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*Alexander
Fedorovich
Kerenskiy*
A. F. KERENSKY.

ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.

(Address delivered before the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Labour Party.)



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Address delivered by Mr. A. F. KERENSKY before
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Labour Party.

London, 2nd January, 1920.

GENTLEMEN,—

I have come here to-day in order to place at your disposal a series of documents which fairly vividly characterise the present state of affairs in Russia, in order to give a brief outline of the activities in Russia of the Entente Governments, and more particularly of the British Government, during the last two years, and, lastly, in order to point out certain actions which should be undertaken by the representatives of English democracy in the interest of the Russian as well as of the English peoples.

The documents which I am submitting relieve me of the necessity of taking up too much of your time in setting out to you in detail the harrowing tale of events in Russia—Bolshevist, as well as the parts ruled by the military dictators enjoying the patronage of your Government. I am therefore going to deal directly with the activities of the Allied Governments during the period from autumn, 1917, to the present time. The representatives of the Entente Governments very often state publicly that they are "not informed" about events in Russia, that they "have no definite opinion" as to what means are best calculated to arrest the disintegration of Russia. But, gentlemen, all this is said only because statesmen, well versed in politics, believe that speech has been given to man only the better to conceal his intentions, and they therefore prefer to do their work without wide publicity, taking care not to arouse public opinion, which is always ready to catch at words, but is hardly ever able to discern the real essence of things.

In actual fact, the policy of the Entente in Russia during the period mentioned, even if it did change in details, fundamentally

followed a well-defined and undeviating course, and expressed itself in—(1) systematic interference, by way of intervention, in the internal affairs of Russia in order to actively combat Russian democracy and to create and consolidate there the most anti-democratic governments; (2) in an endeavour to perpetuate the dismemberment of Russia commenced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; and lastly, (3) in prolonging the régime of blockade, which, as a fact, commenced simultaneously with the declaration of war in 1914.

It may be that to many of you my way of formulating the main points of the Entente activities in Russia will seem to be too severe and unjust, but I hope that the facts which I am going to submit to you will convince you that my definition of it is only an accurate statement of the truth. I kept silence about many things whilst the war was in progress; I did not speak out fully about many things whilst it was being wound up. Now, it seems to me, the time has arrived when, in order to avoid fatal misunderstandings and, maybe, also misfortunes in the future, everyone of us must know and is bound to state the whole truth. I hope to publish in the near future a series of documents relating to the history of the intervention and the relations between the French and English Governments and Russian democracy. To-day I shall confine myself to general conclusions.

I.—INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA (INTERVENTION).

In the first place we must clear up one very important misapprehension existing in the minds of the Russian as well as of the European public regarding intervention. Many people believe that intervention in Russia began at the invitation of Russian democracy and they lay the responsibility for the tragic results of that intervention at the door of the Russian Socialist and Democratic Parties. This is absolutely untrue, because between the intervention which the Allied Governments committed *upon their own initiative* and without any agreement with Russian democracy, and that help which, at the time of the war with Germany in the spring and summer of 1918, we were asking from the Allies, there is absolutely nothing in common, for the simple reason that Russian democracy did not receive the help it was waiting for, whilst the intervention carried out by the Allied Governments was primarily directed against Russian organised democracy.

It must be borne in mind that the liberation from Bolshevism of the whole of Siberia, the Urals, the territories of the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks, the Middle Volga region and its chief cities—Samara, Simbirsk, and Kazan; of the Oufa region and of Northern Russia (Archangel), was effected by the united efforts of Russian democracy and of the Tchecho-Slovaks, not only without any help from the Allies, but even before the arrival of the latter. This heroic struggle against the Germano-Bolshevist armed forces ended in the formation in September, 1918, of the All-Russian National Government (Directory), which took upon itself the duty to complete the internal regeneration of Russia and the immediate restoration of the Russian front in the fight against Germany. Such was the position in Russia when Allied intervention started. But little remained to be done to bring the work of the regeneration of Russia to a happy ending. It was only necessary to come to the aid of the Russian people as represented by its restored democratic government, honestly and quickly, without any *arrière pensées*. How did the Allies act? They (the British and French Governments) did actually prepare for intervention, but on their own initiative and according to their own plan. When in June of last year I came to Europe specially in order to hasten the despatch of Allied armed aid to Russia and to inform the Allied Governments about the negotiations which in this connection had taken place between the block of Socialist, Democratic, and Liberal Parties and the representatives of the Allies in Moscow, I saw that the British and French Governments had already definitely determined their line of action towards Russia.

The intervention started with the landing of a detachment in Archangel. In that town, freed from the Bolsheviks by the forces of Russian democracy, at that time already existed a Government created by the Union of Regeneration and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, with Tchaikovsky at its head. One might have thought that the Allies who appeared at Archangel, with the English General Poole at their head, should have welcomed such a state of affairs. Nothing of the kind. After making a solemn declaration about "non-interference" in internal Russian affairs, General Poole immediately took steps to depose Tchaikovsky's democratic Government. The arrested Ministers were put on board of an English ship and taken to the Solovetzky monastery, situated on a lonely island. It is true, as a result of the strike which broke out in Archangel and of an American protest, General Poole was compelled to immediately bring the deported Government back to Archangel; but his object was nevertheless attained. None of the left wing of the Tchaikovsky Government came back to power; while Tchaikovsky, who remained at the head of the Government, was soon after, under a plausible pretext, called

away to Paris, and in North Russia set in an era of military dictatorship of Anglo-Russian generals, with all its tragic consequences to the population.

Gentlemen, General Poole's activities are not a chance occurrence. On the contrary, General Poole, in effecting a *coup d'état*, carried out an essential part of the general plan of the intervention. I assert this quite categorically in full consciousness of my responsibility for it, because when I was in London and in Paris I had the possibility of observing the hidden part of the preparation and carrying out of the intervention. That I am not asserting this without grounds is obvious from the fact that already a month before the Koltchak *coup d'état* in Siberia I warned Avksentieff, the head of the Directory, about it, and pointed out to him those foreign officers whom the All-Russian Government should particularly fear.

On October 25, 1918 (the Koltchak *coup* took place on November 18 of the same year), I sent by a trusted person a letter to Avksentieff, in which, amongst other things, I wrote him as follows:—

“From July 1, here and in Paris, Zavoiko has been working with his friends. He has held an exclusive position at the War Office with Lord Milner, and is now going to you in order to repeat on a wide scale the *coup d'état*, which failed at Archangel, absolutely with the cognizance and by previous agreement with the English military authorities. I insist that you shall take steps to find out all the conspirators in Russia, because a fresh repetition of the Kornilov attempt may finally destroy and finish Russia. Pay special attention to the activities of General Knox, the *Times* correspondent Wilton, and of the French General Janin.”

About this same matter I wrote still earlier on October 17 to Maklakoff, the Russian Ambassador in Paris:—

“Don't you know what Zavoiko-Kourbatoff has been doing in London, what negotiations he was carrying on with Lord Milner and with what object he left for Russia with a whole retinue? I am trying, if not to destroy entirely the possibility of foreign intrigues in Russia, at least as far as possible to render them difficult. I am not shooting at sparrows (at random, as you write). I am hitting the very centre, since adventures can count on success only with the aid of foreign bayonets.”

Still earlier—namely, at the end of August, 1918—being convinced that *coups d'état* performed with the assistance of foreign bayonets were inevitable in Russia, but unable to warn my friends

there of it, who at times were too confident in the representatives of the Allied Powers, I wanted to return to Russia with the purpose of informing my friends there about the state of affairs and of cautioning them as to what was coming. But I was unable to carry out this plan, as the English Government refused to assist me in returning to Russia. Mr. Lloyd George's private secretary, in his letter dated September 10, 1918, writing on behalf of the Prime Minister, explained this refusal as the consequence of the decision of the British Government "not to interfere in the internal politics of Russia," a decision which would have been violated if I were given assistance in my journey to that country. That was actually written at the time of the Archangel *coup d'état*; at the time when the representative of the Russian reaction, Mr. Zavoiko, was living incognito in Paris and London under a false *passport* given to him by the British Government, representing him as Colonel Kourbatoff, naturalised English subject; at the time when that gentleman was conducting negotiations with the most influential representatives of the English and French Governments, was invited to the meetings of the Supreme Council at Versailles, and was preparing to go to America for the final arrangement about the *coup d'état*, carrying with him letters of introduction to President Wilson from English and French Cabinet Ministers. In America Mr. Zavoiko did not conceal that he came there to smooth the way to Koltchak's dictatorship. He actually acted as one of the agents of the plot which was being hatched. And though Koltchak's *coup d'état* had been carried out before Mr. Zavoiko's return to Siberia, it was accomplished under the protection of General Knox, about whom I had written to Avksentieff.

Who are, then, these Messrs. Zavoiko and Knox? Mr. Zavoiko, a financial shark and an adventurer of Rasputin's type, during the Revolution belonged to the personal suite of General Korniloff, and acted as one of the principal organisers of that General's attempt, so unfortunate for Russia, to overthrow the Government and to proclaim a military dictatorship. As to General Knox, the military *chargé d'affaires* of the English Government with the Tsar's Government and afterwards with its Russian Provisional Government, this gentleman was one of the most trusted assistants of Lord Milner, that evil genius of Russia. During the Galician offensive in the summer of 1918, I personally removed him from the Russian front for his propaganda against the Provisional Government among the Russian officers. He maintained his connection with military conspirators against the Provisional Government, and later on, in 1918, made his appearance in Siberia to carry out with Koltchak what he failed to achieve with Korniloff.

Gentlemen, the exceptional rôle which General Knox played in Russia is well known to the Allied Governments. On November 5 the *Manchester Guardian* published interesting minutes of the Paris meetings of the "Big Five" relating to the Russian affairs. In the minutes of January 16, a speech by Mr. Lloyd George is reported, and amongst other things there occurs the following passage:—

"Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviks? He had been told there were three men—Denikin, Koltchak and Knox. If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building upon quicksand. From information received, it would appear that Koltchak has been collecting around him members of the old régime, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist."

I think the characteristics just given by me to General Knox makes it clear why a foreign officer, known by few, is being mentioned at the High Meeting of the Chiefs of the Allied Powers as a possible saviour of Russia. When the success of Admiral Koltchak seemed well assured, the British Government did not conceal the part it played in the establishment of the military dictatorship in Siberia. On June 6, Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons about the Government of Koltchak, said outright:—"We have called him to life. Thus, in Siberia, as well as in Archangel, the Allied intervention was begun with the overthrow of the All-Russian Democratic National Government—i.e., with the definite interference in the internal affairs of Russia."

In the South the whole might of the Allied assistance was put at the disposal of the Volunteer Army and of the Chiefs of the latter, first Alexeieff and then Denikin. If now there still exists in the South a military dictator, General Denikin, Mr. Churchill would be fully entitled to repeat his words on Admiral Koltchak: "We have created that dictator, and all the secret of his might lies in our tanks." Yes, gentlemen, it was quite lately that the English tanks supported Denikin in his mad struggle against the last bulwark of democracy in the South of Russia, against the Cossack Kouban Republic.

I think I have succeeded in demonstrating to you that I am not speaking at random when I affirm that the Allied intervention in Russia is a gross encroachment upon the internal Russian affairs for the sake of fighting Russian anti-Bolshevist and pro-Allied democracy and of establishing there a military dictatorship to bring about a complete restoration of the old régime. I think the representatives of the British democracy more than anybody else should have known it, since the first fiddle in the Russian concert

of the Allied Powers is undoubtedly played by the Government of the British Empire.

I am not going to dwell upon the consequences of such intervention for the Russian people. The documents just produced to you give a sufficiently detailed description of the horrors of the Bolshevism of the Right, that in its excesses sometimes surpasses even the Bolshevism of the Left. It is far more important for me to-night to emphasise the undoubted fact that the régime of reactionary military dictatorship not only does not contribute to the destruction of Bolshevism in Russia, but, on the contrary, conduces to its strengthening regeneration. The defeats suffered by Koltchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch at the hands of the Red Army, the return of the Bolsheviks to Siberia, whence they were expelled in the early spring of 1918, the quick reappearance of the Bolshevik tendencies in the South of Russia, must convince the most inveterate but sincere believers in the military dictatorship as the best means for fighting Bolsheviks that this method only fans up the Bolshevik conflagration and brings it nearer to the borders of Western Europe.

I was and I am an irreconcilable foe of Bolshevism, and in that very quality, for the sake of defending not only the interests of Russia, but the whole future development of the World Democracy, I insist on a complete liquidation of all experiments in military dictatorship.

Only an organised democracy, only an authority that carried out the fundamental principle of democracy and social justice will be strong enough to conquer Bolshevism, that tyranny invented by demagogues and rooted in the deep hatred of the working masses towards the old régime.

II.—THE DISMEMBERMENT OF RUSSIA.

To my mind, the negative consequences of the military dictatorship in Russia are so evident that it would be very difficult to admit that they are ignored or misunderstood by the most talented and experienced statesmen of England. Perhaps the nature and the aims of the intervention of the Allied Governments in Russian home affairs will be clearer to us if they are appreciated in their connection with the policy of the Entente as regards the so-called "small nationalities" of the Russian State.

In the sphere of our national question nobody can understand the Russian point of view better than an Englishman, for the

existence of the hundred millions of Russian people is just as unthinkable without a free access to the sea and without an unhampered intercourse of Central Russia with Russia's border provinces as the existence of the forty millions of Englishmen without close connection of Great Britain with her oversea colonies.

For Russia the fate of the Baltic and the Baltic Islands is perhaps even of a greater importance than the fate of Ireland for England. Caucasus plays in Russia's life hardly a lesser part than India in the life of the British Empire, while the future of Ukraine is just as intimately connected with the future of the whole Russian State as the future of Scotland with the life of England. Imperial Germany estimated very well the enormous importance for Russia of her un-Russian or half-Russian provinces. She understood that to dismember Russia, to isolate its centre, means to pronounce a death sentence to the whole Russian people; and she made it at Brest-Litovsk accordingly. For the very essence of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty may be summed up in two chief points: (1) The declaration of independence of all the border provinces without exception; (2) the granting to German capital in Russia such exceptional privileges as to practically transform that country into a mere colony of the German Empire.

We all remember the indignation of the official representatives of the Allied countries whenever they mentioned the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. It seemed that the greatest misfortune of the Russian people, the people that had contributed so much to the common victory, was deeply felt by the Allied Governments; "the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty" was the common motto of Russia and her Allies. In that question, however, there occurred the same misunderstanding as in respect to the intervention; whilst the Russians requested a real annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the restoration of Russia as it existed before the Bolshevist *coup d'état*, the Allied Governments were chiefly concerned with the apprehension lest all the advantages resulting from Russia's disruption should fall to Germany.

The programme inspired by that kind of mentality began to be carried out by the victorious States immediately after the defeat of the Central Powers. The pretexts used were of a more or less varying nature. France's chief argument was the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* (a "sanitary barrier") out of small but nationally healthy States against the barbarian Bolshevist Moscow. England mostly supported its national policy in Russia, as it was done a little bit earlier by Germany on the plea of the necessity of defending "the rights of small nations to self-determination."

I am not a "centralist" and still less an "imperialist." Liberated Russia presents itself to my mind only as a perfect

federation, as a kind of United States of free peoples; and that idea of Russia as a democratic federation is the idea of the whole Russian democracy, of the whole Russian Revolution. Russia, liberated from the yoke of the Tsardom, showed in practice during the few months of her existence that for her "the rights of nations to self-determination" were not a mere means for the disruption and dissolution of the States-competitors, but were a guiding principle of her internal policy regarding small nationalities. At the very beginning of the Great Revolution the Provisional Government, both by the will of the people and by their own initiative, announced the Independence of Poland, though at that time the Polish question was regarded by the Allied Powers as a question of Russia's internal policy, the whole of Poland, with Poznan, Warsaw, and Cracow being included into the borders of Russia. The Provisional Government granted to Finland such a margin of autonomy as to make that country practically independent, only a few limitations being made in the sphere of military and international questions. The Government of the Great Russian Revolution laid the foundations of autonomy as well for the Ukraine and Baltic Provinces, and had in view to put the question of Russia's federalisation in its full purport and significance before the Constituent Assembly.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Russia's federalisation is quite a different thing from Russia's Balkanisation. I am deeply convinced that the dismemberment of Russia against her will and without asking the opinion of the Russian people is an injury to the most vital interests of the people and is an open act of hostility towards Russia. On that point there is not the least dissension amongst all Russian political parties without exception.

Thus the official organ of the Bolshevist Government, *Ekonomičeskaja Žizn*, writes: "There is only one way open to us: To strengthen by all means the Red Army, giving it a sufficient supply not only of men power, but of technical power, and to reunite to Russia as soon as possible the Donetz Basin and Caucasus—these chief sources of our economic existence—before our good friends the Allies have pumped out from those countries all the existing supplies for themselves." And then you have Denikin's declaration of English policy in Caucasus, published in the English newspapers 28th December, 1919:—

"Denikin wireless message states that the policy and conduct of the British Authorities in Transcaucasia is giving rise to misgiving and tending to weaken the existing Anglo-Russian friendship. Their ill-considered separatist policy is calculated to encourage the small nationalities in their excessive

demands for absolute race independence. This is only preparing the way for the Balkanisation of the whole of Eastern Europe."

We are seemingly confronted with a riddle. Why, indeed, has Denikin to protest against the English policy in Russia? A convinced supporter, not of a federative, but of a centralised Russia, is he not at the same time *persona gratissima* of the British Cabinet? It is, perhaps, exactly because the unlucky dictator is kept in power by the force of the foreign bayonets, that those bayonets make no ceremony on the Russian borders. For, indeed, what significance can a protest of a client possibly have for his patron?

Does it not really seem as if the English Cabinet, by destroying in Russia all kind of a national democratic power, by creating and supporting there autocratic governments deprived of national trust, and consequently unable to defend national interests, only smooths the way towards realisation of the Brest-Litovsk programme of the dismemberment of Russia? Does it not really seem as if the two seemingly incompatible lines of policy, the support of the reactionary centralists within Russia and the protection of the separationists in the un-Russian provinces are but links of one and the same chain, gradual stages towards one and the same goal, the maximum weakening of Russia?

These questions are extremely serious. This or that way of answering them will determine, for many years to come, the mutual relations between the Russian and the English people. Therefore, I think myself morally obliged in the interests of the two nations to express publicly my doubts that are founded not only on the real facts of the present situation in Russia, but on some announcements, perhaps a little unguarded, made by the English Government. In Russia the representatives of Great Britain are leading a distinctly Russophobe policy, and in that respect the protest by General Denikin must be supported by every Russian. In order to ensure protection and support of the English authorities one must be, or at least one must seem, a Russophobe. "We live now exactly as we did under the German régime," said to me recently a native of Caucasus of non-Russian extraction. There are, of course, many tempting things in Caucasus, such as naphtha, manganese, copper. Of course, the cotton of Turkestan is a product very useful for English industry; of course, the *de facto* protectorate over the late Russian provinces in the Baltic promises enormous achievements for English trade. But are there not some other more serious considerations lying at the root of the British policy in Russia? Gentlemen, on November 17 Mr. Lloyd George made a speech in the House of Commons. One passage

of that speech seems to have passed more or less unnoticed by the British public opinion, but it left a deep and lasting trace in the soul of every Russian. This passage in a speech of the Prime Minister of the British Empire sounds especially bitter to the Russian democrats and radicals, who under the Tsardom always contrasted in the international politics the Germanophile policy of the Court and Conservative circles with their own decisively Anglophile orientation.

This passage is as follows :—

“ Let us look well at the difficulties. On one side you have Baltic States; then Finland, Poland and in the Caucasus, Georgia, Aserbeijan and Russian Armenians; then you have Koltchak and Petlura. All of them are anti-Bolshevist forces. Why are they not united? Why cannot you unite them? It is because in one essential question their ends are incompatible. Denikin and Koltchak fight in order to achieve two great ends: their first end is destruction of the Bolsheviks and establishment of a good government in Russia. That aim might unite all. But their second task is re-union of all parts of Russia. It is not for me to say what line of policy must be observed in that question by the British Empire. One of the greatest statesmen, a man of a deep intuition, who did not belong to the party of which I belong (Lord Beaconsfield), that man deemed Russia, great, gigantic, immense, always strengthening her power, rolling like an avalanche towards Persia and the borders of India and Afghanistan, he deemed that country the greatest danger that may possibly menace the British Empire. . . .”

Then Mr. Lloyd George enumerates all the non-Russian nationalities that, in his opinion, are opposed to the re-union with Russia.

As you see, the chief point of the passage is couched in very guarded language, but its meaning is quite clear to anybody possessed of any knowledge of the history of mutual relations between England and Russia. These words of the Prime Minister, like lightning, throw a flash of light on the most delicate sides of the English policy in Russia. Great Russia is the greatest danger for England! Lord Beaconsfield, that inexorable foe of Russia, has been smuggled back to life from the world of shadows as the best authority on Russian questions. But we are removed from Beaconsfield's epoch by more than half a century. And it always seemed to us that a wall has been constructed between that epoch and our time; a solid wall of the corpses of those Russians, soldiers and officers, who have fallen on the battlefield for the sake of the victory whose fruits are now being harvested by all the Allies of Russia, and by England in particular—by all

except Russia itself. Of course, some of these fruits democratic Russia will never make use of.

A policy inspired by the desire not to allow a strong but democratic Russia to recuperate is a very dangerous policy, especially when pursued by our late Allies. For, gentlemen, even in politics it is not advisable to wish to another what one does not wish for oneself. This truth must be a guiding principle of every honest, democratic international policy. Therefore it would seem to me that only those Englishmen are entitled to advocate dismemberment of other States, and of Russia in particular, who are ready to grant full independence to all the parts of the British Empire that are desirous of it. History leads not to the disruption of the masses of humanity, but to their union. It is only through the creation of a few great world federations of free peoples that the real and firm foundation of the peace of the world will be laid. Federated Russia is an indispensable element in the new structure of international relations, without which any attempts to create the League of Nations are destined to fail.

III.—THE BLOCKADE.

I must dwell on a third link of the Allied policy in Russia, namely, the blockade. It is hardly worth while to repeat that this form of struggle stands in a full contradiction to most elementary principles of humanitarianism. A systematic, merciless starving to death of hundreds of thousands of helpless women, children, and old men that has been going on for years under the eyes of the whole cultured humanity, what a dreadful symptom of the moral dissolution brought by the four years of war! As to the practicability of the blockade as a means of fighting Bolshevism, a few words will suffice.

First, Bolshevism itself was a result of a four years' blockade that had terminated in a complete breakdown of the whole financial and economic fabric of the Russian State. By way of illustration, let us compare the import and export figures for the last normal pre-war year with those for the three years of war and for the first year of the Bolshevik régime. Taking the figures of imports and exports for the last normal year (1913) for 100, we shall see that exports in 1915 fell off 96.7 per cent.; in 1916, 95.2 per cent.; in 1917, 98.5 per cent.; in 1918, 99.5 per cent. As compared with 1917, the exports in 1918, in comparison with

1913, fell off only 1 per cent. The imports in 1915 decreased 93 per cent.; in 1916, 90 per cent.; in 1917, 90.4 per cent.; in 1918, 98.3 per cent.; consequently, the imports in 1918, as compared with 1917 (taking the imports of 1913 as the base of comparison), decreased 8 per cent. Since the whole imports of 1915-1917 consisted almost exclusively of war materials, the difference between the imports at the first revolutionary year and the imports of the first year of the Bolshevist régime will be quite insignificant.

From the economic point of view Bolshevism is nothing else but an inevitable result of a complete dislocation of the economic conditions of the country brought about by the blockade that during the war was felt by Russia far more acutely than by Germany itself. It would be rather strange to hope that the consequences (Bolshevism) of a certain cause (blockade) will disappear if the cause itself is kept up artificially.

Second, being a result of the blockade, Bolshevism, as an economic system, is bound to continue while the blockade continues. It is very well recognised and even publicly confessed by the Bolsheviks themselves.

Thus in the official Moscow paper *Economitzeskaia Zizn*, in the leading article of October 9, 1919 (No. 225), we read as follows: "Whilst expelling our own foreign capitalists who before the Revolution managed to get hold of a considerable part of our industry, we are opening now to them new ways of exploitation in the shape of concessions and allowing them to work on capitalistic lines. The penetration of foreign capital into the Soviet Russia, and its work in it, will serve as a stimulant to make our own capitalists work, who will try to re-establish in full their rights, their order and their old forms of life. . . . Then capitalism will not be abolished within the borders of the Soviet Russia, but, on the contrary, will strike firm roots in its soil. . . ."

This argument is a good commentary on Lenin's peace proposals. It clearly shows that the leaders of the Soviet Russia understand very well that with the raising of the blockade the last fiction of Socialist régime in Bolshevist Russia will at once disappear. Moreover, it is only then that the Bolshevist hypnotism will be lifted from the minds of Western Europe, for then everyone will see the primitive capitalistic and throughout reactionary essence of the Bolshevist system.

Gentlemen, I have finished. I think that at the present time the things that are most important for us are as follows:—

(1) There must be put a final and decisive end to the alliance between the Russian reaction and the Governments of the Great

Western Democracies, *i.e.*, it is necessary to ensure that the English Government, and other Governments of the Allied Powers, should actually cease giving any help to the Russian military dictators.

(2) All the representatives of the Allied Governments who take an active part in the internal affairs of Russia must be immediately recalled.

(3) A special Parliamentary Committee must be instituted to enquire in detail into the activities of the representatives of the British Government who attempted to overthrow by means of conspiracy the democratic Russian Governments.

(4) The raising of the blockade which brings the great country to starvation and a final economic dissolution.