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TRANSFERS OF POPULATION IN EUROPE SINCE 1920

Description

An analysis of the numerous transfers of population in Europe during the last 25 years, with particular attention to the factors determining transfers and the selection of transferees, the characteristics of the groups transferred, the transfer of property, the processes of population transfer, and the problems of resettlement.

Washington

31 May 1945

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SUMMARY

The disparities among the various population transfers of the last twenty-five years preclude conclusions common to all the transfers. With respect to origin, character, and effects, the transfers studied in this report can be grouped into three distinct categories:

A. Pre-1939 transfers: the Greek-Bulgarian (1919-1931) and Greek-Turkish (1923-1933) exchange of population.

B. Transfers of German folk groups during World War II (1939-1944).

C. Transfers of other than German minorities during World War II.

Conclusions with respect to these categories are presented below.

A. Pre-1939 Population Transfers

1. The Greek-Bulgarian Population Exchange. Although allegedly "optional" in character, the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange was in fact no more voluntary than the legally compulsory Greek-Turkish exchange of population. However, because it was voluntary at least in name, the former did not result in so thorough and final a sorting-out of the ethnic minorities as the latter. Nonetheless it was commonly but erroneously accepted that the exchange of minorities between Greece and Bulgaria was a final settlement.

Events have reversed the bases of these judgments. As soon as the occasion presented itself (after the collapse of Greek resistance in 1941) Bulgaria occupied Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace and made an attempt to reverse once more the ethnic structure of these provinces, which had been brought about by the implementation of the Neuilly Treaty. Bulgarians transferred under the Neuilly Treaty were again moved back to Greek Macedonia and Thrace.

2. The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange. The Greek-Turkish population exchange appeared relatively permanent and constructive. It seemed that it resulted in the final solution of the age-old conflict between Turkey and Greece. Until revived by the Greek left in 1945 Greece's ancient aspiration concerning Asia Minor and the reconquest of Constantinople had been abandoned. However, the balance of benefits and disadvantages of the population exchange were not equal for Greece and Turkey.

a. Greece. Greece appears in general to have profited on balance from the population exchange. The benefits may be summarized as follows:

i. Greece achieved a homogeneity of population which could have been effected in no other way. In 1920 the Greeks comprised 80.5 percent of the whole population of the Kingdom; by 1928 they comprised 93.7 percent. The

percentage of Turks decreased from 13.9 to 1.7 percent. Macedonia became truly Greek. In 1914, the Greek element had constituted only 42.6 percent of the total population; in 1926, the Greek ratio had risen to 88.8 percent. However, it must be stressed with regard to this particular case that the Moslem minority in Northern Greece was not a troublesome minority and that the two populations lived together in relative harmony.

ii. Greece profited considerably from the cadastral hydrographic, and geological surveys which had preceded the settlement operations. The reclamation of previously barren, poorly developed soils, as well as the introduction of modern farming methods, greatly improved the country's agriculture. From 1924-28, increase in wheat production was more than threefold, thanks to the labor of these new inhabitants. While Greece had formerly been dependent on imports for over three-fifths of its bread, by 1940 it imported less than one-third of its wheat requirements. In this way a yearly saving of approximately one billion 1940 French francs (\$20 million) in foreign exchange was brought about. All agricultural products followed more or less the same evolution. The establishment of cooperative marketing and credit schemes, the influx of new capital, and a large supply of cheap labor facilitated industrialization. By the end of 1925, some 400 new industrial undertakings had

been established. Production in the silk industry doubled.

The disadvantages of the population exchange may be summarized as follows:

(1) Before the exchange Greece was already overpopulated in terms of prevailing agricultural methods and organization. Even under the assumption of a considerably higher level of productivity, overpopulation would still obtain. Nor did Greek industry at that time offer opportunities for any great expansion of employment. Through the exchange, the Greek population increased by 22 percent. Greece became a country of acute population pressure, further aggravated by a continued high rate of natural increase. In particular, dangerous overurbanization and an undesirable expansion in the number of middlemen and small artisans resulted from the influx of refugees. The high rate of interest on foreign and domestic loans for settlement and general reconstruction work necessitated heavy taxes and Greece's external obligations proved to exceed the State's resources and was a factor contributing to the bankruptcy of 1932. On the other hand, it has been observed that indirect taxes paid each year by the resettlers more than offset the cost of loans subscribed by the Treasury in view of the installation of these same resettlers.

b. Turkey. As for Turkey, the results of the ex-

change have been favorably judged principally by those who gave primacy to a political point of view over all other considerations.

Economically the exchange resulted for Turkey in a serious loss. It has been even said that the exchange paralyzed its economic and financial life. The 379,913 Turkish repatriates from Greece could in no way fill the places of the Greeks driven from Asia Minor, not only because they were fewer in number (1,200,000 Greeks had left Turkey) but also because they were almost exclusively peasants. Their contribution to the commercial, industrial, and cultural life of Turkey was in no relation to that made by the transferred Greek population. It should be taken into consideration that in its population policy, Turkey markedly differs from Balkan countries, since, relatively speaking, it is underpopulated rather than overpopulated. Its total territory covers 767,119 square kilometers, almost equal to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hungary combined. According to the 1940 census Turkey had a population of 17,820,079 and a density of 23 per square kilometer in European Turkey. Asiatic Turkey was even more sparsely populated, with less than 20 to the square kilometer in 1935. This proved to be a serious handicap for the Turkish economy, particularly for industry. Many of the factories

and mines had difficulty in obtaining sufficient manpower. It has been observed that Turkey could triple its population before feeling any lack of land. Particularly acute was the problem of repopulation in Turkish Thrace. The Turkish Government decided in 1935 to settle there an additional 500,000 persons. From 1933 to 1940 about 172,000 Turks from Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia were settled there.

In an attempt to find a solution for this conflict between the political and economic approaches to the problem the Turkish newspaper Milliyet wrote on 20 October 1934: "Those who had studied the problem have found exchanges to be bad from a human viewpoint, economically disadvantageous, but politically indispensable. In our opinion, this question cannot be studied by subdividing it into various phases. No undertaking can be bad from a human viewpoint and good politics. An enterprise is either bad or good. To call it indispensable from a political viewpoint is to admit that it must be carried out at any cost. It may well be that opinion was divided as to whether the exchange had been decided upon at the proper moment, but the friendly character of the Greek-Turk relations since the Lausanne Treaty no longer leave any doubts as to the timeliness of the exchange."

B. Transfers of German Folk Groups During World War II
(1939-1944)

The transfers of eleven German folk groups from areas of Soviet interest (such as Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Volhynia, Galicia, the Narev river area, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Black Sea area) and from Italian territory (South Tyrol and the Kochevye area), are of a very special type and have been carried out under unusual conditions. The additional transfers of two German folk groups from Rumania (Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja) and the isolated minor transfer from the puppet state of Croatia were only incidental to this main transfer undertaking. It is difficult to generalize about these transfers because of their special character. The conclusions which may be advanced are:

1. Evacuation Procedure in the German Transfers

a. Formally and legally, the transfer of these German folk groups was carried out on a voluntary basis. It is true that the German groups affected were under strong moral and psychological pressure, which as a matter of fact left the great majority of the optants with only a doubtful freedom of choice. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate and unjustified to describe the evacuation as forced. Both from the legal point of view and in practice these minorities were given the right as well as the possibility to opt. The

best evidence of this lies in the fact that a substantial percentage of Baltic (21 percent) and South Tyrolese (30 percent) Germans did not opt in favor of return to Germany, preferring to remain where they had lived for generations.

In the areas of Soviet influence the majority of Volksdeutsche were moved to opt for Germany out of fear of impending bolshevization and on account of German propaganda, which, backed by success in the field, promised ample compensation and a future full of opportunities for all resettlers.

b. The purely technical and transport problems connected with the speedy removal of considerable masses of population over exceedingly short periods were successfully carried out by the Germans. The evacuation, by ship or rail, was accomplished without noteworthy accidents or interruption.

c. While the problem of evacuating persons belonging to the German minority was successfully met by the Reich, the same cannot be said with respect to property of folk groups transferred from the areas of Soviet influence. The provisions of the treaties concluded with the Baltic States and the Soviet Union entitled the evacuees to take along only very small cash amounts (\$10 to \$22) and all or a part of their furniture, livestock, and personal belongings. The remainder of their cash, their bank credits, and sums obtained

from the sale of property left behind were to be transferred on the basis of special clearing agreements between the Reich and the respective countries.

The appraisal of property left behind proved very unsatisfactory to the resettlers. Even attempts to transfer very limited amounts due to the Reich in accordance with the above-mentioned appraisal proved a failure. The Chief of the German Resettlement Staff for Bessarabia, Dr. Leonard Oberascher, a biased witness, to be sure, reported on the financial balance of the resettlement transaction in the following terms which might be applied to almost all other cases as well:

"The Reich received only a trifling sum for the whole property of the Bessarabian Germans, while it itself had fully compensated the German settlers for their entire property."

The 1939-1940 reports of the Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhandgesellschaft (DUT) vaguely mention small amounts received for property left behind in the Baltic States and in the South Tyrol. Subsequent reports are silent on the subject. While these are reports from an interested source, in the general circumstances they probably may be taken as substantially correct.

The provisions with regard to the settlement of

property accounts in the transfer treaties with Italy, Rumania, and Croatia were more favorable for the Reich. The financial results of these transactions have, however, not been revealed so far.

d. From the political viewpoint the evacuation of German folk groups considerably simplified and normalized the life of the countries they left by eliminating a minority which had been the source of continuing friction. The economic consequences of their evacuation from the Soviet-incorporated provinces can not be estimated, in view of war-time conditions and the simultaneous introduction of changes in the economic structure of these provinces. But in Latvia and Estonia, the sudden departure of a group as active and economically important as the Germans is said to have resulted in serious disturbances in the economic life of these two Baltic countries.

In Italy, Rumania, and the Croatian "state", the local population has profited economically to a limited extent from the transfer because the Germans in a number of cases relinquished advantageous economic positions.

2. Resettlement of the Transferred German Folk Groups.
German achievements in this respect resulted largely from the ruthless creation of circumstances favorable to resettlement. The German resettlers were brought to a country, from

which large sections of population were deported in order to make room for transferred Volksdeutsche. Their personal belongings, real estate, dwellings, and enterprises were given to the newcomers. The achievement of satisfactory settlement by such means certainly cannot be considered as typical.

With this substantial limitation the following conclusions may be drawn from the Reich's experience in colonizing evacuated German minorities in the incorporated Polish areas.

a. Despite the preceding and carefully scheduled mass deportations of the local Polish and Jewish population in order to make room for the arriving resettlers, their installation proved to be a very difficult, and above all, lengthy undertaking.

b. The only group among the resettlers settled quickly and without trouble were urban dwellers. This was due to two special factors:

i. Prior to the arrival of the first German transferees, German authorities in Polish cities in the incorporated area had eliminated tens of thousands of Polish and Jewish professional people and businessmen by deporting them, on a few hours notice, and turning over their jobs and possessions to the German newcomers.

ii. Among all resettled German minorities, only the Balts included a high percentage of professional people (physicians, lawyers, pharmacists, officials) and businessmen; the other transplanted groups were largely agricultural. The percentage of professional people and businessmen among the evacuated Germans other than the Balts was very small, and they were easily installed in the cities in the vacancies created by the expulsion of Poles and Jews in liberal and commercial professions.

iii. The settlement of peasants who constituted the overwhelming majority of the transferees, on the other hand, proceeded very slowly. In spite of a tremendous stock of confiscated Polish farms, careful planning, abundance and high quality of agricultural implements, and constant supervision by qualified agricultural consultants, the resettled German peasants in the incorporated Polish provinces met with serious difficulties in adjusting themselves to strange soil and climatic conditions. The trustee principle in the management of the allotted farms proved to be of questionable success; cases of mismanagement seem to have been frequent. The policies of the appointed administrators of the small farms were conservative or even backward.

③. Transfers of Other than German Minorities during World War II. Among wartime transfers other than those

involving German ethnic minorities, the most significant and interesting was the Bulgarian-Rumanian population exchange which followed the cession of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in 1940. Some 100,000 Rumanians left Southern Dobrudja in exchange for 63,000 Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja.

It seems that this settlement of a long-standing territorial and ethnic quarrel between Rumania and Bulgaria can be considered to be final. The armistice concluded on 13 September 1944 between Rumania and the Allied powers, which returned Transylvania "or the greater part thereof" annexed in 1940 by Hungary to Rumanian sovereignty, did not mention Southern Dobrudja. Dobrudja was also omitted in the Allied armistice with Bulgaria signed on 28 October 1944. In view of the fact that Russia and Great Britain recognized the Craiova Treaty in 1940, Bulgaria may retain the southern part of the Dobrudja and it is possible that minority conflicts in this area may no longer disturb the relations between Rumania and Bulgaria, as they have for many decades.

The exchange itself resulted in many hardships for the transferees because of the ruthless methods applied by both the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments, who wanted to get rid of as many members of the transferred minority as suited their plans. There were also considerable conflicts with respect to property problems which arose from the ex-

TRANSFERS OF POPULATION IN EUROPE SINCE 1920

I. INTRODUCTION

The present report examines various aspects of the numerous transfers of population which have taken place in Europe in the last 25 years. A transfer of population is here defined as the organized removal of an ethnic group from its country of residence and its resettlement in territory under the sovereignty of a nation regarded as the "ethnic homeland" of the group transferred.

Between 1920 and the present there have been thirty-two transfers of this character in Europe. Many of them have been carried out under the terms of treaties between the state of original residence and the state of reception; some have been covered in part by agreements between the states; and some few were not covered by any international pact.

The 20 European transfers occurring since 1920 which took place in accordance with international treaty are listed in Table 1 below; the 12 European transfers since 1920 which were only partly covered by agreement or took place without any formal understanding are listed in Table 2 immediately following Table 1. Some basic data with respect to the transfers are presented in the tables; discussion of the causes determining the transfers and of

the selection of transferees in the most significant cases is given in Section II. Section III concerns problems of the transfer of the property of the transferees, Section IV the machinery by which transfers have been effected, and Section V the resettlement of the transferred groups in the areas of reception.

Considerable use has been made throughout this report of materials from the European press, sources with clear potential bias. As far as possible, these sources have been dealt with critically; in a number of cases the attention of the reader has been called to specific bias in the materials quoted.

Table 1. POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE SINCE 1920 UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATY

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date of transfer</u>	<u>Minority group</u>	<u>Number of persons involved</u>
Turkey	Greece	1922-1923	Greeks in Turkey	1,200,000
Greece	Turkey	1922-1926	Turks in Greece	380,000
Greece	Bulgaria	1923-1928	Bulgarians in Greece	53,000
Bulgaria	Greece	1923-1928	Greeks in Bulgaria	30,000
Bulgaria	Rumania	1940	Rumanians in Southern Dobrudja	100,000
Rumania	Bulgaria	1940	Bulgarians in Northern Dobrudja	65,000
Hungary	Rumania	1940-1943	Rumanians in Northern Transylvania	220,000
Rumania	Hungary	1940-1942	Hungarians in Southern Transylvania	160,000
Rumania	Hungary (former Yugoslav Bachka)	1940	Szeklers from Hungarians from Moldavia	17,000
"Independent State of Croatia" (former Yugoslav area)	German-controlled Poland (General Government)	1942	Bosnian Germans	18,000
"Greater Germany" (former Yugoslav area)	Croatia	1943	Croats from Lower Styria (Steiermark)	6,000
Estonia	"Greater Germany"	Oct. 1939- Feb. 1940	Estonian Germans	13,000
Latvia	"Greater Germany"	Oct.-Dec. 1939	Latvian Germans	48,000
Italy	"Greater Germany"	1939-1941	Tyrol Germans	100,000 ^a

a. Estimate.

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Table 1 continued.

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date of transfer</u>	<u>Minority group</u>	<u>Number of persons involved</u>
USSR (former Polish areas)	"Greater Germany"	Dec. 1939- Feb. 1940	Germans in Volhynia, Galicia, Narev area	130,000
USSR (former Rumanian area)	"Greater Germany"	1940	Germans in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina	135,000
Rumania	"Greater Germany"	1940	Germans in Northern Dobrudja and Northern Bukovina	66,000
USSR-incor- porated Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia	"Greater Germany"	1941	Lithuanian Germans	68,000
USSR	"Greater Germany"	1941	Lithuanian Russians and from Memel and Suwalki region	21,000
Italy (former Yugoslav area)	"Greater Germany"	1941	Kochevye (Slovenia), Germans	15,000

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Table 2. POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE SINCE 1920 WITHOUT TREATY, OR PARTLY COVERED BY AGREEMENTS

<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Transfer covered partly by treaty</u>	<u>Date of transfer</u>	<u>Minority group</u>	<u>Number of persons involved</u>
Rumania	Turkey	yes	1934-1939	Turks in Rumania	80,000
Bulgaria	Turkey	yes	1935-1939	Turks in Bulgaria	72,000
Yugoslavia	Turkey	yes	1931-1938	Turks in Yugoslavia	11,000
USSR (former Finnish territories)	Finland	yes	1940	Finns from Karelia	400,000
USSR	Finland	yes	1943-1944	Ingermanlanders from occupied Northeastern USSR	65,000
Estonia	Sweden	yes	1940-1944	Estonian Swedes	7,000
German-controlled Poland (General Government)	"Greater Germany" (incorporated Poland)	no	1940	Lublin Germans	30,000
USSR	"Greater Germany" (incorporated Poland)	no	1944	Germans in Black Sea area	350,000
Rumania	"Greater Germany" (incorporated Poland)	no	1944	Germans in Transylvania	250,000
"Independent State of Croatia"	Hungary (former Yugoslav Bachka)	no	1942	Hungarians in Bosnia	1,400
Serbia	"Independent State of Croatia"	no	1941	Croats in Serbia and Macedonia	70,000
Bulgaria	Greece (Bulgarian-annexed Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace)	no	1942-1944	Bulgarians	122,000

II. CAUSES OF POPULATION TRANSFERS

A. Introduction

The system of population transfer prevailing since the first World War is directed to the same end as the more primitive, forced deportation measures which have occurred throughout history: to remove from a territory a group whose presence is undesirable. Formerly deportation aimed at the disintegration of the alien groups; since 1920 the principal rationale has been the reunion of groups who lived in scattered settlements with the nation to which they "belong" by virtue of "national" affinity.

It is true that the concept of "nationality" has, since the nineteenth century, intensified the links between minorities and their "ethnic homeland." It would be erroneous, however, to explain the population transfers of the last 25 years on this basis alone. Hundreds of millions of persons all over the world are members of ethnic minorities, and the number of those whose presence creates a serious problem may be numbered in millions. In spite of this, population transfers have been relatively few, and have been undertaken only in exceptional cases. It is therefore necessary to examine the specific causes which in each case have led to this action.

Three parties are involved in each transfer: the

prospective country of reception, the country of residence of the minority, and the minority group itself.

There may occasionally be a fourth party, when another country, through indirect pressure, is partly responsible for the transfer.

The following discussion of the causes of population transfers treats together the agreements concluded by Germany for the transfer of German minorities abroad, because of a prevalence of common features. The transfer of other minorities will be considered case by case. The causes of a number of transfers listed in Tables 1 and 2 above are not discussed below because of their unilateral character or provisional nature.

B. Non-German Transfer Agreements

1. The Political Climate of Population Transfers in the Balkans. In the Balkans, more than in any other part of Europe, there exists an intermixture of ethnic groups. As a rule, population transfers have been dictated by powers which have achieved control of contested territories and wanted to clear them of specific ethnic groups in order to strengthen a political or territorial claim. The Dobrudja agreement may be considered as the only one seeking to solve the problems of a minority.

Embittered nationalistic sentiments, which in numerous

cases dictated the removal of minorities, have been strengthened by population pressure, overpopulation being a real problem in most of the countries which were involved in the transfers considered below. The only exception is Turkey which was willing to receive a certain number of Turkish immigrants from other countries.

2. The Greek-Turkish Transfer. The agreement concluded between the Greek and Turkish Governments on 30 January 1923 at Lausanne concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish nationals was in the main the legalization of a fait accompli. Over one million Greek refugees had fled to Greece during the Turkish-Greek conflict. Turkey categorically refused to permit their repatriation. Its stand had been accepted at Lausanne.¹ The Greek refugees were forced to remain in Greece. In order to effectuate their resettlement, vast areas of cultivated or cultivable land had to be made available. Greece did not have sufficient land reserves, and the Greek Government therefore suggested the compulsory transfer of the Moslem minority in Greek Macedonia and Epirus to Turkey, as a partial alleviation. This compulsory principle was then extended to the remnants of the Greek population in Turkish Asia Minor. After the conclusion of the Lausanne agreement, 189,916 additional Greeks were transferred to

1. Eddy, Charles B., Greece and the Greek Refugees, London, 1931.

Greece as a counterpart of the 379,913 Moslems evacuated to Turkey.¹

3. The Turkish Repatriation Policy. Unlike its Balkan neighbors, Turkey was not faced with the problem of overpopulation. Instead, the removal of some 1,300,000 Greeks had resulted in underpopulation, while Turkey's economic improvements and industrialization had opened vast employment possibilities. Thus Turkey was in a position to absorb large masses of immigrants. It has even been estimated that Turkey could treble its present population without congestion.² In the years preceding the war, many Turkish factories and mines had difficulty in obtaining sufficient labor.³

But Turkey made it a point to select its immigrants carefully and to limit immigration on the basis of its financial strength. The influx was to be gradual and the settlers were to be Turkish. Numerous Turkish groups were scattered throughout the Balkans, where they were generally in an underprivileged position. These people were desirable immigrants; unlikely to create maladjustments or minority problems.

With a view to the gradual repatriation of Turkish

1. The Turkish Ministry of Hygiene and Social Assistance gave the number as 379,913. Webster, Donald Everest, The Turkey of Ataturk, Philadelphia, 1939.

2. Jackh, Ernest. The Rising Crescent. New York 1944, p. 167.

3. La Turquie Contemporaine, Direction generale de la presse, Ankara, 1935, pp. 330-331. Southeastern Europe. A Political and Economic Survey. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1939, p. 179.

minorities in the Balkans, Turkey signed a series of agreements with the Governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. All agreements provided for small yearly quotas of Turkish immigrants; they were concluded for a period of from 6 to 10 years.¹

The Turks residing in these countries welcomed the opportunity to return to their homeland because of its increasing prosperity. And the pressure on Turks abroad was considerable; the Rumanian land reform of 1924 had resulted in the confiscation of 100,000 hectares of Turkish land in the Dobrudja.² In Bulgaria, the general resentment against minorities had not spared the Turks. Such strong administrative pressure was exerted on the Turkish group that a spontaneous mass evacuation began in 1934. In 1935, 24,968 Turks fled from Bulgaria to Turkey³, a chaotic influx which interfered with the Turkish immigration scheme and hastened the conclusion of the planned transfer agreements. In fact, had it not been for Turkey's desire to limit the number of immigrants in accordance with its fiscal policy, hundreds of thousands of Turkish immigrants would gladly have settled in Turkey. Altogether, only 172,000 Turks were transferred to Turkey between 1935 and 1940.⁴ No

1. Schischkoff, Peter, and Wilsdorf, Heinz: Die Zwischenstaatliche Lösung der Türkiswanderung. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, September 1938.

2. von Stenati, T., Umsiedlungen auf dem Balkan und in Kleinasien, Nation und Staat, June 1940.

3. Istatistik Yilligin 1937-38, X, 89.

4. Geographical Handbook Series, NID, Turkey, Vol. II March 1943.

later data are available.

4. The Bulgarian-Greek Transfer. At the request of the Greek Government the Neuilly Convention provided for a voluntary exchange of population between Bulgaria and Greece. But so long as the respective governments exerted no pressure on the minority, the number of persons who registered for transfer was extremely low: only 197 Greek families and 106 Bulgarian families applied for transfer in the first six months of 1923.¹ Greece, which had just suffered a defeat at the hands of the Turks and was badly in need of space for the resettlement of its refugees, then began to apply pressure upon its weaker neighbor, Bulgaria. Early in 1923, 1,500 to 2,000 Bulgarian families were deported to the Greek islands and Thessaly "for military reasons." And when the Greek refugees from Central and Eastern Macedonia streamed into Greece proper, they were allotted the lands and placed in the homes of the local population, especially those of the Bulgarian minority.² The necessary stimulus to expatriation was thereby given. Within two months, over 600 Bulgarian families applied for transfer from Greece to Bulgaria.

Similar pressure was exerted upon the Greek minority in Bulgaria; Bulgarian "resettlers" forced to leave Greece, on

1. Ladas, Stephen B., The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. New York, 1932.

2. Ladas, op. cit.

their arrival in Bulgaria overran the villages inhabited by the Greek minorities there and in turn compelled them to leave. The transfer was thus merely a disguised form of expulsion. The Greeks wanted room and threw out as much of the Bulgarian minority as possible and the Bulgarians in turn threw out the Greeks. Only the transfer of Greeks from Bulgaria, however, can be considered as complete. In Greece, some 60 percent of the Bulgarian minority remained, mostly in regions far from the Greek-Bulgarian border. Altogether, the net balance has been in favor of Greece, most of the Greeks (46,000 out of some 57,000) left Bulgaria, but the transferred Bulgarians numbered 53,000.¹ No ethnical delimitation was achieved.

5. The Bulgarian-Rumanian Treaty. In 1940, strengthened by German support, Bulgaria was in a position to play power politics. With respect to Greece, the warfare was to become open; with respect to Rumania, a "peaceful" treaty revision was undertaken, accompanied by a compulsory population exchange. According to the Craiova Treaty of 7 September 1940, Southern Dobrudja, ceded to Rumania at the beginning of the second Balkan War (1913) was returned to Bulgaria. The Rumanian population of Southern Dobrudja was to leave this area; in exchange, Bulgarians in Northern Dobrudja, which remained a Rumanian province, were also to be transferred.²

1. Ladas, op. cit.

2. Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, November 1940.

The Dobrudja settlement, while an instance of the Balkan practice of power politics, was on the whole in line with the interests of both countries, since it put an end to minority claims in this region. The agreement was dictated primarily by political considerations. Through the elimination of the Rumanian element, Bulgaria hoped to consolidate its position in Southern Dobrudja. And Rumania in turn was anxious to eliminate future Bulgarian claims on Northern Dobrudja.

Both countries sought to minimize the influx of their respective "ethnic nationalities". The net balance of the transfer proved to be beneficial to Bulgaria, which suffered from agrarian over-population: in exchange for 63,500 Bulgarians who left Northern Dobrudja,¹ some 110,000 Rumanians left the southern part of the province.² Since the exchange was compulsory, the population had little occasion to manifest its desires, but in fact, the transfer agreement was a welcome event. The Bulgarians who left Northern Dobrudja were mostly resettled in the newly acquired southern part, where they took the places of the more numerous evacuated Rumanians; their position was therefore a favorable one.³ Furthermore, the transfer involved a move of

1. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 8.

2. Wirtschaftsdienst, 3 January 1941.

3. Südost Echo, 1941, No. 6. Also Wirtschaft und Statistik, Vol. 21, 1941.

only a short distance and did not require a complete readaptation of the population.

The Rumanians, for their part, were glad to leave Southern Dobrudja, since they had feared a change in its political status. Most of the Rumanian settlers had entered the Dobrudja only in 1918, after its cession to Rumania, and had behaved as conquerors at the expense of the local population.¹ Many of them did not wait for the Bulgars to regain official rule of the country, but fled when they heard of the impending frontier revision.²

6. Population Transfers in Transylvania. Transylvania had been given to Rumania, under the Treaty of Trianon, at the end of World War I over the protest of the Hungarian Government. Like Bulgaria, Hungary undertook a treaty revision in 1940 with Axis protection. The Vienna Award of 30 August 1940 gave the northern part of Transylvania to Hungary.

Once again, a population exchange was stipulated in the agreement. Rumanians were able to leave Northern Transylvania which had been added to Hungary; Hungarians could be transferred from Southern Transylvania, which remained Rumanian. But unlike the Dobrudja transfer this was to be a voluntary exchange. In fact, neither govern-

1. Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, New York, 1943.

2. Wirtschaftsdienst, 3 January 1941.

ment had made arrangements for encouraging and assisting emigrants. The reason for this attitude may be that, according to Rumanian statistics, there were 1,804,894 Rumanians in the ceded part of Transylvania,¹ while 464,422 Hungarians lived in Southern Transylvania, and that neither party considered this territorial settlement as final. Hungary was anxious to maintain its claims to Southern Transylvania based on the continued existence of a large Hungarian population there; for similar reasons Rumania was reluctant to withdraw Rumanians from Northern Transylvania. Furthermore, Rumania had neither space nor funds for a large resettlement scheme. An unforeseen event, however, disturbed this status quo. Some Hungarians from Southern Transylvania decided to move to the northern (now Hungarian) part of the province, but the Hungarian Government was greatly displeased because of their future value as a basis for territorial claims, and attempted to send them back. The Rumanian Government, however, refused them re-entry, claiming that they had left of their own will. Hungary then retaliated against the Rumanians in Northern Transylvania, and deported hundreds of thousands

1. Rumanian Census of 1930. Manuila, Dr. Sabin, Aspects Demographiques de la Transylvanie, Bucharest, 1938. Clark, Charles Upson, Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, New York, 1941. According to Clark, "An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics list 978,074 or 37.1 percent Hungarians, and 1,304,903 or 50.2 percent Rumanians in the ceded territory."

of them, some in sealed cattle cars which were sent across the Rumanian border at Bekes-Csaba and Curtici (Kurtics).¹ Hungary claimed that 160,000 Hungarians had left Southern Transylvania,² while the Rumanian General Commissariat for the refugees from Northern Transylvania reported an influx totalling 218,977 Rumanian refugees,³ registered by the end of 1943.

What actually happened was not a population exchange, but a chaotic shifting of migrants, who had become pawns in the Balkan power game. The question is not yet closed. The armistic between Rumania and the Allies contains a clause granting the return of "Transylvania (or the greater part thereof)" to Rumania "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement."

7. Finnish Groups Evacuated to Finland. Since 1940, Finland proper has received two large groups of evacuees. The first group came only as a result of war: it consisted of refugees from Karelia, ceded to the Soviet Union. A large part of the Karelian population had fled during the first Finnish-Soviet war (the so-called Winter War) to Finland proper.

The Soviet authorities had given the Karelians the

1. Nation und Staat, December 1940.

2. Statement of the Hungarian Foreign Office, given to the Budapest correspondent of the International Labour Office.

3. Universul, 9 January 1944.

right to leave for Finland after the first armistice in 1940, but had not urged their evacuation. However, practically the entire population (420,000 persons) left.¹ Strong opposition to the Soviet regime was a powerful factor, together with the knowledge that Finland's government would assist them in their settlement. In 1943, when Finland reconquered Karelia, some of the evacuated Finns returned, but in 1944, after the new defeat, some 250,000 fled once more.²

Simultaneously, Finland received another large group of people of Finnish stock. Some of the Ingermanlanders, (or Ingris) who had settled in the Leningrad area, were transferred to Finland with the consent of the German authorities during the German occupation of Northeastern Russia. The Ingris welcomed this transfer arrangement. Ever since the Russian Revolution, they had been opposed to the new regime, and thousands had emigrated. Their resistance to collectivization had resulted in large-scale deportations between 1928 and 1936.³

The Finnish Government had promoted their return because of the acute labor shortage. However, the Germans had combed out the most valuable manpower. The returning

1. R&A Report No. 2665, Population Shifts in Finnish Karelia.

2. R&A Report No. 2665.

3. Stamati, T. V. Über die Finnen Ingermanlands, Nation und Staat, September 1936.

Ingri group was largely composed of women, children, and older people,¹ whose employment was mainly confined to agriculture.²

C. The Transfer to the Reich of German Minorities Abroad

The following transfers of German minorities are analyzed below: those from South Tyrol, from the Baltic States, from the Polish provinces incorporated by the Soviet Union after the partition of Poland in 1939, from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, from the Kochevye area of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, and from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja.

1. The Reasons for Transfers given by the German Government. The official German explanation of this "repatriation" of Germans abroad has been repeatedly stated, both in Nazi publications and in speeches of Nazi leaders.

The Führer himself, in a speech delivered before the Reichstag on 6 October 1939, discussing the German-Soviet agreement concerning the partition of Poland, made the following statement:

"The most important task, however, is to establish a new order of ethnographical conditions, that is to say, resettlement of nationalities in such a manner that the

1. Maasedun Tulevaisuus, 1 July 1943.

2. Nya Dagligt Allchanda, 21 October 1943.

process ultimately results in the obtaining of better dividing lines than is the case at present. In this sense, however, it is not a case of the problem being restricted to this particular sphere, but of a task with far wider implications, for the East and South of Europe are to a large extent filled with splinters of the German nationality, whose existence they cannot maintain.

"In their very existence lies the reason and cause for continual international disturbances....

"It is therefore essential for a far-sighted ordering of the life of Europe that a resettlement should be undertaken here so as to remove at least part of the material for European conflict."

Developing this theme, German propaganda repeatedly stressed the "common blood which shall not be separated by arbitrary frontiers"¹ and asserted the existence abroad of "lost brothers" who wished to participate in the great fate of the fatherland. These "splinters of German nationality" were said to be suffering a miserable fate. Emphasis was put, however, on their cultural rather than economic misery; the latter would have been difficult to prove in most cases. The Germans were said to be too highly civilized to undergo

¹ I. Krieg, H., Zeitschrift fuer Politik, January-February 1940. The author claims to formulate in these words "the ideas repeatedly expressed by the Führer."

assimilation and therefore to be in a most unfortunate position.

The Germans resorted to this line only when a transfer had been decided upon for specific reasons. The thesis was never applied to German minorities whose transfer had not become opportune, i.e., those in Transylvania, Banat, Slovakia, etc. Moreover, the Germans did not hesitate later in the war to encourage the dispersion of the German people: for example, new "Germanic" colonists were sent to the General Government.

Numerous explanations have been advanced as to the true reasons for the German repatriation policy, such as the desire for colonization and Germanization of the newly incorporated territories of Western Poland, manpower shortages, and even financial considerations. However important these factors may have been, probably the main reason for the transfer of Germans from abroad was that hinted at by Hitler in his October 1939 speech when he referred to the existence of minorities abroad as the source of "continual international disturbances." It is likely that he had in mind the necessity of minimizing possible sources of friction then existing between Germany and the Soviet Union and Germany and Italy.

In the case of Italy, the presence of the Tyrolese

on the Brenner frontier threatened to disturb the good relations between the German and Italian Governments. German territorial claims regarding the South Tyrol were subordinated to the need for that "natural alliance with Italy, by which alone Germany can become strong." Hitler had written in Mein Kampf that "to jeopardize this aim for the sake of these 200,000 Germans would be a crime."¹ When, on the eve of war, Mussolini raised the question of the removal of the Tyrol Germans, Hitler was in no position to refuse Italy's suggestions, for the Third Reich needed urgently to maintain Axis solidarity.

The bulk of the German agreements for population transfers were those made with respect to territories which in 1939 came within the area of Soviet influence. Eastern Poland and the Baltic States had large German minorities and Hitler was faced with the choice of abandonment of the pretext of protecting the Volksdeutsche, or of interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and thereby risking conflict at an inopportune moment. The German government chose to attempt the transfer to Germany of Germans in Soviet areas. The reasons for this decision were later given by Ribbentrop in his speech of 22 June 1941 on the day after the German attack on the Soviet Union:

1. Mein Kampf, 1927 edition, p. 711.

"Further, in order to eliminate as far as possible any divergence between the two States from the very outset, the Reich Government set to work on a large-scale resettlement scheme, whereby all Germans in areas occupied by the USSR were brought back to Germany. The Reich Government felt that more convincing proof of their desire to come to a lasting peace with the USSR could scarcely be given."

The declaration made by the Führer himself on the same day hints that there was direct Soviet pressure for the transfer:

"The consequences of this German-Soviet treaty... were very severe, particularly for Germans living abroad. More than 500,000 Germans, men and women, all small farmers, and artisans and workmen, were forced to leave their former homeland practically overnight."

The Reich was undoubtedly anxious to promote the survival of the Volksdeutsche everywhere, but it tried to achieve this purpose in ways which differed according to the specific situation of various groups. The Germans weighed the importance of a resident Volksgruppe as a potential weapon of the Reich's foreign policy against other considerations. Where it appeared possible, the group was expected to stay as an outpost of Germanism. But when a Volksgruppe showed signs of faltering, and disintegration impended, it

was transferred to an area where its ethnic character could be preserved and where, at the same time, it could be utilized for German national aims. Such groups were sent either to the annexed areas which were to be Germanized by German colonists, or to conquered territories (in particular in the General Government), to help perpetuate German domination.

Accordingly, in Rumania, and the puppet "Independent State of Croatia", where the Germans did not act under diplomatic pressure, only the smaller and least organized settlements were transferred, while large, and self-conscious groups were maintained in these countries. With regard to Southern Bukovina, where the German settlement was fairly large, the above considerations may have influenced the German decision, as may also the presence of the Soviet Union in the neighboring Northern Bukovina.

2. Government Attitude in the Countries of Residence of German Minorities.

a. Italy. The transfer of the Tyrol Germans was a part of Italian policy, both because it would eliminate a potential German territorial claim and because it would increase opportunities for Italian immigration into this region.

The Tyrol problem had been under discussion for many

years. According to the Survey of International Affairs for 1927 published by the London Royal Institute of International Affairs, it appeared as early as 1923 "as though the policy of Italianizing the South Tyrol would be superseded by the more ruthless policy of expatriating the Germans in order to fill their places with Italian settlers." In 1939, Mussolini undertook to carry out the plan of removing the Germans from the Tyrol, by a transfer agreement with Germany.

In the Kochevye area of the Ljubljana district of Slovenia, annexed by Italy after the defeat of Yugoslavia in 1941, the German Volksgruppe also seemed to be an obstacle to Italianization and to limit the possibilities of colonizing. Once more, the removal of alien groups served both a political and an economic end.

b. The Soviet Union. The Soviet attitude was apparently based on strategic and political considerations. Its first aim was the elimination of a potential fifth column in border areas. The Soviet Union did not request the removal of German groups in the interior of Russia, far from the borders. But at the same time, in view of the anti-communist attitude of the Germans in the annexed territories -- a landed group with an "upper class" outlook -- the Soviet Government apparently felt that regardless of their real financial status, drastic measures would disturb Soviet-

German relations.

c. Latvia and Estonia. Agreements with both of these countries were concluded according to the wishes of the Soviet Union. The Governments of Estonia and Latvia had little to say in the whole matter, but the agreements were apparently welcome to both countries. In a speech delivered on 29 November 1939 before the Latvian Chamber of Commerce, the President, A. Berzins, declared:

"The joint residence in the same areas of the Germans and the Letts has never been a purely internal political question; therefore, we must welcome a clear solution to this problem."¹

d. Rumania. As a German satellite, Rumania could hardly have objected to the German request for transfer. The Rumanian Government may also have been gratified by the departure of some of the Volksdeutsche, many of whom had become extremely arrogant since Rumania had been reduced to the status of a German satellite; the Rumanian Government had even been forced to confer a special legal status on the German minority. It should be remembered, however, that the majority of the Germans in Rumania were not transferred.

e. "Independent State of Croatia". As in the case of Rumania, only a small fraction of the German minority in
1. Frankfurter Zeitung, 3 December 1939.

satellite Croatia was involved in the transfer; 90 percent of the Volksgruppe remained. The Croat "government" apparently had no objection to the removal of this insignificant group.

3. The Attitude of the Transferred Minority Groups. The great majority of the Volksdeutsche appear to have accepted the transfer offer, despite their strong attachment to countries where they had been settled for many generations, in some cases even for centuries.

Numerous reports show that fear of deportation and of economic disaster dominated the outlook of the Volksdeutsche. When the element of fear was not strong, the percentage of persons who enlisted for the transfer fell abruptly. This is clearly demonstrated by what happened in South Tyrol. Rumors were widely circulated that the Italian authorities intended to deport to other parts of Italy or even to the colonies those Volksdeutsche who would not opt for Germany in 1939. The number of those who opted in favor of Germany was then high, although not overwhelming (185,365 out of 266,985).¹ But when it became clear, as time went by, that the Italian threat of deportation would not materialize, the number of actual departures dropped from month to month. Up to June 1942, only about two-fifths

1. Hamburger Monatshefte, 1940, p. 32.

of those who had opted for Germany had gone, and there are no indications of further departures.

In territories in the Soviet sphere of influence, fear of sovietization with its political, economic, and social consequences was an even more compelling motive for a precipitate exodus of Volksdeutsche.

In general, the German settlers in Central and Eastern Europe were more prosperous than their non-German neighbors. In some cases, both for economic or for allegedly cultural reasons, they considered themselves part of the elite, members of an "upper stratum" which would have everything to lose under Soviet rule. In other cases, they belonged, according to Soviet terminology, to the class of Kulaks who in the USSR itself had been subjected to particularly drastic methods of collectivization. The strong influence of fear of sovietization is demonstrated by the attempt of a mass of non-Germans to escape under the false pretense of belonging to the Volksgruppe. Their number was particularly great in cases where fear was prompted not merely by expectations of a Soviet occupation, but by actual incorporation into the Soviet Union.

In certain cases, the fear of Russia was increased by local factors, as in Bessarabia, where the Germans opted 100 percent in favor of a removal to Germany. They were afraid of the arrival of Soviet troops, not only because of

impending collectivization, but also because the local population had its own grievances to settle with them. For example, in September 1925, in the region of the village of Tatarbunary, the local German settlers, together with the Rumanian police, Army, and Marines, took an active part in the crushing of a communist-inspired peasant revolt. Soviet sources assert that the village of Tatarbunary and a number of neighboring villages were entirely burned down; more than a thousand peasants were "killed in the fighting and murdered in captivity" while over 500 participants were turned over to a military court in October 1925.¹ This incident was widely publicized and aroused great hatred against the German colonists.

A number of additional factors should also be mentioned. Local conditions, which varied from area to area, in many cases favored emigration long before the question of transfers had become acute.

This was most pronounced in Latvia and Estonia. The privileged position of the Baltic Germans, former conquerors of these countries, endured up to the end of the first World War. Their domination was essentially of an economic nature. Although they were only a minor fraction of the

1. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedya, Vol. VI, p. 31; Kritzmann, L. Boyarskaya Rumynia vo vlasty Gitlera; Moscow 1941, p. 22.

population (7 percent toward the end of the nineteenth century), they had owned a disproportionate part of the land (some 40 percent), and in their relationships with the native Baltic population, had practically maintained a feudal society. However, a decline set in as early as the 1880's.

Before the first World War, the numbers of Germans living in Latvia and Estonia decreased annually. This was due both to a falling birth rate and to a migration to inner Russia as well as to Germany. At the end of the first World War, after the failure of the Germans to exploit the confused Baltic situation, German soldiers were evacuated from the Baltic area to Germany. They were followed by 25,000 German refugees from the Baltic countries. About 5,000 returned later.¹ From then on there was a decline in the numbers of Germans in the Baltic states: Germans in Latvia fell from 70,964 in 1925 to 69,855 in 1930 and to 62,144 in 1935; Germans in Estonia decreased from 18,319 in 1922 to 16,346 in 1934.² A falling birthrate accounts only partly for this drop; there

1. German Minorities in Europe, The Bulletin of International News, 9 March 1940, p. 281. International Migrations. Edited on behalf of the National Bureau of Economic Research by Walter F. Willcox, Vol. II, New York, 1931, p.321.
2. The Baltic States. Prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1938, pp. 33,36.

seems also to have been a discernible migratory trend.

The Baltic Germans were unwilling to accept the change in their status which resulted from post-war agrarian reforms in the Baltic countries and from the cultural and political development of the emancipated Baltic peoples. What was to them the menace of Russian annexation further precipitated the slow but constant process of emigration.

During the years between 1918 and 1939 there had also been a trend toward emigration in the Polish provinces incorporated by the Soviet Union in 1939. In Volhynia, the prosperity of the once wealthy German minority had considerably declined as a result of the first World War and of Polish agrarian reform. During the war, the Russians had deported the German element from this theater of operations. When the Germans returned after 1918, they found 70 percent of their houses destroyed. Many were disinclined to rebuild and left for Germany with the retreating German armies; some 30,000 Volhynian Germans settled in East Prussia. Those who remained in Volhynia were caught in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, which took place mainly in that region. The size of the German community was diminished by the subsequent partition of Volhynia between the Soviet Union and Poland.

During the World War and the exile of the Volks-
deutsche, the local population settled in villages formerly
purely German, which resulted in rivalry between the
returned Germans and new Polish and Czech settlers. Polish
legislation, enacted after the war, deprived many Germans
of lands leased to them by the state. The Germans thus
developed a general feeling of insecurity which led to
further emigration.

In Galicia, a decline of the German position had
occurred as far back as 1867 when the autonomy conferred
upon Galicia gave virtual hegemony to the Polish population.
Many Galician Germans left the country at the beginning of
the twentieth century when the German Government under
William II called for the colonization and Germanization
of the West Prussian and Poznan provinces; others went over-
seas, especially to Canada and South America. The position
of this minority was reported as precarious in the German
press at frequent intervals. Six months before the 1939
evacuation, the "plight of the Germans in Galicia" was
thus described from the German point of view by Heinz Heckel:¹

"The economic situation of the Germans in Galicia
becomes worse every year. Peasants of the new generation
have little chance of finding employment outside their own

1. Deutsche Arbeit, June 1939, p. 267.

villages. Emigration possibilities are all closed. Whoever calls himself German cannot obtain a state job. New land cannot be acquired. German artisans -- wherever they still exist -- are unable to accept apprentices. Patrimony must be divided for new families. A series of minute landholdings is being created and a peasant proletariat, so characteristic of Poland, is springing up in German villages."

In the case of Northern Bukovina, annexed by the USSR from Rumania, the German inhabitants were mainly city-dwellers (only 25 percent were engaged in agriculture, and of those, 45 percent owned less than 1.25 acres). Many were of the professional and administrative class; some 17 percent were civil servants. Consequently, their position had been considerably weakened after the first World War, when the province, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, was turned over to Rumania. Limited economic opportunities had emphasized in the minds of the Volksdeutsche the advantages of emigration.

In Northern Dobrudja, the German minority was of relatively recent origin. Most of them had come from Bessarabia. They had never been rooted strongly in this region and for many years had manifested a desire for further migration. In addition to the fact that their birth-rate was high, they were prohibited by Rumanian law (as

foreigners) the acquisition of land and also strictly limited in their choice of occupations. In 1938, Nation und Staat reported that a real "emigration fever" raged among the Dobrudja Germans. A plan for mass exodus to the Sudeten area, which was at that time still a Czechoslovak province, gained much popularity among the Volksgruppe, as did other proposals.¹

It is true that the Volksdeutsche have always been very conscious of their origin and have seldom become assimilated. This attitude had been encouraged by the German Governments, long before the Third Reich. But it was greatly intensified after 1933. The Volksdeutsche settlements were consistently under propaganda pressure, stressing Germanness and Nazi ideology, and appealing in particular to the younger generation. Furthermore, at the time, Germany was at the height of its power. First, unresisted territorial annexations, and then military victories contributed to the exaltation of the fatherland, and appealed to the migrants, who were offered both economic and social security. Financial arrangements were such that the loss to the evacuees was minimized; in fact, resettlement often proved profitable, for the Reich distributed to the migrants the farms and property of natives

1. Auswanderungsfieber unter den Dobrudjadeutschen, Nation und Staat, May 1939, p. 539.

whom they expelled. In the Warthogau, where the great majority of them were settled, German farms were created by putting together two to five small Polish holdings.¹

The German promises to the Baltic Germans had been sweeping and the first resettlers were also well satisfied with their new homes.² In Slovenia, where the Kochevye Germans were resettled, three homesteads of expelled Slovenes were combined to make one German farm which comprised 15 hectares of tilled soil, a forest, and a vineyard.³

D. Freedom of Choice in Transfers.

Most of the major transfer agreements contained option clauses. The members of the minority were free to determine whether or not they wished to avail themselves of the transfer privileges. The only compulsory transfers besides the unilateral wartime shifts were those agreed upon between Turkey and Greece in 1923 and between Bulgaria and Rumania in 1940. However, in the "voluntary" transfers the persons involved were for the most part subjected to such pressure that it is hardly appropriate to speak of self-determination. Thus the distinction between "voluntary" and "compulsory" transfers is largely theoretical.

The Greek-Turkish agreement of 1923 contained a

1. Munchener Neueste Nachrichten, 7 October 1943.

2. Rigasche Zeitung, 9 December 1939.

3. Furlan, Boris, Fighting Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Information Center.

compulsory transfer clause. This arrangement was effected only with lengthy and often bitter negotiations. In view of the extremely strained situation, compulsion seemed the only way of speedily removing those Greeks in Turkey who had not fled during the war and whose lives were still in danger. Furthermore, a compulsory evacuation of the Turks from Greece was necessary because of the Greek resettlement problem.

The only other compulsory exchange took place in Dobrudja between Rumania and Bulgaria, apparently because both countries were anxious to eliminate all traces of alien influence in their respective parts of the Dobrudja.

As to the nominally voluntary transfers, there was very little response on the part of the minorities involved so long as no strong pressure, direct or indirect, was exerted. This was true in the case of the Greek-Bulgarian agreement (see pp. 11-12). Furthermore, when the pressure is diminished, the number of actual transferees drops, as was the case in South Tyrol (see p. 76 ff).

E. Persons Subject to Transfer

In general, two factors combined to determine the selection of transferees:

1. The area affected by the transfer (a whole country, a province, or a smaller administrative division), and

2. The ethnic criterion.

1. Areas Affected by the Transfers. In general the Volksdeutsche were transferred from specific areas, usually provinces, which had large German settlements, rather than from entire countries. Only persons living in the designated provinces were eligible for transfer and were entitled to the option and to the benefits offered by the Reich with respect to transportation and financial assistance.

Population transfers resulting from boundary changes are largely confined to the areas affected by the boundary alteration. For example, this was the case in the Dobruđja, and also in Transylvania.

2. The "Ethnic-national" Criterion for Prospective Transferees. The German-Estonian protocol of 15 October 1939, which contained all the details pertaining to the transfer agreement, seemingly defined with precision the persons affected. They were the persons who had been carried in the register (cadastre) which the Volksgruppe in Estonia maintained and which contained the names of those Germans who wished to avail themselves of the cultural autonomy to which they were entitled under the Estonian Constitution. However, since a number of Estonian Germans had never laid formal claim to this autonomy, the register did not carry all Volksdeutsche. The Estonian Ministry of the Interior

had been authorized to deliver certificates of German nationality upon application to persons whose names did not appear on the register. No rules were laid down to guide the Ministry in issuing or refusing these certificates.

In Latvia the situation was somewhat different because no cadastre of the Volksgruppe had been maintained. In the German-Latvian treaty, the Legation of the Reich at Riga was judge of the ethnic status of the persons of Latvian citizenship who claimed German nationality without sufficient documentary proof. On the other hand, an applicant could directly approach the Latvian authorities and establish his German nationality by submitting documentary proof; often a permit for resettlement issued by the German Legation.

In Lithuania, where negotiations took place between the Soviet authorities and the Germans, German nationality was still more readily established; documents, relationship to persons living in Germany, even past resident as a student were sufficient to entitle a person to "repatriation."

With respect to the Volksdeutsche in the Tyrol, the definition of criteria to determine optants was simpler because of the recent incorporation of this province by Italy. It was stated that those German-speaking inhabitants of South Tyrol who had been subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the annexation of South Tyrol to the Kingdom

of Italy, and who had become Italian by virtue of the annexation, were entitled to repatriation.¹

In the Soviet-annexed parts of Poland and Rumania, the Russians required little proof of German ethnic nationality. Applications were automatically approved on registration with the Reich resettlement authorities (Umsiedlungs-Kommando). Again, the Germans were in no way particular about the kind of proof or its authenticity. This resulted in the transfer of a certain number of non-Germans, opposed to the Soviets, especially in Galicia.²

The agreement concerning the exchange of the Turkish-Greek population gave the following definition of persons subject to transfer: "Turkish nationals of the Greek orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory." It was generally felt that the religious criterion was the safest one, since in general both minorities had adhered to their respective religious faiths. However, as might be expected, a number of controversial issues resulted from this definition.³ In view of the compulsory character of the exchange, the question of whether or not a

1. Seton-Watson, R.W., From Munich to Danzig, London, 1939, pp. 264-5.

2. Gradman, Dr. W., Die Umgesiedelten Deutschen Volksgruppen, Zeitschrift für Politik, May 1940.

3. Ladas, op. cit.

person was subject to exchange arose only with respect to persons who refused to leave and those who asserted that they had not been properly included in the exchange. The mixed commission, which had been set up for the organization and regulation of the exchange comprised Greek, Turkish, and neutral members and was sole judge of the validity of these claims.¹

No data are available on the criteria applied in transferring Germans from Northern Dobrudja and Southern Bukovina.

In the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange of 1919-1930, the definition of the persons eligible for transfer was laid down as follows:

1. The persons had to be citizens of the country from which they emigrated.
2. They had to belong to the Greek or Bulgarian racial, religious, or linguistic minority.

This second condition was interpreted to mean that any one of the three criteria of race, religion, or language might justify a claim under the Greek-Bulgarian Convention. Furthermore, it was decided that whenever there was a doubt as to whether a person was akin by his race, religion, or language to the people of a country, the Commission or its

1. Ladas, op. cit.

agents should resolve the doubt in favor of the person in question.¹ According to Ladas, these criteria were extremely hard to apply.

In the compulsory Bulgarian-Rumanian exchange of 1940, the treaty had not specified the classes of persons subject to exchange except as "Bulgarians of the Northern Dobrudja districts of Tulcea and Constanza," and "Rumanians of the Southern Dobrudja districts of Durostor and Caliacra." In the course of the actual transfer, both Bulgarian and Rumanian authorities refused on several occasions to receive evacuees whose minority status was without question. The reason given in these cases was that at the conclusion of the Craiova Treaty, a smaller number of emigrants had been taken into consideration, and therefore the receiving country was under no obligation to accept these so-called excess immigrants.

F. Voluntary Transfers

1. Time Limits. In the case of voluntary transfers, persons eligible to express their preferences were asked to do so within specified time limits:

The convention between Bulgaria and Greece originally provided that the right of voluntary emigration might be

1. Ladas, op. cit.; Procès-Verbaux, i, 7th meeting of the Mixed Commission, 27 December 1920, p. 23.

exercised during a period of two years from the date of the constitution of the Mixed Commission. This option period was extended several times and ran for as long as six years.

The agreements concluded by Germany usually left the evacuees little time to make a decision; the entire evacuation was to be carried out in a short interval. In Latvia, the treaty was concluded on 30 October 1939. It stipulated that the evacuation was to be terminated by 15 December 1939. The Estonian treaty, which did not stipulate a time limit, made it clear, however, that evacuation was to be immediate. Business and industrial enterprises were given three months for liquidation. In Lithuania, the agreement was concluded on 10 January 1941, and the transfer was to be completed by 25 March. The same haste prevailed in the transfer from the Polish areas: the agreements were announced on 20 November 1939 and the transfer was completed by 22 January 1940, far ahead of schedule. In the Tyrol, the deadline for option was 31 December 1939; the agreement had first been announced on 21 October 1939.

2. Voting Procedure. The usual opting procedure was a unilateral one: prospective migrants were merely asked to express their will to be transferred. Non-option was a tacit declaration of the intention to stay in the country of residence. The only exception is that in the South Tyrol

agreement, in which the evacuees were asked to vote either to transfer or to stay; in this case, too, failure to opt at all was interpreted as renunciation of the transfer offer. The optants in the former Rumanian territories had only a choice between German or Soviet citizenship; the possibility of retaining Rumanian citizenship was not considered.

3. Consequence of Option. Option in favor of the transfer in all cases resulted in the loss for the optant of his previous citizenship, and acquisition of citizenship of the reception country. It also bound him to depart within the limits of the time-period laid down in the agreement.

Failure to opt in favor of the transfer resulted in the continuance of previous citizenship with all rights attached, or in the case of annexed Polish and Rumanian territories, acquisition of Soviet citizenship. It was held to bar future claims of "ethnic nationality" such as cultural autonomy, minority protection in the country of residence, etc., and to sever all ties between the "ethnic homeland" and the non-optant. Complete assimilation was expected from those who decided to stay.

4. The Response of the Minorities to Voluntary Transfer Agreements. It has been seen in studying the causes of transfers that the response of the minorities involved was in proportion to the extent of direct or indirect pressure

and that fear was the outstanding stimulus. It has also been indicated that, in one form or another, the element of fear was present in all cases. It was therefore to be expected that the response would be overwhelmingly in favor of transfer in most cases. There is direct correlation between immediate danger as seen by the minority and rate of departure. The response was virtually unanimous in favor of the transfer of German minorities from the former Polish and Rumanian territories as well as from Lithuania. In Latvia and Estonia, where Soviet occupation had yet to be realized at the time of the transfer, the response was less; in Estonia, approximately 7,000 Germans remained, representing 20 percent of the Volksgruppe.¹ In Latvia, about 17,000 stayed behind; they represented some 22 percent.² Those who stayed were for the most part older people, anti-Nazis, or people who had become assimilated, mainly through marriage. In South Tyrol, at first, under the impact of fear of Italian repression, registration figures were high, but actual departures dropped abruptly when it became clear that danger did not threaten those who remained.

As to the agreement between Bulgaria and Greece, the response of the minorities involved was also in proportion

1. Das Reich, 27 April 1941.
2. Pravda, 10 January 1941.

to the indirect compulsion attached. Altogether practically all the Greeks who were in Bulgaria in 1923 (30,000 persons) left. But only some 60 percent (53,000 persons) of the Bulgarians who were then in Greece emigrated.

In all other cases, such as that of the Karelians and Ingermanlanders who were given an opportunity to go to Finland, the Turks who were invited to immigrate to Turkey, etc., the response of the minority was unanimous in favor of the transfer, which was in some cases more sweeping than their respective governments wished. It should again be emphasized that the pressures were both those of the country from which the emigration was taking place and those of the emigrants' own wishes and the aims of the governments of the receiving countries. The response of the migrants involved in such transfers does not differ fundamentally from the response to other types of opportunity for migration, regardless of "ethnic affinities."

III. PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY

A. Introduction

The problems involved in a transfer of population have economic, legal, and transportation aspects and are both numerous and extremely difficult. It is not only necessary to transplant the people, but also to take some action with respect to their property. This includes immovable property,

difficult and complicated problems. They have been solved in various ways, according to the specific circumstances under which the transfers took place.

The following discussion of property problems related to the transfers of population has been divided into a consideration of transfers before World War II and those during that war. The property aspects of pre-war population transfers have been treated at length in several studies, whereas the present report is believed to be the first attempt to summarize the material relating to wartime transfers. For that reason the problems arising out of pre-war transfers are considered only briefly below, while those arising out of wartime transfers are discussed in greater detail, under three heads: (1) the transfer of Germans from the Soviet sphere of influence; (2) the transfer of Germans from Axis and satellite countries; and (3) the transfer of non-German populations.

B. Property Problems of Pre-war Population Transfers.

1. The Bulgarian-Greek Transfer. The convention on "reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria," signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on 27 November 1919, entrusted a Mixed Commission with the immediate execution of the population exchange. This commission comprised one Greek member, one

Bulgarian member, and two neutral members designated by the League of Nations. Its task was twofold: to safeguard the free exercise of the right of emigration for members of the respective national minorities and to supervise liquidation of property and compensatory payments. In addition, the commission had authority to liquidate the property which had been left behind by those Bulgarians and Greeks who had emigrated to their homelands in the course of the twenty years preceding the application of the Neuilly Convention, that is between 18 December 1900 and 18 December 1920. Under the terms of the convention, emigrants were free to take along with them or to have shipped movable property of any kind. No export or import duty could be levied on such property. Real property could be disposed of either by the emigrants themselves within a specified period or liquidated by the Mixed Commission in case no such disposition had been made or in case an application for liquidation had been filed. Cases of direct sale of real property by the emigrants were rare. The basis for the appraisal of real property subjected to liquidation by the Mixed Commission was originally determined to be "value at the time of liquidation." However, in many localities the application of this principle proved to be unjust. Homes inhabited by Greeks and Bulgarians alike had been deserted by them many years before the conven-

tion had come into being. The land had remained uncultivated, houses had been burned down or ravaged. The "real value" was many times lower than it would have been under normal circumstances. In such localities, the Commission tried to determine the real value of properties by comparison with similar ones situated in regions where emigration had not influenced the market prices. In many cases appraisals were conducted by experts. This extremely cautious, careful, and individualized approach to the appraisal proceedings considerably delayed the liquidation work of the Commission, but, according to a qualified observer,¹ "generally speaking, the liquidation prices given were just and fair." The records of the Commission (3 May 1930) reveal that high prices paid for emigrants' property even induced persons of dubious nationality to claim the benefits of the convention so as to have their property liquidated by the Mixed Commission.

The number of Bulgarian properties to be liquidated in Greece was 32,693; 31,114 of them had been processed by the end of 1929. Greek properties in Bulgaria numbered 15,861; 15,180 had been processed by the end of 1929. The value of the property left behind in Greece by the Bulgarian emigrants was estimated by the Mixed Commission at 22 million dollars, while the value of the Greek property in Bulgaria was esti-

1. Ladas, op. cit.

mated at about 15 billions. As a rule 10 percent of the amount due each emigrant was paid in cash by the Mixed Commission which issued a check in dollars on the National Bank of the country in which the property of the emigrant was situated. This check was redeemed in the currency of the paying country at the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of presentation. The banks received the funds necessary for these cash payments from their respective governments. In practice, payments were often considerably delayed. The remaining 90 percent was paid in government bonds, to be redeemed within 12 years beginning 1 January 1928. These bonds carried interest at the rate of 6 percent a year and were negotiable. But as early as 1929 the market value of the Bulgarian bonds had dwindled to about 50 percent of their nominal value and that of the Greek bonds to about 72 percent. As a result, the emigrants actually received only partial payment.¹

The entire operation was completed by 1930, more than ten years after the convention was signed, nine years after the establishment of the Mixed Commission, and more than seven years after the beginning of operations. The extremely long interval was hardly commensurate with the task accomplished.

¹. Ladas, op. cit.

2. The Greek-Turkish Transfer. The first 900,000 to 1,000,000 Greeks fled in September and October 1922 from their homes in Turkey to the seacoast. The Turkish army was close at their heels and they had left all their property behind, taking with them only what they could easily carry. They reached Greece completely destitute. Likewise, the 151,892 Greeks who were transferred from Turkey in 1924 under the terms of the Lausanne Convention of 30 January 1923 did not have the opportunity to liquidate their property. The 355,635 Moslems who were compulsorily transferred from Greece to Turkey in the years 1923 to 1925 under the convention, left under more orderly circumstances and were able to take with them a considerable portion of their cash and movable property. The immovable property left behind was utilized by the Greek Government for the resettlement of Greek refugees. Article XI of the Convention of Lausanne provided for the setting up of a Mixed Commission (four members representing Greece, four representing Turkey and three appointed by the League of Nations) which was entrusted with the supervision of the exchange of persons and the liquidation of their property and monetary assets. The sums due the exchanged citizens of each country for property liquidated by the Commission were to constitute a government debt between the two countries involved. The settlement of

accounts proved to be difficult. Several years were spent in fruitless attempts to appraise the property to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned. The interests of some 2 million persons were involved, and 1,500,000 dossiers had to be prepared. The Commission hardly exaggerated when it reported to the Council of the League of Nations that "it was the most voluminous affair in the history of the world." In view of the fact that the settlement of accounts involving only 150,000 of the transferees took eleven years, Nicola Politis, former Greek Ambassador to France, asserted that a fair final settlement of the accounts between Greece and Turkey would take a century.¹ The discrepancies between appraisals made by Turkish and by Greek experts ran into millions. An evaluation presented in January 1929 by the Greek experts left a balance of 1,648,887 Turkish pounds in favor of Greece, while the Turkish estimate was of a balance of 2,600,493 Turkish pounds in favor of Turkey. Both parties finally came to the conclusion that the work of appraisal and settlement had become fruitless. After the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish Convention, signed in Ankara on 30 June 1930, the Greek and Turkish governments followed the advice of the neutral members of the Mixed Commission and abandoned the application of the Convention of Lausanne concerning appraisal

¹ L. Politis, Nicola, Le Transfer des Populations. Politique Etrangere, April 1940, p. 89.

and liquidation of properties of exchanged persons. All accounts between the two countries were thus liquidated by cancellation on both sides.¹

3. The Transfer of Turks from Rumanian Dobrudja. The Turkish-Rumanian Convention on the repatriation of the Turkish population in Rumanian Dobrudja, which was concluded on 4 September 1936 and went into force on 1 April 1937, provided for a wholesale, although voluntary, transfer to Turkey of the 225,000 Dobrudja Turks, during the five years to follow. The emigrants were permitted to sell freely their urban real estate. Rural real estate was to be taken over by the Rumanian government at a fixed price of 6,000 Lei per hectare (\$60 at the official rate of exchange or \$24 per acre), including buildings. The corresponding amounts were not to be paid out to the individual Turkish emigrants, but were to be deposited for the account of the Turkish Government at the Rumanian National Bank within the next seven years. The Turkish Government undertook to utilize these sums for the purchase of Rumanian goods (wood, cattle, oil), the export of which was exempt from customs and duties. The same procedure was applied to the cash amounts obtained by individual emigrants through the sale of their urban property. However, the emigrants themselves were also permitted to buy

1. Ladas, op. cit.

Rumanian goods and to export them to Turkey, free of customs and duties. Movable property could be taken along without any restrictions. A special Mixed Commission consisting of four Rumanian officials and two delegates of the prospective emigrants was entrusted with the examination of applications for emigration. It also determined the amounts to be paid by the Rumanian Government for property left behind and taken over by the government.¹ Some 100,000 hectares (247,000 acres) of land belonging to 35,000 Turkish families had to be acquired by the Rumanian government under the terms of the 1936 agreement.²

C. Wartime Population Transfers.

1. Transfers of Germans from the Soviet Area of Influence.

The first wartime population transfer agreements were concluded with Estonia (15 October 1939) and Latvia (30 October 1939). At that time these two Baltic states, though already included in the Soviet area of interest, were still formally independent. These two transfer agreements were the only ones ever to be published in full.

a. The German-Estonian Transfer Agreement. Over two-thirds of the German-Estonian Protocol on the Resettlement in the German Reich of the German Folk-group of Estonia, con-

1. Schischkoff, Peter, and Wilsdorf, Heinz Die zwischenstaatliche Lenkung der Türkenwanderung. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, September 1938.

2. Stamati, E.V., Umsiedlungen auf dem Balkan und in Kleinasien. Nation und Staat, June 1940.

cluded on 15 October 1939 in Tallinn, is devoted to problems connected with the transfer of the property of the prospective German emigrees.¹ This preponderance of economic provisions is quite natural, for, by agreeing to the transfer of the German minority, the Estonian state faced a series of difficult and economic problems.

The 16,346 Estonian Germans formed but 1.5 percent of the total population of Estonia. However, their economic role had been considerably more important. The New International Yearbook for 1939 (p. 232), asserted that the "Estonian Balts owned estimated cash and deposits of \$1,250,000 and capital investments estimated at \$200,000,000." This estimate is probably greatly exaggerated.² Nevertheless, the sudden withdrawal of so much capital would have been a heavy blow to Estonia. In order to avoid a slump in the value of the Estonian crown, far-reaching restrictions were applied in connection with the transfer of Germans.

Every German leaving the country was authorized to take out no more than fifty crowns in Estonian currency. (The official rate of exchange was \$45.37 for 100 Estonian crowns). The residual cash and accounts were deposited to

1. The full official text of the protocol, both in Estonian and German, appears in the Estonian Official Gazette. Riigi Teataja, 1939, Part II, pp. 341-346.

2. According to a special dispatch to the Frankfurter Zeitung (23 October 1939) the total property of the German minority in Estonia amounted to 800 million marks (\$362,960,000 at the official rate of exchange).

the credit of the German Embassy in the Eesti Bank, and, later, after the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung had been formed (see below) were to be transferred to the latter's account. The stocks and mortgages held by the Germans in Estonia could not be taken out and were also to be deposited with the German Embassy account, first, in the Eesti Bank and later with the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung. Only non-negotiable documents could be taken out, such as certified excerpts from the land register (Grundbuch) (Art. II. 3.). All operations such as the sale of investments or the liquidation of accounts, had to be authorized by the Estonian Ministry of Economy. (Art. II. 4.) Personal jewels and household objects made of precious metals could be taken out only by evacuees over 14 years of age. Their value was not to exceed 500 crowns per person (\$226.85). Other household objects made of silver and having sentimental or family value could be taken out (or forwarded to Germany later) by special authorization of the Ministry of Economy. (Art. II. 5.)

All household furniture could be taken out or forwarded within three months free of duty. However, after this date, if the property had not been shipped, it was to be deposited with the customs authorities and could be forwarded later on. Three months' grace was also granted for applications to the Ministry of Culture regarding the evacuation of objects of

artistic or cultural-historical value, historical archives, etc. (Art. II. 1.). The resettlers were authorized to take out tools and a certain amount of raw material necessary for the practice of their trade. The Estonian Ministry of Economy could also authorize the export of medical instruments, equipment, and installations (Art. II. 6.); the same was also true of automobiles and motorcycles. If the Ministry refused its authorization, the objects could be purchased by the Estonian government for a fair price (Art. II. 1.). Article II. 7 stated that the Estonian government would endeavor "to settle the question of broken contracts of employment, lease, and rent in a just way in order to compensate for the real damage caused, whenever such problems arose in connection with the resettlement."

Every resettler had to file and sign an inventory of property to be exported; this statement was to be forwarded to Berlin within two weeks of the departure of the person in question. Goods not included in the statement could not be transferred.

The Reich Government was authorized to install at the German Consulate in Tallinn the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung (German Trust Board), which was an Abwicklungsstelle (Office for Liquidation) of the German Reich. This body was in charge of all legal and financial problems connected with

the property transfer of the resettlers, such as liquidation, the settlement of debts, and other obligations of the evacuees (Art. III. 1). Article III. 2 declared that the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung did not have extra-territorial status, and its activities were subordinated to the usual Estonian legislation on procedure, etc. The Estonian government was entitled to a representative in the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung who would have access to all proceedings of this body; a special German-Estonian Conciliatory Commission was created with power to decide all controversies arising between the German trustees and the Estonian delegate. The Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung was responsible for all public and private debts and obligations of the resettlers to the extent of the property with which it was entrusted. Debts and obligations involving Estonian jurisdiction had priority over all other claims.

Large agricultural establishments (farms and estates), other than those already transferred to Estonian groups, were included in a special list and the Estonian Ministry of Agriculture accepted the management of them until their liquidation. Expenses connected with their management, loss, and current income were charged to the account of the property concerned. Smaller farms and other agricultural establishments were entrusted to persons selected by the owners, inso-

far as they had not been disposed of prior to their owners' departure. The two contracting parties had agreed that the Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung would proceed with the liquidation of the German landed property with the approval of the Estonian Ministry of Agriculture (Art. III. 4.). Liquidation of the German land-ownership in Estonia had met with considerable difficulties. For example, in the Estonian Parliament on 11 January 1940, the Minister of Economy, Leo Sepp stated, "With regard to country estates and landed property, in general, no agreement has been reached on account of the price factor; in all probability these estates will have to be liquidated privately in the open market." The Estonian Government was of course anxious to acquire (at the lowest possible price) the land left by the Germans and it knew that there were no higher bidders in the open market. It was therefore in no hurry to make its offer. The Deutsche Treuhandverwaltung, on the other hand, was trying to speed up the liquidation. In addition to the usual reasons for wanting the operations carried out promptly, special reasons made it imperative for the German Trust Board to hasten the liquidation of the German landed property. Most of the properties had been mortgaged and before March 1940, the Board had to pay over 500,000 crowns (\$226,850 at the nominal rate of exchange) to the Government Land Bank in settlement of mortgages

on 187 farms belonging to emigrants in order to save them from sale by compulsory auction.¹

Under the pressure of these circumstances, the German Trust Board became more conciliatory and on 16 March, the Estonian Ministry of Agriculture and the German Trust Board concluded an agreement according to which the Estonian State acquired 150 farms with 12,600 hectares (29,800 acres) at the average price of 200 crowns (\$90) for cultivated and 30 crowns (\$13.70) for uncultivated land per hectare. Twenty to thirty large farms were destined for exploitation by the state and the remainder were to be leased to farm applicants either on a rental basis or by freehold sale. The Minister of Agriculture, Arthur Tupits, stated at a conference of Estonian peasants in Tallinn on 17 March 1940, "Today sees the completion of the Estonian agrarian reform."² By the middle of 1940, about 2,500 Estonian peasants and farmers had applied for the land of the Germans. The demand by far exceeded the supply.³

Originally, the Reich had high hopes of deriving immediate profit from the repatriation of the German minority in Estonia. A Havas telegram from Tallinn, dated 22 November 1939, reported that the agents of the Reich had

1. The Baltic Times, 18 January 1940.
2. The Baltic Times, 14, 21 March 1940.
3. Nation und Staat, June 1940, p. 308.

evaluated the property of the Estonian Germans at ten billion French francs (\$230,000,000). A little later, however, Havas reported from Amsterdam that Berlin had little hope of realizing more than one hundred million marks (\$40,000,000) from the operations in Estonia.¹ Moreover, when the time came for carrying out the transfers of property, there was a considerable difference between the Estonian and German interpretations of the protocol, which was very general in its terms.

Article IV of the protocol, which dealt with the transfer of property, declared:

"The final settlement of the transfer to Germany of the value of properties at present in Estonia will be dealt with in a later agreement, especially the question of realization of stocks and cash which will be deposited and paid to the accounts of the German Embassy or of the Trust Board. The transfer of these accounts will be settled in such a manner that the balance of payments and the Estonian economic life remain undisturbed."

In order to reach the agreement foreseen by the above article, a mixed German-Estonian Commission met in Tallinn, on 7 November 1939. In the very first days, an irreconcilable divergence between the viewpoints of Estonian and German

1. Posledniya Novosti, Paris, 13, 23 November 1939.

representatives became obvious. Ten days later, on 17 November, the Commission was compelled to interrupt its meetings. Ten more days were spent in a fruitless attempt to reach a compromise through consultations with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. On 27 November, the German delegates left for Berlin.¹ This rupture had followed a categorical declaration made by the Estonian delegates to the effect that Estonia was not only unable to pay out in cash the value of property left by the German resettlers, but also that no full payment in kind, goods, or foodstuffs could be made in the near future. The Estonians made it clear that the results would be catastrophic if they delivered to Germany their main export items without receiving foreign currency in exchange and that they would be deprived of the means of purchasing the raw materials and machines abroad that they needed for their industry.²

On 16 December, Sopp, the Estonian Minister of Economy, was asked to come to Berlin to renew the negotiations which had been interrupted for one month.

After his return to Tallinn, Sopp informed the press that the parties had reached an agreement with respect to the capital and the property of German evacuees. The capital collected by the German Trust Board was to be "returned to the Estonian economic system" in order "to increase the production

1. Le Temps, 22 January 1940.

2. The Baltic Times, 15 November 1939.

possibilities of the country, and thus make possible the transfer."¹ On the other hand, the Reich Minister of National Economy, Dr. Funk, had assured his Estonian colleague that the Reich would do all in its power to supply Estonia with the necessary material for its industry, unless the Reich should experience a shortage in these products.² Generally speaking "the German authorities stated that they would keep Estonian interests in mind and that the transfer of property would be carried out at a slow pace."³

Since immediate transfers in cash or in kind had been averted, the outcome of the Berlin visit of the Estonian minister appears at first to have been satisfactory. However, a more careful study reveals other implications.

The very considerable sums which had been collected by the German Trust Board were to be "returned to the Estonian economic system" and would thus become a German investment in the Estonian national economy. In this way the German state as such would become a powerful partner in Estonian production. German economic domination, dreaded by the Estonian government and by public opinion, would be fully preserved in its most threatening form: the Reich itself would be substituted for Estonian citizens of German ethnic nationality. The Reich

1. The Baltic Times, 13 November 1939.
2. Le Temps (Paris), 24 January 1940.
3. The Baltic Times, 4 January 1940.

would thus be able to maintain and consolidate its economic influence in Estonia even after the departure of the German Volksgruppe. Industrial and agricultural enterprises operated with the help of "restored" German capital, would in fact work for the Reich. By supplying them with the necessary raw materials and equipment, the Reich would ensure effective control in the German interest.

On 11 January 1940, the Estonian Parliament voted a bill which conferred upon the German Trust Board in Estonia the status of a legal entity. The Board was authorized to open branches in the province, could sue and be sued before courts in all matters pertaining to the material interests of the German resettlers, handle compromises, etc. The President and the deputy-President of the German Trust Board were to be appointed by the German Ambassador in Tallinn; they had the rights and privileges of German consuls. The Estonian government was to appoint a representative at the German Trust Board who would serve as a link between this body and the government. The records and the internal correspondence of the Trust Board would be conducted in German; all communications with the Estonian government and legal bodies would be conducted in Estonian. According to the President of the German Trust Board, Dr. Wollert, the Board had "no desire to become a kind of permanent institution in Estonia, but is

anxious to carry out its task of settling the claims and liabilities of the Baltic German emigrants and of liquidating their property as soon as possible; it will then discontinue its activities." In the middle of March 1940, the Trust Board had already established ten branches with 133 employees in different Estonian towns. The Estonian minister of Economy, Sepp, when speaking in the Parliament in favor of the government bill on the legal status of the Trust Board, said that the Board would probably complete its task within two to four years.¹

It would seem that the plans of the Reich in connection with the activities of the German Trust Board were based on the expectation that Estonia would continue its existence as an independent state, despite many indications that the Baltic States would soon be annexed by the USSR. It is likely, however, that these agreements were regarded by the Reich as a sort of gamble: from the very beginning the property of the Germans evacuating from the Baltic countries was considered practically lost. Whatever could be obtained from the Baltic States while they retained their independence, through transfer or otherwise, was considered practically a windfall. It was, however, a short-lived gamble. On 6 August 1940, Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, as the Estonian Soviet I. The Baltic Times, 18 January and 17 March 1940.

Socialist Republic. The German-Estonian protocol of 15 October 1939 and all agreements related thereto lost their force. (For further developments, see pp. 76 ff.)

b. The German-Latvian Transfer Treaty. The basic German-Latvian Treaty on Resettlement of Latvian Citizens of German (ethnic) Nationality to the German Reich, signed in Riga on 30 October 1939, stated that the two parties undertook to settle the disposition of the emigres' property left in Latvia, in such a way as to avoid, as far as possible, damage to the Latvian economy.¹ The Latvian Government was to establish a special agency to settle "all material and legal questions arising out of the transfer," and the Reich Government was to create in Latvia an Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Aktion-gesellschaft (Resettlement Trust Company, UTAG) with the same objective.

The basic treaty and its additional protocol gave detailed regulations for the transfer of each of the seven principal types of German property in Latvia; later, the Latvian government issued a number of supplementary rules and orders. The resettlers were permitted to take with them 50 Lats (about \$10) per person but forbidden to take out foreign currency or exchange. German cash and deposits in Latvia were

1. The full official text of the treaty was published in Latvian and German in the Latvian Official Gazette, Valdibas Vestnesis, 30 October 1939 N247, pp. 4-7.

frozen and could be used only for transactions connected with the resettlement. All securities, with the exception of those issued by German enterprises, were also frozen. The export of precious metals (gold, silver, platinum, etc.) was prohibited. Objects and ornaments made of precious metals and stones could be taken out only if they had belonged to the resettler prior to 6 October 1939.

The resettlers were authorized to sell or, with certain exceptions, to take with them, all of their movable property.

The Latvian government bodies together with the UTAG had until 31 January 1940 to take an inventory of German agricultural landed property and to proceed with its appraisal. The Latvian authorities then were to deliver to the UTAG what were called Schuldverschreibungen (promissory notes) dated 31 January 1940, on the total amount of the appraisal, and the UTAG was to turn over the estates to the Latvian authorities or to a body designated by them. In all, 1,764 German agricultural estates (134,400 acres) were registered.

As in the case of agricultural property, the Latvian government was to take over the protection of the urban property owned by the transferred Germans and the UTAG was entrusted with making an inventory of it and managing it. The urban land and real-estate could be sold freely by UTAG, acting on behalf of the German owners.

Special lists of the industrial and commercial enterprises owned by the German repatriates were to be compiled, and those of special importance to Latvian-German economic relations were to be classified separately and to be subject to a special agreement. The Latvian government was to be sole judge of the disposition of all other enterprises. Up to 8 December 1939, 2,500 industrial, commercial, and artisan undertakings were listed, including 700 large enterprises.¹ Of these, 46 enterprises were finally selected as of "special importance to German-Latvian economic relations" and therefore by agreement were not liquidated.² Some 16 other German enterprises obtained special extensions for settlement -- all before 1 April 1940.³ Although certain German enterprises were thus allowed to continue their operations, they were not permitted to delay their decision on the question of their citizenship; like all other Germans, they had to opt before 15 December 1939.⁴

According to the Treaty, the UTAG was to hold all property rights and obligations of those who had left Latvia. Before 31 May 1940, the UTAG had to list all claims and other contractual rights of the transferees which had not been settled before their departure. Claims not declared in due time were invalidated. On the other hand, the total property managed by UTAG was considered a collective security for all

1. Rigasche Rundschau, 9 December 1939.
2. Valdibas Vestnesis, 12 December and 23 November 1939.
3. Rigasche Rundschau, 9 December 1939.
4. Valdibas Vestnesis, 23 November 1939.

unsettled claims against every individual resettler, presented by the Latvian State, local governments and individual or collective claimants. Claims had to be settled or bonded within ten years.

Article XVIII contained an important principle: "The transfer of the amounts accumulated to the credit of Germany will be effected as a rule through increased exports of Latvian products to Germany." This principle led to hot debate, for it was considered that Latvia would be unable to export, except for return value, without seriously damaging its economy. The Latvian government newspaper asserted that "if the demands of the Reich were accepted, Latvia would have to export to Germany during the next 20 to 25 years a large part of its production in order to pay for the property left behind by the Germans and would find it hard to secure the foreign exchange for purchases elsewhere."¹ Even in 1938, 33.5 percent of all Latvian exports went to Germany; their value was between 40 and 76 million Lats (\$7,600,000 to \$14,440,000) during the five years preceding the outbreak of the war. If it were to be increased considerably, this would mean "economic bondage to the Third Reich for 20 years or more."²

After the departure of the Latvian Germans, Latvia took advantage of elastic provisions in the Treaty to avoid

1. The Bulletin of International News, 12 November 1939.
2. The Christian Science World, 28 October 1939.

satisfying German demands. The treaty with the Soviet Union appears to have shielded it from any violent measures on the part of the Reich. In the middle of January 1940, one month after the completion of the German evacuation, the president of the government Chamber of Trade and Industry, A. Berzin, in a speech at Dvinsk (Daugavpils), declared that although the sum to be paid had not yet been fixed, it "will surely exceed one hundred million Lats (\$19,305,000).¹ The sum of a half-billion dollars at which the German property in Latvia had been originally estimated was brought down to about twenty million dollars, or 4 percent of the original estimate.

The UTAG, created according to Article XVIII of the Treaty, was formed on 19 December, with a capital of 300,000 Lats (\$58,000) in 300 shares at 1,000 Lats each. Only citizens of the Reich could be shareholders and partake in its administration. Business was conducted in German. However, the Latvian Ministry of Trade and Industry had the right to supervise its activities.² Serious friction soon developed between the UTAG and the Latvian government and the Latvian Ministry of Justice and the Ambassador of the Reich in Riga exchanged angry notes in which they blamed each other for failure to fulfill the obligations assumed under the treaty.³ However,

1. La Petite Gironde, 18 January 1940.
2. Frankfurter Zeitung, 20 December 1939.
3. The Baltic Times, 9 May 1940.

before long external political events put an end to the entire problem of liquidation and transfer of property of the German evacuees. On 5 August 1940 Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

The Reich did not publish any data on the amounts received by way of transfer for property left behind by the German evacuees in the two Baltic States prior to their incorporation into the Soviet Union. However, a report on the activity of the DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhand Gesellschaft) for the period ending 31 December 1940 stated that the Society "received 12,500,000 Reichsmark (\$17,000,000) from the transfer and other sources."¹ (For further developments see p. 103 ff.)

c. Transfers of Germans from the Former Polish and Rumanian Provinces. On 3 November 1939 the Reich concluded with the Soviet Union an agreement, on the basis of which 128,000 Germans from the Soviet-incorporated Polish provinces of Volhynia, East Galicia, and the Narev area were transferred to the German-incorporated Polish area. Ten months later, on 5 September 1940, a German-Soviet agreement was drawn up providing for the transfer of some 135,000 Germans from the Soviet-annexed former Rumanian provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

1. Neues Bauerntum, April 1941.

The text of these two treaties has apparently not been published. The information given below is derived from various Soviet and German published sources.

The official Soviet-German communique announcing the conclusion of the agreement of 3 November 1939 stated: "Evacuation from former Eastern Poland is based upon the same principle as that from the Baltic States, namely that economic evacuation of the affected regions cannot take place. Certain limitations should therefore be expected with regard to the property the emigrants may take with them. Wherever transportation will be effected by road and not by rail, every family will be enabled to take away its property within the limits of the transport capacity of a two-horse-drawn wagon. Livestock may be taken away in modest quantity. The same rule will be applied to the tools necessary for professional activity of specialists, artisans, physicians, artists, etc. All valuables left behind will be inventoried and included in the lists which will enable the mixed evacuation body to appraise the entire property left behind by the evacuees. The interests of the evacuees with regard to the property they leave behind will be ensured."¹

German sources provide further details concerning this agreement and its application: These may be summarized as
I. Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 November 1939.

follows:

(1) All lands owned by evacuated Germans were collectivized and transferred to local Soviets.¹

(2) Immovable property of the evacuees was also taken over by the state. The Soviet-German treaty provided that: "German representatives will compile a list of all movable and immovable property (abandoned by the evacuees); this list is to be certified by German and Soviet representatives. It will be used as a basis for compensating the German evacuees when they settle in the Reich."² According to Dr. Zäckler, one of the leaders of the Galician German folkgroup, the evacuees were promised that "they would receive compensation for the property which was registered and appraised at the time of evacuation from their former fatherland." Zäckler added however: "The appraisal conducted by the Russian members of the Commission for evacuation resulted in such low figures that, if they were to be used as a basis for compensation the bulk of property would have had to be considered as good as lost... The buildings were appraised according to so-called peace prices, which, at the present value of Polish money, hardly amount to one third or one fourth of their true

1. Thoss, Alfred, Die Umsiedlungen und Optionen in Rahmen der Neuordnung Europas. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (March 1941). Zäckler, Dr. Theodore, Der Volksdeutsche, January 1940.

2. Sommer, Hellmuth, 135,000 Gewannen das Vaterland, Berlin 1940, p. 14.

value. The German Commission, however, accepted our own evaluation with much understanding."¹ The UTAG (Umsiedlungs Preuhand Gesellschaft) was not permitted to participate in the ultimate liquidation of the German property in the regions taken over by the Soviet Union. The liquidation was conducted directly by the Soviet State bodies.

(3) Paragraph 3 of the treaty determined precisely the amount of movable property which the evacuees were authorized to take along: used apparel (one fur coat only), shoes, underwear, household objects, and money up to 150 zlotys per person. They were forbidden to take cash in excess of 150 zlotys, gold and platinum, silver in excess of 500 grammes, precious stones, pearls, weapons, art objects and antiques, merchandise and fabrics, metals, leather articles, printed material, photographs, legal documents, church registers, records, and interest or dividend-bearing bonds and stocks.² Artisans, physicians, artists, and scholars were permitted to take along property necessary for the continuation of their professional activity.³ Zöckler reported that: "It was not specified how much equipment could be taken so that there was a possibility to take away that which otherwise would have been left behind."⁴

1. Zöckler, Dr. Theodore, loc. cit.

2. Thoss, Dr. Alfred, Die Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen Berlin 1942, pp. 16-17.

3. Thoss, op. cit., p. 16.

4. Zöckler, Dr. Theodore, loc. cit., p. 2.

(4) Those who traveled by rail or by car were permitted to take along 50 kilograms of hand baggage for the head of the family and 25 kilograms for every family member. Those who chose to go by cart had the right to take with them the cart, two horses or two oxen, one cow, one pig, five sheep or goats, and ten heads of poultry.¹

The stipulations of the German-Soviet treaty of 5 September 1940 were in the main identical with those of the earlier agreement of 5 November 1939, with respect to the transfer of property. Articles 2 to 6 of the treaty coincide exactly with the corresponding provisions of the 1939 agreement.² The resettlers were allowed to withdraw only small amounts of cash before leaving, and had to surrender all their savings to the Soviet banks. Moscow was to account to Berlin for these sums at a later date. Dr. Leonard Oberascher, who directed the evacuation from Bessarabia, (but who, as a German, must be regarded as a suspect witness) stated that when the day of the departure came, the local village commissars, in obvious violation of the agreement, suddenly and as one man refused to accept from the evacuees more than 250 rubles (25 Rentenmarks or \$10) per family (or per homestead). Oberascher asserted that this refusal took place everywhere and concluded from this that it had been ordered by high authorities in

1. Die Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 17.

2. Ibid., p. 39.

Moscow.

Oberascher also claimed that the local Soviet authorities obstructed in every way the sale by German peasants in Bessarabia of property they were leaving behind. Alfred Thoss, another German observer indicates that Bessarabian German peasants disposed of their belongings without interference.

The same discrepancies characterize the reports on the export of livestock and supplies, furniture and implements of the farmers. For every homestead a cart with two horses (or two oxen), or cow, and ten heads of poultry could be exported, as well as 250 kilograms of produce. Oberascher declared that local Soviet authorities obstructed the carrying out of this provision.¹ Some such cases probably occurred. But in generalizing from isolated instances Oberascher seems to have exaggerated. This is best shown by the fact that as early as 28 September, five days after the beginning of the evacuation from Bessarabia, some 6,000 carts and 12,000 horses were massed on the Galatz military airfield, which had been converted into a central transit camp.²

German property left behind, insofar as it was not subject to nationalization according to Soviet regulations, was to be listed in special records made out in Russian and German. Its value was to be jointly assessed by the German

1. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, March 1941, pp. 164-165.

2. The New York Times, 29 November 1940.

and Soviet Commissions and subsequently credited to the Reich.¹ The German Commission carried out the evaluation of properties independently and exclusively for their own use in the subsequent settling of accounts with the repatriates to whom the Reich had pledged compensation in their new places of settlement. Insofar as the German estimates were not approved by the Soviet representatives, they had no binding effect on the Soviet Union for any subsequent accounting with the Reich. According to the German observer, Oberascher, whose statements must be accepted with reserve, "the Reich received only a trifling sum for the whole property of the Bessarabian Germans, while it itself had fully compensated the German settlers for their entire property."

d. The Transfer of Germans from the Soviet-Incorporated Baltic States. On 5 and 6 August, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the Soviet Union. As early as 23 September 1940, the Reich began negotiations with the Soviet Government concerning the transfer of those Estonian and Latvian Germans who had remained after the evacuation of 1939. The negotiations also dealt with the transfer of the German folk group in Lithuania. On 10 January 1941 an agreement was reached. It was never published, and the official Soviet-German communiqué on the conclusion of this agreement

1. Grenzboten, 30 August 1940; Thoss, Alfred, Die Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 39.

makes no mention of the property aspect of the transfer. However, a passage in a detailed article by Alfred Thoss, devoted to Transfers of Populations and Optations Within the New Order in Europe, may throw some light on the question.¹ Thoss relates that "differing in this from methods of estimating property applied during previous evacuations, the agreement of 10 January 1941 provided beforehand and from the outset for a compensation (Pauschalentschädigung) of 200 million marks for the whole property of the German evacuees, while the Baltic claims of the Soviets, including the Lithuanian investments in Memel, were estimated at 50,000,000." The Soviets had thus to pay the net sum of 150,000,000 marks (\$60,000,000).

This Thoss statement apparently refers to the property of evacuees from all three Baltic countries taken together. In Latvia and Estonia the liquidation of claims arising from the 1939 evacuation was added to the settlement of accounts for the coming evacuation of 1941. The 200 million marks (80 million dollars) cover two evacuation periods and three countries. The Soviet counter-claim for 50 million marks (20 million dollars) also covers all of the Baltic States.

The underlying concept of compensation in this case is an entirely different one. During preceding evacuations from regions incorporated into the Soviet Union (the eastern regions

1. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, March 1941, p. 132.

of former Poland, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina), the value of property left behind by each individual evacuee was estimated and taken into consideration with a view to subsequent compensation. The sum of these individual estimates was the figure utilized for settlement through trade between the USSR and the Reich. But these two experiences had apparently proved unsatisfactory to both parties. There were frictions, delays in procedure, and fundamental disagreement in reaching the estimate itself; as a result, the Reich apparently obtained very little for the property of the repatriated group. Moreover, the settlement of accounts covering three evacuations, chronologically and geographically different, would have been too complicated. For this reason, the parties abandoned the former method of individual estimates in favor of Pauschalentschädigung (over-all compensation.)

The Reich hoped thus to obtain more quickly and surely partial compensation at least for the property left behind by evacuated Volksdeutsche. The evacuation was hardly finished, however, (on 25 March) when on 22 June the Soviet-German war broke out. It is unlikely that in this period of less than three months, the Reich succeeded in obtaining from the Soviet Union a substantial part of the 150 million marks which were still due.

2. Transfers of Germans from Axis and Satellite Countries

a. Transfer of Germans from Italian South Tyrol. On 23 June 1939 the Reich concluded with Italy a preliminary agreement on the transfer of the German minority in South Tyrol.¹ A treaty was signed on 21 October 1939.² Under the provisions of these agreements some 9,000 to 10,000 of the Reich citizens residing in Italian South Tyrol were removed to the Reich. Of 266,985 Italian citizens of German ethnic nationality 185,365 had opted for the transfer.³

An official Italian source asserted that "the Fascist and Berlin Governments have very properly assured complete safeguards of the economic interests of all those being repatriated."⁴ However, the transfer of property proved to be a very difficult undertaking. The German repatriates were entitled to take with them only their clothing, supplies for three days, and the equivalent of not more than 5,000 lire in Reichsmarks. All other real and personal property (real estate, dwellings, and business premises) had to be placed in the hands of a representative of the Italian Royal Prefect forty-eight hours before departure, together with a complete inventory, certified by a notary public. It was stressed in particular that "any person attempting to make any changes in the status of his real or personal property with the view of

1. Nation und Staat, January 1940, p. 118.

2. The New International Yearbook for the year 1939, p. 388.

3. Hamburger Monatshefte, 1940, p. 32.

4. Athesia Augusta, August 1939.

concealing, diminishing, or removing the said property shall be punished by confiscation of the same." An appraisal commission was to be appointed by the Italian Ministry of the Interior to establish the value of the property left behind "at a convenient time...dispose of it and transmit the proceeds to the former owners according to a conversion scale to be determined by the Royal Italian and German Finance administrations; the currency in which this payment will be made is the Reichsmark."¹

In January 1940, a mixed Italian-German Commission was appointed to assess the property values of those who had opted for resettlement to the Reich. Serious difficulties were apparently experienced in arriving at a compromise between German and Italian estimates. While the Reich claimed 12,000,000,000 lire (\$623,500,000), the Italian estimates did not exceed 5,000,000,000. Only with the personal intervention of the Duce was a compromise reached setting the sum due between 7,000,000,000 and 8,000,000,000 lire. A corresponding agreement was signed in February by the General Consul, Bene, as representative of the Reich, and the Italian Minister, Guarneri.² Arrangements were made for a further agreement to regulate the payment of this Italian debt, to be concluded in

1. Lothar, Ernest. Beneath Another Sun, New York 1943, pp. 45-70.

2. The Times, London, 13 January and 26 February 1940; Ost-deutscher Beobachter, 6 February 1940.

1941. That year Italy would not pay any installments but authorized a preliminary payment, using the sums realized from the liquidation of Italian property which had been confiscated by the Reich in Austria, Sudetenland, Poland, and even in Germany. The rest of the Italian debt had to be paid in merchandise.¹

b. Transfer of Germans from Rumanian South Bukovina and North Dobrudja. The German-Rumanian treaty of 22 October 1940 under the provisions of which 76,800 Germans were transferred from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja,² differed greatly from the German-Soviet agreement of 5 September 1940, with regard to the settlement of the property interests of the transferred Germans. Of paramount importance was the clause stating that the value of land left behind by the evacuees was included in the property listed and subject to indemnification.³ An official Rumanian publication states that these "possessions were transferred to the patrimony of the (Rumanian) state with the obligation of reimbursing the Reich with their equivalent."⁴ A special mixed Rumanian-German commission was appointed for the purpose of fixing the financial obligations of the Rumanian State resulting from the transfer of Germans.

1. The Bulletin of International News, 19 August 1944, p. 660.

2. Wirtschaft und Statistik, July 1941.

3. Thoss, Alfred. Die Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 39.

4. Trei Ani de Guvernare, 6 September 1940 - 6 September 1943, Bucharest, 1943, p. 152.

The liquidation of German property in Dobrudja was completed by September 1943 and resulted in the evaluation of the 64,680 acres left behind at 620,921,442 Lei (\$86,352,000 -- at the pre-war rate of exchange).¹

There were no restrictions as to the movable property which could be taken along. If the resettlers were unable to carry their belongings with them, they were allowed to take them out within twelve months of the signing of the treaty. Personal property could be taken out by rail within their physical limitations; there was no limit on the volume of goods if the trip was made by road. All livestock attached to the farm could be taken along.²

c. Transfer of Germans from the Kochevye Area of Slovenia and Bosnia. In the fall of 1941 the Reich and Italy concluded a treaty concerning the transfer of 14,810 Germans from the Italian-annexed Yugoslav district of Kochevye. The provisions dealing with the property of resettlers basically followed the pattern of the 1939 agreement on the transfer of the German minority from South Tyrol. All real estate, land, and houses of the transferred Germans became the property of Emonia, an Italian government-controlled corporation, which announced that it would sell this property to new Italian settlers.³

1. Ibid.

2. Thoss, Alfred. Die Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 39.

3. Slovenca, Ljubljana, 4 April 1943.

Some 18,000 Germans left the province of Bosnia under a treaty concluded on 6 October 1942, between the Reich and the Croat Ustashi government. They had the right to remove custom-free, all their movable goods and cash up to 2,000 Kuna (\$38.40) per person. They were guaranteed compensation for the immovables they left behind; retirement beneficiaries were to receive equivalent benefits from the Reich. On the other hand, the settlers were asked to adjust claims, debts, and rights as far as possible before their transfer.¹

3. Transfers of Non-German Populations

a. Bulgarian-Rumanian Exchange of Population. The Bulgarian-Rumanian treaty concluded at Craiova on 7 September 1940 provided for the cession of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria as well as for a compulsory transfer of the Bulgarian population of Northern Dobrudja to Bulgaria and of the Rumanians of Southern Dobrudja to Rumania. The exchange affected 100,000 Rumanians and 65,000 Bulgarians.

Under the terms of the Craiova treaty Bulgaria undertook to pay Rumania a blanket sum of 450,000,000 leva as compensation for improvements made in Southern Dobrudja by the Rumanians and in settlement of all other claims. Rumania agreed to compensate Bulgarians in both Northern and Southern Dobrudja for losses from requisitions by the Rumanian Army.

1. Nova Hrvatska, 7 October 1942; DNB, 11 November 1942.

Far-reaching disagreement arose between the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments with regard to the property left behind by the Bulgarian evacuees in Northern Dobrudja. The Treaty of Craiova provided (Art. IV, V, VI) that the persons leaving their actual residence under the terms of the Treaty were allowed to export their movable property, cattle, agricultural implements, and so on, free of duty. Real estate left behind became the property of the state. The value was to be appraised by a mixed Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission on the basis of an inventory presented by the prospective evacuees (Art. 10). Mutual claims which thus accumulated would be settled between Rumania and Bulgaria through compensation from state to state. Each state undertook to compensate its repatriates for the rural real property left behind (Art. V). Real estate in the towns remained the private property of the actual proprietor (Art. IV).

These provisions led in practice to numerous and violent conflicts. Estimates of property owned by the repatriates proved to be erroneous. Furthermore, conflicts arose with regard to the settlement of mutual private and administrative claims and obligations, as well as to the rate of exchange of leva and lei.¹ An official Bulgarian announcement also alleged that Rumanian frontier guards had confiscated movable

1. Ein Nachspiel zur Dobrudja Angelegenheit, Suedost Economist, 28 February 1941.

belongings of the repatriates, their money, and official documents issued by the Rumanian authorities concerning real estate left behind and requisitions made by Rumania. As late as November 1943, negotiations continued between the Bulgarian and Rumanian delegations concerning liquidation of mutual property interests in Northern and Southern Dobrudja.¹

b. Transfer of Croats from Lower Styria. On 11 August 1943, the "Independent State of Croatia" and the Reich concluded an agreement providing for the voluntary transfer to Croatia of Croat subjects and persons of Croat ethnic nationality residing or domiciled in the German-incorporated Yugoslav province of Lower Styria.² Some 6,000 persons elected to make this transfer.³ The disposition of property was regulated by two previous agreements concluded between the Reich and Croatia on 16 April and 11 August 1943. The first dealt with estates of Croat citizens which were to become the property of the German Reich. Those losing their real property in Lower Styria were guaranteed compensation in kind within the territory of Croatia, on the basis of assessments to be made by a mixed Croat-German commission. They were entitled to remove, custom-free and without export restrictions, all movable property, with the exception of that farming equipment necessary for the

1. Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero, 15 November 1943.

2. Marburger Zeitung, 4 April 1943.

3. Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien, 7 November 1943.

maintenance and productivity of the evacuated estates.¹

The question of the property of Croats who had acquired German citizenship as a result of Lower Styria's incorporation into the Reich, was settled in a similar way by the agreement of 11 August. They, too, were allowed to take along all their movable belongings. However, seed and fodder strictly necessary to the German economy, machines, implements, cattle, and horses were excluded. Practically, this meant that the departing Croat peasants were to move to Croatia without the tools necessary for farming. As to their holdings, the agreements provided that this land would be taken over for the Reich Government by the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanism, as partial compensation for the property left behind in Croatia by German Umsiedler from Bosnia. The Croat Institute of Colonization assured the prospective transferees that they would "obtain the property of Germans who are returning to the Fatherland."²

c. Transfer of Karelians to Finland. The Finnish-Soviet peace treaty of 12 March 1940 permitted persons who wished to leave the territory of the Karelian Isthmus ceded to the Soviet Union, to do so within the very short period, 14 to 27 March 1940. The majority of the 100,000 Karelians who moved to the interior

1. Nova Hrvatska, 7 July 1943. Hrvatski Narod, 30 September 1943.

2. Hrvatski Narod, 6 October 1943.

3. The New York Times, 15, 16, 22 and 28 March 1940.

of Finland had already done so in 1939 during the hostilities.¹ The number who left after peace had been signed has been estimated at 100,000.²

During the period allowed the refugees for evacuation, persons who had previously left Karelia were permitted to return home for the purpose of assembling their belongings. But conditions were such that they were unable to take very much along. "Automobiles, trains, and wagons from all parts of Finland moved towards the lost districts to help with the evacuation. Despite this, there was a great scarcity of vehicles."³ According to Eljas Kahra, the evacuees "had very little opportunity to take any kind of property with them. Their cattle had already been evacuated but apart from that, all that could be saved was perhaps their money, but very little else."⁴

The Finnish state had undertaken to compensate for property left in Karelia every adult Finnish citizen who moved into Finland or was transferred from an area bordering on the new national frontier. The Finnish Parliament granted 3 billion marks for such compensation. Full reimbursement was promised for values not exceeding 320,000 Finnish marks,

1. Pravda, 26 January 1940.

2. The New York Times, 28 March 1940.

3. The New York Times, 16 March 1940.

4. Reconstruction in Finland, International Labor Review, May 1941.

but only 10,000 marks could be paid in cash.¹

After Karelia's reconquest by the German-Finnish armies in 1941, 265,000 Karelians returned home prior to September 1943.² The Soviet victories and the re-incorporation of Karelia into the USSR in 1944 brought about a new evacuation of some 250,000 persons from the Karelian Isthmus. Some of them were able to take all their cattle and some of their property, but others could only take a fraction of their belongings.³ A conference of representatives of Karelian municipalities and various organizations, which took place on 5 September 1944 in Helsinki, requested that the evacuated Karelian farmers be provided with the necessary land to continue their farming work and be compensated for lost property in order that they might procure new farms and equipment.⁴

3. Polish-Soviet Exchange of Population. In September 1944, the Governments of the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics concluded with the Lublin Polish Committee for National Liberation three agreements providing for a voluntary exchange of Poles living in the Soviet-incorporated Eastern Polish provinces and of Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians living in Poland

1. Schmidt, Martin, Stand der Finnischen Umsiedlung, Neues Bauerntum, May 1941.

2. Karjala (Vipuri) 3 September 1943.

3. Stockholm Tidningen, 13 September 1944.

4. Tidningsarnas Telegrambyrå (Swedish News Agency) 6 September 1944.

proper. The full text of these agreements has not been made public, but detailed communiqués reported their main provisions.¹

According to this information, persons transferred from Polish to Soviet territory might join collective farms, or receive a plot for individual farming, not smaller in size than the one they owned before the transfer, but not to exceed 10 to 15 hectares (24 to 36 acres), per farm. Persons in non-agricultural occupations would obtain work in accordance with their education or special abilities. Persons transferred from the Soviet republics to Poland could, upon application, receive land for individual farming under the new agrarian reform, which was being carried out by the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The agreements provided that persons who chose to be transferred would be relieved of paying all their outstanding taxes, insurance contributions, and quotas of production on the territory they were leaving. In the areas of resettlement, the farms allotted to them would be free of all state taxation and insurance contributions for two years. Resettlers would receive a loan of 5,000 zloty (5,000 roubles) respectively per household for their farm equipment and other needs, repayable over a period of five

1. Pravda, 25 September 1944; Radio Polskie, Lublin, 23 September 1944; The New York Times, 15 September 1944; The Washington Post, 15 September 1944.

years. They would be permitted to take with them cattle (except sheep) and poultry, as well as household and farming equipment up to two tons per family. Movable and immovable property left behind (with the exception of land) was to be paid for in accordance with the laws of Poland or the Soviet republics. If resettlers surrendered their current crops before departure, they were to be fully reimbursed at their destination. Those who had carried out their full sowing before the transfer would receive sown areas of about the same size in the resettlement area.

IV. THE PROCESSES OF TRANSFER

A. Introduction

The previous sections have discussed the causes determining transfers of population and the problems which arise out of the transfer of property of transferred persons. The present section examines the processes by which recent transfers of population have been carried out. In a number of cases sufficient intelligence on the process of transfer was not available with respect to transfers other aspects of which have been treated above; the following discussion therefore does not cover all of the transfers mentioned above, but only those on which sufficient evidence of the nature of the process was available to permit analysis in any detail.

B. Pre-war Transfers

1. The Greek-Bulgarian Exchange of Population. The transfer of 30,000 Greeks from Bulgaria to Greece and of 53,000 Bulgarians from Greece to Bulgaria was in the main carried out individually by the transferees. The Mixed Commission, appointed in accordance with the Neuilly Convention, limited its activities in this field to a few measures which tended to facilitate the emigration of the two minorities. These measures were:¹

a. The Commission delivered passes (feuilles de route) which were the equivalent of regular passports, to emigrants who held certificates of the fiscal authorities indicating that all taxes had been paid. No such evidence was required from indigent persons if they had a certificate of the municipal authorities vouching for their indigence.

b. Free transportation by railway and 50 kilogrammes of free luggage per person were granted to indigent emigrants and members of their families. By a subsequent decision of the Commission, the fare on the railroads of Greece and Bulgaria was reduced by 50 percent for all persons emigrating under the convention, as well as for the members of their families and their movable property.

c. No export or import duty was levied on movable

1. Ladas, Stephen P. The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey. New York, 1932, pp. 116-119.

property of any kind taken along by the emigrants.

2. Greek-Turkish Exchange of Population. There was virtually no organization whatever during the first and numerically the most important stage of the Greek-Turkish exchange of population. When the Greek army was decisively defeated by the Turks in Asia Minor in September 1922 the fleeing Greek detachments were followed by the resident Greek population, with the Turkish army close at its heels. Approximately one million refugees reached the coast line. The tremendous and urgent task of evacuating them with maximum speed was accomplished by an international effort. Ships of several nations were ordered to change their course in the Mediterranean and to move with all speed in the direction of Smyrna where most of the refugees were concentrated. Small fishing boats were pressed into service. The United States Navy sent several battleships. "As this mass of human flesh pressed on from the interior it overflowed from the docks to the boats. Not a few were pushed into the sea to be drowned. The moment the ship received its quota, it quickly pulled anchor and drew out. Husbands were separated from wives, and parents from children. But there was not time to wait."¹ The destination of this stream of refugees was the mainland and the islands of Greece.

I. Allen, Harold B. Come Over to Macedonia, 1943, p. 19.

Only during the second stage of the operation did the transfer assume an organized character. Under the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty 189,996 Greeks and 355,635 Moslems had been exchanged. A Mixed Greek-Turk Commission (4 Turkish and 4 Greek representatives and three members of the League of Nations) was in charge of the whole transfer. The Commission had worked out a plan, setting the date on which each region in Greece and Turkey was to be evacuated by the persons subject to exchange, and the ports from which these persons were to gather for transportation. The government of the country of destination provided the necessary ships. As a rule, the emigrants themselves paid the transportation cost. Certain reductions in fare were made by the railways of both countries. The steamer passage of indigent persons (the accepted quota was 10 percent of 15 percent of the number of exchanged persons from each region) was paid by the Mixed Commission. The emigrants were allowed to take along movable property of every kind, free of export or import duty or any other tax.

The transfer of the Moslems from Greece was carried out with haste. The Greek Government wished to accelerate their departure in order to free their lands and dwellings for the settlement of more than a million homeless refugees. The Turkish Government was also eager to settle the Moslems from Greece on lands left by the Greek refugees, so that the

1924 crop could be reaped. It was accordingly agreed that 150,000 Moslems were to leave Greece before May 1924, the date set for the beginning of the exchange. The exodus began in the middle of November 1923. By the end of January 1924, 53,000 Moslems had already left for Turkey, and by the end of December of the same year, the transfer was almost completed.

The transfer of Greeks from Turkey was to start in May 1924. But in fact several partial transfers were carried out in December 1923. Hundreds of Greeks from the interior of Asia Minor moved towards the Black Sea and Cilician coast, and were in such destitute condition that they had to be sent on to Greece. By May 1924, 15,445 Greeks had left Turkey. By the end of 1924, the number of Greek emigrants had reached 184,629, or 92.2 of the total.¹

C. Wartime Transfers

1. The Transfer of Germans from Italian South Tyrol. The basic agreement on the transfer of the German minority in Italian South Tyrol to the Reich was concluded in Berlin on 23 June 1939; a definite treaty was signed in Rome on 21 October of the same year.²

Under the terms of these agreements all German citizens

1. Ladas, op. cit.

2. Runge, Georg, Zur Umsiedlung der Volksdeutschen, in Nation und Staat, January 1940, p. 118.

Reichsdeutsche) who resided in South Tyrol were to leave for the Reich within three months after the signature of the first agreement; they had no right of option. This group numbered 9,000 to 10,000 persons. Official emigration bureaus were opened in Bolzano and Merano in July 1939;¹ by the end of the month some 6,000 persons had already left.²

The second category of persons affected by the Italian-German agreement comprised those residents of South Tyrol who had been subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the Italian annexation of South Tyrol, and who had become Italian citizens through annexation. Their number was 266,985 in the provinces of Bolzano, Udine, Trento, and Belluno. If by 31 December 1939 they had not opted for German citizenship and resettlement in the Reich, they were to remain Italian citizens. There were 185,365 (69.45 percent of the total number) who opted for transfer to the Reich. 38,274 voted for Italy and 43,626 abstained from voting, which meant tacit retention of Italian citizenship.³

Shortly after the evacuation of Reichsdeutsche, an unascertained number of Italian citizens of German ethnic nationality, who had opposed the idea of transfer or were known for their anti-Nazi sentiments, were forcibly removed.

1. Lohar, Ernest, Beneath Another Sun (New York 1945), pp. 45-46, 48, 190. The Future of German South Tyrol (London 1939), p. 14.

2. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 October 1939.

3. Hamburger Monatshefte, 1940, p. 52.

The Fascist authorities deported to the Reich all "undesirable" elements. In Bolzano on 17 August, 1,003 of these "undesirables" were earmarked for deportation between 29 and 31 August, and 1,700 more were scheduled for deportation before 6 September 1939.¹

Soon after the plebiscite, there was a great rush to the Reich, prompted in part by nationalistic zeal and in part by fear of deportation. As early as 2 February 1940, a report from Rome put the number of Tyrolese who had already emigrated at 14,508.² (It is not clear whether or not the 9,000 Reich-deutsche are included in this figure.) A few days later, the Gauleiter of South Tyrol and Verarlberg, told the foreign press that columns variously estimated at 200-800 Tyrolese were crossing the Brenner frontier daily.³ According to official Italian statistics for 1940, the total number of emigrants from Italy to Germany was 12,308; in 1941 it did not exceed 7,584.⁴ In an article published in September 1940 in Deutsche Arbeit, Dorothea Goedicke reported that the first 50,000 repatriates comprised "all those who have no real property and whose emigration would not otherwise cause any economic harm." The article further stated that all farmers and farm laborers, as well as all workers employed in essential

1. Lehar, Ernest, op. cit., pp. 106-107, 125-126.

2. The London Times, 3 February 1940.

3. Die Suedlicher Zeitung, 8 February 1940.

4. Robilli, Beniamino, Corso di Demografia, 1943, pp. 216-217.

plants temporarily were not affected by the evacuation. "We are now enjoying a quiet spell at our branch", reported the chief of the Bolzano office of the official German Resettlement Trust (DUT). "Only about 70 South Tyrolese are now moving daily to the Reich, while during the first weeks after the plebiscite there were about 500 emigrants daily, and later an average of 200. It can truly be said that all those whose emigration was immediately possible have now left. We expect a new rush after the harvest."

This expected rush never materialized. On June 1942, the total still did not exceed 72,000¹ as compared to 65,000 at the end of 1940.

The report of the German Resettlement Trust (Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhandgesellschaft, DUT) for 1942 acknowledged that "the operation of resettling South Tyrolese was now, as always, a difficult and laborious business", but gave no figures on Tyrolese who actually moved in 1940-1942. Instead it quoted the arbitrary figure of 237,802 persons "to be taken care of" (betreut).² This figure corresponds roughly to the total number of Germans in South Tyrol eligible for option on 31 December 1939, including therefore the 185,626 who did not declare themselves and remained in Italy, and even part of the 38,274 who openly voted for the Italian

1. Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942.

2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 April 1943.

citizenship. The necessity for resort to this obviously misleading figure strongly suggests the failure of the German Tyrol resettlement scheme.

On 31 January 1943 Radio Rome reported that Mussolini had received Agostino Pedesta, who had completed his task of carrying out the Italian-German agreements concerning the Alto Adige. This seems to indicate that in 1942 the remaining 113,000 of the total optants for Germany had actually left Italy. Such an assumption is, however, hardly justified in the light of an earlier Transocean broadcast of 21 August 1942, which reported that "the German and Italian Governments are agreed that for special reasons due to the war, the resettlement of Germans from South Tyrol within the Reich in accordance with the convention of 21 October 1939, will not be possible before 31 December 1942, the original deadline agreed upon. The two Governments have consequently decided to postpone the date at which the resettlement must be terminated till 31 December 1943." All available data indicate, however, that little progress was made. The Allied invasion and the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943 halted the evacuation of the remaining South Tyrol Germans.

2. Transfer of the German Folk-groups from the Baltic States.

a. The Transfer of Estonian Germans. The transfer of

Germans from Estonia falls into two phases: the first ended in the evacuation of nearly nine-tenths of those who had opted for resettlement in the Reich and was carried through in record time; the second extended over a considerably longer period, although only about one thousand remaining Germans had to be evacuated.

The preliminary work was carried out in a speedy manner. The first statement with regard to an impending evacuation of the German minority was issued on 7 October 1939. On the same day, German transport ships dropped anchor in the Estonian ports of Tallinn, Arensburg (Kurusari), and Pernau, and prepared for the embarkation of German repatriates.

On 9 October, a Commission arrived from Berlin by air, and brought files, registers, and lists, all prepared beforehand, which contained the names of some 6,500 Germans of Tallinn and of about 2,700 Germans of Tartu.¹ The first steamer with repatriates (German citizens or stateless persons, since an agreement with the Estonian government was a prerequisite to the evacuation of Estonian citizens),² left as early as 13 October. The Volksdeutsche who had opted for

1. La France, Bordeaux, 16 October 1939.

2. According to police information, 1,500 Reichsdeutsche and 300 German citizens of other countries or stateless persons lived in Estonia in 1936. Giere, Werner, Bestandsaufnahme des estländischen Deutschtums. Deutsche Arbeit (1937), Heft 1, p. 17.

repatriation were meanwhile assembled in special camps in view of their impending departure. On 18 October, the steamer Utlandshoern left Tallinn with 464 repatriates, including over 30 percent of the Reich citizens. The remainder were Estonian Germans, mostly from the provinces. The speed of the evacuation is revealed by the following list of departures from Reval (Tallinn) published in Revalsche Zeitung of 16 November 1939:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name of boat</u>	<u>Number of resettlers</u>
18 October	Utlandshoern	464
19 October	Der Deutsche	911
21 October	Oldenburg	964
22 October	Elder	463
24 October	Sierra Cordoba	1,007
25 October	Orotawa	590
27 October	Der Deutsche	996
28 October	Oceana	815
30 October	Sierra Cordoba	1,109
2 November	Der Deutsche	1,131
4 November	Oceana	863
6 November	Sierra Cordoba	955
15 November	Sierra Cordoba	318

Thus, 10,586 persons left Estonia by the port of Tallinn (Reval) alone, on seven ships, each of which made two, three

and even four trips. The evacuation of the German minority was in the main completed in 28 days, between 18 October and 15 November 1939. On 30 November, after the first general census of repatriates was taken, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that 11,200 Germans had left Estonia to date. According to the list of persons who lost Estonian citizenship in connection with the repatriation published in the Estonian Official Gazette, 11,760 repatriates had left Estonia before the end of 1939.¹ About 900 Germans residing in Estonia but not Estonian citizens, must be added to this total.

The first phase of the evacuation was thus terminated. Only those Germans who had not opted in favor of the Reich or those delayed by liquidation of property remained in the country. Repatriation of the latter, a relatively small group, took more time than the evacuation of the first 11,760 repatriants.

The Estonian-German protocol had foreseen this eventuality: "Persons who must remain a longer time in Estonia in order to avoid an unduly hasty liquidation of economic relations connected with the resettlement, can benefit from the facilities foreseen in this protocol for a period of three months. A list of affected persons will be established in due course."

1. Nation und Staat (June 1940), p. 307.

The three-month delay stipulated in the protocol expired on 15 January 1940. However, the evacuation could not be completed prior to that date, and in January 1940 Estonia and the Reich concluded a new agreement which extended to 7 March 1940 the period for resettlement of about one thousand Germans who had stayed behind for the liquidation of their business interests.¹ However, this new extension of time also proved insufficient. The Baltic Times reported in May 1940 that the steamer Der Deutsche was to evacuate the last 400 to 500 Germans and their movable property between 15 and 18 May. Ten days later, a spokesman for the Estonian Ministry of the Interior stated that "in the last stages of repatriation some Balts who had already filed repatriation papers tried to renounce their expressed intention."²

The statement quoted above referred to the last remnants of the German population of Estonia, which had opted for repatriation to Germany. However, in addition to the overwhelming majority of Germans who had answered the call of the Führer, there were those who, in the words of Otto D. Telischus, had refused "to leave the 'Butterland' for the 'Mutterland'".³ The census of 1934 reported 16,346 Germans in Estonia. According to official German data, 12,900 Germans left Estonia. Thus about 3,500 Germans (20 percent) failed to

1. The Baltic Times, 4 January 1940.

2. The Baltic Times, 14 January 1940.

3. The New York Times, 25 October 1939.

register for repatriation.¹

This was a serious failure of the Reich repatriation policy, and a dangerous precedent. The Frankfurter Zeitung of 25 November attempted to minimize the number of these "recalcitrant" Germans. The newspaper, which only four weeks earlier, on 29 October, had estimated the total number of Germans in Estonia at 20,000 to 25,000 now spoke of 14,000 Estonian Germans only. Those who refused to depart were "persons who for many years have been staying far from everything German, and therefore have not been carried away with the general flow of repatriation."

b. The Transfer of Latvian Germans. The exodus of Germans from Latvia also falls into two periods: the preparatory phase, a disproportionately long period; and the actual evacuation, which was completed within the time limits set by the treaty, although not without difficulties. The Reich was not responsible for the initial delays, since all preparatory steps had been carried out expeditiously. The Germans in Riga received the first announcement of the impending resettlement on Sunday, 8 October. On the same day, a German commission,

1. It is noteworthy that (unlike the case of Latvia) neither German nor foreign sources mention the presence of non-German (racial) elements among the evacuees from Estonia. This is the more surprising as the number of mixed marriages among the Estonian Germans was very considerable. An inquiry made among the pupils of the German schools in the summer of 1930 established that only 53.5 percent of the German pupils had two German parents: 46.5 percent of German pupils belonged to "mixed" families. Krisis im baltischen Deutschland, Kulturwehr, 1931. Heft. 3.

headed by Minister Twardowsky and including economic advisers, arrived at Riga.¹ And as early as 9 October, the New York Times received a cable from its Copenhagen correspondent which reported German transport ships in the ports of Riga, Liepaja (Libau), and Vindavpils (Windau), and added that the steamer Friedericke was to leave Riga that very night with the first batch of repatriates. On 11 October Edmund Stevens, correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, reported the presence at Riga of ten ships for emigrants. Other ships awaited their turn anchored off shore. "It soon developed, however, that such an evacuation was no simple matter, involving as it does many personal and economic problems not only for the would-be emigrants but also for the states concerned, which can be settled only by interstate treaties", reported Tolischus to The New York Times in a cable from Tallinn (25 October 1939). And unlike Estonia, where some problems were left pending, Latvia barred the departure of any of its German citizens until a method for the settlement of property questions had been agreed upon.² Only Germans in Latvia who were not Latvian citizens, but nationals of the Reich or other countries, or else stateless persons, were permitted to leave Latvia, regardless of the state of negotiations. For this reason, the steamer Scharnhorst, which left Riga on 14 October,

1. The New York Times, 10 October 1939.

2. The New York Times, 21 October 1939.

carried only 488 repatriants although she had space for 900 passengers; on her second call to Riga, on 27 October, the Scharnhorst transported another group of 450 Reichsdeutsche. The bulk of Latvian citizens of German descent had to wait for three and a half weeks until the negotiations were terminated.

This unforeseen delay at one time threatened the entire evacuation enterprise. It largely negated the psychological advantages of a rapid departure. Acting on first impulse, the overwhelming majority of Latvian Germans responded to the appeal for repatriation, and, without giving it much thought, decided to resettle in the Reich, and hastily sold their movable property for a mere fraction of its value. But as they had to wait, in empty apartments, their luggage packed, they had time to think matters over, and some discontent developed. A Havas cable from Riga, dated 18 October (the tenth day of the German-Latvian negotiations), reported that because of the delay in the evacuation, "discontent grows among Latvian Germans. Many refuse to wind up their business, others have cancelled their decision to resettle. Street fights between the partisans and adversaries of the resettlement are not infrequent."¹

On 30 October, the treaty was finally concluded. It

1. Posledniya Novosti, 19 October 1939.

stipulated that the resettlement was to be conducted as a single operation, -and- that "after reception of the certificate of release, the resettlers must leave Latvia before 15 December 1939." (Art IV). The representatives of the Reich were anxious to speed up the evacuation as much as possible, and impressed its urgency upon the German population. But, on the other hand, they tried to obtain an adequate period of time in their negotiations with the Latvian government, as they were fully aware of the difficulties inherent in a speedy mass evacuation. The original draft of the treaty was presented by the Embassy of the Reich in Riga at the first meeting (11 October) of the "government commission for an orderly repatriation of Latvian citizens of German nationality." It contained provisions for a time span of over five months, ending 31 March 1940. The Official Gazette of the Latvian government (Valdibas Vestnesis) emphasized on the next day that there were no grounds for believing that the Latvian government would accept that proposal "it is undesirable for the abnormal situation which has been witnessed in recent days to continue and for the people to be prey to all sorts of influences and rumors. It is also undesirable that government bodies should have to spend much time on the settlement of questions which have been raised without the desire of the Latvian government to participate."¹

1. Valdibas Vestnesis, 12 October 1939, No. 232. Italics in the original text.

Instead of 31 March 1940, the time limit for the evacuation was set for 15 December 1939. The treaty was to become valid only after both groups had ratified the instruments. This did not occur until 7 November; on Saturday, 4 November, however, the German transport ship Steuben left Riga with the first shipload. The boat, which normally carried about 1,800 tourists, transported 2,856 repatriates together with their bulky luggage. Over one thousand passengers, mostly men, slept on straw in the ship's holds and elsewhere; the cabins were given to old people, women, children, and patients.¹ More transports followed in rapid succession. There were no transportation difficulties. The speedy liquidation of property, however, created serious problems. Five days before the scheduled departure of the last boat, a number of Germans were not ready to leave and applied, on 8 December, to the German Ambassador in Riga, for an extension until 15 May 1940. An anonymous letter received by the Ambassador contained the following passage: "One cannot ask all Germans to obliterate the past in 45 days and to leave their old homeland before they settle everything honestly and without nervous strain. Therefore, a resettlement of 70,000 Germans in 45 days is altogether impossible and beyond expectation. It has already led to countless tragedies. We hope that a prolongation (of

1. The Times (London), 7 November 1939.

this period) will serve not only the interests of the Great German Reich but will also be agreeable to the Latvian state and, above all, will help those Germans who for sundry reasons would otherwise be forced to stay here."¹ The Ambassador of the Reich, however, refused categorically to intervene on behalf of those who asked for a further delay. In a statement published on 9 December in Rigasche Rundschau he declared that "the two contracting parties fully realized that the contemplated operation was a painful one and claimed sacrifices from both sides. For precisely this reason...they decided... to make the postponement necessary for this operation because of a number of technical factors, and then not to exceed this time-limit since it is clear that a painful decision does not become less painful through further delay."

The repatriation continued at the same rapid pace and, by 15 October, the number of persons who had left Latvia by virtue of the Latvian-German treaty had reached 47,810.² Since the total number of repatriates from Latvia was 48,641, it appears that those who failed to observe the time-limit set by the treaty numbered only about 850. The resettlement of Germans from Latvia was carried out in 45 days.

1. This letter was fully quoted in the negative reply by the German Ambassador, published in Rigasche Rundschau, 9 December 1939.

2. La France, 17 October 1939. On 16 December the steamer Der Deutsche brought to Gottenhafen over 900 German repatriates, and on 17 December, the last 750 repatriates from Latvia arrived on the Sierra Cordeba (Frankfurter Zeitung, 19 December 1939).

The evacuation of the German-Latvian farmers was especially thorough. The leader of the German farmers in Latvia, V. Siverts, told a correspondent of the Rigasche Rundschau (13 December 1939) that "not a single peasant had remained behind. All have answered the call of the Führer." The repatriated farmers exported 6,000 head of horses, cows, sheep, and other livestock, besides agricultural equipment, household furniture, and fodder.¹

In the middle of February 1940, the Essener Nationalzeitung announced that the resettlement of the German minorities from Estonia and Latvia had been completed. About one hundred boat trips had been made to carry approximately 60,000 resettlers.² In addition, 200 German-Latvian citizens applied at Latvian consulates for transfer of citizenship.³

According to the census of 1935, 62,144 Germans lived in Latvia. On the other hand, according to official German data, 48,641 persons had been evacuated in 1939-40 by virtue of the Latvian-German treaty of evacuation. The number of those who remained, was thus over 13,500 or 21.7 percent.

Apparently a considerable number of persons who were not of German descent had left the country together with the

1. Priebe, Hermann. Die Ansiedlung baltendeutscher Bauern im Warthegau, Neues Bauertum (April-May 1940), p. 163.

2. Posledniya Novosti, 19 February 1940.

3. Latvian Information Bulletin, 31 January 1940, p. 2.

Volksdeutsche, taking advantage of the German evacuation to escape Latvia because they feared possible bolshevization of the country. Indications to this effect are found scattered throughout German and non-German sources.¹

According to available data, it can be said that of the total number of 78,500 Germans in the Baltic, nearly 61,500 were "repatriated;" about 17,000 Germans remained (21.7 percent), a much higher percentage than in subsequent German resettlements.

c. Organization of the Transfers. The evacuation machinery was set up by Himmler (as head of Festigung des deutschen Volkstum), whom Hitler had put in charge of the entire evacuation scheme and the personnel was recruited almost exclusively among the local Baltic Germans. The Reich merely sent its ships to the ports of embarkation and took away the Volksgenossen.²

An attempt had at first been made to build the entire organization on a purely voluntary basis. But, according to a report by the Riga correspondent of the London Times, the voluntary system did not produce the expected results. A mobilization was decreed: "All males between 20 and 26 were

1. Baltenbriefe zur Rückkehr in Reich. Berlin. Leipzig 1940, pp. 28, 29, 35. Latvian Information Bulletin, 31 January 1940. See also: The New York Times for October 1939 and Christian Science Monitor for October 1939.

2. Thoss, Alfred, Das grosse Werk der Umsiedlung. Volk und Reich, 1941, p. 62.

summoned for compulsory service until the completion of transportation. A similar order called up all doctors under 60, lawyers under 65, and nurses under 49."¹

Young men and women assisted with the evacuation in the towns. "The National-Socialist organizations in Latvia were not intended to become resettlement bodies, but...they acted in that capacity, which enabled a frictionless realization of that tremendous organizational task. Shoulder to shoulder with men and women stood boys and girls who acted not only as messengers and auxiliaries but bore a direct responsibility in the field of supplies, in the organization and clearing."²

Precise data are lacking as to the numerical strength of this improvised machinery, but it seems that the contribution was considerable.

The evacuation bodies worked without interruption throughout the entire transfer period. Their personnel left only between 9 and 15 December.

As far as can be gathered from German and foreign sources, the departure itself was carried out smoothly. The Reich had sent the necessary number of ships. At first, they were overcrowded: the number of passengers considerably

1. The Times (London), 11 November 1939.

2. Besse, Dr. Heinrich, Das Aufbauwerk der baltendeutschen Jugend, Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 24 January 1940.

exceeded their normal capacity; only women, children and old people received proper sleeping accommodations; the rest slept on the floor, in the passageways, and on deck. These conditions were gradually improved and the ships departed with a number of passengers corresponding to available accommodations. The order of departure was also settled. Every evacuee was given a ticket with the name of his boat and the date of embarkation. Luggage was usually brought on board on the eve of departure. The evacuees embarked without hurry, but without delay. The steamer Oceana was transformed into a floating hospital for 680 patients. Two steamers, the Bremerhafen and Oldenburg, were reserved for mental patients and criminals. The only noteworthy incident in the course of the entire project was an attempt against the German steamer Sierra Cordoba, which left Riga on 9 December 1939, with 1,200 passengers. One of the guards noticed in the luggage a parcel in which an incendiary bomb was discovered. The steamer was brought back to the port where 500 passengers were transferred to another German steamer, the Adler, and some others sent ashore and placed in special barracks.¹ This incident had no further repercussions. Other steamers sailed according to plan; in the course of the last five days, between 11 and 15 December, eight German steamers left Latvia. The departing steamers were

1. Rigasche Rundschau, 13 December 1939.

watched more strictly and the evacuees received orders to refuse all gift packages, unless they could be opened before departure.

The ports of destination were Danzig, Stettin, Königsberg, and Gdynia. On some days as many as four thousand evacuees arrived in Danzig-Langfuhr. Fritz Gerlach in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik summarized the evacuation work as follows: "11 steamships carried 62,000 Baltic Germans and 293,000 cubic meters of luggage. They travelled 121,000 maritime miles. The storage of the luggage brought by the evacuees required 300 to 350 thousand square meters of floor space. The steamers also carried 1,600 horses, 400 head of cattle, 580 pigs, 370 head of sheep and 950 crates of poultry."¹

3. Transfer of the German Minorities from Soviet-incorporated (Former Polish) Provinces.

a. The Evacuation of 128,000 Volksdeutsche. The number of Germans evacuated under the terms of the Soviet agreement of 3 November 1939 from the former Eastern regions of Poland during the winter of December 1939-February 1940 has been given as follows:²

1. Thoss, Alfred, Die Umsiedlungen und Optionen im Rahmen der Neuordnung Europas, and Gerlach, Fritz, Ein neuer Abschnitt deutscher Volksgeschichte, Both in: Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (March 1941), pp. 126, 126-127.

2. Tornau, Dr., Die Alters- und Berufsschichtung der volksdeutschen Rücksiedler, Nation und Staat (March 1941), pp. 223-224.

Evacuated from Volhynia	64,554
Evacuated from Galicia	55,400
Evacuated from Narov District	<u>8,053</u>
Total	128,007

The same figure was given by Gradman, who added that "the number of residents belonging to these national groups was usually given as somewhat lower."¹ In fact, official Polish statistics counted only 46,383 Germans in Volhynia, and even German sources never numbered them above 60,000. The number of evacuees was 64,554, and thus exceeded the first evaluation by 40 percent and the second by over 7 percent.² According to pre-war official Polish data, 36,000 Germans lived in Galicia; German sources put their number at about 51,000; the actual number of evacuees was 55,400. These figures are respectively 9 and 53 percent higher than the estimates.³ (There were no exact statistical data on the number of German settlers in the district of Narov).

Dr. Gradman attributed this discrepancy to the fact that "under the tremendous influence of the unification (Zusammenführung) of German blood and in view of the possibility of returning to the Reich, many persons discovered in themselves a Germanism (Deutschtum) which they had long for-

1. Gradman, Dr. W., Die umgesiedelten deutschen Volksgruppen, Zeitschrift für Politik (May 1941), p. 284.

2. von Loesch, Karl, Der Sieg des Volksgedanken, Volk und Reich (1941), Heft 1, pp. 798, 234.

3. Frankfurter Zeitung, 10 December 1939.

getton." However, in a preceding paragraph, the writer admitted that in Galicia "racially alien elements participated in the evacuation, as happened also in Volhynia." There are no reliable data to support a positive statement that considerable numbers of anti-Soviet non-German elements were evacuated together with the Germans, as happened in the Baltic States.¹

The time limit set by the treaty for the completion of the evacuation expired on 1 March 1940. The Reich thus had 119 days for the operation. Over a month was spent in organizing the evacuation groups and in planning. On 9 December 307 members of the German Resettlement Squad (Umsiedlungskommando) crossed the Soviet frontier. Preparatory work on the spot took a few days. Registration started on 15 December, evacuation started on 20 December, and was carried through in a short time. Of the total of 128,000 German evacuees, 118,000 crossed the Soviet border between 21 December 1939 and 31 January 1940. The evacuation of the remaining 10,000 Germans was completed on 9 February, when the last train of transferees reached Zgierz.² Not until

1. An indirect and belated indication (but indirect indications are numerous) is to be found in the decision of the Landgerichte of Inowraclaw and Lodz, (Litzmannstadter Zeitung, 3 January 1943) which pronounced the nullification of two marriages factitiously contracted during the resettlement action in 1939-1940 by Germans and persons of Russian nationality who "had not the intention of contracting a real marriage but only wanted to leave Russia in this way."

2. Sommer, Hellmuth, 135,000 gewannen das Vaterland, Berlin, 1940, p. 59.

22 February did the official DMB announce that "repatriation of German families from Volhynia, Galicia, and the district of Narev was completed" and that the forces mobilized for that work were being gradually withdrawn.¹

The major part of the evacuation was thus completed long before the 1 March time-limit: 92.2 percent of the total number had been evacuated by 31 January, within a period of forty days, and one month before the final date. This represents an average of 2,800 evacuees a day. In the course of the first 21 days, before 10 January, 76,413 evacuees or two-thirds of the total number crossed the border (68,143 by train and 8,300 by road) at a rate of 3,640 a day; in the course of the next 18 days the total number increased to 104,000, a rate of 1,550 a day; during the last three days the remainder of the 118,000 evacuees left at a rate of 4,600 evacuees per day. In addition to men, women, and children, a tremendous volume of property and livestock were evacuated: 22,000 horses, over 1,500 head of cattle, and over 12,000 carts.²

b. The Transfer Machinery. The evacuation of Germans from Latvia and Estonia had been organized and conducted by their own local groups: the Reich had merely provided ships

1. Frankfurter Zeitung, 23 February 1940. Sommer mentions however, that the repatriation was completed only by 11 March 1940 (p. 8).

2. Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 and 19 January 1940; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 February 1940; The New York Times, 7-February 1940.

for the transportation of repatriates. The evacuation from Volhynia, Galicia, and the district of Narov was conducted in a different manner. It was carried out from beginning to end by a special Umsiedlungskommando (Resettlement Squad) sent from the Reich. Despite the success of the method applied in the Baltic States, Himmler, head of all repatriation activities, had decided not to apply it in the evacuation from Soviet-incorporated Eastern Poland. The Soviet-German treaty of 3 November provided a special, purely administrative, mixed Soviet-German evacuation machinery. The official communique of 4 November stated: "In no way may the repatriates take the initiative in their departure...Individuals may not cross the frontier, but must secure permission of the plenipotentiaries and travel by groups on foot or in railway cars. The repatriates must wait at their places of residence until they are requested to express their preferences...It is most essential that the evacuation procedure be complied with...A specially organized body will undertake the preparatory work and the carrying out of all tasks in order to ensure a speedy completion (Abwicklung)."¹ The communique stated further that a special mixed German-Soviet Commission would be created by the two governments for the purpose of evacuation, to be conducted by specially appointed chief plenipotenti-

1. Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 November 1939.

aries and their staffs. The German chief plenipotentiary was to establish his headquarters at Luck. Since it was assumed that the number of Ukrainian and White Russian transferees from the German sphere of influence would by far exceed the number of German evacuees (an assumption which proved to be erroneous) the Soviet government was to appoint two chief plenipotentiaries with residences at Cholm and Yaroslaw. To each chief a "chief government representative" of the country was to be attached. Both officials (the chief plenipotentiary and the chief government representative) were to appoint delegates ("plenipotentiaries" and "government representatives") for each district. Sommer explained this structure in the following manner: "Each (German) plenipotentiary -- from the one at chief headquarters (at Luck) down to those in the smallest local headquarters -- had attached to him a Soviet government representative who, in close contact with the German plenipotentiary, was to arrange everything in order to make the evacuation possible."¹

With this dual German-Soviet administrative agency, the prospective evacuees could get in touch at the lowest level only, i.e., with the local plenipotentiaries.

Until the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, there was little information as to the methods of organization and

1. Sommer, op. cit., p. 14.

the work of the Soviet side of the evacuation machinery. The Soviet press was silent on the point, and German sources limited themselves to very general praise of the "courtesy and helpfulness" of Soviet Government representatives. Even after 22 June 1941, Soviet sources gave no additional information. But the Vienna Südost-Echo published in its issue of 5 July 1941, an article by Dr. Leonard Oberascher, who had been head of the German Resettlement Squad in Bessarabia in the fall of 1940. He related in detail the set-up and proceedings of the local Soviet evacuation machinery. Oberascher himself had seen it at work in Bessarabia, but his article was also based upon the experience of German families from Volhynia, Galicia, and Bessarabia. Oberascher's report is biased though his statements about the organization of the Soviet staff may be accurate.

He reported that the local Soviet evacuation groups were headed by junior officers, each assisted by a civilian; the officers were members of the NKVD troops of the People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs. Oberascher stressed in particular the part played by "inspectors", frequently women, who were to supervise and direct the evacuation and keep a check on the other members of the commission. The German observer declared that these "inspectors" were entrusted with full powers and were extremely efficient throughout the evacua-

tion.

Abundant material on the organization and activity of the German side of the evacuation agency is found in the German press. Over three hundred persons, chiefly officials or honorary members of the National Socialist Party came from the Reich¹ to Soviet-incorporated Poland for the purpose of evacuation. They were recruited chiefly on recommendation from the League for Germanism Abroad (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Auslande). The evacuation team was given a thorough course of training. It was first brought to Berlin to attend a special series of lectures on repatriation problems. Field problems were studied in special seminars. Regional and local plenipotentiaries were appointed beforehand, together with specialists familiar with the characteristics of the different localities. Medical, sanitary, food, and transport units were selected and received appropriate training.

Obersturmbannführer Hoffmeyer, with the rank of chief plenipotentiary, was put at the head of the Kommando of 307 members. The Kommando left Berlin on 26 November; 37 members were kept as reserves and 270 crossed the Soviet border on 8 December.² On 9 December, they all arrived at their designated places of activity.

1. Wir holen unsere Brüder heim, Der Volksdeutsche, No. 23/24, December 1939.

2. Beckhaecker, Heinz, Umsiedlungs-Weihnachten, Der Volksdeutsche, December 1939.

The Umsiedlungskommando's field of activity extended from the Carpathians, across the Lemberg-Przemysl region and the territories farther north, to Bielsk, Lida, and even Druja, on the Latvian border; it covered an area almost 683 miles in length and 310 miles in width, or 211,000 square miles.¹

This territory was divided into seven regions: three in Volhynia (with centers at Luck, Kestopol, and Wladimir Wolynski), three in Eastern Galicia (with centers at Lemberg, Stanislavov, and Stryj), and one in the Narev area (with a center at Bielsk Podlaski).² Each of the seven regional plenipotentiaries had under him some of the fifty local plenipotentiaries. Each of the local plenipotentiaries had control of six to seven communities.³ General Headquarters were at Luck and had at their disposal about fifty cars, exclusive of the motorized transport for the evacuees.⁴

Registration began on 15 December 1939. Thousands of Germans arrived from the vicinity of each registration center on foot and in carts. "Without special organization even the remotest cabins learned that the return to the Reich had begun, as soon as the German Resettlement Squad arrived," wrote Alfred Thoss.⁵ Special commissions for the registration of

1. Sommer, op. cit., p. 13.

2. Der Volksdeutsche, March 1940.

3. The New York Times, 10 December 1939.

4. Sommer, loc. cit.

5. Thoss, Alfred, Das grosse Werk der Umsiedlung, Volk und Reich, 1941, I. pp. 62-63.

prospective evacuees were set up in towns, and in the more important villages. All who wanted to go to the Reich had to supply the following information on special registration cards: 1. Number of households and persons; 2. Name, age, place and date of birth; 3. Nationality and profession; 4. Address; 5. Religion; 6. Number of horses; 7. Mode of transportation chosen.

Each evacuee was handed an identification card, which contained his origin, number of the evacuation list, residence, and current number of the evacuation records. At the frontier each evacuee was given a numbered badge to be worn around his neck for identification while circulating in the assembling camps. Registration was carried out within the prescribed limits and without incident. The registration machinery worked smoothly, especially in the villages. According to German sources, the German peasants were eager to respond to the appeal of the Führer. "The people here do not ask what their fate will be. They go unreservedly towards the Reich and trust the Führer who will give them work and bread," Sommer asserted.¹

The Soviet groups were reportedly open to all German suggestions and did their utmost to facilitate the evacuation.² The Soviet evacuation bodies put at their disposal the avail-

1. 135,000 gewannen das Vaterland, p. 18.

2. Frankfurter Zeitung, 10 December 1939.

able means of transportation. The Berlin correspondent of The New York Times reported on 15 January that custom and financial control at the crossing points met with no difficulties, since the "Germans were well aware what was permitted to be carried away and Russian administrative bodies treated the entire resettlement action with much political tact."

c. The Transportation Problem. In the exodus of Germans from Volhynia and Galicia, out of the total number of 128,000 evacuees, over 95,000 (74.1 percent) reached the Soviet-German frontier by rail; 25,000 or over 20 percent arrived by road in carts, described in German propaganda as "the great trek"; 1,000 evacuees arrived in eleven motorized truck units and, over 7,500 arrived on foot.¹

The communique on the Soviet-German treaty published on 4 November 1939, stated that "certain limitations must be expected with regard to the property which can be taken away." The communique continued, "In so far as the transportation shall be conducted by road and not by rail, (the evacuees) will be authorized to carry along their personal property including a cart with two horses for each household and also a modest quantity of livestock."² This authorization was, so to speak, a function of the elected mode of transportation. If

1. Gerlach, Fritz, Auf neuer Scholle (Berlin-Leipzig 1940), p. 12.

2. Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 November 1939.

a transferred family renounced transportation by railroad, they were entitled to undertake the journey by their own means and authorized to take out a cart and two horses. In order to save at least part of their livestock and movable property, Volhynian and Galician German peasants sent old people, women and children by train, and proceeded themselves by road to the Soviet-German line of demarcation. Sometimes their wives and grown children accompanied them.¹

The German evacuation groups spent a considerable amount of energy in preparing for the evacuation by road. Detailed itineraries were compiled with ample descriptions of the road to follow, notes on the length of each stage, and time to be spent for rest. Feeding stations were set up, for both men and cattle (each cow needed 100 lbs. of hay per day). The speed of each convoy was calculated so as to avoid overtaxing the feeding stations. German engineering troops built emergency bridges over the rivers at the frontier.

An average convoy was composed of 212 carts, each drawn by two horses and carrying a load varying from 600 to 2,000 lbs.² The primitive wagons were covered with canvas,

1. Gerlach, Fritz, (Auf neuer Scholle, p. 12) points out that only the great number of children and the exceedingly hard winter frost led many evacuees to take advantage of the train communications: otherwise the number of repatriates making use of the trek would have been much larger.

2. Heimkehr aus Polen, Frankfurter Zeitung, 14 January 1940. Engelhardt-Kyffhäuser speaks about treks comprising 500 carts and 9 to 10 miles long. Das Buch vom grossen Treck, (Berlin 1941), p. 37.

bark, and thatched straw to guard the travelers against the bitter cold.¹ These caravans advanced at the rate of 25 to 35 miles a day, over roads deep in snow. Women and children often accompanied men; sometimes a child was born en route.² The evacuees spent nights on the road. They did not ask shelter in nearby villages, but unharnessed the horses, and covered them with blankets. Young people collected wood in the nearby forests, lighted fires and boiled water for the tea into which everybody dipped his ice-cold, hard piece of bread. No one was allowed to sleep, for fear of frostbite. Special men were appointed as watchers to wake up those who fell asleep. From time to time the evacuees rubbed themselves with snow, the better to withstand the cold. "Often the nightly rest was only for two hours; had the rest been longer, the horses would have perished from frost."³

The last convoy was reported on 22 January 1940. Altogether, 12,772 wagons with 22,461 horses crossed the Soviet-German border.⁴

As indicated above, 70 to 80 percent of the evacuees arrived at the frontier in trains put at their disposal by

1. The New York Times, 13 January 1940.
2. "When, on 6 January, a transport arrived at the German frontier, a frail, thin voice sounded from one of the carriages; a child was just born." Das Buch vom grossen Treck (p. 36).
3. Sommer, op. cit., pp. 32, 59; Das Schwarze Korps, 15 February 1940.
4. Gerlach, Fritz, Ein neuer Abschnitt der deutschen Volksgeschichte, Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, March 1941, p. 150; Thoss, Dr. Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen (Berlin 1942), pp. 27, 30.

the Soviet authorities. The chief German evacuation headquarters at Luck were given the exact time-table of the departure of these trains. "The only difficulty was in synchronizing their arrival at the frontier so as not to put too much strain upon the receiving centers at the Reich border."¹ By the middle of January 1940 this difficulty had been overcome. The first train with evacuees left on 20 December, and on 10 January, 55 trains (of the proposed total of 73) had already arrived at the frontier, carrying 64,000 evacuees. The trains averaged 30 to 40 miles per day.²

Whether by train, truck, convey, or on foot, German evacuees finally reached the German-Soviet border. The treaty of 3 November had established ten transit points at the frontier. In fact, only six were used; the most important was Przemysl, which cleared 41 percent of all the evacuees, although it was scheduled to shelter only 19,000 persons. Next came Hrubieszow with 33 percent, Tjraspol with 10 percent and Prostken with 8 percent. Traffic through Derohusk (2 percent) and Nowy-Zagorz-Sanok (1 percent) was insignificant. All road convoys passed through Przemysl or Hrubieszow.³

Careful preparations for the reception of the repatriates

1. Scammer, op. cit., p. 17.

2. Thoss, op. cit., p. 25; Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 January 1940; The New York Times, 13 January 1940.

3. Die Umsiedlungsaktion abgeschlossen, in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 February 1940.

were made at these points of transit. According to a plan prepared in advance, the transferees were to rest there for some time after their trying trip. Percival Knuth described these border receiving centers in the following words: "At border stations they [The evacuated Germans] are quartered in abandoned factories, railroad stations, schools, or other large buildings. Their barracks are primitive but warm, with piles of straw for bedding and plenty of hot food prepared by the Red Cross and National Socialist Welfare organization. Many of them unpacked their huge fourposter beds to get a good sleep during the brief stay in transient camps."¹

Sommer gives a more complete description of the arrangement of receiving centers at Hrubieszow and Dorohusk. In Hrubieszow, the camp was located in a big sugar factory which had somehow escaped damage during the Polish-German campaign. The Schutzpolizei and the Polizeireserve undertook to transform this desolated building into a receiving center for thousands of Germans. A wooden floor was constructed which covered an area of one thousand square meters. Straw was piled up one meter high. Chairs and tables were built on the spot, as well as large closets for the personal luggage of the evacuees. The huge factory boilers were heated until the thick walls became warm. Toilets and lavatories with hot and cold water

1. The New York Times, 13 January 1940.

were constructed. Stables were built and fodder prepared for the cattle. In Derohusk, where the number of evacuees was considerably less and where there was no empty factory at hand, thirty policemen from the Reich had built a camp of barracks. The local population had been conscripted for work on the camp: every one was compelled to work a certain number of hours on the construction of the barracks. The peasants were required to supply transportation for the building materials. The camp is called "a model camp" by the German author.¹

In these reception camps the evacuees rested for a day or two, and then resumed their journey. 270 trains were provided by the German Eastern railways to bring them to the tremendous collection camps near Lodz. The first such train arrived at the Pabianice camp on 23 December 1939, the last reached the Zgierz camp on 9 February 1940, 49 days later. For those who arrived in Soviet trains, the Eastern railways prepared 140 trains of 10 to 12 cars each, which could carry about 1,200 persons. Those who arrived by road were accommodated in 130 trains of 30 cars each. According to the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, each such train could carry 120 to 160 persons, 200 horses and 120 carts.²

On the average, two trains a day left the German-

1. Sommer, op. cit., pp. 27-29.

2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 February 1940.

Soviet border for the region of Lodz (Litzmannstadt). Sixty-six collection camps were prepared for their reception: 33 camps for some 25,000 evacuees were established in the Lodz district, 12 camps for 20,000 people in the Pabianice region, 8 camps for 10,000 people in the region of Zgierz, and 13 camps for 7,000 people in the Kalisz area.¹ An idea of the preparatory work is indicated by the need for 10,000 stoves and 1,200,000 pounds of straw for bedding; 45,000 straw mattresses were manufactured and 115,000 blankets provided. Good stables for 22,461 horses were made available. Room was required for 12,722 carts and the luggage they carried -- including some 3,500,000 pounds of flour, 600,000 pounds of oats, considerable supplies of meat, etc. A disinfecting establishment was set up at Pabianice. Some 1,253 head of cattle brought by evacuees had to be slaughtered to prevent a possible outbreak of disease among the animals.²

The largest collection camp was at Pabianice where a big weaving establishment had been converted into living quarters. The spacious rooms were well heated. Hot food was carried in insulated kettles from the huge kitchens. Food for children under 2 years of age was cooked in a separate kitchen. Physicians and beds were ready for prospective patients. All of the evacuees' wearing apparel underwent a

1. Thoss, Dr. Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 23.

2. Semmer, op. cit.

thorough disinfection. In other camps, the evacuees were not housed in one building, but scattered in week-end houses in the forest.¹

In evacuating 128,000 persons in such a short period of time by primitive means of transportation, diseases and epidemics were a constant threat. According to all available data, the evacuees escaped this danger.

Organized sanitary and hygienic (both curative and prophylactic) measures were apparently taken only during the second phase of the evacuation, after the transferees had crossed the German border. This gave rise to the rumor that many died from coal and privations. After the evacuation was terminated, Vechorniyaya Moskva denied these rumors and asserted that "20 persons only died on the way to the German frontier out of 80,000 men, women, and children who left Western Ukraine."² The same statement is made in German sources. SS Oberfuehrer Dr. Behrends told foreign correspondents that the death-rate among the evacuees during their journey to the Soviet-German line of demarcation was below average. The normal mortality rate in the Reich was 11.7 per thousand. Accordingly, 80 deaths could be expected among the 80,000 Germans who arrived at the frontier by 19 January 1940. In fact, only 55 deaths occurred: two-thirds of them were persons

1. Thess, Alfred, op. cit.; Sommer, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
2. Quoted from Pesledniya Novosti, Paris, 27 February 1940.

over 60, and one-third children who died from scarlet fever. On the other hand, 66 children were born during the journey.¹ German sources attributed the health record to two factors: the exceptionally healthy condition of the evacuees and the terrible cold which checked the threat of epidemic diseases.²

After the Volksdeutsche had crossed the Soviet-German border, they were cared for by special German medical and sanitary services.

In the beginning of December, 220 members of the German Red Cross were sent to Lodz, where at that time all repatriation activities were centered. Part of this personnel were attached to provisional camps for the repatriated Germans, others were sent to frontier stations or to the points near the frontier, to Lublin, Zamosc, Hrubieszow, Derehusk, Biala, or Chelm. Shortly afterwards, the Red Cross personnel was quadrupled and at the end of the evacuation there were 20 nurses, 554 assistant nurses, and 265 helpers.³ The German medical association provided 45 physicians. Medical groups met the evacuees on the Soviet side of the frontier and noted their special requirements. Five hospitals with hundreds of beds awaited eventual patients. A tremendous stock of drugs was also on hand: 40,000 anti-neuralgic pills, 40,000 analgesic pills, medication against frostbite, heatpads, thermometers,

1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 20 January 1940.

2. Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

3. Frankfurter Zeitung, 11 February 1940.

bed linen, bandaging supplies, etc.; 50 tons of semi-liquid soap and calcium chloride and 10,000 pounds of disinfecting liquids had also been stocked.¹

4. The Transfer of Germans from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

a. The Evacuation of 135,000 Volksdeutsche. In Südost-Echo of 27 October 1940, Dr. Oberascher quoted Rumanian estimates of 30 June 1940, according to which the total number of Germans in Northern Bukovina and Middle and Southern Bessarabia (that is in the Rumanian regions taken over by Russia) amounted to 122,400 persons. He indicated, however, that this estimate was not an exact indication of the number of Germans to be transferred and that results of the transfer might deviate substantially from Rumanian figures.

The difference was probably considerable. The number of Germans evacuated from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina according to German sources was 135,989,² i.e., all the 122,400 Germans listed in Rumanian statistics and an additional 13,589, or 11 percent.

The number of evacuees thus exceeded not only official Rumanian statistics, but also estimates on the size of the German population of these two regions made by the Germans themselves. According to Rumanian data there were 81,087 :

1. Sommer, op. cit.

2. Tornau, Dr., Alter und Beruf der Umsiedler, Das Reich, 11 May 1941.

Germans in Bessarabia in 1940; German sources reported 85,000. However, the number of resettlers from Bessarabia was 93,548 according to data of the German Einwandererzentrale. Available data on Northern Bukovina are contradictory. Neues Bauerntum estimated the number of Germans in Soviet-incorporated Bukovina at 27,700 (15,000 in the city and region of Czernowitz) and it was expected that not more than 25,000 Germans would be repatriated from this area.¹ According to Volk und Reich, Rumanian official statistics listed 35,000 Germans in Northern Bukovina; the number of evacuated Germans was 42,441, or increases of almost 15,000 (34 percent) and 7,500 (17 percent) respectively.²

Possibly a certain percentage of these additional Germans were assimilated persons of German origin, who had not been registered as Volksdeutsche either by Rumanian or German census counts. However, their number could hardly have amounted to 8,500 (and certainly not 11,500) in Bessarabia or to 7,500 (and 15,000) in Bukovina. By analogy with the Baltic States and Volhynia, there is every reason to believe that a considerable portion of the "stateless" persons, white Russian emigres, Ukrainian nationalists, and local "bourgeois and anti-Soviet elements" were included in the number of persons evacuated from Bessarabia and Northern

1. Neues Bauerntum (August 1940), p. 282.
2. Volk und Reich (1940) No. 12, p. 798.

Bukovina on the basis of the agreement of 5 September. The German evacuation authorities appear to have been very lenient on this score, and these persons encountered no difficulty in getting themselves placed on the lists of Germans to be repatriated. The Soviet authorities for their part also placed no obstacles in the way.

The evacuation from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was carried out at an extraordinary pace. The Soviet-German negotiations originally provided that the evacuation from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was to be completed within two months, between the beginning of September and 15 November 1940. Actually the time required was about half of that. The first transport from Bessarabia left on 23 September; the last transport reached Galatz on 23 October: an average of 13,000 persons were evacuated per day. The evacuation from Northern Bukovina took longer: the first transport left on 26 September, the last on 17 November. In all 42,411 Volksdeutsche were transferred in 49 days, at a rate of 865 persons per day.¹ Furthermore, since 88 percent of the Bessarabian and 25 percent of the Bukovinian Germans were peasants, the livestock they were permitted to take along (two oxen or two horses one cow, and ten fowls per family) was of considerable bulk.

b. Organization of the Transfer. In organizing the

I. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, Berlin 1942. p. 69.

evacuation from Bessarabia, the Reich did not enlist the help of either voluntary or mobilized local German elements from among the evacuees themselves, as had been the case in the Baltic States. As in Galicia and Volhynia, the task of evacuation was delegated to Umsiedlungskommando. Section II of the agreement of 5 September 1940, provided for the appointment of a mixed German-Soviet resettlement commission in which the Reich was represented by a chief delegate (Hauptbevollmächtigte) and the Soviets by a chief representative (Hauptvertreter), with headquarters at Tarutino. The German Aussiedlungskommando (evacuation squad) numbered 299 men, including doctors, interpreters and couriers; in charge of transportation, insofar as it was carried out by trucks, was a squad of 300 NSKK (National Socialist Chauffeur Corps) men. The 152 German settlements in Bessarabia were assigned to four regional headquarters comprising 30 to 40 villages each and located in Hnnsburg, Bercsina, Albota, and Hishinev, where regional delegates (Gebietsbevollmächtigte) were appointed. Within each region local delegates (Ortsbevollmächtigte) were designated for individual settlements, taking into account the size of the settlement and its distance from regional headquarters.¹ Regional delegates were responsible to the central authority at Tarutino, and local agents to their

1. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, pp. 39, 50.

regional delegates. It was the job of the local delegates (together with an equal number of Soviet representatives) to register those who wished to be repatriated, to evaluate homes and crops left behind, property accounts, and so forth.

A similar procedure was applied in Northern Bukovina. Headquarters of the Umsiedlungskommando were at Czernowitz.

The problem of transportation from Bessarabia and Bukovina was a great deal more complex than in preceding operations of this kind, because Bessarabia and Bukovina had no common border with the Reich. Therefore, the emigrants had to be transferred through the territories of two (or even three) foreign states.¹

The evacuation from Bessarabia was the most difficult; not only because of the absence of a common frontier with the Reich, but also because German evacuation authorities chose to complicate matters still further.

Bessarabia's geographical position would logically have indicated one of two repatriation routes: the shorter from Bessarabia through Bukovina and Soviet Eastern Galicia into the incorporated Polish regions which had been designated for the resettlement of the Bessarabian Germans; the longer through Rumania and Hungary into Southern Austria, and from there through Bohemia-Moravia (or Slovakia) to the Warthegau

1. Nation und Staat (October 1940), p. 33.

and Danzig-West Prussia. Neither of these two routes was chosen. The evacuees followed a third still longer route.

Nation und Staat described this route as follows:

"They (the evacuees) will first be brought by wagons or trucks sent by the Reich to the embarkation ports of Reni and Chilia at the mouth of the Danube, or to the first reception camp at Galatz. From there they will sail on Danube steamers as far as the migration camps at Prahovo and Zemun in Yugoslavia, whence the journey will be continued by train."¹

Nation und Staat, however, did not point out that this itinerary would necessitate the crossing of Hungary from east to west, and passage through Southern Austria, whence the resettlers would have to proceed to the Polish regions by a long and complicated trip.

Those in charge of repatriation probably did not favor the immediate transfer of 93,000 Bessarabian Germans to new territory, the settlers being in a "raw state." As in the case of Volhynia and Galicia, they preferred the repatriates to pass first through a number of intermediary camps in which they would undergo a preliminary survey and sifting as to their political and racial outlook, occupational status, etc. During the comparatively long passage through Galatz, Belgrade, Hungary, and Southern Austria, this task could be accomplished

1. Nation und Staat (October 1940), p. 33.

much more thoroughly and surely than during the much shorter railway trip through Rumania-Hungary. Wirtschaft und Statistik reported that a preliminary statistical survey of the 93,500 Germans repatriated from Bessarabia had been conducted during their trip on the lower and middle Danube.¹

On the other hand, there was no reason to hurry the establishment of the Bessarabian repatriates in the annexed Polish provinces. The settlement of the previously evacuated Germans from the Baltic countries and from Volhynia and Galicia had proved to be much slower than had been expected. Tens of thousands were still in various camps on Reich territory. There could be no question of the immediate transfer into the annexed Polish regions of the 93,000 evacuees from Bessarabia, and delay was desirable.

On the basis of the available fragmentary data, the exodus from Bessarabia appears to have proceeded in the following way:

On 25 September, nine days after the Umsiedlungs-kommando had begun its work, the first transport of evacuated Germans left Bessarabia. It was composed of eight hundred persons and forty trucks, which had been provided by the Reich. Of the total number of evacuated Germans, 30,441 (34.5 percent) were transported by truck. This means of

1. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7, p. 150.

transportation was utilized especially for women, old people, children, and peasants who had no horses of their own and therefore could not travel by cart.¹ The long columns were divided into sections with several NSKK men commanding each section. At night the resettlers were bivouacked in camps, where rations were served from special food trucks.² These motor transports were bound for Reni and Chilia. However, when the autumn rains began, which made the roads impracticable for heavy vans and trucks, railway trains and wagons were utilized.

According to Thoss, "the Soviet representative obligingly placed at the disposal (of the Germans) a greater number of trains than had been stipulated." This facilitated the evacuation of 22,377 persons (25 percent of the total number). The remainder reached the frontier in carts (15,573 persons, 17 percent), and covered wagons (20,301 persons, 23 percent). The first trek left on 4 October. The average number of wagons per trek was approximately 140, and the journey usually took ten days or more. The treks included 11,360 wagons and 22,922 horses. Just as in the case of the evacuees from Galicia and Volhynia, the peasants preferred a long and difficult journey by cart and wagon, since "travel by wagon per-

1. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 64.
2. The Christian Science Monitor, 11 November 1940.

mitted two horses and a cartload of property to be taken by the evacuees."¹ Those who traveled by train had to leave much of their property behind.

The immediate destinations of the evacuees were the Soviet Danubian ports of Reni and Chilia and then across the Prut River to the Rumanian shore.

As two bridges had been blown up by the Rumanians when Bessarabia was occupied by the Russians, the Rumanian government built a special pontoon bridge for the passage of the Bessarabian Germans. Rumanian soldiers with bayonets guarded one end of the pontoon bridge and Russian soldiers with bayonets stood at the other end. Between them in the middle of the bridge two unarmed SS-men were on guard. Each night the Rumanian soldiers took the pontoon bridge apart.² Danubian steamship lines placed twenty-eight boats at the disposal of the evacuees; each steamer could carry from 400 to 1200 passengers. Of a total of 88,478 persons, some 20,044 (23 percent) embarked at Chilia; 39,905 (37.3 percent) at Reni; and 28,523 (32 percent) at Galatz. Altogether the steamers made 137 trips and covered 249,630 km.

Some 5,000 German residents of Bessarabia had been away at the time of Russian entry, most of them because they were serving in the Rumanian Army. They now joined their

1. Thoss, Alfred, op. cit., pp. 62, 64, 65, and Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (March 1941).

2. Athens Palace, pp. 302-303.

countrymen and brought the total number of resettled Volksdeutsche to 93,548.¹

Galatz was the central assembling and departure station. Motor loads of emigrants from Chilia and Reni arrived every day. Several weeks before the beginning of the evacuation, uniformed Germans arrived in Galatz with five hundred trucks, and converted the former military airfield into a huge camp.² Sleeping quarters for 5,000 people had been prepared in eight tremendous hangars. Numerous tents had also been put up, so that, if necessary, 25,000 people could be accommodated in the camp; in fact, at one time, for a short while the camp took care of over 20,000 persons.³

Necessary sanitary, hygienic, and police measures had been taken. A general hospital which could accommodate up to 300 people, a maternity hospital, and one for contagious diseases had been provided; at the Galatz railway station a hospital train stood prepared and in the harbor a hospital ship was anchored; a motorized hospital column was sent through Hungary with 17 doctors and 25 to 50 Red Cross nurses in charge. Rumanian authorities had furnished help during the construction of the camp. The local Reich

1. Thoss, Alfred, Das grosse Werk der Umsiedlung, Volk und Reich, (1941), No. I, p. 64; also Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 61; Zeitschrift für Binnenschifffahrt, April 1941, p. 57.

2. The New York Times, 29 September 1940.

3. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 61.

Germans, especially women, also assisted. Later, 40 Volksdeutsche girls from the Banat and Transylvania were permanently attached to the camp, and 60 girls from Galatz and Bucharest.¹

A large dining room had been provided. Trucks brought foodstuffs from Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, so as not to deplete the supplies of the Galatz country. Food was said to be good and rich, considering the standards of the Bessarabian Germans.² The repatriates did not stay in the Galatz camp for long. Evacuation started on 23 September and two days later the first contingent of 1,300 Germans left the port of Galatz on a Danube steamer bound for Belgrade.³

Yugoslavia was the second stop. Here, as in Rumania, very thorough preparations had been made for the reception, medical care, and further journey of the repatriates, with the assistance of the German minority in Yugoslavia, numbering some 550,000. As early as 21 August, one month before the evacuation from Bessarabia itself, an order issued by the leader of the German minority in Yugoslavia announced that "hundreds of thousands" of Germans who were to be repatriated from Bessarabia would spend an indefinite period

1. Nation und Staat (October 1940), p. 33; Thoss, op. cit., p. 61.

2. Athene Palace, pp. 306,307.

3. The New York Times, 29 September 1940.

of time in the camps to be established by the Germans of Yugoslavia.¹ The camp in Prahovo contained 34 tents spread over an area of 50,000 square meters, plus the necessary barracks for administration, kitchen halls, wireless station, washrooms, etc. To facilitate the transportation of the settlers and of their luggage, a railway platform had been constructed. A month later the Belgrade correspondent of the New York Times cabled that "about 300 laborers worked through today finishing the new German camp at Zemun,² across the Sava River from Belgrade." Alfred Thoss gives a detailed description of the Zemun camp. Before it could be installed, 50,000 cubic meters of sand had to be levelled. 23,000 square meters of wooden floor were laid. 12,000 meters of road was surfaced with planks. A water main, connected with the Belgrade water system, was also constructed; for this purpose 6,400 meters of pipe were utilized. The camp was supplied with electric light; there were 4,400 outlets. The camp contained 72 tents, those for sleeping and eating being 90 meters long and 10 to 15 meters wide; of smaller dimension were 4 kitchen halls and pantries, 24 wash rooms, 8 shower-rooms, a dressing room, and a first aid station. There were 15,000 bags filled with straw for the sleeping

1. The New York Times, 22 August 1940.

2. The Zemun camp had a capacity of 10,000; the camp at Prahovo was planned for 5,000 persons. Zeitschrift für Binnenschiffahrt, April 1941, p. 56.

quarters. The Red Cross had come down with a large mobile field-hospital which contained 32 barracks. The local Volksdeutsche contributed extensively in Prahovo as well as in Zemun to the construction of these camps. Almost every young man worked there for a few days; the girls sewed clothes and underwear and were of assistance in the maintenance of the camps. The Volksgruppe contributed 55 wagons of wheat, 8 wagons of other foodstuffs, and money to be used for food. Furthermore, they served as intermediaries for the purchase of all other foodstuffs.¹

The construction of these transit camps and the voluntary self-mobilization for this purpose of a group of Yugoslav citizens of German origin had the consent and approval of the Yugoslav government. In a sense, these transit camps constituted a temporary "state within a state." Only their external protection was entrusted to special units of the Yugoslav police.² Young Yugoslavs wearing brassards of the German Labor Service Corps stood guard at the gates.³ Special permits required for entrance into the camps were issued by the German repatriation authorities and not by the Yugoslavs.⁴

The first convoy of about 1,300 repatriates arrived

1. Thoss, Alfred, op. cit., p. 65.
2. The New York Times, 26 September 1940.
3. The New York Times, 15 September 1940.
4. The New York Times, 20 October 1940.

in Zemun on 27 September. Further transports arrived at regular intervals. Ordinarily the repatriates did not stay in the Prahovo and Zemun camps for more than two days. Special trains of the Reichsbahn and of the Yugoslav State Railroad carried them from Zemun via Maribor and from Prahovo via Jesenice to Graz in Austria.¹

The next stop was Hungary. The Germans had secured the government's cooperation in the transit of resettlers. As early as 4 September, the official Hungarian news agency announced that Germany was sending relief trains to assist in the evacuation of the German minority from Bessarabia.²

The evacuation of the 42,441 Germans of Northern Bukovina presented quite a different transportation problem. Northern Bukovina was separated from the annexed Polish regions only by a comparatively narrow strip of Soviet Eastern Galicia, which could be crossed by railway in a very short time. The Soviet authorities provided some 40 trains for this purpose. The frontier points through which the Bukovina Volksdeutsche were directed, had been established at Przemysl and Olhovec -- Nowy Zagory. At Sanok, situated at 5 km. from the frontier, there was a reception camp for

1. Zeitschrift für Binnenschifffahrt, April 1941, p. 56.

2. The New York Times, 5 September 1940.

3. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 65.

health control and documentary formalities.¹ The transfer from Northern Bukovina was carried out by railway only; no trucks were used.

5. The Transfer of Germans from Rumania. The organization of the transfer of 55,250 Germans from Southern Bukovina (under the provision of the German-Rumanian treaty of 22 October 1940) was entrusted to an Umsiedlungskommando under SS Oberfuehrer Sickmeyer. It was carried out during November and December 1940. The evacuees traveled by railroad through Hungary; 111 trains were provided, the majority of which left from Curshumora.² Four trainloads a day traveled over the Dej-Cluj-Nagyvarad (Oradea)-Budapest-Vienna-Leipzig line. The journey was made in German coaches. Each train had a staff of physicians and nurses as well as special facilities for the care of children.³ The first transport left on 15 November, the last on 13 December. The entire operation lasted only 28 days.⁴

The evacuees from Dobrudja had a choice of traveling by railroad or by wagon. Those leaving by train were permitted to take with them only their belongings "within the limits of the transport capacity of the Rumanian railway network." Therefore many resettlers preferred to travel by cart

1. Thoss, Alfred, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 65.

2. Thoss, Alfred, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

3. The New York Times, 18 November 1940.

4. Thoss, Alfred, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

or wagon, which involved no such baggage restrictions. They went to the Danube port of Cornavoda and from there, as did the Bessarabian Germans, to the transit camps established at Zemlin (Zemun) and Prahovo (Panchevo) in Yugoslavia. 26 steamers were put at their disposal; they made 27 trips and covered 43,220 km. From these camps they were brought to the Reich via Hungary in special trains provided by the Reich. The first steamer left Cornavoda on 11 November, the last boat left on the 27th of the same month.¹

The supervision of the transfer was entrusted to a special mixed commission. The Rumanian counterpart of the German chief of the Aussiedlungskommando was the chief representative of the Rumanian Government. The seat of the commission was at Gura-Humorului. The three regional delegates had their headquarters at Radauti and Gura-Humorului for Bukovina and at Constanza for Dobrudja.²

6. The Transfer to Germany of the German Minority of Lithuania.

a. The Evacuation of 50,000 Volksdeutsche and its Resettlement in Lithuania. Under the terms of the Soviet-German agreement of 10 January 1941, 50,471 Germans were transferred from Lithuania. This number considerably exceeds

1. Thoss, Alfred, op. cit. p. 66; Zeitschrift für Binnenschifffahrt, April 1941, p. 57.

2. Thoss, op. cit., p. 39.

the figures on German population given by Lithuanian (29,231)¹ and even by German sources (40,000).² The discrepancy has been interpreted in several different ways. The Germans explained it as an awakening of national consciousness among assimilated Germans. A more realistic explanation has been given in an unpublished report by Dr. J. Robinson, who left Lithuania late in 1940. Dr. Robinson stated that in Lithuania (as well as in Latvia and Estonia) "not only Germans are going to be transferred, but also anti-Russian Lithuanians, who possess only the slenderest ties with Germans or even none at all." This statement finds confirmation in Lithuanian and German sources. As far back as the winter of 1939, the Lietuvos Zinios (Kaunas) reported that "according to the representative of the Kulturverband, German nationality will not be decided on racial grounds but according to desire."³ Current News on the Lithuanian Situation of 15 October 1941, published by the Lithuanian Legation in Washington, stated that "many Lithuanians, unable to flee Lithuania earlier, seized this final opportunity to save themselves and their families." The very broad definition of "persons of German nationality" laid down by the Soviet-German treaty of 10 January

1. Heberle, Dr. Rudolf, Die Deutschen in Litauen, Stuttgart, 1927, p. 38.

2. Der Volksdeutsche, March 1940; Deutsche Arbeit, April 1940.

3. Lietuvos Zinios, 5 December 1939.

1941 entitled all persons to register for transfer to Germany who could prove their German descent, graduation from school in Germany, affiliation with the Lutheran church, or possession of property in Germany.

The real proportion of non-Germans among the 50,471 transferees was revealed in 1942, after Lithuania's conquest by the Wehrmacht, when the Reich announced its intention to return the repatriated Germans to Lithuania. According to reliable information, the Reich authorities had from the very beginning been well aware of the fact that a large part of the alleged Volksdeutsche were ethnic Lithuanians. This large group did not know that the German evacuation authorities had registered them in a specific category: their passports were usually stamped with the letter A, standing for Altreich, which indicated that they had to be sent to Germany proper. The passports of racial Germans, on the other hand, were stamped with the letter O for Osten, which meant that they were to be resettled in the German-incorporated eastern Polish province.¹

Only after the announcement that persons transferred from Lithuania in the spring of 1941 were to be sent back to this country, did holders of A-passports discover that only those with O-passports were eligible for return. Holders of

1. Dagens Nyheter, 19 December 1942; DNB, Broadcast from Berlin, 2 February 1943.

A-passports had to remain in the Reich.

The Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhand Gesellschaft (DUT) report for 1942 announced that it had been decided to transfer 36,000 Lithuanian Germans back to Lithuania, where they were to be resettled in five districts. By 1 July 1943, some 4,700 families, comprising from 18,000 to 20,000 persons, had actually been resettled.¹ Some 3,600 other Lithuanian Germans who had been in the meantime permanently installed in the Zischenau district of Eastern Prussia were not to be returned to Lithuania.² Only those German resettlers from Lithuania, who had been selected for the East, but had not yet been settled there, and workers not yet trained for new vocations, could apply for resettlement in Lithuania.

Some 34,000 Lithuanian Germans are thus accounted for (30,000 persons who returned to Lithuania and 3,600 permanently settled in the Zischenau district). However, the number of persons evacuated from Lithuania in the spring of 1941 was 50,471. German sources are silent as to the fate of the remaining 17,000. This figure presumably includes all non-Germans who managed to leave Lithuania together with the Volksdeutsche in the spring of 1941.

b. The Organization of the Transfer. The preparatory

1. Current News on the Lithuanian Situation. Published by the Lithuanian Legation in Washington, November 1943.
2. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1943. No. 10, p. 344.

work for the evacuation was done by delegates of the German Kulturverband in Lithuania. The immediate task of evacuation was carried out by a Reich Aussiedlungskommando (evacuation squad) as had been the case in previous operations. The Aussiedlungskommando crossed the German-Soviet frontier on 20 January 1941, ten days after the conclusion of the transfer agreement. Regional headquarters of the Kommando were set up in Kaunas, Mariampole and Tauroggen. Three transit places had been designated at the frontier for those who traveled by railroad: Krottingen-Bajohren, Tauroggen-Laugszargen, and Wirballen-Eydtkau. For those who chose transportation by road and cart, five frontier passages had been selected.

Soviet trains carried 31,347 Lithuanian Volksdeutsche to the German frontier. There, they and their luggage were transferred to German trains. In the beginning, bitter cold and heavy snow made transportation difficult. "The snow-covered trains and caravans of carts evoked memories of the resettlement from Volhynia and Galicia, which had taken place during the previous winter" reports Thoss. The first train with 527 Volksdeutsche coming from Schenzne, a suburb of Kaunas, arrived at Eydtkau on 3 February; the day before a train made up of 25 cars had already brought luggage and household articles across the border.

The evacuation by road and cart started considerably later. The first trek, composed of 80 two-horse carts and 180 peasants arrived at the border on 25 February. Altogether 6,733 Volksdeutsche with 3,850 vehicles and 5,890 horses left Lithuania by truck; 1,349 went in a pedestrian trek; 6,890 reached the Reich by bus and truck which form the German settlements situated along the German-Lithuanian frontier. In addition to the resettlers, nearly 70,000 yards of household effects, 4,011 head of cattle, 7,000 sheep, 5,651 pigs and 24 truckloads of poultry were transported.¹

The immediate destination of the resettled Lithuanian Volksdeutsche was the assembly camps in East Prussia, where "adequate preparations had been made for the reception of compatriots from across the border." Large camps had been built by the Technical Emergency Service (Technische Nothilfe), the Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst), and the Police at Bajohren, Heydekrug, Langszargen, Meidenburg, Soldau, and Ebenrode. "As in Galatz or Zemun, washrooms, kitchens, dining-halls, infirmaries and even a large lounge were provided." The motorized emergency camp at Ebenrode had 32 barracks for sick people, with 11 physicians. It had assisted with all previous resettlements.²

1. Thoss, op. cit., pp. 69-70. See also the article of the same author: Umsiedlungen und Optionen im Rahmen der Neuordnung Europas, Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, March 1941, p. 132.

2. Thoss, Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen, p. 71.

7. The Transfer of Germans from Dismembered Yugoslavia.

The dismemberment of Yugoslavia in 1941 split the folk-group consisting of 500,000 to 700,000 Germans into several distinct parts.

In the rump state of Serbia proper there remained about 200,000 Volksdeutsche. The overwhelming majority of them were concentrated in the Banat.¹

In December 1941, 1,925 Germans were transferred from Serbia to the General Government in small groups, by railroad. The DUT was entrusted with the organization of the transfer.² During the year 1942, 13,500 Germans of the Kochevye area, Slovenia, were transferred from the Italian-annexed part of Yugoslavia with the help of the DUT machinery.³

Under the provisions of an agreement concluded on 6 October 1942, between the Reich and the "Independent State of Croatia", 20,000 Germans from Bosnia and Herzegovina opted for resettlement in the Reich.⁴ Volksdeutsche who wanted to be included in the transfer were to register with a mixed Croat-German repatriation commission which had been set up at Slavonian Brod.⁵ Registration began immediately after the announcement of the agreement and the whole operation was

1. Grenzboten, 19 February 1943.

2. Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1943, NIO p. 344; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 April 1944.

3. Volkischer Beobachter, 4 April 1943.

4. Relazioni Internazionali, 31 October 1942.

5. Transocean, 25 November 1942.

completed by the end of December 1942. SS units were in charge of the transfer activities. According to a German source, the evacuation was attacked by Tito's Partisans, who were said to have killed many Volksdeutsche.¹ The transferees had no travel expenses. They were given three weeks to complete their preparations, then assembled in a temporary camp at Bosanski Brod and transported in large groups to the chosen resettlement area in the General Government.²

The Yugoslav region of Bachka was annexed by Hungary. With the advance of the Soviet Armies into this province in the autumn of 1944, 33,000 Volksdeutsche left for the Reich. Women and children were transferred by railroad, while others traveled by horsedrawn carts for several weeks. The itinerary was from Bachka through Austria and the Sudetenland to Central Germany.³

8. The Transfer of Germans from South Russia. A mass transfer of Volksdeutsche from Soviet Russia began in the second half of 1943, when the position of the German Armies in the occupied Soviet territories had become extremely difficult. The Germans had been forced to evacuate, one after another, large areas of Northern Caucasus and Southern Ukraine. These areas contained large and prosperous German settlements.

1. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 February 1942.

2. Transocean, 25 November 1942.

3. Die Zeit, Liberec, 6 December 1944.

They were concentrated mainly in the former Russian governments of Yekaterinoslav (now called Dnicpropetrovsk), Cherson, and Tauria, around Krivoi Rog, Zaporozhe, Melitopol, Mariupol, and in the neighborhood of Taganrog and Rostov.

The evacuation of these Volksdeutsche was carried out in four installments:¹

1. Between October 1943 and March 1944, some 72,000 Germans were evacuated from the Ukraine. Among them were peasants from the German colonies in the Crimea and urban dwellers from Kherson, Nikolaev, Nikopol, Kiev, Kharkov, Zaporozhe, Krivoi Rog, Melitopol, and Mariupol.¹

2. Between August 1943 and May 1944, some 73,000 Volksdeutsche peasants were evacuated from the Black Sea regions and from southern Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper.

3. Between October 1943 and May 1944, some 44,600 Germans, mainly rural dwellers, left Soviet East Volhynia.

4. In May-July 1944, 135,000 Volksdeutsche were evacuated from Rumanian-held Transnistria (the area between the Dniester and the Bug).

On 14 May 1944 the order to begin the trek from Transnistria was given.² The evacuation took place by two routes. The northern trek which had to cover about 450 kilometers

1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 23 July 1944; Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1944 (Moscow dispatch).

2. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 21 July 1944.

was directed through Moldavia and the Carpathian Mountains into Transylvania and from there by rail to the Wartheland. This route was taken by 70,125 persons with 38,444 horses and 6,548 head of cattle. The shorter southern trek, about 230 kilometers, which led through the Dobrudja along the south bank of the Danube into the Banat and from there by rail to the Wartheland, was taken by 38,022 persons with 12,224 horses and 5,516 head of cattle.¹ The route taken by the remaining 25,000 to 27,000 has not been disclosed.

The transfer of the Germans from South Russia took place under difficult conditions. The Völkischer Beobachter of 21 July 1944, in an article on the homeward trek of the Russian Germans, states: "The resettlement of German families from the Baltic, Volhynia, Galicia, the area of Narva, Choln, and Lublin-Land, from Bessarabia, Bukovina, Dobrudja, and Bosnia, took place according to carefully worked-out plans. But the evacuation of Germans from the Ostraum, from the Caucasus to the Dniester, had to be done during a military retreat which occupied to overflowing all communications and means of transport, bridges and ferries, railways and vessels, and which was compelled constantly to vary its dispositions by events at the front."

1. Willy Dismar. Der Grosse Trek. Die Heimkehr der Schwarzmeer-deutschen ins Reich in Berliner Börsen Zeitung, 1 August 1944.

The evacuation of the last 150,000 persons from Transnistria took place under particularly difficult conditions and made great demands on men and material. Many of these evacuees covered as much as 1,000 or 1,500 miles on their trek from the southern Ukraine to northwest Poland, which lasted 12 to 14 weeks, often under very adverse weather conditions. The following details were given by the German press:¹

"1,800 people, who were unable to travel on foot, were put on boats on the Danube at Galatz. The city people were put on trains in Transnistria, but some had to get off on the way, because the bridges over the Dniester had already been blown up. Mothers, carrying their children, walked for many, many miles."

Numerous transit camps were set up for the evacuees. In Poland, there was even a camp exclusively for pregnant women.² In January 1944, 33,000 resettlers were billeted in 36 Styrian camps (at Fürstenfeld, Bierbaum, St. Michael, etc).³ In April, about 1,000 resettlers from the German colonies in the Ukraine, on the Volga, on the Black Sea, and in the Caucasus were reported in the camp of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in Pörsch, in the Salzburg district.⁴ A large

1. DNB, 4 February 1944; Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 8 February 1944; Berliner Börsen Zeitung, 1 August 1944.

2. Litzmannstädter Zeitung, 31 March 1944.

3. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 12 July 1944.

4. Salzburger Zeitung, 20 April 1944.

group of Transnistrian Germans was reported in a camp near Bistritsa in the region of Novi Sad.¹

V. RESETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSFERRED GROUPS

A. Introduction

The following section considers the process of resettlement by which the transferred groups were installed in the areas designated to receive them in the countries of their reception.

Available data on the resettlement process in each of the transfers treated above are not sufficient to permit detailed analysis of all cases. The following discussion is therefore limited to the process of resettlement subsequent to the following transfers: the Greek-Bulgarian exchange under the Neuilly Treaty; the Greek-Turkish exchange under the Lausanne Treaty; the transfer of Volksdeutsche from Eastern Europe to Polish territory; the Bulgarian-Rumanian exchange under the Craiova Treaty.

B. Resettlement of Greeks and Bulgarians Exchanged Under the Treaty of Neuilly²

The settlement of the exchanged Greeks and Bulgarians in their new homelands presented a difficult problem.

1. Deutsches Volksblatt, 7 June 1944.

2. Source material for this chapter was obtained from Ladas, Stephen P.; The Exchange of Minorities, New York 1932 and from International Labour Office, Refugees and Labor Conditions in Bulgaria, Geneva 1926.

The settlement of 30,000 Greeks from Bulgaria was only a small part of the tremendous resettlement task which also involved a million Greek refugees from Turkey. The smaller problem of the Greeks from Bulgaria was thus practically absorbed by this larger resettlement undertaking, and is therefore considered below in the discussion of the Greco-Turkish exchange of minorities.

The 96,000 Bulgarian emigrants from Greece also constituted only part of the general refugee problem in Bulgaria, though they were the largest group involved and were strongly represented among the refugees who arrived in 1923 and 1924 in dire need of relief. The problem of settling the Bulgarian refugees was thus very similar to the problem confronting Greece. Earlier transferees had of their own accord settled in villages or towns, and needed relatively little help in completing the process of settlement. Others were still unsettled and constituted a heavy burden on the government. Mortality was very high, and government assistance inadequate.

On 3 May 1926 the Bulgarian government, in a letter to the League of Nations, stated that Bulgaria was unable to cope with a refugee problem of such dimensions and requested that a foreign loan be granted to the country under the auspices of the League, to be used for the establishment of the refugees. The Council of the League agreed to the proposed

Bulgarian settlement scheme, and a £2,500,000 Refugee-settlement Loan was issued simultaneously at London and New York on 21 December 1926 with great success.

The Council of the League appointed a Commissioner for the settlement of Refugees in Bulgaria, M. Rene Charron. It was agreed that a plan for settlement should at once be drawn up. The Commissioner was to make quarterly reports on the progress of the work. No adequate machinery for settlement existed at that time, and therefore, a General Directorate was set up by the Bulgarian government in December 1926. It was found that the number of families to be assisted was 31,271, comprising some 125,000 people. The total area covered by the plan was 175,000 hectares, on which small agricultural holdings were to be established. Many difficulties at once arose over the distribution of land. The communes resisted the attempts of the government to take away vacant land for the purposes of settlement; and frequently the local inhabitants had already taken over property left behind by Greek emigrants. In many places, boundaries were in dispute, and no proper land register had been maintained. Before the land could be divided up it had therefore to be measured. The work of surveying was entrusted at first to the Bulgarian Geographical Institute, and later to a private group of engineers. It was carried out only with great diffi-

culty and amid much local hostility. The final appraisal of the land distributed was begun in May 1929 by a Land-valuation Committee.

Division of land was only part of the problem. Houses had to be built; livestock and seed to be distributed; plows and other agricultural implements to be provided; adequate water supplies to be secured. Many areas were marshy, and drainage works and anti-malaria campaigns were initiated. In some areas, roads had to be built and a railway was constructed from Rakovski to Mastanli, now Momchilgrad (to the north of Komotini in Greece), in order to open up new areas for settlement. Along the coast of the Black Sea, the fisheries had hitherto been mainly in the hands of Greeks; refugees were now established here, and boats and gear provided for them. The cost of all these facilities was charged individually against the refugees, and arrangements were made for them to repay their debts over a period of years. Bulgarian emigrants from Greece who had received Bulgarian state bonds in return for property left in Greece were allowed to utilize them in repayment.

The original settlement scheme provided that, as a rule, refugees should not be settled within a zone of 50 kilometers from the frontier between Bulgaria and the neighboring states, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. But the prohibited zones on

the three frontiers represented approximately half of Bulgaria (of a total of 103,000 square kilometers), and many refugee families had already spontaneously settled there before the acceptance of the scheme: 3,000 had moved within the Rumanian frontier zone, about 6,000 families had settled in the Greek frontier zone, and some 4,000 in the Yugoslav frontier zone. Numerous exceptions from the general rule had to be made. Over half of the refugees were settled in the district of Burgaz near the Black Sea coast. The remainder were accommodated in the north along the Danube, in the Deli Orman region of the northeast, where water-supply schemes and the evacuation of former Turkish inhabitants made settlement possible, in the Plovdiv and Arda basins of south central Bulgaria, and in the Struma valley.

By 15 August 1930, 1,016,695 decares of land had been allotted to 28,342 refugee families. The construction of dwellings progressed at a much slower pace. Out of the 16,000 projected new houses only 1,831 had been built by 15 May 1929, and 2,854 were contracted for. By the middle of August 1930, the settlement work was considered as basically completed. The commissioner of the League of Nations expected that only little work would remain for the year 1931.

C. Resettlement of Greeks and Turks Exchanged Under the
Lausanne Treaty¹

1. The Greek Resettlement. The first problem with which the settlement authorities in Greece had to cope was to ascertain the number of refugees to be settled. Several waves of refugees had poured into the country. The census of 15 May 1928 counted 1,104,216 refugees from Turkey, 49,027 refugees from Bulgaria, 58,526 from Russia and 10,080 from other countries. Notwithstanding the differences in these various refugee movements all 1,221,849 refugees presented a common problem of resettlement.

This tremendous task imposed a heavy burden on the resources of Greece, which the small and war-stricken country was obviously unable to bear alone. For the work of settlement the Greek government enlisted international sympathy and assistance.

On 2 February 1923, the League of Nations authorized its Finance Committee to study the question of assistance for the Greek refugee settlement. After thorough investigation, an independent body, called the Refugee Settlement Commission, was set up for the installation of refugees. It consisted of four members: two appointed by the Greek Government with the

1. Unless otherwise stated, facts and figures utilized in this section are taken from Ladas, Stephen P., The Exchange of Minorities, New York 1932.

approval of the League, one appointed by the League Council, and the chairman, also appointed by the League Council. A refugee loan of £10,000,000 was issued in December 1924 in London, New York, and Athens. In January 1928, a second loan of £6,500,000 was raised in London and New York. A further loan of £2,500,000 was granted to Greece by the American Government.

The Refugee Settlement Commission began to function in November 1923, and worked regularly until January 1931.

a. Rural Settlement. Chief consideration was given to the problem of installing rural immigrants. Lands for the settlement of peasant refugees were in part made available by the Greek Government, which turned over to the Commission vast state and federal properties (18 percent of the total); farms left by Turkish and Bulgarian transferees (70 percent of the total); and expropriated church property, community holdings, and large estates (12 percent of the total).¹ However, even this total area was insufficient to meet the needs, and so the draining of extensive swamps, lakes, and flooded areas was successfully undertaken. The reclamation work added over 800,000 acres to the 1,500,000 originally provided by the government from the sources

✓ 1. Rodocanachi, Andre, Les finances de la Grece et l'etablissement des refugies, Paris, 1934, p. 60.

mentioned above.¹

It must be remembered that while the Commission was performing its task, Greece was engaged in carrying out a program of agrarian reform in favor of small tenant farmers. By the Agrarian Reform Law of October 1924, large estates were broken up: their owners were permitted to retain 30 hectares (74 acres), the remainder being distributed to native tenants or to refugees. The Commission was, therefore, really engaged in two tasks: it participated in agrarian reform as well as in the settlement of refugees.

The great bulk of agricultural refugees were placed in Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace, which was the part of Greece with the greatest potentialities for settlement, especially with the aid of drainage and irrigation work. Moreover, most of the Moslems and Bulgarians who left Greece were from Macedonia, and thus the large estates, formerly owned by the Turkish ruling class, were now available for occupation by peasants. Other refugees were settled in Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, Euboea and to a very small extent in the Peloponnesus.

The Commission as a rule allotted land to groups of families rather than to individuals. The idea was to regroup

✓1. Eddy, Charles B, Greece and the Greek Refugees, London 1931. Mr. Eddy was Chairman of the Refugee Settlement Commission from October 1926 through December 1930.

together refugees from each village in Turkey, but this could not always be done. Each group elected councils which allotted shares to the constituent families. The share (for a family of four members) varied according to the quality of the soil and the nature of the cultivation. In the cereal lands of Macedonia and Thrace it averaged about 3.5 hectares (8 2/3 acres). In Thessaly the holdings were smaller; in Epirus larger; in the fertile lands of the Evros (Maritza) valley they were only about 1.5 hectares. In the tobacco districts of Macedonia and Western Thrace they varied between 0.9 and 2.0 hectares. To the cattle-breeding groups in the mountain districts of the northern provinces, holdings of about 8-10 hectares per family were granted. One of the difficulties encountered in this allotment was the absence of adequate maps. At first a provisional distribution of land was made, and then a survey was undertaken before final allotment could be made, and the debt of each refugee fixed.

But allotment of land was only part of the problem. Homes also had to be provided. Over 50,000 houses had been left behind by Moslems and Bulgarians, but at least 10,000 of these were badly in need of repair. Over 50,000 dwellings had to be built in order to house the 130,000 families who settled in Macedonia and Western Thrace. Nor was this all.

Animals, sheds, plows, carts, furniture, had to be provided, as well as maintenance while the first season's crop was growing. Public utilities had to be built; hospitals, schools and churches erected; wells sunk; health services and agricultural and veterinary stations established. Water supply and sanitary services had to be provided; roads and bridges constructed; drainage and irrigation works carried out. The large-scale drainage works, started in the valleys of the Axios and the Struma, not only provided more land for cultivation but helped in the fight against malaria so prevalent in the region; the death-rate from malaria in the early years of the settlement was very high. Experiments had to be made with various types of wheat to find out which suited the country. On the coasts of Chalcidice and the shores of the Gulf of Euboea, fishing communities were established and equipped with boats and gear.

Numerous and serious mistakes were sometimes made in the haste and confusion of the emergency settlement. But on the whole it proved to be as satisfactory as any such settlement could be expected to be. The conditions were exceptionally favorable:

"There were ample funds provided from loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations, there was skilled

technical supervision of a high order, wide areas of vacant land were available for the agricultural immigrants, they were welcomed by the Greek Government, and with astounding generosity by the Greek people. The immigrants themselves were thrifty, hard-working and determined to make good."¹

By the end of 1926, the main work of agricultural settlement had been completed. On 1 December 1927, 143,012 families numbering 551,468 persons, were settled in rural districts. The bulk of the settlement took place in Macedonia and Thrace.

b. Urban Settlement. The settlement of the urban dwellers proved to be much less satisfactory. The Greek community of Asia Minor had included a large and prosperous urban element of bankers, merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans for whom there were no ready business opportunities in Greece. The industrial economy of Greece was unable to provide work for them. They brought certain industries along, notably those of Oriental-carpet manufacturing and of pottery, but these provided employment only to a small portion of the mass of urban refugees. The great majority found themselves unable to earn a living and suffered from extreme poverty.

The Greek government itself grappled with the urban problem; the Commission did not undertake to help in this

1. Simpson, John Hope, The Problem of National Minorities, The Fortnightly, July 1944, p. 12.

sphere until the beginning of 1925. It was then agreed that it was impracticable to settle the urban refugees on the land and that it was possible to provide them with urban occupations only through large-scale planning. All that could be done was to facilitate their absorption into the existing urban life of Greece. The Commission therefore restricted its efforts to two main lines of activity:

(1) It lent financial support to the construction of permanent quarters for the housing of the urban element. When the swarm of refugees had come into Greece in the autumn of 1922, Athens, Piraeus and Saloniki had provided the greatest number of suitable shelters (schools, theaters, warehouses, etc.). Building work was accordingly undertaken mainly in these three cities. Athens and Piraeus seemed the places where new industries would most likely be established; and Saloniki, as the center of an expanding agricultural hinterland, promised many urban possibilities.

To a lesser degree, of course, urban quarters were also constructed in many of the smaller towns of Greece where opportunities arose, or where dwellings left by Turkish and Bulgarian emigrants could be used as a starting point. Altogether urban quarters were erected in eighty-six other towns ranging from Patras (the fourth city of Greece) to small communities with less than 5,000 inhabitants.

(2) In the second place, the Commission gave financial support to certain outstanding arts and crafts which utilized the traditional skill of the refugees and which promised a sure return for loans; these crafts were mainly the making of carpets, embroideries, silks, pottery, silver-ware, and enamelled articles.

c. Results. The total number of refugees cared for by the Commission by the end of 1927 reached 623,698 persons, or over 50 percent of the total number of 1,221,849 refugees in Greece. In addition, another 250,000 persons, representing 66,920 families, were rehabilitated by the Greek Government independently of the Commission. By the end of 1928, some 8,000 agricultural families and 20,000 urban families were still in need of resettlement. Many had settled through their own efforts.¹

The total cost of the settlement was very considerable. In addition to the net amount of £13,000,000 provided by refugee loans contracted abroad, the Greek Government spent some 7,400,000,000 drachmas, obtained through national loans. The average total cost of settlement was about £90 per family.²

1. Allen, Harold B., Come Over into Macedonia, New Brunswick, 1945. Mr. Allen was from 1928 to 1938 Director of Education for the Near East Foundation.

2. Simpson, John Hope, The Refugee Problem, London 1939, p. 19.

2. The Turkish Settlement. The settlement of the 355,635 Turks who went to Turkey under the terms of the Lausanne Convention seemingly did not present any considerable difficulties. They left Greece in a more or less orderly manner, and were able to carry along their movable property. The removal of some 1,200,000 Greeks from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor largely provided homes and lands for Turkish immigrants. However, it must be taken into consideration that most of the dwellings, orchards, and vineyards of the Greeks who fled with the armies in face of disaster in 1922 were destroyed -- if not by the former owners, by retreating Greek or advancing Turkish soldiers. Furthermore, much time had been lost, so that many fields grew up to weeds before new settlers arrived. Having determined not to seek foreign financial assistance for the settlement of the emigrants, the Turkish Government was extremely cramped financially and thus could not be of great help to the resettlers.

As a rule, the Moslem emigrants from Greece were installed in villages and properties left by Greek refugees. Land was abundant, and every new settler was granted sufficient space to secure his livelihood. They were also granted agricultural implements by the state, and seeds to raise crops. Artisans were granted a small capital to give them a start. All debts of emigrants to the state were payable by installment

in twenty years; the value of the property left in Greece by each emigrant was to be deducted from the amount of the debt. A total of 9,341,583 Turkish paper pounds (something less than a million pounds sterling) was spent in 1923-28 by the Turkish Government for the resettlement of immigrants; this is less than one-twentieth of the expenditure incurred by the Greek Government in the settlement of Greek refugees three times as numerous.

The total number of Turkish immigrants from Greece settled in Turkey from the year 1921 to the year 1928 (including several thousand people who left Greece of their own initiative) may be estimated at 400,000. Of these, 152,770 (38 percent) settled down in the four vilayets of Eastern Thrace (before 1914 at least 600,000 Greeks lived in this area, including Constantinople), and 167,891 (42 percent) in the vilayets on the Aegean coast and on the sea of Marmora (1,600,000 Greeks lived in Asia Minor in 1914).

The new settlers were undoubtedly a valuable economic asset to their new homeland and were considered "persons most vigorous in building up that country."¹

D. Resettlement of Transferred Volksdeutsche

1. Resettlement in the Incorporated Polish Provinces. The overwhelming majority (80 percent) of transferred Volksdeutsche

¹ Webster, Donald Everest, The Turkey of Ataturk, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 114.

were resettled in the German-incorporated Polish provinces.

This area (35,572 square miles) received consecutive waves of German folk groups transferred from Latvia and Estonia (61,000) from the Soviet-incorporated Polish provinces (128,000), from Bessarabia, Northern and Southern Bukovina (185,000), and from the Soviet Black Sea area (285,000). The first wave arrived in the winter of 1939-1940, the second in the spring of 1940, the third in 1941, and the fourth in the spring of 1944.

Only in the early transfers of Volksdeutsche -- up to the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941 -- was it possible for the Germans to plan resettlement efficiently. After 1941, resettlement activities were interrupted, and when they were resumed in 1944, with the evacuation of 350,000 Black Sea Germans, this transfer was more in the nature of an organized flight from the Soviet advance.

a. Resettlement Machinery. When Hitler decided in October 1939 to inaugurate his large-scale repatriation policy, Himmler himself was put in charge of all resettlement activities with the title of "Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanhood." His task was "to take care of the resettlement of all Volksdeutsche from abroad who return to the Reich permanently."¹ He was to avail himself of the existing bodies

1. Neues Bauerntum, November-December 1939, p. 294-295.

and institutions for the fulfillment of his assignment. Furthermore, a special agency was created called the "Reich Commissariat for the Consolidation of Germanism" which was mainly a coordinating body. It was headed by Ulrich Greifelt.

Early in 1940, Greifelt outlined the original structure of the machinery as follows:¹ the Commissariat comprised six departments: 1. Planning; 2. Administration of Resettlement Installation; 3. Indemnity Payments; 4. Finances; 5. Central Land Office; 6. Colonization Activities. For the fulfillment of its numerous duties, the Commissariat secured the cooperation of a number of institutions already functioning, among them:

(1) The Reichsstelle für Raumordnung (Office for Space Planning) whose task, according to the Kölnische Zeitung of 21 November 1940, was "to fill the unpopulated (menschenleere) areas in the east by settling German peasants, German businessmen, and workers, so that as a result, a country truly German shall arise."

(2) The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Ethnic Germans) was charged with the immediate evacuation of the various German minority groups and with the investigation of resettlement possibilities. It had headquarters at Poznan and was subdivided into twelve departments, the most important

1. Deutsche Verwaltung, 2. Januarheft 1940.

of which were:¹ a. The Landabteilung (Agricultural Department) which was to study the possibilities of land settlement and to choose appropriate candidate-farmers among the transferred German; b. The Abteilung für freie Berufe (department for liberal professions) with subdepartments for physicians, chemists, architects, engineers, lawyers, and foresters; c. The department for schools and culture; d. The department for industry and commerce.

(5) The Deutsche Einwandererzentrale (Central Immigration Office, EWZ), composed of representatives of all organizations and offices dealing with immigration, was to take care of the investigation, first sheltering and appropriate selection of the evacuees. Its main duties were:² (a) to carry out the necessary administrative measures in order to complete the incorporation of resettlers into the Reich, first of all through naturalization; and (b) to determine the settlement of resettlers in the East or in the Old Reich.

The German Ministry of the Interior was entrusted with the immediate task of naturalization. Every arriving German had to pass through five subdivisions: the registration office; the photographer's office; the office for investigation and issuance of documents; the health division; and the

✓ 1. Carstens, Peter, Aus der Praxis der volksdeutschen Umsiedlung, in Neues Bauerntum, (April 1941), p. 156.

2. Gradman, Dr. W., Die Erfassung der Umsiedler, in Zeitschrift für Politik (May 1942).

office for investigation of nationality.

The workings of this complicated apparatus are described as follows by Hans Krieg:¹

The Registration Office and the Office for Investigation and Issuance of Documents were the first two divisions to be approached. Each person received an envelope containing instructions and the necessary forms to be filled out (registration card, application for citizenship, list of property left behind or brought along). The registration card contained the following items: first and second name, family status, profession, place and date of birth, religion, citizenship, data concerning Aryan origin, data about parents, names of and data regarding children, when and whence the person had arrived, and his present residence. Each person then obtained an identification card with a serial number. The number of the identification card was then transcribed on the registration card. A copy of the registration card was stencilled and thirteen copies sent to various divisions of the Central Immigration Office. The original registration cards were kept on file in the Registration Office.

A decision was usually taken during the process of investigation and selection concerning ultimate resettlement of the repatriates. According to a high official of the

¹ Krieg, Hans, Baltischer Aufbruch zum Deutschen Reich (Berlin 1940).

Immigration Office. Dr. W. Gradman, Hitler's wish was that "only the best, the soundest German blood must be colonized in the new East areas ... every one who does not fit into the specific conditions of life and demands of the East must be singled out."¹ According to Gradman, the following criteria were applied: physical fitness; origin and ethnic-political attitude; vocational training.

Physicians of the Health Department of the Central Investigation Office had to decide as to the physical fitness of the resettlers. Those unfit for the East were assigned for settlement in the Old Reich. The investigation of descent and ethnic-political attitude was carried out very carefully. Whether a settler was naturalized and installed or not depended upon the result of the investigation. Persons of foreign stock, except for a few special cases, were not granted citizenship. For instance, in the case of a mixed marriage and offspring from such unions, naturalization was temporarily denied. After a certain time, however, these persons could apply for re-examination of their case.

The least important consideration in the choice of the resettlement area was vocational training. Here the only important question was whether a skilled resettler was essential for war work in the Old Reich. Since most of the

1. Gradman, Dr. W., Die Erfassung der Umsiedler, in Zeitschrift für Politik, (May 1942).

resettlers were farmers, these cases were relatively few.

One of the basic principles of resettlement was the maintenance of family unity; it was not customary to settle one part of a family in the East and another part in the Old Reich.

The most important document given to the resettlement staff by the Einwanderungs Centrale (Immigration Office) was the "EWZ card"; the EWZ card was compiled on the basis of the regular Arbeitskarte (workcard) used by labor offices. A record was kept for each resettler in the vocational placement office of the DWZ. In addition to personal data concerning all members of a resettler's family, the card contained information as to property left behind and brought along, size and kind of previous enterprise, and results of the investigation made by the Health Office. The EWZ card thus included all needed information for installation of the resettler, and was a summary of all data collected by the EWZ.

(4) The Volksdeutsche Einwandererberatungsstelle (Advisory Office for Immigrants) at Poznan, with a branch-office in Berlin was to provide further care and counsel for the evacuated Germans.¹

(5) The Berufseinsatzstelle (Office for Vocational Placement) was entrusted with professional matters. Special

1. Umsiedlung und Festigung deutschen Volkstums, in Neues Bauerntum, (November-December 1939), p. 295.

departments were created for the investigation of (a) handicraft and industry; (b) agriculture; (c) commercial, technical, and liberal professions; (d) officials; (e) female professions; (f) youth; and (g) recipients of social security benefits. The results of the investigation of every evacuated German were recorded on a special card, and an exhaustive card-index was thus set up in Poznan, which enabled systematic vocational settlement. On the average 1,000 persons were investigated daily.

(6) The Landesarbeitsamt (Regional Labor Office) was in charge of the immediate settlement task. This office held all information on wanted manpower and used the above-mentioned card index to satisfy actual needs. Installation in the liberal professions (physicians, lawyers), was carried out in close cooperation with the Chambers of Physicians and Lawyers. In the field of agricultural settlement the help of the Reichsnährstand (Food Administration) was secured, while the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the Handicraft Chamber cooperated in the installation of artisans and industrial workers.

(7) The Ministry of Finance, represented by (a) the Property Supervision Office (Vermögensstelle), and (b) the Local Office of the Reichsbank (Verbindungsstelle der Reichsbank), was entrusted with preliminary investigation and

settlement of property interests and the most urgent financial needs of the arriving resettlers.

The Property Supervision Office registered the declaration of every resettler concerning property which he had brought along or left behind in his former residence. Appropriate forms had already been distributed in the temporary shelters, where a special official had discussed the questionnaire with the persons concerned. The declaration had to be signed by the owner of property and certified by the official.

The repatriates usually came with little cash, so that the question almost always arose as to whether advance payment was necessary and so be recommended. If it was so decided, the person received a money order drawn on the Dresdner Bank. If the resettler still had certain amounts in a bank of his former homeland, he was also allowed to receive an advance on his account. All these advances were later settled with the Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhand Gesellschaft m.b.H. (DUT, German Resettlement Trust Company) in Berlin.

The Local Office of the Reichsbank had to supervise the conversion of valuables brought along or left behind by the repatriates, in accordance with the law on foreign currency; it was charged with the establishment of exchange offices through private banks (foreign currency banks), so

as to enable the repatriates to exchange their money against Reichsmarks without considerable loss of time.

A special machinery for the organization of resettlement was also set up in the incorporated provinces themselves. In Gau Danzig-West Prussia, and in Warthegau, a high SS official was assigned to each of the two Governors (Forster and Greiser), who were simultaneously deputies of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germandom.¹ In Warthegau, where the resettlement work was carried out most rapidly, a special Ansiedlungsstab (settlement staff) for eastern Wartheland with headquarters in Lodz was created; Kreis-Arbeitsstäbe (district staffs) were subordinated to the Lodz headquarters. Every Arbeitsstab included 25 to 40 employees; half of them were farmers, assigned by the Food Administration (Reichsnährstand), which had been set up in Warthegau on 10 January 1940;² the second half were "proven representatives of various Party groups." SS Leaders assigned for this purpose by the SS Race and Settlement Office were entrusted with the management of every Arbeitsstab. They were to register all available Polish farms, draw up a detailed map of these farms, investigate the nature of the soil, and do the preparatory work for the resettlement itself.

1. Neues Bauerntum, l. c. p. 295.

2. Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, Heft 25, 1 September 1940.

A series of institutions cooperated in the work of resettlement: the NSV (National Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt) took care of urgent needs for beds, kitchen objects, etc.; branch offices of the DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhand Gesellschaft) carried on all kinds of connected administrative and financial activities, and the governor himself, through the Office of Settlement and Economy as well as through the Culture Offices provided the necessary farm equipment, seed corn, etc.

The administration of the seized urban property of the Polish State and Polish citizens was in the hands of Haupttreuhandstelle Ost (Main Trustee Office for the East), created by decree of 1 November 1939.¹

A Housing and Settlement Company was created by the DUT at Poznan with a capital of 1 million marks for "political housing purposes." Agricultural estates taken from Polish citizens were managed, by the Ostdeutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft m.b.H. (East German Agricultural Society) and its supplementary organizations until they were turned over to German settlers. The Central Supplies Office was to carry out the necessary repairs on farms intended for occupancy by Germans, to group small buildings into larger units, and to supplement livestock and equipment.²

1. DAZ, 6 November 1939.

2. The German New Order in Poland, pp. 203, 204.

As mentioned before, the financial side of the transfer was concentrated in the hands of a central institution, the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft m.b.H. (DUT), Berlin. The DUT was entrusted with: (a) the liquidation of immovable property left behind by German resettlers and of all their other financial interests; and (b) the actual settlement on the land, where DUT had to carry out all kinds of activities of an administrative and financial nature. These activities had been inaugurated in the former homelands of the resettlers, long before their departure; the only remaining problem was "final compensation for property left behind."¹ The first category of activities included registration, management appraisal, realization, and transfer of property values; the second the selection, appraisal, and procurement of suitable compensation. Until final installation, the resettlers obtained from the DUT weekly allowances, advance payments on property left behind, subsidies for the installation of new households, and finally, in anticipation of future property settlement, means for beginning a new existence.²

The DUT was created in the fall of 1939 with an initial capital of RM 1,000,000 (400,000). Originally, the DUT

1. Die finanzielle Regelung der Umsiedlung, in Neues Bauern-
tum (April 1941), pp. 171-172.

2. Ibid.

made considerable use of state capitals. Later, in order to economize public funds, a special Ost-Konsortium headed by the Dresdner Bank put at the disposal of the DUT credits amounting to 100 million Reichsmarks for settlement in the East (similar credits amounting to 60 million RM had been given to the DUT by a Tirolkonsortium headed by the Kreditanstalt Bankverein for the resettlement of Tyrolese Germans).

The DUT report on the first period of its activity stated that the "property and legal interests of the resettlers should be dealt with according to business principles," although the DUT was not a profit-making enterprise. Sums derived from the sale of German property in the countries of residence of the transferees were recorded as "obligation of the Reichsfuehrer SS"; as re-installation of the resettlers proceeded, compensation payments were deducted. Advance cash payments and reconstruction, equipment, and liquidation loans were recorded as "credits given by order of the SS Reichsfuehrer." During the first period of its activity, the DUT had at its disposal only small amounts derived from the liquidation of property abroad, and operated almost exclusively with bank credits guaranteed by the Reich. Of the 34.22 million Reichsmarks in credits and reimbursements paid out by the DUT to resettled Germans, 27.51 million (80 percent) were credits guaranteed by the Reich. Credits and

reimbursements paid out by DUT in the first year were distributed as follows:

Up to the end of the first year, DUT granted to the resettled Germans altogether, 7,748 government-guaranteed credits, totaling RM 27,51 million. Among the various resettled groups these credits were distributed as follows:

Baltic Germans	6,138 credits totaling RM 17.56 million
Germans from South Tyrol	281 " " RM 6.52 "
Germans from Volhynia, Galicia and Narev area	1,332 " " RM 3.42 "

Besides these credits, the Baltic Germans were granted 281 purveyance credits (Anschaffungskredite) amounting to 1.49 million Reichsmarks. Credits to the number of 19,244 totaling 5.16 million Reichsmarks were given to all resettled German groups for household objects, including credits for earnest money and furniture. (See Table 3 on the following page)

An evaluation of the results achieved so far is found in DUT report for 1942, excerpts of which had been published in the German press on 4 April 1943. In 1942, thirteen new Liaison Offices had been established, while the number of officials, which had reached 1,893, at the beginning of the year had decreased by the end of 1942 to 1,701. According to the report, the balance increased from RM 148 million in 1941 to RM 245 million in 1942 (an increase of 70 percent); 76,810

Table 3. DISTRIBUTION OF CREDITS (INCLUDING REIMBURSEMENTS)

Occupational groups	Total		Distribution in million Reichsmark		Distribution of credits guaranteed by the Reich		Distribution of credits in Reichsmark	
	In million Reichsmark	in million Reichsmark	Below 10,000 R	Above 10,000 R	In million Reichsmark	in million Reichsmark	Below 10,000 R	Above 10,000 R
Industry	21.8	7.45	0.94	6.52	26.3	7.25	0.83	3.42
Commerce	27.3	9.53	4.54	4.99	29.1	5.01	3.93	1.08
Trade	9.5	3.24	2.55	0.69	10.3	3.80	2.17	0.63
Free professions	12.5	4.25	1.21	3.04	13.6	3.75	0.71	3.04
Agriculture	23.9	9.90	3.33	1.56	20.7	5.79	4.14	1.56
Total	100.0	34.22	17.57	16.80	100.0	27.51	11.78	15.73

resettler accounts out of 209,574 had already been fully compensated (36.7 percent); compensations paid increased from RM 80 million in 1941 to RM 318 million in 1942 (an increase of 170 percent); the balance in favor of the resettlers was then RM 66.66 million. The report stated in this connection that in 1942 the DUT no longer handled credits given to the resettlers against property left behind as purveyance or working capital credits; it treated them as anticipated compensatory payments and its policy was to turn over this type of credits to private financial institutions.

The number of resettlement agencies created by the Reich was exceedingly large. It is difficult, and sometimes impossible to trace the organic interdependence among the activities of these agencies. A good deal of chaos and overlapping seems to have prevailed. The German resettlement scheme evidently suffered from heavy over-organization. The number of bodies in charge of the various aspects of resettlement was out of proportion to the efficiency of the work and constituted a burden rather than an asset.

b. The Installation of Transferred Volksdeutsche. The basic principle of the German resettlement policy was compensation in kind for property and vested interests left behind by the transferred Volksdeutsche. The main task of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germandom was to assign

to the resettlers as soon as possible a suitable and constructive field of activity and to undertake a property settlement, which would represent an equitable solution for every resettler, taking into account the difference in the cost of living. As a rule, the resettlers were to be assigned an enterprise "of equal size and kind."¹ A farmer was to receive a farm with all the necessary implements, approximately corresponding to his former farmstead; the shopkeeper, the industrialist, the craftsman had to be compensated by getting a shop, a factory, a handicraft establishment of similar value; the professional was to obtain a job or an office corresponding to his former occupation. In exceptional cases only, or as an additional form of indemnification, cash payments were made.

The German-annexed Polish western provinces which had been selected for resettlement were densely populated, with an average density of ninety-five inhabitants per square kilometer according to the census of 1931.² In order to make room for the consecutive waves of German resettlers, an extensive and ruthless depopulation and expropriation policy was inaugurated. Its stages coincided exactly with the various periods of the German transfer undertaking.

i. Germanization of the Towns. The first resettlers

1. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, Oktoberheft, 1941.
2. Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, Glasgow, 1941.

arrived from Latvia and Estonia in the fall of 1939. Of the 61,500 resettlers, the overwhelming majority were urban dwellers. To provide them with shelter and jobs, the German authorities undertook the wholesale and speedy deportation of the Polish and Jewish urban population.

The first Polish towns to be affected by these measures were Orlowo (12 October), a summer resort, and Gdynia (16 October), the large Polish port on the Baltic... On 22 October deportations began from Poznan, the capital of Western Poland. In November and December, and in the following months, similar steps were taken in other towns of Poznan and Silesia. The first to be deported were Jews, Polish intellectuals, members of the clergy, and the middle class... They were permitted to take along only small packs of personal belongings and two hundred zlotys in cash. Their houses and all other possessions, were to be left in good order, with the keys hanging on the doorhandles. The expulsions were regularly accompanied by the wholesale expropriation of the deportees' movable and immovable property.¹ In May 1941, the Gauleiter of Wartheland declared: "No Pole in the future will be allowed to have land or a home here."² However, these plans were never carried out. One and one-half million Poles were possibly removed, but seven and

1. The German New Order in Poland, London 1941, Passim.

2. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 13 May 1941.

one-half million remained in the area. The Germans could not afford further to depopulate this important agricultural and industrial region and they no longer had a reserve of German resettlers for installation in Western Poland.

Over two-thirds of the transferees from the Baltic States were settled in towns. By June 1940, they were distributed as follows:

Poznan	29,000 (45 percent)
Lodz	8,800
Gdynia	2,000
Kalisz	2,000
Bydgoszcz	1,800
Gniezno	1,700
Flock	1,300
Leszno	1,200
Inowroclaw	1,200

Besides these 49,000, other groups were settled in smaller towns.¹ They were housed in comfortable quarters which had formerly belonged to the expelled Polish and Jewish inhabitants. In a collection of letters written by Baltic Germans shortly after their installation in the wartheland, a general feeling of great satisfaction predominated. Following are some excerpts:

1. Reichsverwaltungsblatt, 8 June 1941.

A physician's wife reported from Poznan: "We feel very well at home here, and a very large and beautiful apartment with a doctor's office was assigned to us by the Chamber of Physicians. The furniture and the entire equipment is in good taste." Another lady relates in a letter from the seaside resort of Adlershorst (Orlowo) that her family was lodged in a three room apartment of a rich business man, "very clean, with brand new furniture ... vessels, crystal, complete kitchen equipment, snow white bed linen ... kitchen, W.C., bathroom, basement, abundance of electric light, a garden with unpicked vegetables, a dog, rabbits, and chickens -- everything at our disposal."¹

Extremely favorable terms were arranged for transferred businessmen, industrialists, craftsmen, and professionals. They were more than satisfactorily compensated for the property they left behind. By the spring of 1941, the Baltic Germans alone had been given 4,000 industrial and commercial undertakings and 700 artisans workshops.² They had also received 6,419 individual credits amounting to RM 19,53 million.³ The Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten of 7 December 1941, stated with pride that in Lodz, by the end of 1941, the relation of German to non-German undertakings in trade has been exactly reversed: in 1939 only 10 percent were German,

1. Baltenbriefe zur Rückkehr ins Reich; Berlin-Leipzig, 1942.

2. Auf neuer Scholle, p. 19.

3. Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, p. 172.

and by the end of 1941 only 10 percent were non-German undertakings. By the end of November 1942, the Essen National Zeitung stated that "all Polish trade in the incorporated area has been liquidated": 51 percent of all enterprises were by that time taken over by the local Volksdeutsche, 8 percent were in the hands of Germans from the Old Reich, and 20 percent were controlled by Germans who had been resettled from Eastern European countries; the remaining 1,200 enterprises were being run by administrators pending final dispositions.

ii. Germanization of the Rural Areas... The purge of farmland for purposes of resettlement by Germans was even more thorough and ruthless. According to official Polish sources, in Gau Danzig-West Prussia, Poles were expelled from some 35,000 holdings, and in Silesia 15,500 peasants were deprived of holdings totaling 54,000 acres. In the Ciechanow district, united with German East Prussia, some 18,000 Polish farms were seized. In addition, the Germans confiscated 5,500 larger estates of more than 125 acres. Included was livestock estimated at 1.3 million cattle, 1.4 million pigs and half a million horses in Warthegau alone.¹

The first to be removed were large landowners, in the beginning from the rural districts of Poznan, Pomerania,

1. Polish News Bulletin No. 103, 31 October 1941.

and Silesia and shortly afterwards from areas further East (Suwalki, Ciochanow, Wloclawek, Plock, Lodz, etc.). Their estates were at first administered by local Volksdeutsche and subsequently partly turned over to transferred Baltic Germans, many of whom were experienced in the management of large and medium-sized estates.

A few months later, in December 1939 and in January and February 1940, smaller estates and holdings were seized by the Germans, and their owners expelled. The same geographical order was followed here: first Danzig-West Prussia and Warthegau, and subsequently areas situated farther east.

In order to maintain agricultural production, not all Polish peasants were removed; a number were left to till the soil pending ultimate settlement of their fate. According to German sources, more than half a million of these small Polish farms were by August 1941 controlled by the German agricultural trust Ostland, through German commissioners.¹ However, insofar as German settlers were available, small Polish peasant estates were liberally distributed among them. As early as at the end of 1940, 23,000 resettled German families with some 140,000 to 150,000 members had "already been allotted farms which formerly belonged to small Polish landowners."²

1. Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 29 August 1941.

2. Das Reich, 26 January 1941.

The principle of indemnification in kind, as applied by the DUT, is illustrated by the following example:

"When a German settler in the Warthegau wished to obtain, for example, a sawmill, he will do his utmost to become trustee for the particular sawmill he has in mind. Then, looking for a sawmill for him, the DUT will assure itself that out of the total wealth he left in his previous fatherland, and which is put to his credit with DUT, there is enough to pay for the sawmill."¹ The distribution of seized Polish farms presented a special problem. In the incorporated Polish Western provinces, small and even dwarf holdings predominated.² According to the German resettlement authorities Polish peasants were able to live on these small farms "only because of their very low standard of living."³ The authorities decided that such small units would be unsatisfactory for German resettlers, and that out of the 275,000 "available" peasant farms in Wartheland, only a very small part could be taken over by resettlers in their actual condition, particularly in the former districts of Russian Poland. Several farms were thus frequently united to form a single large unit for the use of German resettlers. In the community of Buczek (in Sieradz county) the farms of 173 Polish peasant

1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 9 February 1941.
2. Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, Warsaw 1938, p. 63.
3. National-Sozialistische Monatshefte, January 1941, p. 29.

families were occupied by 23 families of Bessarabian Germans, while in the community of Wadlew, the holdings of 171 expelled Polish farmer families were allotted to 37 resettled German families.¹ A German author, Dr. Carl Hartwig, related, early in 1941, that "so far in the district of Kattowitz 153 estates have been set up, each estate consisting of 12 Polish small farms on the average."² "The German family was established in the best house, and all the other houses were destroyed and used for firewood."³ In other cases "superfluous" Polish dwellings were not destroyed, but converted into stables or cow-houses. The picture supplement of the Neues Bauerntum (December 1940) shows a German boy driving a cow into a Polish peasant house; the caption reads as follows: "Since several former small farms were united and converted into a large German estate, dwelling houses often serve as stables."

By the end of 1943, the balance of German rural resettlement in the incorporated Polish provinces was as follows:

Some 33,000 peasant families were resettled in the Wartheland province where they received twice as much land as they had owned in their country of origin. Their farms were equipped with 100,000 agricultural machines, valued at

1. Bulletin Polski, 19 June 1942.
2. Bauernland im Osten, in Das Reich, 26 January 1940.
3. The German New Order in Poland, London 1941, p. 197.

22,000,000 marks; they were also given furniture and domestic implements valued at 12,000,000 marks.¹

In Gau Danzig-Westpreussen, 9,960 peasant families received 220,000 hectares of former Polish property; the reconditioning of their farms amounted to 25 million marks.² Some 240 peasant families were settled in Gau Upper Silesia.³

iii. Trade, Industry, Commerce, and the Professions.

Soon after the incorporation, widespread expropriation of existing Polish and Jewish industrial establishments was inaugurated. The first objectives of this policy were the larger Polish and Jewish industrial concerns, which it was easier to take over and to administer. The Treuhandstelle (Trustee Office) Posen (Poznan) seized 3,500 industrial undertakings; the Treuhandstelle Litzmannstadt (Lodz) alone seized 2,000 textile factories.⁴ Thousands of undertakings were simply closed down.

By November 1944, a total of 54,000 enterprises employing approximately half a million workers and clerical staff were functioning in Wartheland under German control. A similar situation had been created in Gau Danzig-Westpreussen. Ten thousand handicraft undertakings, mainly operated by Poles and Jews, came under the trustee management of the

1. Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, 7. October 1943.
2. Danziger Vorposten, 16 October 1943.
3. NDZ, 22 August 1942.
4. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, I, Oktoberheft, 1941.

Treuhandstelle Ost; only part of them were reopened.¹

The same measures were applied with regard to commercial undertakings. Of the 24,700 enterprises registered in Warthegau 15,000 were Polish and Jewish. According to Deutsche Volkswirtschaft of October 1941 "the existing Polish enterprises had to be reduced to about one-half, in order to secure the clientele and means of subsistence for German retail merchants."

The beneficiaries of all these drastic measures were partly the local German population of the incorporated Polish provinces, and partly Germans transferred from abroad.

In the liberal professions, the expulsion of Polish doctors, dentists, and other members of the professional classes created vacancies for the newcomers, who could be immediately installed in vacated offices. On the other hand, the new German administrative machinery called for thousands of qualified civil servants. Thus, almost all the transferred professionals found occupations and jobs. Some 500 teachers, 305 physicians, 256 lawyers, 200 pharmacists, 190 engineers, 67 foresters, 45 university lecturers, and 16 architects were easily settled; 2,000 were employed at the Reichspost in Warthegau, 400 became fonctionnaires of the Germanized Lodz municipality.²

1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 11 November 1944.

2. Gerlach Fritz, Auf neuer Scholle, Berlin 1941, pp. 13, 19.

c. The Results of the Resettlement. The transfer of German folk groups from abroad was practically discontinued after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June 1941. In the course of three years, until the spring of 1944, the number of German repatriates in the incorporated Polish provinces remained practically static.

According to official German sources, there were 300,000 German resettlers in the model Gau Wartheland in May 1942,¹ and the same number was given by the Völkischer Beobachter of 17 March 1944. On 2 July 1942, the Danziger Vorposten announced that 148,039 Germans transferred from the East have been resettled in Gau Danzig-West Prussia. Since then no figures were published which would indicate a more or less considerable increase. The number of resettlers in Gau Upper Silesia (11,322 in November 1941),² and the Ciechanow district of East Prussia (3,600 in 1942)³ also remained substantially unchanged. Thus a total of some 465,000 transferred Germans were resettled in the Polish western provinces. No more "transferrable" German folk groups from abroad proved to be available at that time. The Volksdeutsche, in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Slovakia, numbering some two million, were considered by the Reich too valuable as carriers

1. Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 May 1942.
2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 August 1942.
3. Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1943, No. 10, p. 344.

of German imperialism to be transplanted.

Not until the spring of 1944 was the resettlement of transferred German minority groups in the incorporated Western Poland, interrupted since the summer of 1941, suddenly resumed. The German withdrawal from the Soviet Ukraine brought about the wholesale evacuation of 350,000 Volksdeutsche living in the Soviet Black Sea area and the Zhitomir region. Some 285,000 of them were directed to the Wartheland.¹ Announcing in March 1944 the arrival of the millionth German in the Warthegau, Gauleiter Greiser included in this figure the first 80,000 Black Sea Germans who by that time had already reached there and forecast that the number of Germans in the Wartheland would reach 1,100,000 after the immigration of this new group was completed.²

1. Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 5 November 1944.

2. Völkischer Beobachter, 17 March 1944. In this number were included, the local Volksdeutsche and some 400,000 Reichsdeutsche who had individually settled in the Warthegau.

2. Resettlement in the General Government. Because the German resettlement policy aimed simultaneously at Germanizing Western Poland, Germany had originally avoided diverting resettlers to other areas. The General Government had been explicitly barred as a resettlement area and was allegedly destined "to form within the framework of the Reich the motherland of the Poles."¹ It was to this Polish reservation that the one-half million Poles deported from the incorporated Western provinces had been sent. What is more, in September 1940, 30,116 Volksdeutsche peasants who lived in the eastern part of the General Government, in the Lubin-Gholin-Luberton triangle, were transferred to the Wartheland in exchange for an undetermined, but probably much higher, number of Poles.²

A reversal of this initial German policy took place in 1942. In October-December 1942, some 20,000 Volksdeutsche from Croatia were resettled in the Lublin area in the General Government.³ Other small groups of Volksdeutsche who have been installed in the General Government include some 2,000 resettlers from Bulgaria,⁴ some 1,925 from old Serbia,⁵ and 2,104 from the Leningrad area.⁶ Furthermore, a small number of

1. Böhmische Zeitung, 22 September 1940.
2. Neues Bauderftum, September 1940, pp. 301-302.
3. Wiesci Polskie, Budapest, 9 April 1943.
4. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 April 1943.
5. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1943, No. 10.
6. Völkischer Beobachter, 4 April 1943; Krakauer Zeitung, 27 March 1942.

transferred Volksdeutsche from the Baltic States and from Bessarabia were resettled in the General Government.¹ From 1942 until spring 1944, the General Government was the only German-held area in Europe where the resettlement of German groups was being continued, although on a small scale.

3. The Resettlement of Bulgarians and Rumanians Exchanged Under the Craiova Treaty

a. The Settlement of Bulgarians. The resettlement of Bulgarians repatriated from Northern Dobrudja did not present considerable difficulties. They brought with them a large part of their livestock: 18,500 horses, 3,500 swine, 215,000 sheep, 12,500 horned cattle, and 12,000 small cattle.² Land and dwellings in Southern Dobrudja which had belonged to the 100,000 repatriated Rumanians were largely adequate for the settlement of the 66,000 transferred Bulgarians. On 4 May 1944, Transcontinent Press reported from Sofia that 14,500 resettler families had been allotted 314,558 acres of land in Southern Dobrudja. Since land vacated by transferred Rumanians considerably exceeded this amount, the government was able to allot 157,155 additional acres to 22,000 landless families from Bulgaria proper.

b. The Settlement of Rumanians. The Rumanian Government made every effort to settle the 100,000 repatriates from

1. Volksischer Beobachter, 7 April 1943.

2. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, March 1941.

Southern Dobrudja permanently on Rumanian territory as quickly as possible.

A General Commissariat for Dobrudja entrusted with the resettlement of evacuees from Southern Dobrudja was set up by the Rumanian Government.¹ Northern Dobrudja was selected as the main resettlement area. Here 283,965 acres of arable land and 11,974 farms vacated by 61,000 to 65,000 repatriated Bulgarians, were put at the disposal of the General Commissariat. An additional 64,982 acres of land and 2,481 farms were made available by the emigration from this area of 14,500 Germans. However, the colonization plan provided that each family of resettlers be given a house and a farm of at least 25 acres. Thus, of the 21,897 evacuated families not more than some 14,500 families or (counting five persons per family), some 65,000 to 67,000 persons (65 percent of the total number) could be resettled on an area of 327,160 acres of cultivated land in the Constanza and Tulcea districts of Northern Dobrudja. As the number of Rumanians repatriated from Southern Dobrudja reached 100,000, the land reserves of Northern Dobrudja proved insufficient for the settlement of all Rumanian repatriates. Peasant families to the number of 1,235 were installed in Bessarabia and 543 in Bukovina (in villages evacuated by the German colonists in October and November 1940); 29 families were colonized

1. Bukarester Tageblatt, 20 July 1943.

in the district of Timis Torontal.¹ A large group was to be settled around the Danube delta where fishing colonies were to be created: 25 million lei for the construction of houses, and 18 million lei for fishing tackle were earmarked for them.² Housing was the most difficult problem in Dobrudja, because most of the houses abandoned by repatriated Germans and especially by Bulgarians were found to be uninhabitable. In August 1943 the Rumanian Commercial Service planned the repair and construction of 3,900 houses.³

Although the General Commissariat for Northern Dobrudja was dissolved in July 1943,⁴ some twenty thousand Dobrudja repatriates have not yet been settled in permanent homes. In August 1943, the Ministry of Finance granted a credit of twenty million lei for indemnities to these repatriates who had abandoned their estates in Southern Dobrudja and had not been indemnified in kind.⁵ In January 1944, the Finance Office was authorized to grant a new credit of 100 million lei to the Office for Rumanization and Resettlement. Farmers who had lived in Southern Bulgaria and were resettled were to be given loans. On 6 October 1943, Universul reported that the Association of Evacuees from Southern Dobrudja had appealed to the

1. Trei Ani de Guvernare, Bucharest 1943, p. 150.

2. Donauezeitung, 28 May 1942.

3. Universul, 26 August 1943.

4. Bukarester Tageblatt, 19 August 1943.

5. Transcontinent Press, 21 January 1944.

Office for Rumanization, requesting the same treatment which had been extended to refugees from Transylvania, who had been given confiscated Jewish buildings and enterprises.

Taking into account the apparently permanent character of the Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement concerning the partition of Dobrudja, the 65,000 to 67,000 Rumanians colonized in Northern Dobrudja can be considered permanently settled. The 25,000 Dobrudja Rumanians who were installed in Bessarabia and Bukovina (as far as the northern part of the latter province is concerned), may face further displacement, now that these provinces have been recovered by Soviet Russia.

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