Q: Well, not going back to conception, Jim, but how did you happen to join the Foreign Service?

LEONARD: I guess it sort of came up at the end of World War II when I was about to get out of the army and I saw a notice advertising for the Foreign Service exams, and signed up for them. It turned out I was too late. I was still overseas then. I missed it that year, but having made the effort, I then ... went off to school in France for six months or so, took the exam the next year and passed it and got on the track to get in. I came in in early ’49. Late ’48 in a way, because as you may know there was a long delay before people would get appointed and they would find a job for you to keep you from starving to death during the period when you were actually appointed. They found me a job as a courier traveling around carrying the mail from one post to another. It was a very nice introduction to the foreign life.

Q: This was before you were married?

LEONARD: Yes, although I got married as soon as I got the appointment. We were engaged at that time and just waiting for me to have an income greater than a thousand
dollars a year which was about what I was getting on scholarships or the G.I. Bill at that time.

Q: Your entire career was about a quarter of a century in the Foreign Service?

LEONARD: Well I went in in '49. I retired for the first time in '73 and stayed out for four years and came back in for four years, the four Carter years, and retired again the beginning of '81. That's 28 years plus or minus.

Q: Well, going back to your first foreign assignment which I suppose was the first meaningful one and this was Damascus?

LEONARD: That's right, yes.

Q: I was looking back in some of the clips, and I see there was a bit of activity there. There was a coup I think, and there was the burning down of the Embassy, there was an attack on it, and things like that ...

LEONARD: Yes, it was a reasonably exciting first post. There was a coup just before we got there. Then there was another coup about six months later, and still another one after that. A very unstable political situation. They kept on having coups even after we left. I was there about two and a half years.

Q: And wasn't the head of government assassinated?

LEONARD: Yes. The second coup, he was. The first one was a peaceful coup. And then the second coup, they killed the big man and his prime minister both. They went on from there and actually developed a very bloody record over the following years. It only stabilized when (Hafez Al Assad) came in. I think it is now twenty, twenty-five years ago. In fact, he's said to have ruled Syria longer than anyone since the Ummayad caliphs in the eighth century.
Q: He came in when you were still there?

LEONARD: No, he came in afterwards. He came in about 1965 I think.

Q: So, this is sort of a baptism of fire for a first foreign post in the middle of a coup.

LEONARD: Well, in a way, and yet there was no personal danger involved. In fact our relations with the Syrians were very friendly in that period. They were very bitter about the creation of the state of Israel which had taken place the previous year, but didn't take that out on us in personal terms. We enjoyed the post very much and developed a few good friends among the Syrians, etc. It was a very enjoyable and a very small Embassy. In fact it wasn't even an Embassy in technical terms, it was a Legation. I don't think we have any legations anymore, but at that time that was what we had in the smaller countries. Even a junior officer was in daily touch with the Ambassador and able to follow the political events quite closely. We lived right next door to the CIA Station Chief who was a very lively and colorful figure. So it was a very interesting introduction to the Foreign Service life.

Q: But the Legation was bombed. Was that before you came?

LEONARD: No it was bombed actually ... I was talking on the telephone with the marine guard when it happened.

Q: Not much of a bomb then?

LEONARD: Not much of a bomb. It blew the poor guy across the room and didn't hurt him at all.

Q: But the Leonards didn't say: “This is it, we're going back home.”?

LEONARD: No.
Q: Then, you went on to Moscow. Since much later in your career you did a lot of negotiating with the Soviets, how much baptism did you get in this first exposure? You’d already studied the Russian language.

LEONARD: We’d studied Russian, yes. The Department gave me first the language training, six months, then nine months at Harvard. Though I had only a rudimentary knowledge of the language, I was lucky; I got a job there which called for me to be out on the street a great deal. It was buying books for the Library of Congress. There was no normal exchange of published literature between the US and the Soviet Union at that time and the people back here were very thirsty for whatever was coming out. I’d just go out to all the book stores and buy stacks of books and bring them back, wrap them in brown paper and ship them back to the US. In that way I was able to get some contact with Russians. This was a few months after the death of Stalin in the summer of 1953. The Russian people were terrified of foreign contacts. It was very difficult to have any real sort of relations with anybody other than the diplomatic corps and a few correspondents.

Q: This was the time that Beria ...?

LEONARD: He was arrested actually just a month or so before we got there. It was a dramatic incident which we didn’t see. The tanks apparently drove down the main boulevard in front of the Embassy building. The people that saw them didn't know what it was and found out the next day that the tanks were on their way to surround various residences and take him away. In fact to this day it's not really clear whether he was killed on the spot or was simply imprisoned and executed later.

Q: And you as part of the Embassy were pretty much in the dark on this?

LEONARD: Yes. The Embassy was really very isolated.

Q: Who was Ambassador then?
Q: And through the Library of Congress book acquisition did you get any familiarity on how to deal with the Russians as you later had to do?

LEONARD: Well, a little bit. Although I must say it was a completely different game many years later when I went to Geneva and was dealing with them face to face on issues of substance. I think in my two years in Moscow I went possibly twice to the Foreign Ministry to go along and take notes when some more senior officer was making a demarche. But our relations were so frosty. The Ambassador had I think meaningful contacts, discussions with the Foreign Ministry and even with I think it was ...

Q: Molotov, was it?

LEONARD: Molotov. But Gromyko replaced him about that time. I guess it was still Molotov when we arrived. But more junior officers had very little dealings of any sorts with any Russians.

Q: Did you get clued in from the top, from the ambassador, or at least ...?

LEONARD: Yes, he was very good. He would discuss problems and our task really was more that of trying to decipher what was going on from the press. In fact, not I but some of the people in the political section did a pretty good job of figuring out that there was a power struggle underway. It turned out to be Malenkov on one side and Khrushchev on the other. A struggle which eventually Khrushchev won.

Q: But Malenkov won on the first ...?

LEONARD: Malenkov was on top to start with.
Q: Wasn't this the period when Malenkov said we were preparing an H-bomb, or the tests began on this?

LEONARD: The H-bomb had already been detonated by that time, their H-bomb. The thing that Malenkov did, which caught everybody's attention was to make a speech which was then reproduced in the paper, that a nuclear war would mean the end of civilization, or the world, or such. He said the first sober thing about the consequences of nuclear weapons that any Russian or any Soviet had ever been known to say, and it was used against him, it appeared by Khrushchev. He was made to seem afraid of the American nuclear weapons in the controversies that went on then. In effect the Soviets repudiated his statement, but it was very interesting that you did begin to see some discussion already in '53 about nuclear weapons, and I remember one of the officers in the political section saying to me that he thought the Soviets really were sincere about wanting some sort of arms control. It didn't happen for quite a while longer, but you could see a bit of intellectual ferment reflected in the press.

Q: So this was your first taste of later arms control, even though you were not part of it at this time?

LEONARD: Yes.

Q: Now, this was Eisenhower's presidency?

LEONARD: This was Eisenhower's.

Q: Eisenhower's and Dulles's? Was the U2 part of your period or not, when that was shot down?

LEONARD: No, that was 1960. Exactly where was I then, I don't know. Either in Taiwan or on home leave.
Q: What about the UN proposals to share nuclear matters. Was that earlier then?

LEONARD: That was being prepared in Washington, although I had no part in that. In that period, Eisenhower, as we know now, was much more uneasy about nuclear weapons than he let on, and so was Dulles. In fact Gerry Smith has dug up some material on Dulles's thinking of that period which indicates that Dulles was not all that happy with massive retaliation, etc. But what it came down to was the proposal, I think it was in 1957, for Atoms for Peace. Arms control was gestating in this period. There were the beginnings of talks but they focused on the problems of Europe, Berlin, Germany, you know, “would some sort of German reunification be permitted?” and things of that sort, because this is the period when in the West we were beginning to crystallize NATO, and consider German rearmament. And that, believe me, got the Russians' attention when we began talking about rearming the Germans.

Q: And then you went on to NATO in Paris, is that right?

LEONARD: I went from Moscow to NATO, that's right. They had a slot in the NATO secretariat for an analyst for eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Since it was traditional to write a paper for the ministerial meetings every six months, a sort of situation report, and the US had traditionally provided one so-called Russian expert to do this report, and this was me in that period.

Q: Now this period is also when the US began to share weapons with NATO in a much more meaningful way?

LEONARD: Well, we certainly moved in that period toward what became the deployment of nuclear weapons all over Europe, the tactical nuclear weapons, even in Germany. It's a period in which even Eisenhower who generally on nuclear matters had his head screwed on right, apparently felt that nuclear weapons were just a bigger kind of artillery shell and the US developed nuclear artillery and deployed it in western Europe. We developed then
the doctrine of first use, that if the Soviets were to attack western Europe we would use nuclear weapons to repel the attack.

Q: Did you have any input in this part?

LEONARD: No no, that nuclear doctrine was done at a high level within the State Department and NATO in general. I don't know if our Ambassador at NATO had a role in that but I would suspect that the real decision making on all of this was done at the top levels of the State Department and the Defense Department, and not anywhere outside of a very small circle.

Q: Did you have any thoughts at that time? “Is this wise or what's going on?”

LEONARD: I have to say I did not.

Q: No quarter-backing?

LEONARD: No, I think I rather accepted whatever it was that was dished out by the policy makers.

Q: Now, this was the period of Joe McCarthy back here in Washington?

LEONARD: It was. As a matter of fact, it started even while we were in Damascus or maybe, yes, I guess it must have started about then, '49.

Q: How did that affect you abroad?

LEONARD: Relatively little. We read about it with considerable interest, although we didn't get the papers, you know. There was no Paris Herald Tribune, at least there wasn't in Damascus, and we didn't know much. We would read Time or Newsweek, or whatever. I think that there was a very strong feeling within the Foreign Service of being persecuted, that this was a bad guy, a very hostile element. We didn't believe the charges that he
Library of Congress

was levying at the State Department. Some of our more senior colleagues actually knew individuals who were being persecuted by McCarthy. It was clear that the Department as a whole was being focused on. But all of us were so far from it that it didn't have any real impact in personal terms. And I have to say that was true in Moscow and I guess maybe by the time we got to Paris ... I forget when the McCarthy hearings were and his destruction by Mr. Welsh, but ...

Q: I can tell you, I covered the hearings. In '54.

LEONARD: '54? Well, I was in Moscow then. It was essentially over by the time we got back from Moscow. As you know the consequences remained with the State Department. For a long time, there was a fear of provoking another round of this kind of McCarthyism and the Department leaned over backwards on security clearances and all that sort of thing, even for another twenty, twenty-five years. Maybe it still does today, I'm not sure.

Q: Now this is the period that US troops were sent to stay in Europe when you were in NATO then?

LEONARD: You know, I think they must already have been there, because by '55 when I got to Paris because I don't recall any debate over that. I'm pretty sure. When I arrived in NATO they had just had their fifth anniversary, but I don't think US troops, in fact, ever completely left Europe.

Q: I see.

LEONARD: I think they remained there in Germany and they simply changed roles from being occupation forces to being NATO forces as Germany became independent.

Q: Now, you mentioned the Germans, and I once was told that the one person John Foster Dulles feared was Franz Joseph Strauss. He really distrusted him. Did he come into the picture when you were in Paris in NATO then?
LEONARD: Not at all. I came to have a very similar feeling about him much later when I was doing arms control or even actually even before that when I was working on related matters in the State Department. But by that time we were into the '60s. In this period in the '50s, I don't think I understood anything of German politics. It consisted of Mr. Adenauer, and that was that. I doubt if I could have identified Franz Joseph Strauss for anybody.

Q: He became Defense Minister eventually, didn't he?

LEONARD: He did. But my focus was really very much on the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree on Eastern Europe. We had the Hungarian revolt in '56, while I was in NATO. We had the double crisis of Hungary and Suez. You know meetings around the clock and all that sort of thing, but of course no action of any kind.

Q: Was there within the US contingent dismay with Eden and dismay with France at this time, and feeling that ...?

LEONARD: One of my most vivid memories is the dismay with Mr. Eden on the part of the senior Brit in the Secretariat. He was a British Naval Captain, Lord Coleridge who was given to extremely strong language, British Naval language. He talked about the British government. He was after all an international civil servant. He was not a British representative there, but he, like all Brits in NATO thought that the Suez thing was just the most awful disaster and that the conniving with the French and the Israelis over that was utterly unprincipled and sick even. So we realized it was a controversial question. But NATO was not the focus of that, and in fact NATO was not a focus on Hungary either. There was every effort made to simply keep everything calm and business as usual and not show any signs of panic or any intention to make a move of any kind.

Q: So the annoyance on the part of the US vis a vis France and Israel and Britain didn't disturb NATO. That alliance stuck?
LEONARD: That stuck, yes. Our normal working relationships went right on, and I really don't know whether the ... I'm sure the British Ambassador kept a very straight face on all of this. You know I have no idea whether he would in talking with the American Ambassador acknowledge that this was a pretty dumb thing that they had done. But it was so evident that this whole action had simply infuriated President Eisenhower that further comment was unnecessary. It was just a disastrous miscalculation on the part of the British and compounded of course by the fact that it gave the Russians cover for what they were doing in Hungary.

Q: You went on to Chinese language school and then Taipei after this, is that right?

LEONARD: Yes.

Q: Now, I'm curious on the Taipei part. I went out with Eisenhower on his last trip abroad, when he couldn't get to Japan because of the riots against the ...?

LEONARD: I was there then.

Q: You were in Taipei then? There everything was sweetness and light between Chiang Kai-shek and Eisenhower, and there was no Quemoy and Matsu ...?

LEONARD: Well, yes. Let's check. This would have been 1960?

Q: Yes, his last trip before he stepped out of office.

LEONARD: Yes. Things were fine at that point. They deteriorated very sharply a year or so later between us and Chiang Kai-shek. That is a more interesting story, but at the time that Eisenhower came, there were no problems, we were very friendly and supportive toward Chiang and the government there on Taiwan. We were fiercely determined to defend the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. There had been a crisis that had got under way the summer of '58 and I was sent out there in the fall of '58 to the language school. It
was going on. We, as students, were completely insulated from it. We didn't understand the gravity or lack of gravity of the whole situation. We knew we had made a massive deployment of the seventh fleet to the area. In fact the airbase near us in Taichung had had a lot of big airplanes deployed to it. I don't know if they were stationed there, but they were coming in and out a great deal, really as a measure of intimidation to make it clear to the Chinese on the mainland that we were not going to allow them to take the offshore islands. The way it was described to me by a friend who was in the Embassy was that we put these carriers on the east side of Taiwan and we put the aircraft from them flying up and down the straight very intensively and in a way which made it pretty clear to the government in Peking that they were going to be in real trouble with the United States if they pressed any attempt to take the islands. This was enough to cool them off and avert the crisis.

Q: I have some recollection of people here suspecting that Chiang Kai-shek was fomenting Quemoy/Matsu, provoking, trying to get the US more involved. This is not ...?

LEONARD: Well, that may relate more to the '61, '62 period, because what happened after 1960. The Great Leap Forward took place in 1958, and the Quemoy/Matsu was at the same time as that. But the Great Leap Forward had disastrous economic consequences on the mainland. The first year or so, it wasn't so apparent, and then by 1960, it had produced a massive famine. We knew that things were terrible on the mainland, there were a lot of ways that information came out through Hong Kong, etc. At that time I was in the Embassy and was following mainland affairs.

Q: You were in the ....

LEONARD: In the Political Section. Although we knew things were bad, we had no idea how bad it was. Millions of people literally starved to death in that artificially created famine which followed the Great Leap Forward. That inspired Chiang to think that maybe, maybe he had a chance to overthrow the regime and return to the mainland. He began talking
to us about that, and he also began doing things on his own, sort of behind our back that made us very nervous. So what happened was that ... Averell Harriman had become the Assistant Secretary for the Far East ...

*Q: In the Kennedy administration?*

LEONARD: Kennedy by now, yes. This was early 1961. They replaced Eisenhower's Ambassador on Taiwan with Admiral Kirk, a personal friend of Averell Harriman. I don't know if you ever knew him, but Kirk had commanded the naval landings in Italy and in Normandy, and then was Ambassador to Brussels and Ambassador to Moscow, and then had retired. He was in his early 70s I think at that time. His son is my contemporary, Ambassador Roger Kirk. Harriman asked him if he wouldn't go there in order to ensure that the thing didn't get out of hand, because there was a lack of confidence. There was a feeling that Chiang Kai-shek had been pampered by the China lobby and might misunderstand what would be the American attitude toward an attempt on his part to recover the mainland, to launch any sort of armed action against the mainland. Therefore, Ambassador Kirk was sent out to talk very frankly to the “Gimo” (Chiang) and make sure that this was understood. I didn't go along on the conversations ...

*Q: You were the Political Councilor ...?*

LEONARD: No, I was not the Counselor, I was the number two or three in the section. I became the Counselor a little later. At this time I was not, so I didn't go along on those talks, in fact I don't know that anybody else was in the room when Ambassador Kirk would talk with the Gimo.

*Q: Was Mrs. Chiang in the room?*

LEONARD: I don't know that at all. Very clear messages were conveyed. In fact, Harriman himself at one point came out. The first time I ever had the pleasure of meeting him, I was sent out to the airport to capture him as he got off the plane, bring him into town. The State...
Department, and Kennedy personally I think, were all concerned that there might be some sort of dangerous action on the part of the nationalists, but it didn't happen.

Q: Well, how did you people in the political section, who were not the Ambassador, not the Assistant Secretary back in Washington, react to this policy, when the end of the Eisenhower period and the beginning of Kennedy, did you feel the US had been naive, or was doing right with a difficult customer? How did you personally react to all this?

LEONARD: I think most of us were probably critical of the China lobby. We didn't like our Ambassador. He was a very difficult personality and that may have played a part in our attitude.

Q: This was before Kirk?

LEONARD: Yes. His name was Drumright. He was a very difficult and very conservative personality and most of us felt that there were a lot of things wrong with the way Taiwan was being run, economic as well as political. It changed very substantially over the subsequent years. Eventually, emerged into the sort of success story that it is today. And that all began more or less in that period. But at the beginning of the Kennedy period, we were all almost without exception in the Embassy exhilarated by the victory of Kennedy, and very pleased that there was somebody there who was not in any way a captive of this right wing Republican ideology on the China question.

Q: Now, and your language training was a good training in Taipei?

LEONARD: It was good. Chinese is a very difficult language, but I was very fortunate in going from the school where you got a smattering, a barely able to make out kind of level, to three years in the Embassy, with a good deal of chance to talk Chinese with the political people there, many of whom, outside of the Foreign Ministry of course, did not speak English, it was a good chance to get your language to a useful level.
Q: So by now, you'd had Russian and Chinese, Mandarin I guess?

LEONARD: Yes. The Russian was of course deteriorating rapidly.

Q: So now, you came back then and got into the INR was it?

LEONARD: That's right. I went right in to INR in the Far Eastern Office.

Q: So you'd be watching China from Washington?

LEONARD: Yes. My first assignment was on the China desk, or whatever it was of INR. Then during the time I was in INR, I guess three years, '64 to '66, almost three years, two and a half anyway, I moved from China, to focus pretty much on Vietnam. During that period we were engaging in the escalation in Vietnam and we had a whole series of intelligence estimates on what would be the consequences of various US actions. I was often, not always but often, the State Department representative in those meetings over in CIA where these intelligence estimates would be turned out saying: “Suppose we bomb, suppose we do this, suppose we do that? What will be the consequences?”

Q: Well now, there has been great dispute about the US was informed by its professionals and how much of that information was ignored. So you had a chance to see it coming in and ...

LEONARD: By professionals you mean people in the field?

Q: Coming in and the CIA, and the State Department intelligence people. I guess what I'm driving at is you saw the hard memos. Did they reflect what actually we now know was happening there or not?

LEONARD: I think so. There was from the Tonkin Gulf onward, a tone, an outlook in the State Department, from Mr. Rusk, not including of course George Ball, but then very much including most of the other seventh floor principals as they were called, and Bill Bundy who
was the Assistant Secretary for East Asia, a feeling that the war could be won if we just plugged away at it and kept doing what we were doing but did it better. The estimates that we in INR were doing, were ambiguous on that. It was hardly a cheering section for our policy, but it was not anything like a bugle call to lay off, to cut it off. The only bugle calls like that that I am aware of were issued by Bill Trueheart when he was the number two in Saigon and became convinced that there was no hope ... You know the sad story of the Trueheart/Nolting relationship?

Q: I saw both of them out there, but ...

LEONARD: Well, Nolting was the Ambassador and Trueheart was his deputy. They had been together at NATO where Nolting had been the number two. Trueheart had been his deputy and they went together to Vietnam. They were very close friends. Then they had a basic difference. This was in the period of (Ngo Dinh Diem). The difference was over whether Diem could make it. Nolting went away at one period on home leave and Trueheart sent in a famous cable which said basically: “Diem has got to go.” “We cannot possibly win; the whole thing will go down the tube if he doesn't go, and probably will go down the tube anyway.” Nolting found out about this and rushed back to Washington to try to change things, but by that time that Kennedy and others had begun to think that some reexamination of our policy there was very important. This led, just how directly is a very complex matter which I'm not an expert on, to the overthrow of Diem. Both Nolting and Trueheart eventually left and we got a new team in.

Q: Was the US informed that there was going to be a coup against Diem and looked the other way, because some people said that the US was very much immediately involved in it, in the overthrow of Diem ..?

LEONARD: I don't think that anybody said to the plotters: “Go get him, get rid of him, and we'll be behind you.” What it seemed to me may have happened is that there was a failure to say: “At all costs, protect him.” But I have read some other memoirs on this period which
are much more detailed, specific, and knowledgeable than anything that's in my head. I just think my own thoughts on that ... I was in Taiwan when it happened. I'm simply not a good source for what really took place at the time of the overthrow. What was more important in a way was that after that you got a series of Ambassadors. Alexis Johnson and General Taylor, etc., who basically were in support of the policy, what you could call the McNamara/Rostow policy, and I have to say it looked as if it had Kennedy's support as well, although people swear that if he had lived he would have changed it. It certainly had Johnson's support to see the thing through and not buckle under the pressure. It was at that time that I came into the Department and saw what was I think an uncritical acceptance of our Vietnam policies, except in INR. In INR, attitudes were more skeptical, though not bluntly hostile.

Q: I want to ask you now ... You mentioned the gulf of Tonkin earlier. The gulf of Tonkin resolution. You in INR would be getting the cables on what we assume had happened there.

LEONARD: We would, although I was not in Washington quite yet. I came between the first gulf of Tonkin and the second gulf of Tonkin incidents. There were two of them. The one in August, I had not arrived. I think I may have mentioned this to you earlier, when I arrived I was curious about it, because it to me had seemed like such an extraordinarily inexplicable and stupid action on the part of the North Vietnamese to have attacked our ships and brought down this escalation on themselves. So I went back and looked at the classified material, and my conclusion from that was that you couldn’t say that it hadn't happened, but also you sure could not and should not have said that it really did happen. Maybe there was other information that I never saw, but in fact I don't think there was, and it's all been researched and written up very thoroughly.

Q: So you raised your scepticism on that?
LEONARD: Yes, I indicated I was rather skeptical about this and I was told by my boss: “Well, keep your scepticism to yourself.”

Q: This is the boss in INR?

LEONARD: This is past history, yes.

Q: I see. Now then, you were there for the second ...?

LEONARD: I was there for the second, and we had, in effect, what looked to me like a replay of it. This time I was in a position to say: “I think we ought to have some reservations in anything we write about just what it is that happened here, because it is a very unclear sequence of events.” And in fact, INR did write it up that way, and as far as I know, the second gulf of Tonkin incident, although the right wing used it, you know the hawks, used it for their purposes, I don't think it served quite the same way as the first did.

Q: Why was this in getting the congressional resolution then ...?

LEONARD: The resolution went in right after the first one.

Q: I see.

LEONARD: That's when Senator Fulbright signed on.

Q: But the Senate was not informed of the scepticism of the second?

LEONARD: I don't know.

Q: At that time, the Senate had committed itself. The second time around, the doubts weren't aired with anybody, elsewhere in the administration or what?

LEONARD: Well, I found when I got to INR that my boss there had established a very warm and direct relationship with George Ball, and my boss Allen Whiting, in spite of the
fact that had gone along with the standard interpretation of the first gulf of Tonkin incident as a real attack, still was supplying thoughts to George Ball constantly in opposition to escalation and in opposition to involvement of American forces and that sort of thing. So although I myself didn't do it, I'm sure that the doubts that a number of us expressed at that time over the second incident were communicated to Ball and almost certainly were in play in the discussions which Ball would have had with Rusk and Johnson, etc.

Q: Overall having been posted overseas in your first years, and now you're coming back to more and more responsibility in the Department, what's your reaction? Did you feel that you're more effective when you're in the front line or back home or is there a frustration, is there an unnecessary conflict between home and abroad or what?

LEONARD: I think my reaction, which is I believe quite common among Foreign Service Officers, is that being abroad is far preferable when you're young at the beginning of your career. It really is very enjoyable to be living in a foreign environment and learning languages, and seeing interesting and romantic places and people and all that sort of thing, but you shouldn't kid yourself that you're having any real effect on policy. That would be very unusual to have that at an early age, and that in any case, the only people abroad who have a real effect on policy are the top one or two people in a mission. They are the ones who decide what to put in cables that go back, not the routine reporting cables, but the ones that really weigh in on policy issues when there is one in front of the Embassy. Whereas in Washington, when you get to middle levels, then you can begin to play more of a role. You learn what it is that's going on, who is having influence with whom and the structure there. I think you feel more satisfaction that maybe you're doing something useful, than perhaps you would at the same level abroad. Of course, life is much less agreeable. You're in Washington, you're struggling with the traffic and all the other problems of daily life. Your standard of living has dropped very precipitately since you left the land of amahs and cooks and all that business.
Q: You mentioned cables and the traffic. I've often wondered. I've seen these people sweat till all hours to send the cables back to Washington, people exhausted back here reading cables. Do they really matter?

LEONARD: I hesitate because I haven't read cables for a long time now. I don't feel very deprived of them, but I think they do matter. Whether an individual cable is acted on, or has an effect, they create the atmosphere and the structure within which decisions are taken. Another very major part of that atmosphere and structure is the reporting in the daily press. I don't have to tell you that everybody in the State Department reads the Post and the Times or finds out one way or another what's in it first thing every day, and maybe some of the other papers as well. But the cables also do have an impact. One of my jobs that I had a little later was early morning briefer on the seventh floor. This is a small group of three, four, five department officers usually led by the Assistant Secretary for INR. At that period it was Tom Hughes. We would come into the Department very early in the morning, get briefed on everything that had happened in the previous eighteen hours or so, including the cables and intelligence reports from the CIA, various intercepts, all sources. Then we would go up with these materials and brief the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and so on, and end up about ten o'clock briefing the Assistant Secretaries, the various regional Assistant Secretaries and so on. I did that for a while, and found that in fact the people who were being briefed were very eager to get this. They felt if they didn't get it, they were missing and were not able to function as effectively in the meetings that they would then be having with the other senior officials later in the day. If you were behind on one important fact or one key analysis of some event or other, you not only lost face or prestige, it looked as if you didn't do your job, you weren't paying attention to it. You also simply weren't being paid any mind to in the meetings. So the cables have a very important effect on these key officials, and one of the reasons they are surrounded by swarms of junior aides, etc., is because there's far more than anyone can possibly read and you have to have a system of filtering and funneling these down so that the facts that
really matter, not the texts, are available to the people who have to then do the policy making.

Q: Now, I'm a little mixed up. Your Asian communist affairs that was earlier than INR?

LEONARD: No, that was it.

Q: OK. I was in Pakistan when Zhou En-lai came through, I remember, the only time I ever saw him. Was that the beginning of the cultivation of the Pakistani?

LEONARD: Must have been. I don't think that had really got under way when I was in INR. Somebody who's more of an expert on the subcontinent than I would have to ... What year was it when Zhou came?

Q: I also saw (Liu Shao-Chi) come there with his wife and I'm a little mixed up. (Ai Yu) was in control then and whether this was '66 or an earlier period I was there, I'm fuzzy.

LEONARD: That must have been in the middle sixties. I think that's when the relationship began to develop.

Q: So you were watching from Washington then?

LEONARD: Yes, although I was not watching South Asia, that was out of my area, but Chinese relations.

Q: Then you moved over to become the Korean country director?

LEONARD: It was a little more complex. I left the East Asia office there in INR and moved to another office which really was concerned with arms control and US/Soviet strategic relationship. There is a series of intelligence reports that are done on the Soviet military, probably are still being done today, and I became the State representative in those
meetings going over to the CIA and arguing through how many missiles they had and all that.

Q: So this is the beginning of your real ...?

LEONARD: That's the first contact I had with arms control and in that job I then also would have contact with the ACDA people, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. But then while I was doing that, I also became a seventh floor briefer.

Q: Did you volunteer for this?

LEONARD: No, I remember Tom Hughes asked me if I wouldn't like to do it? It was a chance to get some exposure to the top level of the Department, and it was useful in that respect.

Q: So you get into arms control with this assignment.

LEONARD: Yes. Then we had this crisis in Korea. First the capture of the Pueblo, then the raid on the Blue House, where the North Korean team almost got a hold of the president and killed him. That produced a real crisis in US/Korean relations. A little task force was formed as a result of a recommendation that Cy Vance made. Vance was asked by Johnson to go to Korea and talk to the Koreans about US/Korean relations. Vance came back very critical of the character of our relations and of our policy toward Korea.

Q: Was this (Syngman Rhee) then?

LEONARD: No, no, much later. This would have been Park Chung Hee. Vance recommended that a study be done of the US policy on Korea, and he suggested that some people who never had anything to do with Korea should do the study so that they didn't have built in prejudices. A good friend of mine, Joe Yager, was named to run that and Mort Abramowitz and I were his team together with a very capable colonel who was in the State Department on detail. The four of us did a study. In the course of that study, Joe
Library of Congress

Yager became, as negotiations were opened up, to try to get the crew of the Pueblo back, the officer in charge of those negotiations. Then in the summer of '68 ...

_Q: May I interrupt you for a moment. There was some scepticism on your part with the Tonkin business. What about the Pueblo?_

LEONARD: No. I was sufficiently on top of all of that, so that I think I accepted, in fact I probably wrote a lot of the stuff that was published about what really happened. I remember that one of our jobs was to write a long report for Senator Fulbright on what the Pueblo was really doing.

_Q: The Pueblo was really victimized?_

LEONARD: Oh yes. It was outside of territorial waters. It was doing intelligence work, no question about that, but what has long been accepted as legitimate intelligence work. In fact I still remember the first sentence of the report I wrote for Senator Fulbright which said that “communications' intelligence began with the warriors of one tribe listening to the tom-toms of another tribe.” That sentence got knocked out before the final version went off to the Senator.

_Q: Now, again a bit of a digression. How did you feel as executive branch, State Department, dealing with the legislative branch and particularly Fulbright who by then was .._

LEONARD: Well it was as you know, a very dicey relationship, because by that time he had become very critical. Here we were at the period when Johnson is about to give up. McNamara is about to resign. Johnson is considering not running again, etc. But on the surface nothing has changed. So I can recall with what minute scrutiny anything that we wrote for Fulbright was gone over by the people in the Department to make sure that there wasn't anything in there that could be used against us so to speak.
Q: Did you feel pulled apart knowing that you had this very overwhelming power in the White House and also a very strong figure in the Senate, and you're a civil servant and trying to ... or Foreign Service Officer?

LEONARD: Well, there's no doubt who we were working for. We were working for the White House. The feeling was strong that if you just couldn't keep going, then you should resign, and as you know a number of people did in precisely that. I think that's about the time when Bill (Maynes) resigned and went to work down on the Hill. But I did not. I was more hawkish on Vietnam. It rather surprises people. I really continued to think until a very late stage that if it were only done right there was a chance of saving the situation there. But in any case, it really didn't bother my conscience to be writing material in support of our policies. And on Korea which is what I was dealing with at that point, I felt we were completely in the right and the North Koreans were a very dangerous crowd. Still feel that way today. In fact the lunch I just came from was on the North Korean nuclear problem.

Q: Yes, that seems to be more and more ...

LEONARD: But in any case just to get the chronology back. The chief of this little working group, Joe Yager, was named the negotiator for the recovery of the Pueblo crew. He did it for several months and then he resigned from the State Department and took a job outside. I guess he recommended me as his successor and I did take his place. Eventually some months later I became the Korean desk officer, and did that for the rest of '68 and the first three or four months of 1969 in the period when the crew eventually did get released.

Q: Desk officer or country director wasn't it called?

LEONARD: It was called country director.
Q: How much power do you have then. How much do you feel you can really sign off on things, or again is it such a bureaucracy or what?

LEONARD: Well, it was a very satisfying job. I was the lowest level that dealt with the negotiations. Those negotiations were considered super secret and I was not allowed to discuss them with anybody at my level or below, only with my superior who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary Ambassador Win Brown, he had been Ambassador in Korea and was Bill Bundy's deputy. He was put in charge of the thing, and over him was Katzenbach, and over Katzenbach was Johnson. That was the pecking order. So I felt that what I was doing, trying to come up with some sort of way of dealing with this problem, was a very responsible job. If anything it was a frightening responsibility because you knew that if it went wrong in some way or other, it could be quite a serious problem.

Q: Now, you went from there into arms control?

LEONARD: Yes.

Q: How did that happen?

LEONARD: I think I got a certain amount of undeserved credit for the success of the Pueblo negotiations. I may have mentioned to you that a rather bizarre formula was used to get their release and I was given credit for coming up with that formula.

Q: What was the formula?

LEONARD: In fact, it was my wife who came up with that formula. The formula was that we would agree to sign the totally false piece of paper which the North Koreans had put on the table. It was a confession that the Pueblo had been inside the territorial waters, that it was an espionage ... etc. All sorts of totally untrue things. We, in December of 1968, told the North Koreans that we would agree to sign that if they would release the crew. But that we would sign it only if before signing it we publicly denounced it as a complete total
fraud and told the press that we were signing it only in order to secure the release of the crew. The North Koreans grabbed that and it took approximately a minute and a half for the North Korean negotiator to accept it. I was in Washington, I wasn't out there. It was all done at Panmunjom.

Q: This was real typical oriental face saving?

LEONARD: Yes.

Q: You learned that from your exposure out there. In the field?

LEONARD: Yes. So anyway, I got, as I say, credit for subtlety or duplicity or whatever. Maybe it was not deserved. In the new administration when they were looking around for people to staff the arms control disarmament agency, because for whatever reason (as it has happened again in the last few weeks) the new administration, the Nixon administration decided it wanted a complete change. All of the presidential appointees there were let go and Gerard Smith came in as the director and he was casting about for people to do various jobs. I'd never met him but somebody suggested my name to him and he hired me to become one of his assistant directors and to take at the same time as that the job of heading the delegation in Geneva where we have the arms control negotiations. What's called today the conference on disarmament.

Q: So you commuted, or were you based in Geneva?

LEONARD: Commuted basically.

Q: And your specialty was chemical and biological?

LEONARD: Well, not a the beginning. The NPT had just been completed in that conference the previous year and it was going through the ratification process. So there was a question what the conference would do. It had a whole list of things on its agenda like the comprehensive test ban, etc. The Nixon administration was new to this. It didn't
want to have its hand forced and yet it didn't want the conference to sit there completely idle. Somebody came up with the idea of a treaty which would prohibit nuclear weapons on the seabed. This idea had been around for a while. So, we tried it out on the Russians and they said sure. It was basically a nothing treaty.

Q: There's never been any?

LEONARD: Never been any, never were going to be any, although other people would contest that. It was my belief then and still is now, but it served as a political gesture. It was clear that the big league, the center ring of arms control negotiations was going to be a US/Soviet bilateral over strategic weapons. An attempt had been made to get that started the previous summer. Dobrynin came in to see Gene Rostow who was Under Secretary, one morning, to arrange to set up that negotiation. As Rostow likes to tell it, that was the morning after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, so the Johnson strategic arms negotiations never got started. It became politically impossible. But it was picked up and it was pretty clear that Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers wanted to do it, but they wanted to take their time about it. So they fixed on this seabed treaty as something that would fill in a dull period and show that the US and the Soviet Union could deal with each other, could negotiate without engaging any really important interests on either side. The military had no intention of putting stuff there so you didn't have to override the Pentagon on the treaty. They were very cooperative, and probably the same was true on the Soviet side. We went ahead and did the treaty the first summer that I was in Geneva. But chemicals and biologicals came later. Those were on the agenda of the Geneva conference but nobody was doing anything serious about it.

Q: Let's just get back to the seabed. You had been in Moscow. You'd had some contact with the Russians. Did this serve you in dealing with these people actually in a negotiation or what?

LEONARD: Well, I suppose it did.
Q: Did you use your Russian for instance?

LEONARD: You could use it socially, but they spoke such beautiful English that it was useless.

Q: I see.

LEONARD: What I think was more important was they knew that I knew something about their background. They knew that I understood the constraints under which they were operating. Therefore I would not be unreasonable and hostile and embarrass them uselessly. I wouldn't take a sort of “let's score one on these S.O.B.s,” you know. My opposite number was a good ten or twelve years older than I, a very experienced Soviet diplomat, but a very nice, solid person, and a decent human being. We developed a decent relationship, and this was even more true with his number two and number three who remain very close friends of mine right to this day.

Q: You said they understood you wouldn't needlessly humiliate them and understood their ... You built it up through your open expressions: “I remember ...”? How does this confidence develop?

LEONARD: It's just that they would see that we were not when we would make statements in the committee, or when we were talking with them in informal contacts standing around at receptions, we wouldn't try to score off them. You know ... “You dummies, how can you maintain that such and such ...” They were under very strong compulsions to defend absolutely ridiculous positions. They knew they were ridiculous, and we knew they knew it, and we knew they knew we knew it, etc. But why make a point of it, whereas you've had a lot of American diplomats who would take the other line with them and try to make them feel humiliated and embarrassed, and simply make them look bad, make the US supposedly look good in that kind of a situation. But these people, were confident that this was not going to happen because they were the ones who had gone through the NPT
negotiation. That was one where the closest and most serious purposeful collaboration between the US and Soviet delegations was really essential to get a pretty ridiculous treaty through. You know to get the rest of the world to give up weapons and say: “It's fine if you keep them but we're not going to have any.” That was rather a tour de force.

**Q:** You were not a part of that?

LEONARD: I was not a part of that at all.

**Q:** At least, these people were all veterans of that?

LEONARD: Yes, they all were.

**Q:** So now you have gone into the seabed one, and then to move on?

LEONARD: Yes, the seabed one took us ... well we had the treaty basically done after a year, but then it encountered technical legal problems because it dealt with matters of legal rights on the high seas. It ran into difficulties with a number of countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil who by that time were proclaiming two hundred mile territorial seas. The US wasn't having any of that, so we had to write a treaty that applied basically outside of the territorial waters of a state, and yet you couldn't accept that the territorial waters of some parties went two hundred miles off their coasts. It took us actually two years to completely finish the seabed treaty, but by the time we were in the course of the second year, it became clear what the next thing ought to be and that was that we ought to move from that into the chemical/biological field. What was not clear to us was how to move.

**Q:** Why was that the next logical step?

LEONARD: Well, in part because the US had prepared the way for it by its unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969. This was basically a Laird initiative although I'm sure he didn't think it up on his own.
Q: (Mel Laird?)

LEONARD: Yes, but he pushed it through. The US in the fall of 1969 did in fact decide that it would ratify the Geneva Protocol which was almost fifty years unratted. It took quite a while longer before we finally did it, but in principle the decision to ratify was taken, and a decision that we would give up biological weapons, but that we would not at that point give up chemical weapons. The name of the game became to get chemical and biological weapons separated. All the rest of the world was against this separation except for our British colleagues who had proposed it in the first place. So our first year or so of work on this issue involved trying to develop a framework in which we would get biological weapons separated out and get a separate treaty on them while giving some sort of convincing hostages to the idea of an eventual chemical weapons treaty. It was what the rest of the world really was demanding.

Q: We're in Vietnam now. Tear gas, herbicides, all this sort of thing. The world is really getting very stirred up about US use of chemical weapons. All right, how do you ... you're now an experienced diplomat but you're not a scientist. How do you prime yourself for these things?

LEONARD: Well, it turns out that in these issues, the level of scientific knowledge that a negotiator has to have is not very deep. You have always got at your side, just as you have lawyers who have all sorts of background knowledge on international law, you have experts with Ph.D.s in chemistry or biology or whatever, and you've got military people who know a lot about the actual weapons themselves. Anything that you do, any proposals that you put forward are framed in the light of that expert advice that you're getting from the people concerned. Well I happened to have been an engineer in college, but you could be a history major or an English major perfectly well and do the job without any problem.

Q: And there are no fast questions thrown at you across the table. You can always say: “I want to think about that, I suppose.”?
LEONARD: Yes, or you can turn to somebody on one side or the other.

Q: So, these went on for how many years, getting these treaties?

LEONARD: I was in Geneva for three years. The first two years was doing the seabed treaty, and preparing the way for the BW treaty, and the third year we actually came out with a draft treaty on biological weapons, we and the British. The Soviet looked at it, and criticized it, etc., but by July they had agreed that they were going to do it, for whatever reasons, and I think now in retrospect, we can understand that some of the reasons were not very good, because they proceeded to violate the treaty as soon as they'd signed it. Their military did. I don't think their negotiators knew that at all. But the negotiators saw that here was something that probably was not of serious interest to their military establishment and therefore was a proper subject for arms control negotiations. And eventually, in the summer of '71, they got approval from Moscow to go ahead and we reached agreement on a text in the matter of four, five weeks.

Q: You were then head of the arms control disarmament delegation?

LEONARD: No, no. Gerard Smith was the head, and during all of this period, SALT I was going on. He was negotiating in Helsinki and Vienna, etc. Frankly we were a sideshow to that.

Q: Your ACDA work came to an end with the change of administration?

LEONARD: Yes. I was replaced in Geneva in the spring of 1972. Gerry Smith told me that he wanted me to do something else but it never became clear to me what it was. I think probably what he had in mind was having me go to the MBFR negotiations which were just beginning to get started in Vienna in the fall of '72. The ones that Jock Dean eventually did. Whatever it was, it didn't happen, and in the fall of '72, Smith decided to resign. You know, he had very bad conflicts with Kissinger during the whole START business, they came almost to blows during the summer of '72. Then in the winter of '72, '73, with the
end of Nixon I and the beginning of Nixon II, we had what we later called the ACDA purge of ACDA. Gerry left of his own accord. I don't think he was fired, but everybody else was fired. In fact, I then decided to retire. I couldn't be fired because I was a career Foreign Service officer.

Q: Smith was a political appointee?

LEONARD: Yes, the other assistant directors along with me and there were a whole bunch of us who were told that our services were no longer needed. I was basically sent back to the State Department and it was up to them to offer me a job. But I decided I didn't want it. I really was very indignant at this whole procedure. It was partly the specifics of what happened in ACDA and partly the more general business of Watergate which was by that time becoming more and more evident. So I simply retired in the summer of '73 and took a job with the UN Association up in New York.

Q: You moved on then to the UN Association.

LEONARD: The UN Association, yes. I was there for four years.

Q: Even though that's not State Department, it certainly impinges on the US and its Foreign Service. What was your reaction from the outside of the government having to deal with US policy toward the UN?

LEONARD: Well, that was not a very good period in our relations with the UN, although it got worse. This is one of the years.

Q: This is '73/'77?

LEONARD: First of all, you had very bad things happening. You had the visit of Arafat to the UN, his appearance on the podium.

Q: The guns? Pistols, not guns?
LEONARD: The guns, yes, and the US which had become angrier and angrier at the UN during the first four years of the Nixon period, was really getting really very angry by this time. At the beginning, let me see now, let me get this straight. In '73. Was that when Mr. Bush came there? No he was there earlier, because when I met him I was in from Geneva. He would have been the Ambassador there in '70/'71. I think by that time it was John Scali and then Moynihan, and then very briefly Bill Scranton. Then the end of the administration, and Andy Young came in. During that period, you had a conscious decision on the part of the administration in Washington to really take on the UN, not listen anymore to this kind of guff. Moynihan carried that out, you know, in his own style, very effectively.

Q: I always felt that he ... I saw him the night he left his post in India, and he was upbeat for the moment because Mrs. Gandhi had given him two hours of final farewell. But he was really furious most of his time in India for never being respected as an intellectual by the intellectuals of India and I always felt that his annoyance with India he took out on the UN generally. Now is there anything to that?

LEONARD: Well, he certainly took it out on the UN. Whether it was based on the India experience I have no idea, but he did. You know, the ugliest incident that took place then was the famous “Zionism is racism” resolution. I was there, not in the Mission but in the UN Association during that business. The most I should say about that is that there was an awful lot of criticism of Moynihan's handling of that in the Mission by the people who were watching it up close and there were even those who felt that in a way he had provoked it in order to provide himself a platform for then making himself very popular with the Jewish groups and the American people generally, who were outraged by the famous resolution. I just honestly have no way of knowing whether that was true. I know that he conceived a dislike for me personally based on one incident where he simply misunderstood what had happened. We had every six months or so a meeting of our board of directors and we would usually invite the American Ambassador to speak. On this particular occasion, we did. It was when Moynihan was really riding very high. He was a very prominent figure in
the news, etc. We invited him and he couldn't accept. He had another engagement. So we invited the British Ambassador who came and delivered what in effect was a stinging criticism of Moynihan.

Q: What Ambassador was that?

LEONARD: His name was Ivor Richard. He was a very witty fellow and he said he didn't know what the UN was. But he knew one thing that it wasn't. It wasn't the OK Corral and he hadn't been sent there to ride out of the sunset and put things straight with his six-shooter. He then released the text of what he had said to the press who loved it, picked it up and made a big thing of it. Moynihan, I'm really convinced, blamed me personally for having set this whole thing up. Although I was critical of Moynihan and his handling of his job, I was not guilty of that particular thing at all. In fact I thought it was rather out of order for the British Ambassador to use a US group like that, to tear into the American Ambassador.

Q: This time, you were president of the UN ...?

LEONARD: I was president of the UNA at that time.

Q: I can't remember whether I asked you. How did you get into this to begin with after you resigned?

LEONARD: Well, I was invited to come there by a gentleman you may have know named Ed Korry. The founding president of the UN Association was Porter McKeever who just died a few months ago. Porter decided to retire in 1972 and he and his board hired Ambassador Ed Korry, who had been Ambassador to Ethiopia and Ambassador to Chile, to come up and become the new president, and Korry hired me to be his vice-president. He arrived there a little before I did and by the time I arrived he had begun to go off the deep end. He had become convinced that he was being persecuted for a series of actions in Chile which he was not guilty of. He thought he was being blamed for disasters down
there connected with Allende and the coup d'etat and that stuff. He was spending all of his time defending himself against these charges which in fact nobody was really paying much attention to, and not doing his job as president. So the board of governors bought him out. By that time I had seen what an awful job it was, really didn't want it, but several of them who became close friends of mine came to me and asked me if I would do it. They said they thought I could do the job and they would give me their support on the Board if I would take it on. So I did and I am certainly glad that I did.

Q: So you had the advantage of a Foreign Service officer who had been in Moscow, who had been associated with the Chinese relations, and NATO. So you had all the background that was involved and you probably knew the people in the US mission. You will correct me, the UN Association of the US is also to get American public support, but in a sense you're also lobbying with the UN mission, aren't you?

LEONARD: Yes. Our objectives are parallel but not identical with those of the Mission and there has to be a close working relationship. I must say my successors there, and there have been two of them since I left the job, have had a much tougher job than I did because they've had Ambassadors at the Mission there who were much more difficult to deal with than Moynihan. Moynihan, you know, is a very agreeable, very pleasant type on a personal level.

Q: Are you referring to an earlier lady ..?

LEONARD: Yes. That would have been very tough for me, Mrs. Kirkpatrick. It is a difficult job, maintaining that balance, being for the UN, and yet criticizing US policy toward the UN when you think it is wrong. For example in not paying dues, but yet not being so hostile that you become kind of a spokesman for the UN against the US Mission. That wouldn't do either.

Q: Now you move on from that to actually being the number two man in the US mission?
LEONARD: Yes, in the course of that job, when I was at UNA, I got to know Cy Vance. He had been associated with the UN Association for a long time. In particular with the part of it that I was hired to run, which was their policy studies program, which has gone on for twenty-five years I guess. These are exchanges mostly with the Soviet Union, although they've broadened out now and have them with China and Japan and some others. Cy Vance always just loves that kind of thing, when you get a bunch of people together in a room and discuss some policy problem. So I saw a great deal of him in the course of that four years that I was there. When he became Secretary of State and Andy Young was named as the Ambassador, then I was put forward by Vance at his suggestion for number two and to Andy's credit or discredit, however you want to interpret it, he accepted the suggestion without hesitation.

Q: Now you then became a political appointee or you're back in the Foreign Service?

LEONARD: Technically I went back in the Foreign Service. They have a provision, as the Military does I guess, to rehire people when they choose to. I just went back in as a Foreign Service officer.

Q: I see. Now this is multilateral diplomacy, and this is something you prefer to bilateral?

LEONARD: Absolutely. From the time I first went to Geneva in 1969, I had seen it as far more interesting, as far more challenging, intellectually demanding, than old-fashioned bilateral diplomacy. I have been for these past twenty-five years very critical of the State Department, the Foreign Service, for continuing to put the emphasis on the bilateral and not see that the shape of the future is multilateral diplomacy. I loved it.

Q: Is it right that if you are on a fast track for promotion, this isn't the way or hasn't been?

LEONARD: It has not been, that's correct, and I would hope that somehow in the next couple of years it would be put there as a required course that you would have to take, if I
may put it that way, in order to get your degree. You know a ticket that you gotta punch, as the military would put it.

Q: We're jumping into the days of 1993. Is the UN now coming into its own at the time when ten years ago when you were associated with it it wasn't given this ...?

LEONARD: Well, I think it is. We had very high hopes for it at the beginning of the Carter administration. Hopes which were to a large degree disappointed in circumstances, we'll talk about that another time. But we saw an enormous potential for the UN. It turns out that the potential now is even so much greater than I had imagined it would be because of the collapse of the Soviet Union which has made a shambles of the previous power structure of the world and has left just a bunch of fragments lying around with no shape or structure to them. So that now, it's not that the UN is in itself going to solve these problems and give us a glorious new world order, but that it's absolutely clear to everybody, even to the most troglodyte, old bilateralists, or conservatives, that if you're going to do something today, you'd better try to do it through the UN. Except in those few unusual circumstances where you can find some other multilateral organ to operate through, like in Latin American maybe the OAS. But the UN is only the only one that we've got, the only universal multilateral organization.

Q: Now, back to your job as number two in the US mission. What is it like dealing in New York with Washington and also having the people you've got to negotiate with up there? Do you feel that Washington is behind you, because I think there has been a lot of surmise in the past that Washington couldn't care less down here, and the people up at the mission are frantically trying to achieve various things.

LEONARD: Well, Washington is certainly on top of you. Whether it's behind you or not is another matter. They are watching you very closely, because every twitch is evident to them. The press even in the bad days is watching what the UN does very closely and reporting on it. If you make a slip of some kind it becomes pretty evident to a lot of people.
It's very public diplomacy. It's not like bilateral diplomacy which is carried on in private conversations in foreign ministries, etc. So you're in the spotlight to a certain degree. But in my two years there, it was only a little over two years that I served in that job, I couldn't have a more ideal relationship with Washington because the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor Brzezinski, whom I had a lot of disagreement with ...

Q: Under President Carter, the Security Advisor?

LEONARD: Yes. They all wanted to use the UN. Brzezinski less than the rest, but he wasn't hostile to using it. Certainly Carter and Vance wanted to use it and they had what for my money was an absolutely superb Assistant Secretary, Bill (Maynes) in Washington, and Bill had a bunch of extremely capable officers under him, the most notable being his deputy Gerry Helman. I talked to them ten times a day through that whole two years and we almost never had serious policy differences. When we had differences, it was over tactics, details over how to handle some problem or other. You know: “Can't you get Andy to pipe down? or “Can't you do something more over that problem in ECOSOC?” or wherever. .They were understanding, they knew plenty about the UN themselves. Both Bill and his principal assistant had served in New York.

Q: How much has the US's affiliation with Israel mortgaged its freedom to operate at the UN?

LEONARD: In some ways it is really astonishing how much understanding we have of the rest from the world and how much credibility there is for us. For one thing, there is an assumption in the UN by and large that the individual they are dealing with, me let's say, there is an assumption there that he is anti-Israel. Even on the part of the Israelis. It requires some effort to convince them that you're not anti-Israel, simply because they assume that all State Department people have a natural tendency to be hostile to Israel. But since the rest of the community think that you are anti-Israel, they blame the things that they don't like on Washington, not on you. So you don't have a personally tense
relationship with these other delegates. In fact, it's a difficult job to be really honest with them and honest with yourself when in fact you disagree with their horseback judgement, their assumption that you're against whatever it is that Israel is doing. In many situations I thought that Israel was right and the Arabs or whoever was in the wrong, and they found that very hard to believe that really there was such an American diplomat, especially one who'd served in the Middle-East. “You know us, you know what we're like, and how can you possibly take that kind of a position?” No, I didn't find that our relationship with Israel a grave handicap. What I did find troubling was attitudes on other more serious matters, from the viewpoint of most of the rest of the world ... You know they support the Arab group for various reasons including the oil and so forth. But to them, to most of the world, the Middle East is not problem number one. Their own area is problem number one, and their own economic development is the universal problem number one, and there, they were less understanding. They had expected more of the Carter administration than they got and they were not very understanding of our problems of delivering on this. I think there was really a lack of sophistication, a lack of perspective on the part of most of the developing countries on what the Carter administration could do either through the UN or in other ways about the problems that they thought were the most important.

Q: When you speak of the developing countries, do you think that it is covered by the non-aligned group or ..?

LEONARD: Well, it's almost but not quite coterminous. The non-aligned group has a very strong influence setting the tone on an awful lot of issues. There are developing countries that are not part of it, and there are countries that have no business being there like North Korea. You know, it is supposedly part of the non-aligned group but really not a typical member, to say the least.

Q: Now, how did the non-aligned group come into your arms control interest, and I assume you were keeping a big eye on that in the UN too?
LEONARD: Basically, they appreciated very much the arms control policies of the Carter administration, even the policies which were not the very best. You'll remember that in March of 1977, the Carter administration sent Mr. Vance and a whole team of people off to Moscow to open up negotiations on arms control and strategic weapons and this turned into a disaster. The US put forward a very far-reaching proposal for substantial cuts in nuclear weapons, and the Soviets were outraged and reacted violently against it. By and large in New York people thought we were right. They didn't understand why this was a clumsy proposal, why the Russians were so angry about it, and they sympathized with the Carter administration. They also in the same period, in early '77, they were very sympathetic toward our policy on the Middle-East. This was before Sadat went to Jerusalem. Our policy at that point was to get a comprehensive solution to bring all the parties together at the table, and even the very hard-boiled types like the Syrians were working with us in trying to get that achieved. Then, you know, in the fall of 1977, that effort more or less collapsed, or if it didn't collapse, Sadat lost patience with it and decided to try his ploy of going to Jerusalem. Then we were off on quite another track where members of the UN, not only the Arabs but in general were extremely critical. We had a very hard time with the General Assembly from that point on. But at the beginning on these issues everybody was really patting us on the back, saying: “This Carter administration, this is really great.” Of course the thing that made the most impact of all up there was the Panama Canal treaty. That brought the whole Latin American group, a very important, vocal, active group of governments. They were completely on our side on this and they understood what political risks Carter was exposing himself to in going for the treaty and they appreciated it and were ready to be helpful to us on other issues in return for the effort that we were making on that issue. We had a real honeymoon there for almost the first year.

Q: Now, Camp David was during your watch?
LEONARD: Yes, but ... Sadat went to Jerusalem at Christmas time 1977 and then there were the trilateral negotiations, the US, Israel and Egypt, leading up to Camp David, which was if I remember in September of ’78. That was a very bad period for us at the UN because we had lost the whole Arab group, the whole Islamic group, and many of the non-aligned. Whether they really believed it or not, they were attacking Camp David as a betrayal of proper principles for making peace in the Middle-East. So that was a much tougher period. Behind the scenes, if you could get Arab Ambassadors to talk to you really frankly, they didn't feel the same way that their governments did, and I'm not sure that even their governments felt that way, but public opinion was demanding this extremely hostile, critical attitude in the UN. The PLO was making the running on that issue, whereas the more conservative Arab governments, some of the ones in the Gulf, were not unsympathetic to Sadat. Yet they wouldn't ever dare come out and say so in public. You know the sort of thing: “If you ever quote me on this, I'll call you a liar or deny I ever said it.” sort of attitude. That bad atmosphere on Camp David persisted on into the summer and through Camp David and through even the subsequent period of the Egyptian/Israeli bilateral negotiations on a treaty for the evacuation of the Sinai and normal relations. I was in New York still through that period. We had one brief honeymoon with the Arabs during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the installation of the UN forces in Lebanon. But through most of that period we were having a very hard time with everybody in the Middle East and it lasted on through my time in New York ... I left there in March or April of ’79 to go to the Middle East and the hostility toward what the US was doing in the Middle East remained at a very high level all through that period and until Secretary Baker and his breakthroughs.

Q: I once was told that Carter was completely frustrated by Begin at Camp David. That he couldn't make him stand still. In fact Begin wanted to see him and Carter would run away and then the actual Begin statement about his commitment, is it the left bank area? He didn't deceive, he just never committed himself to (the US hoped he'd had). Wasn' that it?
LEONARD: That's a very controversial thing. This is the question of: “Did Begin agree to a halt in settlements, a freeze?” I discussed this at length with most of the people who were at Camp David. The best authority on that I think is Roy (Atherton) who was there and maybe in some ways a better authority on the matter than Cy Vance who was the only one in the room when this actual discussion took place. Vance came to New York I think it was the Tuesday following the Camp David meeting when they had their photographs on the lawn of the White House, shaking hands, etc., and the agreement had been signed. In the Mission, we asked Vance: “What is the story here on this freeze? We thought there was a freeze, and now Israel is saying no, there's no freeze at all. There is a three-month partial freeze, or something of that sort.” Vance said: “Well, the answer to that question is very simple. Begin is wrong and we're right; he agreed to a freeze, and we're going to see to it that there is a freeze.” Whether Begin was right or not, Vance was wrong. The Israelis never did agree to it and in effect the Carter administration lost the chance of a broader peace than just a bilateral peace agreement right at that moment by failing to secure a settlements freeze from Begin, because I think if they had, there would have been a chance of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiations.

Q: Now you mentioned a few moments ago that Lebanon was a better moment?

LEONARD: Yes. You may remember that in the spring, I think it was April of '78, Israel invaded the Lebanon. Mr. Begin acted on the advice of his Defense Minister Weizman. It was a bad business. They misled us, deceived us, lied to us literally about the whole thing. It made Carter and Vance and Brzezinski extremely angry, just determined that they were going to rectify the situation. And the way that they fixed on was a UN force. On about a Monday or a Tuesday Israel went in and by Thursday it was clear that Mr. Carter had decided, on recommendation I suppose from Vance and probably from Bill Maynes, that we should propose to put UN forces into the Lebanon as a way of getting the Israelis out. That just delighted the Arabs, they were exhilarated by this. Here they had for once the Americans on their side in an Arab-Israeli dispute. So there was a brief honeymoon there.
for collaboration with the Arabs. It was important that we have this collaboration, because the Soviets were against it. They didn't want to see the UN forces go in. Their Ambassador at the UN, Oleg Troyanovsky, who is now at the present time here at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, never ceased to remind me of the fact that they had been against having the Syrians go into Lebanon in the first place, while we the U.S. had encouraged the Syrians to go in in order to put an end to the Lebanese civil war which unfortunately it did not do. And now here we were compounding that mistake with another one by sending the UN into Lebanon. But the Arabs were for it in order to get Israel out of the Lebanon, so the Arabs leaned on the Soviets and brought them to accept the despatch of UN forces there. Unfortunately, the Israelis were extremely against this, very much against this. They accused us of failing to consult with them, etc. Tried to stop it and failed. It meant that the “birth certificate” of the UN forces in Lebanon was a one-sided birth certificate. It didn't have the consent of one of the principal parties, namely Israel. When the time came to get out, they refused to get out. They pulled back part way, but not all the way and they're still there today.

Q: On one story you gave on the UN while you were there, you gave that wonderful phrase: “Diplomacy is politics carried out in formal fashion between governments.” You were thinking I think at the time of the congressional delegates to the US mission. That struck me as something new?

LEONARD: Oh, it's a very commonplace observation on the part of professional diplomats up there, that when members of Congress go up there, they feel quite at home right away, if they don't have too hostile a set of prejudices to start with. Because they see everybody log-rolling and playing the same kind of games there in the General Assembly that they play in the Congress here. You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.

Q: And so they get some winners, huh?
LEONARD: Yes, they kind of enjoy it, if you can get them involved. Sometimes, they don't. Sometimes they come with ideas that it shouldn't be like that. But in general I think that most members of delegations, at least during the times when I'd been in the UN, found it a rather pleasant and rewarding experience.

_Q: Now overall your long association with the UN, do you think the US is reconciled to not having its own way as it did in the beginning to make the whole thing work better._

LEONARD: Well, I think we're beginning to learn. I think the Reagan administration ... It's hard to know what was in their minds, but in the Bush administration, Mr. Bush had a warm personal relationship with Secretary General Peres de Cuellar. They had both sat in the Security Council together. Partly because of that, Mr. Bush was more understanding about the UN and tolerant if you like of its weakness, its feebleness in certain situations. He knew what's so obvious to anybody who's worked the UN, that the UN is only what the governments permit it to be. It has no inherent strength of its own. It's not an autonomous body with its own power. You know it's like the famous question of Stalin about the Pope: “How many divisions does he have?” Well the Secretary General has zero divisions, and that means that he's not going to be taken seriously in a lot of situations. He also has no money. If you don't have military force and you don't have economic power, what are you? You're only what governments will permit you to be. When the US has understood this and has used the UN, whether it's the Secretary General or the Security Council or whatever, in an intelligent way, we found it rather fruitful. I believe the present administration has got a fairly sophisticated understanding of this. I hope I'm not going to be gravely disappointed in all of this. You certainly see it in something like Bosnia today.

_Q: What about widening the Security Council membership?_

LEONARD: I think that has to be done. As people say over and over again it's reflective of the situation at the end of the World War II, and not of the world as it is today. You really have to bring in some more. It's very shortsighted to talk only of Japan and Germany. You
really must talk about the rest of the world. India is my number one candidate. Not many American diplomats think it would be fun to have India in the UN day in, day out. I don't think it would be that bad. I've had, you know, we've been talking together about it, I've had better experiences with Indian diplomats than some people. I think they're a very major factor in the world, and you've got to have that and you've got to have important Africans, important Latin Americans there, so that they take their responsibilities as members of the famous “international community” in a serious way.

Q: I'm thinking of giving up the veto for instance in the Security Council. Is that ...?

LEONARD: That I don't think is on. I don't think it's a problem.

Q: Not anymore?

LEONARD: Not anymore. When I first went to the UN I remember talking with one of the people in the mission. He said: “you know, we're looking for some way to cast a veto. We've never used the veto.” Really this is 1973 or '74. We had never had occasion to cast a veto. We'd always had, if not a majority, at least a blocking minority. You know, you almost need nine votes in the security council to take a decision, and we'd never had any need to cast a veto, because we had at least seven votes out of fifteen that would stick with us on any tough issue. We then went into a veto mania. It was a kind of machismo, a not very attractive phase. We'd lost the war in Vietnam and we were going to show the world that we were not a paper tiger. What better way could there be to show that we were not a paper tiger than to cast a veto! That's ridiculous. We went through that phase, and now since the fall of the Soviet Union, since their collapse, we haven't had to veto anymore and I think it's likely to stay that way for a long time. People will proceed more or less by consensus in the council. The French and the British? I can't imagine what kind of circumstances twenty, thirty, fifty years from now will have evolved so that they will give up that symbol of great power status. It certainly isn't there today, and if the French and British don't give it up, the Chinese and the US will. You're an American like I am, I don't
think the American public is ready to give up the veto, or even to dream of giving up the veto.

**Q:** Let's go back now to your final assignment which was the Middle East negotiations. This was Ambassador Bob Strauss?

**LEONARD:** Yes.

**Q:** First, how did they happen to take you away from the UN? This was an emergency or what?

**LEONARD:** No, actually I had said that I thought I ought to be replaced up there. Andy had already begun recruiting a replacement for me and I was going to go back to private life. I got a call from Washington, from Bill Maynes. He said: “Vance wants to talk to you. You better get ready, he wants to send you out to the Middle East. If you're not willing to do it, you'd better be pretty firm in that because he's determined to have you take that on. At that point Strauss had been appointed as the special representative of the President to conduct the Middle East peace negotiations on the question of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza.

**Q:** This is which President now?

**LEONARD:** Carter. Strauss obviously needed a number two. He had made it clear that he did not intend to go and live in the Middle East, simply to shuttle back and forth, but that there should be a delegation out there that would do that. So, what was needed was to find some professional willing to go and settle down in the Middle East, shuttle back and forth between Israel and Egypt, and carry the negotiations forward between the visits of the special representative, Strauss. Well, Vance put it to me, and I talked it over with my wife and we decided: “Well, it's not exactly what we'd pictured. We were planning to really retire, but it's certainly an interesting thing.” You know in a sentimental way, here I was thirty years later right back where I started in, 1949 ...
Q: Damascus?

LEONARD: Yes. And I've always loved the Middle East, physically, historically, the chance to climb around on old ruins, and all that sort of thing. We took it. The structure of the negotiations was very defective. Supposedly the Palestinians and the Jordanians were to be part of the negotiation. That was what Camp David had foreseen, but because Carter failed to get the settlement freeze that he thought he'd got from Begin, the chance of getting the Palestinians was not very good. It hadn't completely vanished when I got there, even though that was eight or nine months after Camp David. When I first arrived and was introduced with the aid of our Consul General in Jerusalem to a number of Palestinians and talked about it, they were very standoffish, they made it clear that the PLO had said no. In fact one Palestinian whom I had gotten to know in New York, I ran into in the street, and he said he was sorry he would of course shake my hand but he couldn't have supper with me or anything because of the position that I was in. He was a former Defense Minister of Jordan, a very senior Palestinian, very widely respected, wonderful man, but he simply was not going to go around behind the back of the PLO and engage in any sort of private negotiation with the Americans. We settled into a pattern of negotiations with the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Americans, trying to produce some sort of results. Our (U.S.) objective was to produce results that would convince the Palestinians that this was all in their interest and would bring them into the negotiation, but we failed completely. That was the history of the next year and a half.

Q: Now, Bob Strauss, the super negotiator from the US, he would stay in Washington, you'd fill him in?

LEONARD: No. He would come out about once a month, maybe a bit oftener than that. Between the time he and I were appointed, in April and May, and the time he resigned his position, which I think was about September, he must have made about five trips to the Middle-East. The negotiations were set up so that there were meetings at two levels. There was the ministerial level where Strauss was the American representative, and you
had the Egyptian Prime Minister, and you had an Israeli team of five, repeat five, cabinet ministers under the normal chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior. That top level negotiation would meet for two or three days in Alexandria, or in Haifa, or some other place. And then in between those meetings, roughly spaced a month apart, the working level, that is me and the U.S. team two Egyptian Ambassadors, and a couple of Israeli representatives, would work out the details and prepare things for the next round of the ministerial level meetings to take decisions on.

Q: What's Strauss like to work for, is he all taking bows in front of a curtain or is he actually doing work or ...?

LEONARD: He's an absolutely brilliant human being. I'm convinced this is one of the best minds I've ever had any dealings with. No, question at all, and a person of enormous charm. When he wants to charm somebody, that person is absolutely overwhelmed by it. It's a marvelous thing to watch. I can cite a very personal example. My wife absolutely detests him in principle, but when he gets face to face with her, starts giving her his stuff, it's Strauss for president. He came to it with a great deal of arrogance—it's hardly necessary to say that. Anybody who knows anything about him would expect that. He'd just finished the trade negotiations with great success, and he was convinced that this was no more difficult, and we'll come to a repetition of this little drama with Linowitz in a moment. He was convinced that in two or three months he would be able to size it up and work out a deal and with both parties and come back in triumph. By September, he was frankly saying to us: “You know, this is a lot tougher than I ever thought. These people are really very difficult.” And the way he finally put it, in the last discussion I had with him out there, he said: “You know, I'm going to quit this. I don't think I can do what I set out to do here. But there is something I can do. I can go back and I can get Jimmy Carter reelected president. He's asked me to come back and head his committee for the reelection of the president and that's what I am going to do.” And he went off to Washington and a disastrous defeat in the reelection campaign, probably not his fault however. In the Middle
East, he came to it without any real understanding of the basic attitude of the parties. He didn't know the history of the area.

Q: Was it like Texas?

LEONARD: Not at all like Texas. Moreover, he came with an enormous burden of suspicion toward him in the minds of both the Israelis and the Egyptians, to say nothing of the other Arabs. We made a quick swing around after one of his first trips out there. We went to Jordan and we went to Saudi Arabia and I think that was all.

Q: A suspicion because he's Jewish or what?

LEONARD: The Arabs were of course suspicious because he was Jewish. They were convinced that he was Jewish and would totally side with Israel whenever it mattered. The Israelis were totally suspicious of him because he was Jewish and had no record of strong support for Israel in the American Jewish community. He'd never played any big part in things here. He wasn't even as they would put it a very good Jew. You know he grew up in a little town in Texas, his family was the only Jewish family in town. I recall the way he put it once in a meeting that he had with the Arab Ambassadors here in Washington. He said: “You know, I grew up in a town where there were two “foreign” families, there was my family and there was an Arab family, a Lebanese grocer.” And he said: “My father and that guy were very good friends, and my only friend in that town was that little Arab kid. We were outsiders.” But he was not a part of the mainstream Jewish Zionist community here at all, and the Israelis were profoundly suspicious. Israelis are much more suspicious of Jews who have not got that record of support, and for them, object of suspicion that I was, I was maybe more understandable, more predictable. They felt they knew how to handle me better than they did a guy like Strauss. This was very evident in the very first meeting we had out there, it was one of these ministerials, sitting around a round table with the three delegations in Alexandria. The Egyptians, as I remember spoke first and whatever it was that they said, Strauss launched into a rather strong criticism. He's got a
real gift with words and he made their position seem pretty ridiculous. You could just see all those Egyptians saying, “what did I tell you, there it is. He's on the side of the Israelis all the way.” Then the Israelis spoke next and after they got through Strauss did the same thing to them, and the Egyptians I could see querying each other, “what's goes on here?” And the Israelis all looking at each other and thinking: “I told you so, he's a self-hating Jew.” Naturally they all came to know him much better over the next several months. I think they came to respect him, to feel that this guy was really trying, but in all honesty the framework of the situation was not one that he could do anything about. He couldn't bring Begin to make the concessions that were necessary to bring the Palestinians in. Without the Palestinians, the Egyptians were determined that there was not going to be any outcome to that negotiation. Begin, for his own very obvious reasons, didn't want the Palestinians in and he didn't want any outcome to the negotiations either. So you had two of the three parties sitting there at the table who didn't want anything to happen. It was very hard for the Americans to overcome that kind of obstacle.

Q: Sol Linowitz was sent in to replace Strauss, but had the same ...?

LEONARD: Sol came out, but he was very different in a lot of ways. He had a very strong record in the American Jewish community. He's a very, I won't say devout, I really don't know how observant a Jew he is, but he is a very profoundly Jewish Jew in a very admirable way. He told me once, when I first got to know him, that he had grown up in a family which didn't take its Jewish heritage very seriously, or at least not as seriously as he did, and so when he learned that there was a famous writer named (Sholom Alechem) who wrote in Yiddish, he taught himself Yiddish in order to be able to read Sholom Alechtem in the original. He was the head of a theological seminary in New York, you know stuff like that he really paid his dues to the Jewish community all the way through.

Q: So here the Israelis then would have been more disposed toward him, but the Arabs much less?
LEONARD: The Arabs were that much more hostile, and Sol himself, I have to say never, to this day I think, hasn't really understood the Arab outlook on these things. As he's listening to an Arab talk, he is constantly engaged in an argument, an internal silent argument with the guy refuting him. Even in things like body language, this becomes apparent to them. They know they are not getting a real hearing.

Q: Funny choice from Washington to send him?

LEONARD: Yes. I don't honestly understand it. I'll have to say I don't think that either of these was Cy Vance's choice. Vance is one of the very few people who has got, as far as I can discern, has got the confidence right to this day of both Arabs and Israelis. Total confidence in his integrity, his balance, his evenhandedness as between the two of them. That doesn't mean that they always believe that he's right on whatever he says on Middle East issues. But they don't think he's carrying a chip on his shoulder, you know, any sort of prejudice for the favor of the other side. And that's very unusual, very difficult.

Q: So, at the end of the two years, you just had to back out?

LEONARD: Nothing had happened. Sol and I have a very basic disagreement on this. Sol thinks a lot was achieved, and he keeps saying so every chance he gets. I really don't think anything much was achieved. Some outlining of what the issues were but no real presentation of any substantial solutions to those difficult problems. Problems like the disposition of the land, allocation of water, all these things which are now on the table. Here we are almost fifteen years later.

Q: And the mission came to an end because the administration came to an end, is that it?

LEONARD: Exactly. Sol resigned. I resigned. None of us made any effort to stay on.

Q: This is your second resignation from the Foreign Service then?
LEONARD: Yes.

Q: And this was it.

LEONARD: That was it.

Q: OK. And then since then, you've been doing what?

LEONARD: Odd jobs. You know, several very interesting ones.

Q: Such as?

LEONARD: Well ... Cy Vance got me in as an advisor to the Palme commission. He was a member of the Palme commission. You know in the very bad years of the Reagan administration, he was trying to patch together some sort of east/west reduction of tension, etc.

Q: This is Olaf Palme, the assassinated Prime Minister of Sweden?

LEONARD: Olaf Palme, yes. It was interesting, and I enjoyed it very much, but it was very much kibitzing from the outside. And way on the outside. Vance accepted the job. It was offered to him just after he resigned as Secretary of State in the full expectation that Carter would be President for another four years, and as a close and respected friend of the President, even if he had resigned over the desert whatever it was attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran. Nevertheless, Vance would be a real pipeline into the White House and of course he was anything but that during the Reagan years.

Q: I see. Well, I think you have been very patient and I certainly thank you very much, Jim Leonard.

LEONARD: Very enjoyable for me, Warren.
End of interview