.

I think everybody recognized that if the west Germans ever developed a nuclear capability of their own, it would have devastating consequences on the Continent. I did not distrust the Germans and did not believe that their goal was to achieve an independent nuclear capability. But as I have said before, I never viewed nuclear weapons as a security blanket. I never believed that nuclear weapons would ever really be used in a war, either tactically or strategically. I had great skepticism, particularly, that tactical nuclear weapons would ever be used. I don't think from my conversations with Defense that we ever had any realistic plans for the use of our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. All the plans I knew about would have caused more collateral damage or damage to our forces than they would have inflicted on an enemy. Just look at Chernobyl; the fallout was less than would have been created by one nuclear weapon, but just remember how much damage that one reactor caused. I always felt that using nuclear weapons was totally unrealistic, although I did favor stationing some of our tactical weapons in Europe as long as the Europeans wanted them and felt comfortable with them. I did not favor pressuring the Europeans on these issues. I proposed what became the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in order to involve the Europeans in real nuclear planning.
That was another interesting experience because it also got me in hot water with Schaetzel and his friends. They regarded the NPG was a way to undermine the MLF. By the time I made my suggestion, it was clear to me and many others that the MLF was not going to come into being. In any case, even if by some major miracle the MLF was borne, the NPG would not be a competitor. I proposed the NPG to John McNaughton, then Assistant Secretary for Defense for International Security Affairs. I had in mind a very small, multi-national and carefully selected group who both knew and “needed to know” about nuclear matters who could discuss informally and intensively, nuclear strategy and weapons—concepts, uses, etc. McNaughton managed to sell the idea to McNamara, who in his usual manner, proposed the idea in a speech without ever discussing it with any one in State. The Department was furious; that fury was not assuaged when McNaughton mentioned that the idea had come from a State official in the first place. As you can imagine, that did not go over very well. In any case, the NPG was established and it is still functioning today, although it has such a large membership today that it is no longer the kind of body I had in mind. Of course, nuclear issues also do not carry the sensitivity today than they did twenty-five years ago.

Q: In 1966, you went to London as Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs. You have already mentioned how that assignment happened. What were the functions of a Politico-Military Counselor?

SPIERS: I had a mixture of responsibilities. It turned out that the most important one was our effort to persuade the British not to withdraw from east of the Suez. I developed a close personal friendship with Denis Healey. I also worked with the Foreign Office, primarily on issues created by the French withdrawal from NATO. That of course was a continuation of involvement in issues that had been of concern to me in EUR/RPM. I spent a lot of time following British Defense planning in a period when the British were retrenching around the world—leaving Malta, Aden, etc. I also became involved in the sale of U.S. weapons to the British, like the F-111, working with Henry Kuss and his staff. We
dealt a lot with matters relating to U.S. forces in Britain (the Third Air Force, Hollylock, etc). There were four officers in the section: Jock Stoddart, Dick Hennes and David Passage.

All in all, the assignment to London was very enjoyable; I learned that there is a life away from the office. I didn't work until 8 or 9 p.m. as I had done in the Department. I went to the theater; I became reacquainted with my family. London was fun and interesting and I met a lot of intelligent, cultured people. It was a great assignment.

I got along well with Ambassador David Bruce. We had a former political appointee as Political Counselor—David Brubeck. I had no problems with Brubeck because I think he recognized that I had a background in politico-military matters. During my first day at the Embassy, he called me to tell me that he had been handling a lot of NATO-related matters and he felt that they should be transferred to me.

Bruce and Brubeck didn't hit it off very well and when the opportunity arose, Bruce combined the two sections and I became the Political Counselor and kept my politico-military portfolio. That brought me into touch with the whole range of U.S.-British relationships.

Q: Let me raise the issue of the British presence east of Suez. What were the British views and what were our views on this issue?

SPIERS: Bob Bowie used to say that it was a matter of “Atlantic politics”. There was a lot of opposition in Britain to the withdrawal from east of Suez. I don't think that Denis Healey favored it, but they did have to face economic reality. The British were in deep economic difficulties; their presence in the Gulf Emirates was costing a lot of money. It was noted that the British forces were put in the Persian Gulf initially to block Napoleon's threat to British communication routes to India and that Napoleon had long hence left this earth. So that the rationale for assigning troops was no longer valid. It was an expensive policy which the British could ill afford. There were of course British who still viewed their country as having a world mission which required it to be engaged far from its shores
—it is an argument that one hears here in the United States when our country's role in the world is discussed. Then there were people who thought that the days of the British world responsibilities had passed. Ultimately, the economic realities won the day and forced the gradual British withdrawal. The British wanted to reduce their BAOR, but we managed avert that by talking to government people, political leaders, the media, etc. My contacts were both with the Labor Party, then in power, and the opposition. I would see Ted Heath about once a month and chat with him in his office. I spent a lot of time talking to the media—Peter Jenkins, David Watt and other influential British newspaper people—trying to make the case for those who opposed withdrawal. We did not want the British to withdraw because it would have made the world a lonelier place for us. We believed, rightly as it turned out, that we would have to fill the vacuum left by the British just as we had done in Greece and Turkey during then Truman administration. We saw the vacuum as an opportunity for the Soviets to move in, so that the British withdrawal was viewed essentially as an element of the East-West conflict. There was also some concern about the potential for instability in the area itself after British withdrawal, but that was not the major argument I used to make. Of course, being in an Embassy, I carried out the instructions sent by Washington; I can't therefore say what all the elements were that went into our opposition to the British plans.

Q: You were in London for Nixon's first overseas visit. What are your recollections of that event?

SPIERS: A succession of quasi-disasters. Every time there is a change in administrations in Washington, the poor State Department takes it in the neck. I will never forget Ralph Dungan, who had been a classmate of mine at Princeton and subsequently became one of Kennedy's White House aides, telling me that State Department was not very well liked by that new administration. We were viewed as a bunch of conservative Republicans. When Nixon was elected, friends of mine who worked for him viewed us as a bunch of leftist Democrats. A lot of Nixon's attitude toward State, I believe, was shaped by his Vice Presidential experiences with Dulles. As I mentioned earlier, he was treated with some
disdain by Dulles and I suspect that he felt that the whole Department regarded him with contempt. That is why he selected Rogers as Secretary of State; he could then move all the authority over foreign policy to the White House—i.e. Kissinger—with impunity.

I was not the responsible officer for Nixon's visit, but I did a lot of the control officer work. Getting ready for the visit was an experience in itself. It was suggested to me—and I thought it was a good idea—that Wilson invite Nixon to attend a British Cabinet meeting at No. 10 Downing. It would be a regular Cabinet meeting except that the President of the United States would be invited to join and observe it. Everybody agreed that it was a great idea.

As was the custom in those days, all arrangements were discussed in conference calls with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. During one of them, as we were reviewing the schedule, I recall Ehrlichman asking how many people would be in the Cabinet meeting. I told him that I would guess that there would be about 20-25 people. He said: “Too many! Tell the Prime Minister's office to cut down attendance!” I told him that it was the Prime Minister who was extending the invitation to his Cabinet meeting and that we had no right to dictate the number of attendees. Ehrlichman got furious. He started yelling at me, accusing me of insubordination and disloyalty. It was so acerbic that when the call was finished, I went to see Ambassador Bruce. He of course had a lot of prestige and although still an appointee of a previous administration, was highly regarded and respected by all. Bruce sent the President a personal message pointing out the absurdity of Ehrlichman's position. I am sure that the President knew nothing of what had transpired; it was undoubtedly the work of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Of course, the Bruce message didn't help my standing with them; they became even more enraged with me. When they finally arrived in London, we went out to dinner together at a very expensive restaurant right off Barclay Square. I got stuck with the bill, which probably added up to half of my monthly pay.

Haldeman did the advance work for the visit. He came over personally and met with us and then held meetings with the British on the details of the visit. Kissinger, of course,
came along with Nixon. I assembled some leading British figures that he could meet with at Claridge's, where he always stayed. I had known Kissinger fairly well from his consulting days during the Kennedy administration. He used to visit the Department periodically to meet with people like Schaetzel, Tyler, etc. Sometimes he would have to wait for his appointment and then he would walk across the hall to my office, which was on the opposite side of the hall from the Assistant Secretary's suite. He would pull up a chair in my office and just chat. So I got to know him and I think that when he came to the White House and later to the Department, he viewed me as one of the “good guys”.

Q: What were your thoughts about working with the British bureaucracy?

SPIERS: I enjoyed it. They were very cooperative. I like them. They were a first class act. The British, when assigned overseas, are a problem, but in London they are a pleasure to work with. When in an Embassy, they tend to be somewhat arrogant and dismissive of the natives, but in London they are very, very good.

Q: What were our major bilateral problems while you were in London?

SPIERS: The cancellation of the F-111. That was a traumatic experience. The British had contracted for a number of those planes. I had made a trip with one of their Air Force Marshals to the McDonald-Douglas headquarters in St. Louis and in Texas to look at the planes that were being built for the British. Some already had Royal Air Force insignia and tail numbers. The British Cabinet decided to cancel the order for economic reasons. That was a big shock. We tried to do what we could to minimize the cancellation penalty payments. What made it even more difficult was that I had made efforts to get the Marines to buy the Harrier, a British aircraft, as a sort of quid pro quo. The Marines procured the Harrier, but the British canceled the F-111 order. They did buy some Phantom aircraft in lieu, but it was not a pretty period.

Another interesting issue in which I became involved was Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is a tiny island in the Indian Ocean, known for guano deposits. We wanted to build a base
for our own use because since we were still involved in Vietnam and had major interests in the area, Defense wanted a base very badly. As part of their general withdrawal, the British were considering giving up their Mauritius base. We first looked at a little island called Aldabra, which happened to be the home of an endangered species—the pink footed booty, a bird which was found mostly on that island. This brought us into a real buzz saw because there were some British Parliamentarians who became mightily upset by the thought that the last refuge of this booty bird might disappear because of the invasion of this American herd. It was something like the spotted owl debate today. Finally, I suggested Diego Garcia as an alternative. No one in Washington had ever heard of it. When Washington sent out a message to several posts to see what the reaction of their host government might be to an American base on Diego Garcia, the Embassy in Burma responded that their hosts would think it was a Cuban cigar! The negotiations were prolonged; I finally signed the agreement several years later when I was Chargé in London. Our deal with the British included a waiver on some R&D costs for the Polaris missile as an unspoken compensation for Diego Garcia expenses. Diego Garcia was very controversial because Mauritius was gaining its independence and the Mauritians were very unhappy with this scheme, even though Diego Garcia was over 1000 miles away. But there was guano on the island and it had been “mined” by Mauritians. That is still an issue because Mauritius still lays claim to Diego Garcia, although it never was a part of Mauritius; the island had always been an administrative part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), as had Mauritius.

Q: in 1969, your London tour came to an end and you were assigned to be the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department. How did that come about?

SPIERS: I don't know. One day I received a call from Ambassador Bruce who said that he had just been called by Alex Johnson. Johnson had asked Bruce whether I could be released for a new and important job. I didn't have the slightest idea what that was all about, but shortly thereafter I received a letter from Alex saying that the Department was establishing a new Bureau and that because of my background and experience, they
thought I would be the right person to head it. By this time, I was not very anxious to return to Washington. I had grown to appreciate the Foreign Service life in London. I also got a call from Gerry Smith, then Director of ACDA, who wanted to know whether I would be interested in returning to be his deputy. In all frankness, that was the last assignment I would have wanted. But since there was an evident pressure to return me to Washington, I figured that I'd better grab Alex's offer. It was nearing time to leave London, but I hated to give it up; there was another life than that of Washington and I liked it.

Phil Farley took the ACDA job and I accepted the PM job. When I got back to Washington, I found that it was not only a matter of building a new bureau, but I also had to save the remnants of what had been G/PM. That staff was dispersing and in the process was losing whatever bureaucratic influence and muscle that it may have built up over the years. So I had to start PM practically from scratch.

I went to see Elliot Richardson first of all. He was then the Under Secretary of State, the number two man in the Department. I told him that I would need his help in recruiting a staff for PM. I had already run into trouble with the “system” which had turned down my candidate to be my deputy. Personnel had ruled that the officer I had in mind—Tom Pickering—was too young and too junior. Elliot took care of that problem and Pickering was assigned to PM. I then asked for Ray Garthoff, whom I knew was a key player in the SALT negotiations. If PM was going to play a role in arms control and disarmament we needed people like Garthoff. Then I wanted others, like Lee Sloss and Jock Stoddart. Finally, we managed to put a Bureau together, but it was a struggle.

When I accepted the Director's job, I was told that PM was going to be a bureau and that I would have the rank of an Assistant Secretary. PM would be the Department's principal liaison with Defense and ACDA and would be involved in all politico-military issues. It was to be essentially an expansion of the G/PM staff, but I didn't really know much about G/PM although I had worked with Sey Weiss and Jeff Kitchen when I was in EUR/RPM, primarily
on MLF issues; they were part of the Department that viewed the Ball-Schaetzel-Owen group with great suspicion.

It was a challenge, to say the least, to establish a new Bureau. The Department's bureaucracy does not accept new competitors with grace. Since G/PM had fallen on hard times with the departure of its leadership and much of the staff, the regional bureaus particularly had gotten out of the habit of involving that part of the Department on politico-military issues. ACDA also took advantage of the situation and tried to keep the Department out of arms control issues. Defense wanted to assume full responsibility for the security assistance program. So I needed not only a competent staff, but one that would be sufficiently aggressive to get politico-military affairs under one roof again. Furthermore, PM had to develop new processes to permit it to carry out its responsibilities.

The first decision I made was to stay out of the Vietnam issue. That would have taken up all of our time if we had tried to play a role in that mess. EA had control over that issue in any case and I was not at all interested in challenging the Bureau on that score.

With Defense, we ran into some difficulties. Warren Nutter was the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA) and he was not the easiest guy to work with. We did get a break when Elliot Richardson became the Secretary of Defense. I always had an excellent relationship with Elliot when he was in State. People knew that and I am sure that helped considerably in the Pentagon. I also pushed the State-Defense exchange program. I visited a lot of military establishments. From my previous assignments, I knew a lot of the mid career officers in the military—people like Jack Chain, who later headed PM and now the head of SAC. I worked hard on establishing relationships with the military officers; I did not try as hard with civilians. I would bring visiting Chiefs of Mission over to meet with the Joint Chiefs in “the Tank”

Q: Did you have any difficulties in recruiting Foreign Service officers who had an appreciation for the military?
SPIERS: That was a mixed bag. Some of the staff distrusted the military; some liked them. I always had gotten along well with them and admired a lot of them. I got to know Buzz Wheeler who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He complained to me about EUR and its attitude during the Spanish base negotiations. I was able to intervene on that issue and got EUR to support some of the positions that Defense was taking. I sometimes leaned toward the Defense points of view in order to establish good working relationships. Dave Jones and Bud Zumwalt became friends.

Q: Let me now ask you some questions about disarmament issues that were high on the national security agenda during the 1969-73 period. First of all, what were your views about the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and the Anti Ballistic Missile negotiations?

SPIERS: They were part and parcel of our over-all negotiations with the Soviet Union. During this period, the responsibility for negotiation strategy and tactics had been absorbed by the White House. A new committee, called the Verification Panel, had been established and was chaired by Kissinger. I represented the State Department on it. The meetings were interminable; I often thought that they were stage managed by Kissinger to keep the bureaucracy occupied with busy work while he developed the policy and guided the negotiations. He was actually conducting the negotiations as well because he had meetings with Dobrynin during which key deals were discussed. There were important developments in Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva. Paul Nitze and Gerry Smith (who wore two hats as director of ACDA and chief of the SALT negotiating team) worked on these issues. Kissinger didn't like Gerry Smith; he didn't want any competitor in the policy making process.

I probably knew more about what was going on than anybody else because Ray Garthoff, who was one of my deputies, was the senior State Department member of the SALT delegation. Ray used to get reports from his Soviet counter-part which included information on the clandestine conversations that Kissinger was holding with the Soviet
Embassy. Garthoff would let me know what was going on. I used that information on occasions by referring to some of the clandestine discussions in hopes of throwing Kissinger off balance. My comments of course meant nothing to the other members of the Verification Panel because they weren't privy to the information, but it did discomfort Henry considerably. He of course assumed that his conversations with the Soviets were strictly private. So we gained some advantage from having Garthoff in the SALT delegation. He spoke Russian and had long standing relations with the Soviets.

Kissinger tried to set the State Department, ACDA and Defense against each other. It was a virtuoso balancing act by Kissinger. Generally, State and ACDA were on the same side of the issues with Defense on the other side. ACDA was on the far left most of the time; Defense was on the far right. Defense had dual representation: from the Joint Chiefs and from the Office of the Secretary. It was interesting to note that the Pentagon civilians were far more conservative than the military. The inability of the agencies to achieve a consensus gave Kissinger wide latitude to pursue his own agenda. The split between the agencies allowed Kissinger to develop his own policies and describe them as “compromise” positions.

The most interesting aspect of the disarmament negotiations during this period were the discussions about ABM. That issue sprung up first at the Glassboro summit between Johnson and Kosygin. It was there that McNamara outraged the Soviets by saying that restrictions on ABMs on both sides would be advantageous to both. He said that ABM systems would be destabilizing because they would challenge the concept of deterrence. The Soviets rejected the McNamara thesis at the time, but years later became strong proponents of the concept. During the lengthy ABM negotiations, we spent a lot of time trying to convince the Soviets that it was not “immoral” to limit or forego defensive systems, which had been their initial position—as well as being the position of a lot of Americans. The negotiations during the period we are discussing were going on while a number of technical developments in the anti-ballistic field were occurring—Sentinel, Safe-guard, etc. These embryonic systems would have been both very expensive and
technically questionable. We did build a big, multi-phased radar complex in North Dakota, which we later abandoned. There were a lot of arguments on how many sites each side should be allowed to have, ranging from three to one. The agreement finally said two. But we didn't build any in the final analysis; the Soviets had a somewhat antiquated system around Moscow. But the negotiations dragged on for three years in a drawn out, esoteric and scholastic dialogue. For example, oceans of ink were spilled on the SAM (surface to air missile) up-grade issue. Was the Soviet anti-aircraft system sufficiently sophisticated to be counted as an ABM system? That question was discussed forever. The representative of the Joint Chiefs (General Ray Allison) on the delegation became a strong proponent of the negotiations; so much so that the Chiefs finally fired him because he was perceived as having gone over to the other side, i.e. the evil State Department or the White House—whichever the “other side” was.

Kissinger played his role very shrewdly and no one was ever quite sure what he was doing. On one occasion, the White House surprised everybody by announcing a statement of principles that Kissinger and Dobrynin had concluded. Essentially, he kept the whole bureaucracy off balance. The State Department itself, with the exception of PM and to some extent Sey Weiss in S/P, was not very much involved in disarmament matters. We followed the issues, read the incoming cables even though we knew that the information contained was just the tip of the iceberg. The Secretary himself paid very little attention to the negotiations. He turned it over essentially to his deputy; after Richardson's departure, none of his successors—Ken Rush, John Irvin—were very qualified in the intricacies of disarmament. So State's participation was not very effective. We would spend long hours working on papers that had been requested by the Verification Panel—essentially Kissinger.

There were some amusing incidents. One time, people worked for weeks preparing a very well researched and considered paper which was given to Kissinger. Two weeks later, he asked that a paper be written on a certain subject—it happen to be the same subject of the first paper. He obviously had never read it. I used to call it the “Atalanta game” after
Atalanta and her golden apples; she was a figure in Greek mythology who won her races by dropping golden apple along the way which diverted her competitors as they stopped to pick them up. That paper incident was typical of Kissinger's operation; he just tried to keep the bureaucracy busy and out of his way.

The ABM Treaty was somewhat controversial. The SALT agreement was controversial because on the one hand there were people who didn't think it had gone far enough and permitted countries to do what they would have done in any case and on the other there were those who thought we had given “the store” away. I thought it was a useful contribution although a lot of time had been wasted when Nixon assumed the Presidency and a full review of the U.S. position had to be undertaken, which didn't in the final analysis change the position essentially. The same thing happened when Carter became President with the same results. That wastes a lot of time. The agreements that were reached could have been achieved in much shorter time given a more purposeful and less bureaucratic and chaotic approach. Alex Johnson became the chief U.S. SALT negotiator after Gerry Smith's departure.

Q: To what do you attribute the lack of interest in the State Department leadership in disarmament issues?

SPIERS: The issues were complex; they required a lot of study and detailed knowledge. I spent a lot of time learning about weapons systems—ABM capabilities, etc. We had to know is some detail the capabilities of the Soviet missiles and aircraft. That is not something that busy people who have a wide range of responsibilities can possibly follow. The leadership of the Department was concerned about a number of general issues, largely in part due to the work of Sey Weiss who would send them long, long memoranda which were probably never read in their totality, but which an alarmist tone, full of skepticism, which probably raised concerns and generated nervousness about what was transpiring. I would have to constantly explain to senior officials, like Jack Irvin and Ken Rush, the theory behind what was going on. Sey did have an “evil empire” view of the
Soviet Union, although I don't think he had ever talked to a Russian and had never even been in the Soviet Union. He did have strong ideological views and was very suspicious of about anything that seemed to be a Soviet concession. He followed the disarmament negotiations closely and was always in touch with the Pentagon and particularly those in Defense who opposed negotiations. Sy's long memoranda would bemuse and befuddle the Deputy Secretaries, who did not have the time or the capability to read and understand them. But Sey would raise their level of uneasiness and so they would sporadically get involved. But the absence of a continuing, sustained high level participation weakened the Department's influence. It was clear that when high level NSC meetings took place, neither Rogers or the senior official who represented the Department knew enough about the subject matter to make a credible case for one position or another. They didn't have a clear grasp of the situation, what our objectives and tactics were, etc. But most of the important discussion took place in the Verification Panel where the participants were knowledgeable; they were mostly assistant secretary level people. If Kissinger did not chair the meetings, then Al Haig did.

**Q: I gather that the main issue that the Verification Panel had to wrestle with was whether the Soviets could be trusted.**

SPIERS: True, although it was a false issue because none of us ever proposed that the Soviet be “trusted”. There was deep distrust of the negotiating process. It was intellectually difficult for some to accept the concept that we could negotiate with an enemy. The mentality was a “zero sum” one; that is, anything that the Soviets might agree to had by definition to be contrary to our interests, even if it wasn't apparent. There was no conceptual readiness to assume that there may have been issues which could be resolved in the interest of both parties. I always thought that there were some solutions which could be advantageous to both us and the Soviets; instability was not in any one's interests. Furthermore, military expenditures above a level which would have provided a reasonable level of deterrence were wasteful and not in either our or the Soviet interests. It is possible that the outrageous military expenditures were in the final analysis more detrimental to the
Soviet Union than they were to us, but I am not now ready to accept that thesis. Billions and billions of dollars were spent on non-productive efforts which did not contribute to deterrence or even war fighting capabilities. For example, I favored spending resources on developing precision-guided munitions and delivery systems over investing any further in strategic nuclear weapons. I was strongly opposed to an ABM system because I thought it was a waste of money. I was convinced that deterrence as it had developed in the 60s and 70s worked well and that ABM systems tended to be part of a nuclear war-fighting mentality which as far as I was concerned was entirely unrealistic. But precision-guided missiles did add to a fighting capability for a war that might actually be fought.

Q: You indicated that State Department did not get involved in any decisions concerning the development of new military systems. Should it have been?

SPIERS: That would have meant that some State officials would have to become thoroughly knowledgeable with military systems. Defense would certainly have resisted that. I doubt that State's leadership would have been very interested in such a project. In any case, I don't believe that the development of most new systems was an impediment to reaching accord with the Soviets. Undoubtedly, a lot of the actions we took added to Soviet paranoia and conversely. There was a case of mutual paranoia.

Q: Were you involved with the decision to withdraw an Army division from Korea which took place in 1972?

SPIERS: Yes, I was. It was an issue that arose early in my PM tenure. Alex Johnson told me that the President wanted to get one of our divisions out of Korea. We had two: the second and the fifth. He said that one of my jobs as PM Director was to follow-up upon the President's wish. I was told that in 1969; the withdrawal took place in 1972. It was a good illustration of a policy decision which had a lot of steam behind when first taken in 1969; there wasn't that much opposition to it, but it just took three years going through the ponderous machinery.
Q: You referred to Secretary Rogers on a number of occasions. Was he involved to any great degree in the issue that confronted you as Director of PM?

SPIERS: Not very much. He was quite impatient with some of the matters that I raised with him. When he swore me in as Ambassador to the Bahamas, he described one meeting he had with me, when I had to brief him on MBFR negotiations. He said that I started the meeting by saying: “Mr. Secretary, this is a very complicated subject, but it is not my fault!”. Rogers had a good sense of humor. But his charter was to keep the Department running on an even keel without letting it get involved in major policy making. He himself was not interested in it; he was a close personal friend of Nixon's—he had been Nixon's lawyer and strong supporter of the President. He probably knew that Nixon was antipathetic to the Department and he was not going to challenge that view. He suffered considerable humiliation from Kissinger and was very bitter about him. I had a recent occasion to talk to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers and it was clear to me that they were still very sensitive about the treatment they had received.

As I said earlier, it was Elliot Richardson who provided me guidance as long as he was in the Department, which wasn't very long. After that, I was mostly on my own; I got some guidance from Alex Johnson, but he was essentially a pragmatist who preferred to deal with specific situations. Until he personally became involved in negotiations, he wasn't that interested. Disarmament and arms control presented some tough intellectual challenges which required constant and consistent pursuit; one had to wade through lengthy cables which required study. It was much like being in graduate school. The issues were complicated. Ray Garthoff and few others like myself, although in subordinate positions, were the only ones who put time and effort into studying the multi-faceted issues.

Unfortunately, this syndrome was true of many of PM's functions. We didn't get much guidance or attention from the Department's leadership on issues such as security assistance or military bases. Richardson was the exception. He was interested and took
the time necessary to remain current on the various politico-military issues. As far as I am concerned, Elliot Richardson was the best Deputy Secretary the Department has ever had. After his departure, we were pretty much on our own. It is true of course that the Department was not making major policies such as on arms control and disarmament; that was being developed in the White House. Kissinger paid a lot of attention to the details and followed up on the actions by the bureaucracy in great depth, using such devices as the Verification Panel. Jim Schlesinger used to represent CIA frequently at the Panel meetings, but he or CIA's representative was always careful not to press policy viewpoints.

Q: What were your relationships with Congress during your PM tenure?

SPIERS: I would occasionally testify on a military assistance matters such as ships loans. I earlier mentioned my testimony before Fulbright. But in general I had little contact with Congress while in PM; that changed when I was in Turkey and when I was Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and later when I was Under Secretary for Management. While I was in PM, I think Congress recognized where the decision-making authority lay. They were frustrated that they couldn't get at Kissinger and that they couldn't get much out of the Department.

Q: In 1973, you were appointed as U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas. How did that come about?

SPIERS: By 1973, I had served four long, trying years in PM. I remembered the joys of living and working in London. So one day I told Ken Rush, then Deputy Secretary, that I was running out of steam and that it was time for me to go overseas. At about the same time, the Department's personnel system got hold of me and said that it wanted to nominate me Ambassador to Mauritius. I barely knew where that country was. I felt that there must have been a better assignment. I went to see Bill Porter, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Curtis Tarr, Under Secretary for Security Assistance. I was told that all that was available was Malaysia and some other post. They seemed so far away
and of marginal interest. By sheer luck, the Bahamas became independent in mid-1973; it was close to Washington and the first Ambassador would have to establish an Embassy and negotiate base agreements. I thought that might be fun. In any case, it sounded attractive to a worn out bureaucrat. So I volunteered for the Bahamas and the Department said OK. In mid-1973, the Ambassadorial pickings were slim, although there is a tale related to this assignment, which was not told to me till later and had something to do with my assignment to London.

By 1974, Kissinger had become Secretary of State. As I said, I had known him for sometime. I heard that he became outraged when he heard that I was in the Bahamas. I later found out from Al Haig that in 1973 the White House wanted me to become Ambassador in Morocco. Haig asked me why I had not wanted to go to Morocco. I told him that no one had ever offered me the opportunity to go to Rabat. Subsequently, I discovered that Bill Hall, the Director General, had decided that Morocco was too important to be offered to a relative newcomer to the Foreign Service; so on his own, as far as I know, he never had transmitted the White House's suggestion to me. Hall was from the "old school" and felt that people should serve in the hardship posts before being elevated to important positions. The story goes that when Kissinger and Haig found out about this Hall ploy, they told Hall that he was going out as Ambassador to Mauritius. Rather than doing that, Hall retired. I don't know whether the story is apocryphal, but Al Haig swears by it. He has told me that story several times.

So I became the first U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas and found it interesting because I had to establish relationships with a new government in a sort of hidden corner of the British Empire. The British had not sent their best talent to govern the islands, e.g. the Duke of Windsor. This was a black nation which had over a period of time developed considerable resentment against whites; that was reflected by the new government, which became a challenge as we tried to develop relations. We had had Consuls General there since 1831; it was one of our oldest consulates. Our representatives had tended to mix primarily with the white, wealthy community. When I got there, I refused to join the Lyford...
Key Club, which was on the eastern side of the island in a billionaires colony. Blacks and non-whites were never permitted there. When the Prime Minister heard that I had refused to join the Club, he called me and reacted very favorably. That enabled me to develop some friendships with the native population.

The only irreplaceable U.S. military facility overseas was in the Bahamas. It was an underwater testing facility which we used to test submarines and torpedoes, particularly their noise levels. The facility was located in the “Tongue of the Ocean” between New Providence and Andros Island in an area that is not replicated anywhere else on earth. The U.S. military viewed it as an indispensable overseas facility. So I was involved with issues dealing with that facility.

There were other problems that arose, so that there was enough work to keep me busy, particularly since this was a new embassy which always raises new issues. Roz Ridgway was my DCM. I stayed in Nassau about a year. As I said, I enjoyed my tour and it was a good post for my children, although I would not have wished to be the second Ambassador in the Bahamas, as Sey Weiss was. I was the only career officer who was ever posted as Ambassador to the Bahamas; it is a highly desired post by political appointees. The present Ambassador is a former Senator.

As I said, when Kissinger became Secretary in 1974, he questioned my assignment. Furthermore, Washington wanted to move Annenberg out of London. The general view was that he had served his term, but he didn't want to leave. He had first agreed to leave, then changed his mind. A search had been made for a replacement for Annenberg, but nothing seemed to click. So Kissinger decided that I should return to London as Chargé, which delighted me. Eagleburger later told me that a cable was sent to Annenberg telling him of my appointment and requesting that he leave before I got there. That is the main reason I spent almost three months in Vermont waiting for all the pieces to fall into place. I left Nassau on September 2 and I didn’t reach London until late November. It took them that long to get Annenberg out; Kissinger didn't want me to go except as Chargé.
I was Charg# for approximately four months when Elliot Richardson became Ambassador. I was Charg# again for a couple of months in 1976 between the time Richardson left and Anne Armstrong arrived. She left in early 1977 after a new President had taken over in Washington and then I was Charg# again until Kingman Brewster presented his credentials in June 1977. By that time, I had been appointed as Ambassador to Turkey, so that I worked with Brewster for only about a month. So much of my tour in London was as Charg#.

I had made many friends during my previous tour in London and most of them were still in influential positions. In fact, many had moved up in the hierarchy. For example, I had known David Owen who had been Navy Secretary in the late 60s and had become the Foreign Secretary. Much to the consternation of the British Foreign office bureaucracy, the first thing he did when he became Foreign Secretary was to call me to his office; I spent three hours talking to him about a whole host of foreign policy concerns. No one from the Foreign Office was in the meeting. Mrs. Owen was an American and a good friend of my wife's. I picked up my relationships with Denis Healey, who had been Minister of Defense and now was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I had known Jim Callaghan when he was the Chancellor and who was then Prime Minister. I was essentially on a first name basis with most if not all of the Labor Government ministers and leaders. My friendships of the 60s stood me in very good stead. The fact that I was a Charg# was of no significance; as a matter of fact it was an advantage because it spared me from having to do a lot of things that Ambassadors to the Court of St. James usually had done. Ray Seitz, who is now Ambassador in London, was a junior officer in the Political Section in the mid-70s; he is the first career officer to be appointed as Ambassador; all the others have been political appointees. Moving from Charg# to DCM, back to Charg# back to DCM etc. was no problem; being Charg# or DCM in London was more interesting than being Ambassador in the Bahamas.
I got along well with Elliot Richardson, who, as I have mentioned, was a long time friend. Times were a little rockier with Anne Armstrong at least at the beginning of her tour. That was an interesting experience. She had been in the White House with Nixon; she may have felt that being a women she was at a disadvantage and had to impose an extra heavy hand on her bureaucracy in order to make it respond. When she was named as Ambassador, she called me from Washington and began to give me a list of requests, most of which were silly or outrageous. I told her that we just didn't have the capability to meet most of her demands; that made her very angry. That of course led me to believe that after he had arrived, my days in London were numbered. She had no concept of the role of an Ambassador; she didn't know what she was supposed to do. She was very insecure and undoubtedly felt completely lost in a world of which she knew precious little. I think she was probably concerned by the fact that I had been an Ambassador. Strangely enough, we ended up being very good friends. I was completely straight-forward with her. Gradually she began to see that I was not her enemy; I had told her that the Embassy's reputation depended on her success; her failures would come back to haunt us. I pointed out to her that we came from different parts of the United States—she was from Texas, I was from New England—and that I had always been absolutely candid. I said if anything about me made her uncomfortable, all she had to do was to call Washington and I would be gone very quickly. Such a move wouldn't hurt my career. She immediately picked that up and said: “It may not hurt your career, but it will certainly hurt mine!” After that, we got along famously.

She was great on public relations. The British really liked her. They were entranced by the Texas style—informal, casual, friendly. It was the total opposite of British—tight, proper, class-conscious. She was entirely different from any of her predecessors, which worked both to her advantage and disadvantage. One of her predecessors had spent a lot of money in London, but was somewhat of a laughing stock. The British liked Elliot Richardson. But Anne Armstrong was genuinely popular; the British loved her. So her tour was a real success.
Q: During the 1974-77 period, what were the major issues in our relationship with the U.K.?

SPIERS: The major issues were economic. I spent a lot of time on such matters as IMF agreements, etc. By this time, the Defense issues had receded in importance and were no longer central. It was the British economic situation that was the core problem. I used to send first person cable to Kissinger trying to engage his attention in the British economic situation and the IMF programs. The Treasury Department was difficult to deal with because it considered itself independent and sovereign. Treasury officials would come to London without informing State and went about their business in London without telling anyone what they were doing; they in fact were involving themselves with issues which were at the core of our relationships with the British. We found out what went on and then had to tell State and Kissinger what was going on. Kissinger would then have to talk to Treasury in Washington—he finally did get involved even if economics was not his favorite subject or interest. Economic issues received the same treatment from Kissinger as arms control matters had from Rogers.

The British were going through a period of pound devaluation. They wanted to borrow large sums from the IMF to support their currency. They were trying to marshal international support for their plans and that brought me fully into the issue because U.S. backing was crucial. Denis Healey was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and since we knew each other well, that helped considerably. That was true also for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister who were also old friends. I don't think that my personal relationships concerned my Ambassadors too greatly. One of the problems was that our Ambassadors were in London for such a short time (Richardson=10 months, Armstrong=one year) that once they had gone through the protocol requirements, they weren't there long enough to grasp hold of the issues and get to know the people well. This I think was all coincidence; Richardson left to become Secretary of Commerce and Armstrong left when Carter became President. I think she was treated very cavalierly.
Mondale and David Aaron — who was to become the deputy to Brzezinski on the NSC staff—came to London and wanted to see the Foreign Minister. They told Armstrong that she couldn't go along to the meeting; they asked that I go along instead. I told Armstrong that if she didn't want me to go, I would refuse to do so, but she told me to go. I suggested to her that she resign because there would more incidents of his kind; I had seen it happen in other circumstances. I told her she should return to Texas; her political opponents had won and undoubtedly wanted her job. Sooner or later, I am sure that she would have had to resign anyway, but she wanted to hang on in London as long as possible; she liked it. The British did not like the way she was treated by the new Carter administration. They have never understood our system and it sometimes offends them.

While I was Chargé, in the Spring of 1977, Carter made his first overseas trip. That was an interesting experience. It was much different from the Nixon visit. It did begin with an embarrassment because at the request of the Department of State we had booked the suites and rooms at Claridge's that we had used in the past for Nixon and Kissinger visits. When Carter heard that, he said he was not going to stay at Claridge's. In the meantime, the hotel had given notice to all of its guests that they would have to vacate; it canceled reservations already made. We had a major uproar on our hands when Carter said that he wouldn't stay at Claridge's. The hotel wanted payment for its losses; the White House refused. It said that it had not authorized the reservations in the first place. It got very messy. Carter stayed at the residence. I went to the airport to meet him. We rode back to town together with his son Chip, all of us crowded together in the back seat of a Chevy. We had two motorcycle escorts, but no motorcade. Kissinger would never had traveled like that.

This was of course Carter's first trip abroad. He acted genuinely surprised when a few Londoners would stop and wave. He didn't think that anyone would recognize him. I took him into the residence and showed him around. I took him into the Ambassador's bedroom where he was going to stay. There was a huge bed. He said that he would find it difficult to...
make up the bed in the morning. He was serious; that was the way he was, at least at the beginning of his administration. It was sort of funny!

Q: Did the visit go well substantively?

SPIERS: Yes. He met with a lot of people in one-on-one situations. He had a meeting with the Queen. He wrote notes by hand after the meetings thanking people. I got one; they all were addressed “TO:” —the Queen, Ronald Spiers, etc. It was his style. He wrote the notes on little White House stationery pads. I think the British were puzzled by Carter; they didn't know what to make of him. In some respects, I suspect they viewed him as a hick. He didn't seem to be over-awed by the pomp and circumstances, although it is true that he had less of that than his successors had. It was also much more informal than the Nixon visit.

The London tour was another great three years. A lot of it was just personal enjoyment of London life—the theater, the music, the city, the intelligent people.

Q: Did you have any difficulties with the large presence of other U.S. government agencies?

SPIERS: Indeed I did. Everybody wanted to be represented in London. It was a constant problem for the Department of State. The whole question of U.S. representation abroad was an issue because the State Department is too often the minority of an Embassy staff. That was certainly true in London. Carter raised this question with me on the way in from the airport. He asked him many American government employees there were in London. I gave him the number, which I read from a little 3x5 card that Mike Conlon, the Counselor for Administration, had given me. It was something like 741 people and Carter was aghast. He thought that that was just terrible; actually that was a reduction of approximately 500 from the level that was in effect when I had been in the U.K. in 1969. That was due in part to the closing of most of our consulates. But then I asked the President to guess how many were Foreign Service officers. He tried several numbers, all too high. The lowest he
got to was 50; in fact, there were only 46 Foreign Service officers in the whole Embassy and that included all of the political, economic, consular and administrative staffs. We continually tried to lower the American presence. Kingman Brewster was perhaps more effective on this issue that any of his predecessors because I had impressed on him that he had take some actions. For example, we had twelve Coast Guard people in London. We had too many USIA people, we had AID personnel, a big CIA liaison staff—the CIA personnel were “declared”—not clandestine. Everything was unnecessarily large. Almost every agency of government had representation. The U.S. government would not have suffered had there been fewer people in the Embassy, but London was a very attractive post; it was good living, it was easy to reach, there was no problem in assigning people there. So it was an obvious place for federal agencies to set up shop.

The American presence was essentially an issue of cost control. It was not a foreign policy problem as it is in some posts. The British don't pay that much attention to Embassies. It is always an embarrassment when other diplomats or a Britisher ask you the size of your staff and you have to confess to this huge number.

We had a lot of Congressional delegations; it was a constant stream. Most of them were shopping trips. When I first went to London as Minister in 1974, we came directly from Vermont, where, as I mentioned, we were waiting out the Annenberg departure. We flew overnight and arrived in London in the morning. As soon as I arrived at the Embassy, I immediately had to brief a Congressional delegation. One of the Congressman was Wayne Hayes who was as always very nasty. When I started the briefings, he stood up rustling his papers and said: “I know all this stuff. I have heard all this before from the State Department”. And he left to go shopping. He would buy antiques, intimidating the shopkeepers to bring the prices down. His military escorts would carry the objects away to the military aircraft for a customs-free flight home. He was corrupt.

Most of the Congressional delegations were not in London for serious business. But we had to put on a show for each—a reception, a party or something. We'd give them
a briefing, but then we would leave them alone to do their own thing. Many were very demanding. Fortunately, the Embassy had a British employee—Joan Auten—who was well known to every American Congressman because she performed for each all sorts of services—and I do mean “all sorts”. One does not get a favorable view of the U.S. Congress through the Congressional delegations that pass through London.

Q: Auten set the standard for service to U.S. Congressmen throughout Europe. She was known to all American Embassies on the Continent. In 1977, you were appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. How did that come about?

SPIERS: One day while serving in London, I was called by Bill Galloway, who was a special assistant to Dick Moose, who had been a neighbor of ours in Hollin Hills (Fairfax County, VA). We had been living, before going to London, on a short cul-de-sac in Hollin Hills; Tom Pickering lived right across the street from us and Moose was next to him. I had known Dick from his earlier stint in the State Department; in 1977 he was the Deputy Under Secretary for Management in the Carter administration. I didn’t ask to be reassigned; I was quite happy in London. I had been in London almost three years and it was time to think of another assignment. In any case, Galloway called and asked what I wanted to do next. He thought I could have my pick of posts. I mentioned a few; Turkey was not in that list—Greece may have been.

The next Washington call came from Phil Habib, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who said that the White House had approved my assignment to Turkey. I know that that call came before the Carter visit because during the visit, Carter asked me what I was going to do next and I had to tell him that he had recently nominated me to go to Turkey as his “personal representative” i.e. Ambassador. Carter said: “Oh, yes, that is right. I remember that!”.

I didn't know much about Turkey and I guess I was somewhat disappointed. As I said, I would have liked to go to Greece or something similar. But as it turned out, my Turkey
assignment was the high point of my career in many respects. I think that originally I was supposed to go to Iran. David Aaron had mentioned that possibility when he came to London with Mondale. I told him that I would prefer not to go there. I didn't have any sympathy for the Shah and in any case, I was a NATO expert and thought that I should be assigned to a country that was part of that coalition. I suspect, although I never had any confirmation, that David, upon his return to Washington, mentioned my concerns and had my prospective assignment changed to Turkey. In retrospect, I am more than delighted with that change. I would have been in Iran during the Shah's fall, as Bill Sullivan was.

We returned to the States with my family remaining in Vermont, while I went to Washington for a week or ten days of briefings. We didn't have much time because there was still no Ambassador in London and the post couldn't be left open for too long. Then we returned to London, stayed there to break in the new Ambassador—the new DCM, Ed Streator, had not yet arrived—and went through the usual farewell routines and then on to Ankara. My main background in Turkish matters came from my EUR/RPM and PM days. That was very little.

Q: What did you expect to find in Ankara and how were those expectations met?

SPIERS: I didn't know what to expect because I knew so little. I had worked with Turkish officials. The senior official in the Foreign Ministry when I arrived in Ankara was an old friend—Sukru Elekdag—, who later became the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. I knew him when he had been head of NATO affairs for the Turkish Foreign Office in the mid 60s. I got to know him well as I did many of the officials in charge of NATO affairs in the various Foreign Ministries of NATO countries.

So I had some friends, but I didn't really know what to expect. I didn't speak Turkish; I had only visited there once as Director of PM; I didn't know anything about the country beyond the NATO relationships, e.g., the internal political situation, the economic conditions, etc.
I found an absolutely fascinating country filled with great people. I loved the Turks. It is a country that has had about twelve civilizations moving across its surface, with each leaving its mark. Turkey was the location of a lot of places that I thought were in fact in Greece.

When I arrived the U.S.-Turkish relations were in very bad shape because of the arms embargo which Congress had imposed after the Cyprus invasion. I believe that in fact many in Congress were motivated by the desire to embarrass Kissinger rather than just to punish Turkey. Kissinger had had a close relationship with the Turks; he liked them very much. Before going to Ankara, I went to see Henry and he told me that I was going to one of the most important places in the world. He thought that the administration had made a great assignment and that I was very lucky. I asked him a lot of questions about various Turkish personalities whom he knew well.

Al Haig, whom I had known from EUR/RPM and PM days was then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He also regarded Turkey as one of the most vital links in Western defense. Turkey was the eastern flank of NATO, bordering on the Soviet Union. We had a lot of important listening posts—intelligence facilities—there. From Turkey, we monitored Soviet nuclear tests. The whole southern part of the Soviet Union was covered by devices located in Sinop, Karamursel and Diyarbakir. All of these were very important military facilities. We had an important air base at Incirlik. The commander of the NATO south east flank was stationed in Izmir where the U.S. had a substantial military contingent.

My challenge was to get relationships back to a more friendly basis. The relations, despite all of our military presence and the importance of Turkey, were at a stand still. The Turks, in retaliation for the embargo, had closed all the PXs. Our military stayed, but it was not a pleasant situation. Demirel was the Prime Minister then; he recently became that again. I just saw him in New York a few weeks ago. The internal politics were on a see-saw. Ecevit and Demirel would trade-off the Prime Ministership. They disliked each other personally. What ever one of them did when in office, the other would undo when he succeeded. It
was a very unstable political situation with the political extremes—both right and left—at war with each other. It was very difficult security situation; eight Americans were killed during my tour by Turkish terrorism, mostly left-wingers from the revolutionary group Devsol, which was quite anti-American. About five thousand Turks were being killed every year in political shootouts. A right wing group would drive by a left wing coffeehouse and throw some firepower into it, killing some and the next day the left would retaliate in similar fashion. These outbreaks of political violence lasted throughout my tour.

Our relationship with Ecevit was interesting. He was the Prime Minister for most of my tour. He had been a journalist, an intellectual. We got along pretty well primarily because he was a devotee of T.S. Eliot—he had translated a lot of Eliot's works into Turkish—and I happen to know by heart a considerable amount of Eliot's poetry. So that built a good base for a relationship. In general, Ecevit was very suspicious of the American government. This stemmed from a leftist, socialist ideological background. He was also anti-military. He spoke excellent English, having lived in the U.S. as a student and journalist. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Turkish relationships had tensions.

The Congress was a major problem. We used to have a number of Congressional delegations visit; I used to believe they left with a better understanding of the situation. But there were two Greek-American members of Congress that were a real stumbling block: Paul Sarbanes and John Brademas. I had only seen Pat Leahy and Bob Stafford, the two Senators from Vermont before I left for Turkey. As I mentioned earlier, I wasn't in Washington very long between London and Ankara. During my briefings in Washington the Greek “lobby” may have been described to me, but at that time I didn't really have an appreciation for its political heft; that I didn't find out about that until I had been in Turkey for a while.

I had known both Sarbanes and Brademas before. Both had been Rhodes scholars; both visited London relatively frequently. Whenever they came to London, they would have dinner with me. I introduced them to a number of important Britishers; that I think
helped them look at me favorably. But once I became engaged in Turkish affairs, we were
on opposite sides of the fence. I considered the embargo as pure impediment to good
U.S-Turkey relations without having a scintilla of effect on Turkey's Cyprus policy. It just
hardened the Turkish position and I said so. They were unhappy. They called me on the
carpet. I had to return to Washington and they, in effect, threatened to have me fired. It
is interesting to note that after I left Turkish matters, we all became friends again. I saw
Sarbanes often when I was Under Secretary for Management and when I was Director for
Intelligence and Research. I saw Brademas often when he became President of NYU and
I was at the UN.

It has been suggested that they were motivated by anti-Kissinger feelings, but I think
they were just spokesmen for the American-Greek community. That made them strong
opponents of Turkey. Of course, in some ways, the Turks are their own worst enemies.
They are not very adept at handling Congressional relations. They are not very nimble
politically; they are not very subtle; they are heavy-footed, deliberate and lumbering. They
have very little understanding of the American system. I became good friends with the
Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later
became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated
them carefully.

Q: Let me pursue that effort a little because I think it is somewhat unusual in the Foreign
Service. What led you to cultivate a foreign military establishment?

SPIERS: I did that in Turkey, Great Britain and Pakistan. I had worked with the American
military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan,
of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a
former admiral. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as
I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs
of Staff—Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie—gave a dinner for me which I was
told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these
officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect. It was very amusing.

Q: Let's talk a little about Cyprus. What was that situation in the 1977-80 period?

SPIERS: The Turks are not very flexible, but they were helped at the time by the fact that Cyprus was also governed by an inflexible leader, Kyprianou, who was probably the greatest obstacle to conciliation. That protected the Turks from themselves; they didn't need to overcome their own inflexibility. At the beginning of the crisis the Turks probably had a very defensible position. There had been a coup in Cyprus which overthrew Makarios; that was engineered by the Greek military who undoubtedly wanted to incorporate the island with Greece. In some respects, Cyprus is much like North Ireland—very difficult to solve; the problems are confessional and cultural. The Turks are a minority on an island forty miles off their own coast. The Greeks are a majority, but separated widely from the metropole. The Turks are the poor; they have been badly treated for a long time by the majority. That situation rankled. The Turkish Cypriots are much like the North Ireland Catholics—the dispossessed, the poor, the despised minority. But the Turks, in their usual way, are not very agile in dealing with the issue.

We urged genuine negotiations, but most people realized that the obstacle at the time was Kyprianou, the Cypriot President. So the Turks couldn't be solely or even primarily responsible for the deadlock, but I did what I could to urge that reasonable negotiations be undertaken. For the Turks, the "Law of the Sea" negotiation was a much more important issue at the time in their relationships with Greece. I didn't constantly raise the Cyprus issue; Washington didn't expect that and it would have been counter-productive. Cyprus was a major issue and I followed it closely in Ankara; when I had an opportunity, I would urge negotiations, but never in a heavy handed manner. I tried to explain to the Turks the American political system in which they were at a disadvantage because there was little
Turkish influence in Congress, nor was there a very vocal American-Turkish lobby. There had been a large number of Turkish immigrants, but most had been assimilated and had lost that fervor for their former homeland that Greek-Americans tend to display. I tried to point out these realities, but the situation was just not ripe for negotiations.

Today, the obstacle to a solution is Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot, much more than the Greeks. Nevertheless, I think today’s situation is ripe for negotiations. But the Turks are very heavy handed, stubborn, suspicious of the Greeks. On the other hand, they are much more straightforward than the Greeks, more loyal and reliable. The Greeks can run circles around them in the public relations arena; they are faster, quicker, they appear much more flexible. The Turks sense this difference and that makes it much harder to deal with them on the Cyprus question.

The issue loomed large when I was in Turkey. The Turks hated the Greeks; they had a love-hate relationship with us. In 1964, Johnson had sent a letter to Ecevit which the Turks read as a threat. They read it to say that if the Soviets attacked, the NATO accords would not be called into effect because the crisis was related to Cyprus and not to an East-West issue. It was a mistake to send that letter, given the existing political situation and the cultural chasm. It generated a very bad relationship between the U.S. and Turkey which was still very much in evidence when I got to Ankara three years later.

As I mentioned earlier, fortunately I knew a few people in the Foreign Office. It was lucky that I knew something about T.S. Eliot. It was lucky that I had an affinity for the military, which very soon came to accept me as an active opponent of the embargo. When I came home on leave, I spent almost every day for two months working the Hill. I must have talked to about 250 Congressmen. I know I changed fifty votes and eventually the embargo was lifted by a very, very close vote. The Turks appreciated my efforts.

Sarbanes and his colleagues represent a strong ethnic nationalist affinity. Their position was not entirely unreasonable. Even Sarbanes will admit that the original Turkish invasion
in 1974 was probably justified, but then a truce was declared, which the Turks broke by occupying additional territory to consolidate their position. That Sarbanes finds unreasonable and I must say, even without the pro-Greek bias that Sarbanes has, that his position has merit. Strangely enough, one of my best friends in Ankara happened to be the Greek Ambassador—George Papoulias—, who later became the acting Foreign Minister for the Greek government. I think that the Greek Ambassador in Ankara reported to Athens which reported to Washington, including Congress, that I was not anti-Greek.

Q: Do you see an eventual settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute?

SPIERS: It has to come sometime. The tensions are deep-rooted in history. Greece was part of the Ottoman Empire and then revolted against it in 1822 after a costly war. Greece and Turkey were on opposite sides during World War I, and Greece invaded Anatolia after the Axis' defeat. Greece took a lot of islands in the Dodecanese, which were very close to Turkish shores. They were taken over by the Italians during World War II, but after the end of that war, reverted to Greek control. The “Law of the Sea” is a major issue because the Turks feel their access to the Aegean Sea is unacceptably restricted because the Greeks have declared unilaterally a ten-mile zone around all of their islands, which effectively hampers Turkish access to both the sea and some of their ports. Then there are the cultural differences to which I alluded earlier. The Turks have something of an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Greeks. So we are facing a set of difficult and complex issues, many of which have long historical roots. But there is no reason why they can't be resolved.

The real tragedy is that after World War I, Ataturk and Venezuelos met and arranged for a transfer of populations. But that arrangement did not apply to Cyprus because at that time Cyprus was a British protectorate and therefore could not be part of any Turkish-Greek deal. The Cyprus problem is a real one; as I said, it is much like Northern Ireland and much like the present problems in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia lies across the fault line between the former Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, which creates all
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sorts of cultural and religious divisions. Cyprus has a Muslim North and a Christian South, with the latter being richer than the former. The Greeks have emphasized business in their history; the Turks have leaned toward the military. That explains to a considerable extent the economic gap between the two. But the issues between them are not unresolvable.

Q: Did you while in Ankara keep in constant communication with the U.S. Ambassador in Athens? Did you try to coordinate strategy?

SPIERS: We were always in touch with our Athens Embassy. We kept each other informed. Unfortunately, we couldn't visit each other; we probably would have had to go to Frankfurt in order to get to either capital. I didn't have even a chance to go to Cyprus until after I left Turkey. Galen Stone was our Ambassador in Nicosia and we tried to keep in touch with him. There had been a history of antagonism between the two American Embassies and I would have none of that while I was in Ankara.

Q: The embargo was lifted in 1978. How did that change your role?

SPIERS: It immediately made it easier for the Americans in Turkey. The PXs and the Commissaries opened giving us all access to a new supply line. The relationships between the Turkish and U.S. military reopened. The Turks became eligible again for military assistance. This was very helpful because the Turks had always felt that they had gotten the short end of the stick from NATO in terms of military hardware especially since they were the nation with the longest common border with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they felt, and appropriately so, that they did more for NATO than any other country by hosting so many military and intelligence facilities. They were very loyal to NATO, but felt unappreciated. The Turks have been given short shrift by the European Community; they have gotten a very cold shoulder. The Turks feel this discrimination very keenly.

Our embargo certainly had an impact on Turkish military preparedness. When the embargo was lifted, we had to face the question of the level of assistance. I had spent a lot of time with the military, as I have mentioned, both Turkish and American. We had
a large military assistance office. I worked very closely with our military planners who had office in the Turkish General Staff headquarters. The Turkish requirements were so great that we couldn't possibly have met them. In addition to all the other issues, we were also stuck with the McNaughton commitments that I described earlier. As I said, I think his promises were made without reference to Washington; he may have added that “the administration would make its best efforts”, but those footnotes are seldom heard by the other side. The “McNaughton commitment” made our job very difficult because the Turks always said that we were not doing enough for them; we would point out to the high level of our assistance, but in fact, their needs were so high that even a doubling or tripling of our assistance would probably not have met the requirements that NATO's planners had established. The Germans also provide assistance. I used to meet with their Ambassador; he had been previously the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union and earlier to NATO. The perceived “shortfalls” were a constant source of tensions. Intellectually, the Turks may have understood the mechanics of the U.S. government, but not emotionally; that is true for many countries. They feel that if the President of the United States really wanted something done, he could ensure it is done. They can not accept the concept of divided powers, of checks and balances. Even the British have a hard time understanding a Presidential system. So when an American President is not able to obtain Congressional support, he is perceived as not really having wanted to do so; the failure is due to the lack of personal commitment and not a systemic problem as it is often.

Q: Did you have to face the issue of the relationship of the Greek assistance program to the Turkish one?

SPIERS: That was not as much of a problem in the late 70's as it is today. In those days, the issue was a Congressional matter; the administration opposed the 7:10 ratio, so that that ratio was a sense of Congress and not law. It was a relationship that the administration had not accepted; later the Executive Branch may have gotten used to it because it is certainly in effect now. Of course, the Turks also opposed the concept.
Military assistance was the major aid effort still in being when I was Ambassador. The old aid program had been phased out; the only economic assistance still left was what was called “security assistance” which was essentially a budget support program. It was useful to us because any assistance program is useful to achieve political objectives. I spent a lot of time on Turkish economic issue, particularly in the Ecevit period. He was essentially a socialist. The Turks are well-organized and hard-working, but were hampered by statist economic ideas. As a matter of fact, Turkey is a fertile soil for foreign investment because the returns will be good. But they did have a lot of quasi-socialist rhetoric and formulas. Some Turks were convinced that our embargo was really an economic one, promoted by the Greek lobby to strangle them. I used to tell them that they couldn't blame the U.S. for their crazy economic policies. One of the pillars of Ataturkism was “statism”—state owned industries. Such policy may have been defensible in Ataturk’s time, but by the end of the 70s, the Turks had pushed the concept so far that many of their industries were totally non-competitive. Their products were not marketable overseas. They had an import substitution policy which could not be justified on economic grounds. I cooperated with the IMF and the World Bank to try to get those institutions to push the Turks towards more sensible economic policies, which they finally accepted under Demirel. I used to talk to the military about their country’s economic policies. When the military executed their coup in September, 1980—shortly after my departure—, Evren became the head of government and he instituted a more sensible economic policy with a much greater emphasis on the free market, which is what Turkey needed.

Security assistance was not very useful in changing the government's economic policies. It was helpful in our relationships with the military. What would have been more helpful than anything else would have been the removal of U.S. tariffs on Turkish textiles and the abandonment of the multi-fiber agreements. Those are actions that are often much more economically useful than aid. Some Turks complain about our protectionist policies and we didn’t have a very good answer to their charges. They would point out that they had proceeded with economic reforms of the kind that we had urged on them and which made
them competitive and then we raised the tariff barriers so that they had difficulties selling their wares in the U.S. market. What made the matter even more egregious was that the Turkish exports were really minuscule in the total textile picture.

Q: You earlier mentioned the physical security problems in Turkey. Was the left-right conflict also a barrier to economic development?

SPIERS: Of course. It had to interfere with development. It was destabilizing; it was a barrier to foreign investment. Fortunately, most of the conflict had abated although periodically there was some resurgence. There are some sympathies for Muslim fundamentalism. You have to understand that Turkey is stratified. The older generation spoke German; the middle generation spoke French; and the youngest generation spoke English. So German is now disappearing, but at the time of Ataturk, the German relationship through World War I was very strong. In addition to this generational gap, there were strong ideological differences, with a pure revolutionary sentiment being felt by part of the population. That in part caused the domestic violence. Turkey has some elements of a tribal society. Vengeance is a very Turkish sentiment. If someone kills a member of your family, you are duty bound to kill some one in the family of the aggressor. Tensions spiral upwards.

Q: What was the Kurdish situation in the late 70s?

SPIERS: The Turks denied that there was a Kurdish situation. Now they have accepted the facts of life. They believed that all people living within Turkish borders were Turks first. They called the Kurds “mountain Turks”. There was some evidence of Turkish cultural imperialism. They refused to let the Kurds use their language. It was a question whether everybody had to speak the same language or whether diversity and separate nationalism would be acceptable. But there was no overt insurgency while I was in Turkey. There were Cabinet officers who were of Kurdish origin.
I had great concern for these internal instabilities but there wasn't much we could do about it. I was personally exposed to terrorism on two occasions. The first one occurred shortly after we arrived while we were visiting Istanbul. The U.S. government had an apartment there for the Ambassador because Ambassadors spent considerable amount of time in that city. About 3 a.m. one morning there was a loud pounding on the apartment's door. I was there with my wife and one of our daughters and Dick Moose's daughter who was visiting us at the time. I roused myself from bed and went to the door and looked through the peephole. There, in the hallway, were three seedy-looking bearded guys carrying machine guns. I was quite concerned, particularly since they were yelling at me in Turkish and I didn't understand a word they said. My wife looked out of the window into a narrow alley and told me that a police car was parked there. At about this time, the phone rang; it was the Consulate General's Marine Guard who said that a detachment was on its way over to the apartment and asked that I wait for them. When they arrived, we let everyone in. Apparently, CIA had intercepted a message between Japanese Red Army operatives reporting that they had plans to attack the American Ambassador or the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul. The intelligence people didn't pay much attention to it because they assumed that the Japanese Red Army had Ankara and Istanbul confused. But when someone found out that I was in fact in Istanbul, it dawned on them that precautions might be in order. I found about all of this later. So the police and the Marines had come to the apartment to intercept any attack that the Red Army might have contemplated.

The other terrorist threat occurred in Ankara itself. A team of Palestinian-Syrian terrorists occupied the Egyptian Embassy, which was about 500 yards from our Embassy on Ataturk Boulevard. That team killed several people; they captured the Egyptian Ambassador. They let him make only one phone call which he made to me; he wanted my help to intercede on his behalf. The siege was ended when the Turks stormed the Embassy and captured or killed the Palestinians, although a few more innocent bystanders were killed in the process. It turned out later that the terrorists' principal target had been the American Embassy, but they shied away from an attack because our facilities looked
too well protected. So they went to the next Chancery up the street. That was a real plus for our security program. It is a lesson that I didn't forget when I became responsible for security as Under Secretary for Management.

Q: What do you believe the future holds for countries that have tribal rivalries, e.g., Northern Ireland, Turkey, etc?

SPIERS: I don't know. There may not be a solution. Yugoslavia will be an interesting test case. One of our friends is the former Yugoslavian Ambassador to the UN. He was fired because he is a Croatian; his wife is a Serb. These internecine wars create a lot of personal hardships. Ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted and very hard to resolve. It is hard for an American used to a multi-ethnic society to comprehend how ethnicity can be such a potent force. We may have ethnic “lobbies” but we don't have open conflict between ethnic groups.

Our influence in situations of this kind is minimal. It may be that the UN can help. There are so many of them: the former Soviet Union republics, Northern Ireland, which is a confessional problem stemming in part from the implantation of British protestants into Northern Ireland in the 1700s, Yugoslavia, where a solution is hard to imagine, Africa where there are many conflicts.

Q: Anything else that should be mentioned about your tour in Turkey?

SPIERS: It finished with a flourish; I signed a base agreement on my way to the airport for my trip home. I had been ordered back, again to my great unhappiness, to become the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

Q: So you were dragged out of Ankara. Why?

SPIERS: I never knew why. One day, a cable showed up on my desk in Ankara. It was sent by Harry Barnes, the Director General, telling me that Vance wanted me
return to head INR. Bill Bowdler, who had been in the job, had been moved to Assistant Secretary for Latin America. Harry told me later that if I had called and told him that I wasn't interested, he would have looked for someone else. But I didn't have enough sense to do that; I accepted the assignment as an order from the Secretary. I really had enjoyed Turkey. We had traveled through the country to a great extent. It is probably the world's most fascinating country to travel through. I felt that as far as relationships were concerned, we and the Turks were beginning to travel a good road together. Demirel had just returned to power as Prime Minister and that I expected to be a big plus. Unfortunately, it didn't turn out that way because before too long the military once more interjected itself into the political life. I used to joke with Vance about the assignment. I told him that I had understood that he was looking for someone with "little intelligence" and that was me; I had as "little intelligence" as anybody. I suspect that the system had a vacancy to fill and since I was nearing the end of my three years, the dart fell on my name. I would have been glad to stay in Turkey.

**Q: You did know something about INR, did you not?**

SPIERS: A little. That didn't help in making me any happier about the assignment. I, like most Foreign Service officers, regarded INR as a backwater of the Department. Most people think it is essentially a research organization. In fact, it turned out to be very fascinating and interesting. The major problem with my career is that I have always liked my assignments so that when it was time for a transfer, I was reluctant to leave. Invariably the next assignment was interesting and always different.

I don't think that Vance had any special interest in INR. I had seen Vance when he visited Ankara in 1979; he stayed at the residence. He gave me no indication that he considering me for another assignment, although he may have been looking me over. I had known him slightly, very slightly, when he was in Defense. But I doubt that at the time he was considering me for INR.
After my appointment as Director of INR, I became most interested in operational intelligence, rather than research and analysis. Dave Mark was my principal deputy and he was a natural INR person. He was absorbed by research and loved details. Unfortunately, he didn't stay very long and was replaced by Hank Cohen, whom I didn't know but had been highly recommended. Phil Stoddard was one of the other deputies; he was in the Civil Service and a Middle East specialist.

A few weeks after my arrival in Washington, I had an appointment with Vance to talk to him about what I wanted to do with INR. It was the day he resigned, but he never gave me any indication of that at all during our discussion. The meeting took place as if nothing was happening. Vance, Muskie and Haig all accepted my concept of INR. For Haig, INR was a very important cog in the machinery. He viewed it as any general sees his intelligence section. Those are the first people you see at the beginning of the day and the last at the end of the day. Vance and Muskie did not rank INR as highly as Haig did. My view was that INR's main function was liaison with the intelligence community. The Director is a member of USIB which is the body that approved National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and SNIEs. INR was the liaison with CIA on all intelligence operations; no operations are undertaken without the Director's knowledge. There is information available to the Director of INR that can only be shared with the Secretary. I had five special clearances that only the Secretary of State had in the Department.

The first major operation I was involved in was the exfiltration of our personnel in Tehran who had escaped being taken hostage by taking refuge in the Canadian Embassy. After that, I became very interested in intelligence operations and I must say, I learned a hell of a lot!. I became fascinated by the world of covert operations. I found them much more interesting than the analytical work.

INR received information from a lot of different sources. First, there was the Embassies' reports that also went to the geographical bureaus. Then came material from CIA, NSA, NRO, DIA which was received only by INR in the Department. INR's principal task was
to digest all this information and make it relevant to the principal decision-makers in the Department and particularly the Secretary. We had to keep a close eye on the Secretary's schedule and be cognizant of what he needed to know at all times. Then we had to choose material that might have been relevant to his interests of the day. We had an overwhelming mass of information that had to be digested and capsulized. The Director of INR has to judge the relevance of information to everything that is going on and has to package it in such a way that it gets to the senior policy makers in time. The intelligence community may have all the information, but unless it is made available to the key policy maker, i.e. the Secretary of State, in a digestible form, it will be useless. It is like the Bishop Berkley's tree in the forest that may fall, but if no one is there to hear it, it makes no sound.

I don't know why the Department has never recognized the utility of INR. While I was its Director, I tried to get the name changed to “Intelligence and Analysis”. Somehow “Research” has an academic connotation—non action—; it implied a process that brought forth papers to which no one paid attention. When I was in INR, the word “Intelligence” was not in good repute. It evoked the sense of something unpalatable; I never felt that way. I always had a lot of respect for the intelligence people who I thought had a lot of capability and integrity. In some respects, Foreign Service officers are a major part of the intelligence community. When I was in INR, I had a quantitative assessment made of the “National Intelligence Daily” and the Secretary's “Morning Summary”, both which go to the President and other Cabinet officers. We found that approximately 70% of the material in those reports came from Foreign Service sources. The balance came from the intelligence community which had a budget of over $15 billion as compared to State's $4 billion, half of which is a “pass through” to the UN and others.

The Director had to know what was on the Secretary's mind because timing was most important. INR has the great advantage of having a cadre of people who have spent a career specializing on one subject or another; my policy was to staff INR 50/50 between Foreign Service and Civil Service. The Foreign Service people learned to appreciate
the value of field reporting and particularly the importance of timing; the Civil Service people knew the subject matter better than almost anyone else in the Department. The Foreign Service officers with the best reputation did their best to avoid an assignment to INR, although it is interesting to note that most of those who rose to the top ranks of the Foreign Service worked in INR at one time during their career. I did a survey of Career Ambassadors once and over half of them had a stint in INR. It was very helpful to us to get Hank Cohen to come to INR because he had an outstanding reputation; I did my best to get younger officers with promising futures to be assigned to INR, but I ran into that conventional wisdom. Foreign Service officers wanted to be where the “action” was rather than in the “ivory tower” which was INR's reputation—a totally inaccurate one.

I kept emphasizing the importance of timing because I knew that the Secretary and other senior officials would not pay attention to information unless they could see it was relevant at a moment of time when they were concentrating on a particular issue. They do not have time for information for information's sake.

Others have viewed INR as the Department's link to academia, but I must confess that that was not among my priorities. I thought that a lot of academic contributions were somewhat irrelevant to the Department's concerns. INR had an External Research Branch which had been used by some of my predecessors. I found it less significant to the Department.

INR has a very important role in intelligence operations. That responsibility may have diminished by now, but in those days there were many operations that had potential foreign policy implications. INR was the sole depository in the Department for all the information. I am not only referring to those programs of which only I was aware. There were dozen others that were known to members of my staff.

Q: How did you manage to be brought current on operational intelligence?

SPIERS: We would have periodic meetings with the Director of CIA, first Stansfield Turner, whom I had known well because he was one of the naval officers I dealt with as Director of
PM—he was then the Commandant of the Naval War College and we would meet together and I would lecture there. Turner, Vance (later Muskie) and I would meet once a week or every other week to be briefed on and talk about intelligence operations. We would also discuss policy related issues. If it was wanted to send submarines within the three mile zone off the coast of the Soviet Union, that is where that operation would be discussed. Or if we were copying under water communications or if we were breaking diplomatic codes, that is where the plans would be discussed.

So I had knowledge that I could not discuss with anyone but the Secretary. If I had any reservations about any covert operation, I would make my views known to the Secretary. That happened but not frequently.

The Department had to approve the RECON schedule book; that was the responsibility of INR. Someone from our office would take the plans contained in that book around to each regional assistant secretary to give each an opportunity to object if he or she wanted to. The plans were essentially about RECON operations, both then in effect or being planned, but it included sometimes other operations, such, for example, as the raising of a sunken Soviet sub by the GLOMAR—the Howard Hughes ship. That particular operation didn't have any particular geographical focus, but it certainly had foreign policy implications. I thought it was a waste of money to try to bring that submarine to surface because it was such an old vessel. When the Navy began to lift it, it fell apart and not much of use came from it in spite of all the costs.

Q: Were you confident that you knew all of the intelligence operations that were being conducted?

SPIERS: You can never prove a negative, but I was never surprised. There may have been operations only known to the President, but I don't know of any. I had no reason to believe that anything was being done without the knowledge of at least two people in the
Department: the Secretary and myself. If a third person had been necessary, it would have been the Deputy Secretary, but there were activities that he knew nothing about.

On a couple of occasions, the Secretary refused to go along with a planned operation. It was rare, but it did occur. I was more willing to take risks than the Secretary was. There was one operation which was to take place in Moscow itself that the Secretary objected to and it was aborted.

When Haig became Secretary, these intelligence meetings would take place every two weeks at breakfast. It would be Haig, Casey, Inman (Casey's deputy) and myself on the Secretary's eighth floor dining room. That breakfast would normally last an hour during which we reviewed a variety of issues that Casey wanted to discuss. Sometimes these sessions would be rather strange because Haig would use the occasion to fulminate against the White House. He would talk about the “three-headed monster”—Meese, Deaver and Baker. I was certain that within ten minutes after breakfast one of the three had a full report of the conversation. In some ways, Haig was very naive.

Q: How were your relationships with Haig?

SPIERS: They were very good. It was Haig that I went to when I wanted to get out of INR. He and I had a major disagreement on terrorism. Bob Woodward has referred to it in his book “Veil”. Haig had a “devil” theory; he also was a paranoid about the Soviet Union. He saw the “evil empire” behind every negative event around the world. It was certainly behind a lot of them, but not all. Haig thought here was a “Moscow centrum” which directed all terrorist activities. He voiced his opinions in public. That was not the view of any one in the intelligence community. One day, I sent a memo to Haig summarizing the intelligence community's contrary view on this issue. The conclusions upset Haig; he sent it back to me with a note: “Ron, if you believe this hog-wash, you have been really brain washed”.

In fact, it was Haig that had been brain washed by people like Mike Ledeen, Claire Sterling and by some lower level German officials. When he was SACEUR, Haig was the target of a bomb explosion; it had gone off under a bridge that he had just crossed, although some cars in his convoy had not been so lucky. Some lower level German intelligence officers told him that the Soviets had been behind the assassination attempt. That had not been the case, but he, Ledeen and Sterling (all conspiracy theorists) had all always believed that the attack had been directed by the Soviets who were out to get him. So Haig was always predisposed to believe all these theories, but that paranoia was not shared by any one in the intelligence community. After that memo, despite the Secretary's comment, I did not change my views and that was the beginning of the cooling of my relationship with Haig. I kept bringing him the judgments of the experts in the intelligence community, saying that I had no reason to disagree with them; he was increasingly unhappy with these judgments and my acceptance of them. So rather than jeopardizing my relationships with Haig completely—a relationships that had been good for a long time (he had supported me very strongly when I was in Turkey trying to get the embargo lifted and we had worked very closely together on that issue), I decided to seek another assignment. I must say that I thought that Haig was a disaster as Secretary of State. That was not a good appointment, which the White House soon realized. When he threatened to resign once too often, they accepted it.

Haig didn't stand in the way of another assignment. I wanted to go to India, but Harry Barnes, then the Director General wanted to go there and his position gave him the advantage.. The regional bureau suggested Pakistan because it felt that that was a more challenging relationship. Haig approved the Pakistan assignment without objections.

Q: So in 1981 you went to Pakistan as Ambassador. Why were you so interested in the Asia subcontinent?

SPIERS: I had never been there, in the first place. India was a huge country and that made it appear interesting. I knew little about the area and I wanted to learn more about
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it. I had been in Europe; I had little interest in Latin America or Africa. I would not have minded going to the Far East, but no interesting assignment was available at the time. I would have regarded Korea as a great assignment because that was a significant country. Bob Peck, who was then the Office Director for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, suggested that we lunch together. He told me that he had heard that I was interested in India and that if I insisted, I would probably be assigned there. But he told me that I should really consider Pakistan and then he made a very persuasive case. So I volunteered for Pakistan.

I really didn't know that much about Southeast Asia. I of course learned something about the subcontinent while in INR, but in INR you get a synoptic view; that is you view the world as a whole. You are not involved in day to day action, except for intelligence operations; as I said, INR's role is to provide information to the decision makers.

I knew something about Pakistan's efforts in the nuclear field although in the early 80s that was still a very nascent program. In general, having had some experience in the intelligence area was tremendously useful to me in Pakistan. I think every ambassador should have some experience in the intelligence field. It is so important, so protean, all encompassing that it is very useful to have been exposed to it. I am now speaking particularly of operational intelligence. What I learned about the U.S. government's intelligence capability was extraordinarily very useful. When in Pakistan, if I wanted to find out something, I would task a satellite. Ambassadors who had no knowledge of operational intelligence would not have thought of doing so.

Q: What was the status of U.S.-Pakistan relations when you went there?

SPIERS: They were improving. They had hit a low point following the 1971 war with India which led to the cancellation of U.S. assistance. Pakistan had a military dictator at its helm, General Zia. That did not make the country particularly popular in the U.S. The former Prime Minister Bhutto had just been executed. These factors were burdens on
our relationships. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the atmosphere entirely. That actually took place during my last week in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the Soviet ambassador was a dinner guest at our house on the day of the invasion and the evening was a tense one.

That event changed the nature of our relationship with Pakistan. During my whole tour, our total attention was devoted to juggling the various facets of our relationship: the India issue, the Pakistan-China relationship, the Afghan problem, the nuclear issue, the military assistance problems. It was a fantastically complex web of issues that made up the relationship.

Although we had always tilted toward Pakistan in its tensions with India, we got little credit for that. The issue was always “What have you done for us lately?”. It was the same way it was in Turkey. Gratitude has a very short life span in international relations. As I suggested earlier, the relationship with Zia was slowly but surely becoming a very positive one.

Q: What were our interests in Pakistan?

SPIERS: There were different theories about that. I used to have arguments with Zia about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We all agreed that we had to make it as difficult for the Soviets in Afghanistan as possible. Zia’s view was that the invasion of his neighbor was the beginning of another traditional Soviet expansionary effort to gain access to the Arabian Sea. That view was shared by our military. Zia foresaw a Soviet effort to take over Baluchistan—a province of Pakistan. He had countless meetings with Congressional visitors, Cabinet members and other U.S. dignitaries, most often in his modest little house, which had been the home of the Army Chief of Staff (He never moved to the Presidential residence). He would display a map, on which he super-imposed a red area, which was the part of Asia occupied by the Soviets. He would then discuss how Pakistan was being squeezed between India and the Soviet Union. He really believed this strategic view of the
world and was genuinely concerned with the “red horde” knocking on his door. He also believed that India would attack him one day; I never accepted that, just as I didn't believe that Pakistan was waiting to attack India.

I told Zia that I was convinced that it was important to stop the Soviets in Afghanistan, even though I did not necessarily accept his theory of the Soviet's larger intent. In my mind, the Soviets were essentially improvisors and didn't have any grandiose world plan. They were paranoid and that meant that they would never have enough security. That paranoia would always be a justification to broaden their security perimeter; they viewed such a policy as a defensive one. I thought that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan because Hafizullah Amin was so contravening Afghan Islamic sensitivities that the Soviets were concerned about having another Iran on their border. That would have created major political pressures in the Central Asian Soviet Republics which might have threatened the whole union. I therefore viewed the invasion as quasi-defensive or preemptive. They wanted to overthrow Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal, who they viewed as less of a problem. That is what I believed the Soviet rationale was; I did not believe that they were rally interested in annexing Afghanistan. At the same time, I thought that there would be a good chance that if the Soviets were successful in Afghanistan, they would be tempted to look at Baluchistan as a necessary buffer and become a threat to Pakistan. That made me a strong proponent of assistance to the Mujahideen. That became one of my principal responsibilities in Pakistan. All of our efforts to help the Pakistani to help the Mujahideen was handled in Islamabad by the CIA Station Chief and myself. Casey visited Pakistan on several occasions clandestinely. He, the Station Chief and I would meet with Zia and his Inter-Services Intelligence group commander, unbeknownst to the Pakistani Foreign Office. Casey would usually be accompanied by one of his Washington staff, Chuck Cogan or Claire George. That small group would meet and dine at Zia's residence. The daily liaison was handled by the Station Chief. I urged maximum assistance to the Afghan “Freedom” fighters because I thought it was important that the Soviets be stopped before they got any other ideas.
Q: You are saying that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed our relationship with Pakistan.

SPIERS: Right. It was an interesting period because while we were on the same side of the Afghan issue, we did have major differences on the nuclear issue. So we were drawn together on one issue and apart on another. The Afghan issue took precedence. Our problem was to contain Pakistan's nuclear development efforts without losing Pakistani support for our efforts in Afghanistan. Now, that situation is changed because the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, eliminating that problem; that brings the focus of U.S.-Pakistani relationship more to the nuclear issue. That is the reason this relationship is going downhill again.

Q: What was your evaluation of our intelligence on the Pakistani nuclear developments?

SPIERS: It was rudimentary; most of the information came from clandestine sources developed by the Embassy. But I must add that I didn't know how much there was to know. It was very clear that there was a group in Pakistan that was working towards the development of a nuclear capability. We didn't know how far it had advanced. We knew that they were not reprocessing plutonium at that point. We knew they were obtaining some technical assistance from the PRC—that was common knowledge in Islamabad. There was an installation near Islamabad which was off limits to everybody. Once, the French Ambassador had a picnic near this area and was jumped upon and brutally beaten up. It was clear to me that the Foreign Office, including the Foreign Minister—Jacub Khan—who by the way was one of the most competent people I had ever met, didn't know anything about what was going on the nuclear field. It was not clear to me that even Zia's principal nuclear advisor, Munir Khan, was fully cognizant of developments. The little group of nuclear experts was headed by A.Q. Khan, whom I never met because he lived in the south some place and was kept under-cover. Khan had worked once upon a time for EURENCO (European Uranium Enrichment Company) and had allegedly stolen or had copied enrichment machinery plans. That was some evidence here and there of small
procurement efforts which by themselves appeared innocent enough, but that if taken as a whole appeared to be part of a larger pattern. Once plans for a nuclear device had been purloined, the evidence became very strongly suggestive that the Pakistanis were embarked on the development of a weapons program. I am sure that Zia was well aware of what was going on.

There was a cultural dimension to this whole effort, which very few Americans could be brought to understand. Zia valued the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. The culture of the subcontinent makes it impolite to tell someone the truth if it would offend them or make them uncomfortable. For example, if you send something to the launderer and he knows that you want it back the next day, he will tell you that it will be done although he knows full well that it is impossible. For Pakistani, that is not a lie; it is politeness. The launderer knows that you know that it will not be ready the next day, but the game must be played.

We didn't pay enough attention to these local cultural nuances. Dick Walters, who was every President's favorite special emissary, visited Pakistan once. He had with him what was allegedly a Pakistani blueprint for a atomic weapon which we had gotten through the efforts of a third country's intelligence service. It looked to me like any drawing from a scientific magazine which would be readily available to anybody. We, i.e. Walters, was going to confront Zia with these plans. I tried to tell him that this scheme wouldn't get very far because Zia didn't want to embarrass us; he wouldn't admit to anything that we might find offensive because that was contrary to the culture in which he was raised. Zia would not have viewed his negative response as lying; it would have been more of what we would call a “white lie”, that is an answer which would have spared us embarrassment or hurt. In the Pakistani culture, that was perfectly innocent behavior; we just couldn't understand it.

I tried to make our policy clear to Zia. We had a good relationship and I liked him. I did the same with the Foreign Minister, whom I think was persuaded by the logic of our arguments. He understood that there would not be any winner in a nuclear war with
India. But at some stage, irrationality becomes the controlling factor. I tried to point out that even if they had a nuclear device, they did not have a delivery system; it would be a very expensive enterprise which would soak up resources foolishly, even if they were available—which they were not. Unfortunately, since both we and the Soviets were building weapons, our arguments against anyone else doing so were somewhat less than credible. The reality was that the Indians had exploded a device in 1974; it did not make much difference that it was labeled “peaceful” explosion. It was a nuclear explosion and it created concerns, fears and pressures among the Pakistanis. Pakistani public opinion favored and still favors the development of a nuclear weapon. Any government that disavowed it would lose the support of the people.

We persuaded the Pakistanis to publicize the best position they could under the circumstances and that was that they would sign the non-proliferation treaty and put all their nuclear programs under international inspections when and if the Indians would do the same. The Indians of course won't play because they equate themselves to China and won't accept any nuclear regime less stringent that the one under which the PRC operates.

Q: Did you ever try to use the press as leverage?

SPIERS: I gave some speeches in which I presented our point of view. Some of what I said was reported accurately; some was distorted. My statements were discreet; there was no use in being a blusterer. Interestingly enough, my comments received a more favorable reaction in India than they did in Pakistan. That of course was not helpful in Islamabad. But Zia knew that I was trying to be helpful; he was as honest with me as he could be.

I was also helped in Pakistan by a very sizeable military assistance package that Jim Buckley, then Under Secretary for Security Assistance, had put together. So I was able to arrive with something in hand. Then came the sale of the F-16s. That was a real coup. I thought it was silly for the Pakistanis to waste their money on equipment they didn't
really need, but it certainly gave the country a shot in the arm. The acquisition of the aircraft became a symbol of national virility. The whole issue caught the imagination of the Pakistani public. It is hard to believe how emotionally important that wing of planes became. When the first deliveries were made I became a sort of national hero. I went to an Air Force base; there were hundreds of thousands of people watching. The Pakistanis flew these planes over the stands. They were good. They had as good, if not better, a reputation in U.S. training circles as the Israeli pilots. They took off, flew straight up until they disappeared from sight, did loops, flew in formation; it was a sight. The Pakistani's busses which were always carefully adorned, had pictures of these F-16 planes on them. The planes became a symbol of national pride and identity. It was almost incredible; just that euphoria made the sale worth while. I don't think Zia tried to marshal this enthusiasm, which developed spontaneously, but when he saw it happening, he certainly did nothing to discourage it. That whole era was a remarkable sequence of events. The arrival of the F-16s became a defining moment for the unity and patriotism of all of Pakistan. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to enjoy the total benefit of the occasion because I left Pakistan a few months after the arrival of the planes, but the benefits of that sale certainly lasted for the rest of my tour. It is true that we had some residual discussions about the ancillary weapons. The Pakistanis wanted AIM-9 missiles that we would not at that point sell them.

We also had some arguments about other weapons systems. I wanted to arm the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles—the shoulder fired surface-to-air—, but I didn't win that one. The Red-Eye which was an earlier and cruder version was inadequate. The arguments for not providing those kinds of weapons are well known and it was not until long after my departure that we began to arm the Mujahideen with Stingers.

Q: What in your view are the limits that the U.S. government should impose on types of arms it will sell or allow to be sold?
SPIERS: Of course, anything nuclear; that is immediately ruled out. I would have ruled out sale of very sensitive technology except to some of our NATO allies because there was always the possibility that it might fall into the wrong hands. I would not have sold surface-to-surface missiles outside the NATO area. But in general, planes, tanks, artillery, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles gave me no great concern, although I don't recall the latter missiles ever being an issue. I don't think I have had to face that question.

Q: Let's return to the Pakistani situation. Tell us a little more about your tour.

SPIERS: One of my first tasks was to collect money from the Pakistanis to pay for the rebuilding of our Chancery which had been burned down in 1979. In fact, they used some of our military assistance money to repay us for our building. But I had made it clear that our relationships would not improve at all as long as we were not compensated for our losses. That was a very expensive rebuilding.

Q: What did we get for our military assistance package, besides compensation for loss of the Chancery? Did it motivate Pakistan to help with the Afghan program?

SPIERS: The Pakistanis were completely cooperative when it came to assistance to the Afghani resistance fighters. They would probably have been helpful on that matter in any case because getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan was in their interest as well.

The military assistance package was another illustration of a large aid program which had to cover requirements far in excess of anything we could afford or would give. The decision as to which requirements would be met was made essentially in Washington, much of it even before I became involved. As I said, I viewed the F-16s as an unnecessary luxury; the F-5s would have done just as well for military purposes. But Pakistan loved its new toys. You have to remember that I never thought that India and Pakistan would ever again go to war; if such an event had taken place, India would have clobbered Pakistan.
So I didn't take the Indian threat very seriously and I felt that Pakistan had a adequate military force to deter Indian aggression, if that was India's intent, which I did not see.

Much of the military assistance was important to Zia to keep his own military commanders pacified. He needed their support. The military is the most coherently organized element of the Pakistan social structure. It is important to understand that in many respects, Pakistan is not one country; it is an amalgam of four distinct linguistic and ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi. The military were primarily Punjabi. Bhutto was a Sindhi who eventually didn't enjoy anyone's support. Zia was a military officer who had been appointed Army Chief of Staff and then had to run the government after Bhutto's overthrow.

The common denominator of the four parts was Islam. Also Urdu, which is the second language for most Pakistanis. Interestingly enough, there are more Moslems in India than there are in Pakistan. Also the paranoia about India helps cement the four parts together.

Q: Let me move on to economic assistance. What was our aid intended to do?

SPIERS: Our assistance was, as in the case of Turkey, an economic support program. We had a big AID mission, which managed a lot of projects. We were deeply involved in crop substitution. Pakistanis grew a lot of poppy which created a major drug problem for us. In almost every post I have served—Bahamas, Turkey, Pakistan—we have had a major drug problem. Pakistan was the largest problem of all. We tried to find other crops for farmers to grow. We also assisted with rural electrification by helping dam construction. We helped a lot on agricultural development in general. We were very much engaged in infrastructure development—highways, etc. We helped with population control programs—marketing of condoms, etc.

I must confess to some skepticism when it comes to economic assistance. We had a difficult, but good AID mission director. I had a very hard time keeping him in check. He and the economic section were always at each other's throats. He didn't care for
my supervision or that of the Embassy; most of the arguments were about “turf” issues; very little dispute about substance. But our assistance was a drop in the bucket. The fundamental Pakistani problems were low literacy, poverty, slow economic growth and little free-market and our assistance could only be marginal.

Q: How did economic assistance abet the achievement of our political objectives?

SPIERS: We had three political objectives: a) maintain India-Pakistan relations on a non-violent basis; b) elicit Pakistani assistance for our efforts in Afghanistan; and c) discourage the development of a nuclear capability. Our economic assistance helped to enhance our political influence and leverage. It also helped, even if only marginally, to improve the living standards of ordinary Pakistanis.

As said earlier, although I had great reservations about the need for the Pakistanis to buy the very expensive F-16s, our government would not deny them that right. If the Pakistani wanted to spent U.S. funds in that way, so be it. The sale certainly increased our ability to meet the three objectives. That was the principal determinate and I suppose the same could be said for the economic assistance programs.

Q: Let me turn now to the human rights issue. You got to Pakistan after the Carter administration, which had human rights high on its foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, I wonder how much interest Washington displayed on this issue?

SPIERS: I don't remember the subject ever being raised. I don't believe that it was a very hot issue on our agenda with the Pakistanis. As I mentioned earlier, Pakistan lived in a different culture than the American one. That question was more relevant to in our relationships with Turkey than it was with Pakistan. We certainly intervened on behalf of Bhutto, but that was before I reached Pakistan.

Q: While you were in Pakistan, Zia came to Washington on a State visit. How did that go?
SPIERS: It went very well. Reagan was something else. I was part of the briefing team for him. His eyes glazed over during the meeting; I am not sure that he knew where Pakistan was. But Zia knew who he was dealing with. Zia was perfectly willing just to stay with generalities, so that there was very little of substance discussed. The visit became largely ceremonial; Reagan hosted a State dinner for him. We did take Zia around the country. We took him to Texas, California and New York; in all places he was treated royally. We traveled by SAM aircraft—the VIP Air Force wing. Zia visited a number of Pakistani communities around the U.S. In Houston, he stayed at the Inn at the Park; he was the guest of honor at a large banquet attended by all the local luminaries. He visited a mosque. In San Francisco, we had a great boat trip around the Bay. He gave a speech to the World Affairs Council. He did the same thing in New York. It was all very nice, but little substance came of it.

State visits are useful to an Ambassador. I had attended one when Callaghan was Great Britain’s Prime Minister; that one covered many substantive issues. It enables the American Ambassador to become better acquainted with the Chief of State of the country to which he or she is assigned. He also gets to know the people around the Chief of State better.

Q: Pakistan was another example of a situation in which the U.S. often finds itself: a country which is at odds with another country with which the U.S. has or is trying to have friendly relations. How would you compare your relationships with your counterparts in New Delhi with those you had with your colleagues in Athens?

SPIERS: We had a good relationships with our Embassy in Delhi. There was no backbiting or arguments which unfortunately had too often been the precedent. Harry Barnes, then our Ambassador in New Delhi, agreed to exchange visits. I went to Delhi and he arranged for me to see Mrs. Gandhi. That turned out to be a very formal, twenty minute call during which she gave full vent to her unhappinesses about various matters. When I mentioned to Zia that Harry was coming to Islamabad, he immediately invited us to have dinner with
him. So the three of us spent the evening chatting in a very relaxed fashion. It was quite a contrast. We exchanged visits on a number of occasions. Harry and I would of course have opportunity to exchange views during Chiefs of Mission meetings, one of which was held in New Delhi, one in Islamabad and one in another capital. It gave us a chance to talk about the area as a whole. One of these meetings was chaired by Secretary Shultz. That was the one that resulted in my return to Washington to become Under Secretary for Management.

Q: What is the role of the United States in situations such as Greek-Turkey, Pakistan-India, etc? Can the U.S. play a useful role?

SPIERS: The U.S. can play a pacifying role. It can avoid becoming a partisan for either side; it can be perceived by both sides as even handed. In both situations of this kind that I was involved in, we tended to tilt more towards Pakistan and Turkey due to exogenous factors. With India, we have had a difficult relationship with that country for a long time, partly because we felt that they tilted toward the Soviet Union and because India was not a free market economy. Pakistan was viewed as being more hard-headed, more reliable and friendly; it was part of the Baghdad Pact a long way back. So our relationships with Pakistan over the many years have been entirely different than those with India.

As far as Turkey was concerned, the Greeks certainly felt that we tilted towards Turkey. I don't think the Turks ever accused us of favoring the Greeks, although they certainly would have preferred a more pro-Turkey policy. In some respects, our relationships with Greece over the long haul have been more difficult than they have been with Turkey. There had been more anti-Americanism in Greece than in Turkey. Turks tend to like Americans in general.

Q: Were you satisfied with the assistance we were providing the Mujahideen?

SPIERS: I would have liked to see more done. The program did increase substantially after I left. I worked with Casey as much as possible because he was really the manager
of the program in Washington. It was never clear to me how much State was involved. I know that Larry Eagleburger was when he was Under Secretary for Political Affairs because he was the person I would communicate with. But I don't think that the Bureau for Near East Affairs had much input or even knowledge. The Afghan support program was probably handled primarily in the breakfast meetings between the Secretary and Casey when covert operations were discussed. Casey would probably tell Shultz that he was going out to Pakistan again to see how things were going and that he would stop in Saudi Arabia on the way to get more contributions just to make sure the Secretary had no objections.

There was only one Afghan incursion into Pakistan while I was there; it was an overflight, probably made in error. There were already three million Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps when I was there. I visited those camps several times. It was an emotional experience for a lot of American visitors. The emigration had started before I had gotten to Pakistan, but it became a flood while I was there. Of course, there is really no border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is Patan territory, inhabited by various tribes. Islamabad's writ did not run very strongly in that area. One day, my wife and I were invited to visit his area as guests of one of the tribal chiefs. We were escorted by Pakistani government guards. When we approached the tribal territories, the guards were sent back because we were the guests of the tribe who felt we were their responsibility in their territory-not Islamabad's. The central government is very circumspect with these various tribes, which actually inhabit both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. They are all related. The border may sometime run through villages; that makes it a different proposition than what we in the West regard as an international line of demarcation. People cross those borders constantly without any inhibitions.

Pakistan was a very interesting country. We saw a good deal of it. We went to the northern territories as close to the China border as they would let us. It was spectacular with all the mountains and glaciers; it dwarfed Switzerland. We saw K-Z which some say is higher than Everest. We went to the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas. We went to the Kingdom
of Hunza, which is one of the oldest in South Asia. We spent some time with the Mir of Hunza. You have to recognize that many of these mountainous areas area almost autonomous. The Mir was not too bright—the result of many years of in-breeding; he had been a member of the Pakistani Foreign Service. He really was just a figure-head, but Hunza was spectacular. It is the place that Shangri-la was allegedly based on. The atmosphere and life-style are so healthy that the inhabitants tend to live longer than they do in other parts of the country.

Q: What was China's role in the subcontinent while you were in Pakistan?

SPIERS: The Chinese had a very close relationship to the Pakistanis, partly because they were in a competitive situation with the Soviets. They also had an antagonistic relationship with the Indians so that a close relation with the Pakistanis was natural. The Chinese were very helpful in Afghanistan. They provided support for the Mujahideen which is not well known, but they were part of a cooperative effort. I had some conversations with the Chinese Ambassador, but they didn't amount to much because he was kind of old and not well versed in what was going on. Most of the Chinese contributions to the Mujahideen were handled in Beijing. I had good relationships with both the Chinese and Soviet Ambassadors in Islamabad.

The Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan was Smirnov, a career diplomat. He was a stamp collector, which provided some fodder for our conversations. We would give him American stamps. He was not really well plugged in and didn't have much of an idea of what was going on in Afghanistan. He used to tell me that he knew what we were doing there; that he knew we were running clandestine training camps. I would offer to take him by helicopter to any spot he designated; all he had to do is to tell me where these camps were supposed to be. Sometimes he would ask me what we were up to; I would always respond that I wouldn't tell him if we were or if we weren't doing something. I don't think that either he or the Soviets in general had much information about what we were doing. Smirnov was a nice guy and we had good personal relations. He would come to our
Fourth of July party, although I was never allowed to go to his national day. In Turkey, the Soviet Ambassador, Rodianov, was less personable and friendly; he later became Soviet Ambassador to Canada. He was also a professional diplomat. Yuli Vorontsov, whom I mentioned earlier in connection with disarmament negotiations, was the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi. He had been the DCM in Washington while I was Director in PM, so I used to see him frequently. He is now the foreign affairs advisor to Yeltsin. I did not have the same relationship with the Soviet Ambassadors that I did with Soviet delegation members at disarmament conferences because that work required daily close collaboration. That is where I saw daily that the Soviets were human like all of us, with the same variety of vulnerabilities and strengths. I think all the Russian Ambassadors I met had been given a biographic resume on me from Moscow. They all seemed well briefed. I had their bio sheets from CIA. Because I had known so many of their colleagues, every once in a while one of the Ambassadors would pass greetings from an old Soviet acquaintance. Both Russian Ambassadors, the one in Turkey and the one in Pakistan, always said that they were strong defenders of Soviet foreign policy; now a number of my Russian acquaintances tell me that they really never were, although when I knew them in the old days they certainly seemed to be strong proponents. I was sometimes the same way; I strongly supported certain U.S. policies even when I didn't agree with them. But then I didn't have to face the extremes that Soviet diplomats did.

Q: We have already covered your period as Under Secretary for Management. I just wanted to ask one question about your tour with the UN. You retired from the Foreign Service before taking that assignment? And what is you view of detailing American officials to the UN?

SPIERS: I took the UN job rather than go overseas again. As for detailing American officials to the UN, I am opposed to it. We don't do it. We recruit Americans for the Secretariat; every country has a quota of nationals and we try to fill ours in part through the recruitment work that IO does. But as far as I know, no Foreign Service officers has ever been detailed to the UN. Some people go through an entrance examination; some are
appointed directly. There are some ex-Foreign Service or State Department employees in the UN, but no current employees on detail. The Soviets used to do that, but they have now stopped that practice.

There are really two kinds of people in the UN: career officials and political appointees. The latter is what I was when I was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The permanent members of the Security Council have the right to nominate one of their own nationals to senior UN positions at the Under-Secretary level. Ever since Ralph Bunche, an American has filled that particular Under-Secretary job. It is officially an appointment by the Secretary General; the Secretary General could refuse to appoint the American nominee and ask for other names. I don't know whether that has ever been done. In my case, the new administration may have panicked somewhat. Every one had gotten an appointment except me; I had stayed in M long after the change in administrations because my successor's confirmation was delayed. My wife and I had agreed that if I were offered the ambassador's post in Canada again we would go. My name had been proposed for Canada by Shultz in 1987 or 1988, but at the time, the security problems in the Moscow Chancery and Marine Guard issue were hot. The White House personnel staff felt that my nomination would be very controversial and it wanted to wait for a few months until things cooled off. Shultz said that his tenure was limited and asked me to stay until he left; he promised he would ensure a good assignment before his departure. But we were only interested in Canada, although had someone offered us London, we would have packed the same day. It never occurred to me that a career officer might be appointed to the Court of St. James's. The administration suggested Greece, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, India, none of which really attracted us. When the UN nomination was suggested, I decided to accept.

Q: In closing, I want to thank you again for the time you have given us. This has been a most interesting interview which I am sure will be of great utility to historians and other interested parties.
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End of interview