A stylized graphic of the Russian flag, featuring a red field with a white diagonal stripe and a blue triangle at the top right. The stripes are thick and slightly irregular, giving it a hand-drawn or stencil-like appearance. The graphic is positioned on the right side of the cover, overlapping the main title text.

**REVELATIONS
FROM THE
RUSSIAN
ARCHIVES**

**A REPORT
FROM
THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS**

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Letter from Lenin, August 1918,
to regional Communist leadership ordering the hanging of kulaks:

11-8-18

Send to Penza
To Comrades Kuraev,
Bosh, Minkin and
other Penza
communists

Comrades! The revolt by the five kulak volost's must be suppressed without mercy. The interest of the entire revolution demands this, because we have now before us our final decisive battle "with the kulaks." We need to set an example.

- 1) You need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100 notorious kulaks, the rich and the bloodsuckers.
- 2) Publish their names.
- 3) Take away all of their grain.
- 4) Execute the hostages - in accordance with yesterday's telegram.

This needs to be accomplished in such a way that people for hundreds of miles around will see, tremble, know and scream out; let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking kulaks.

Telegraph us acknowledging receipt and execution of this.

Yours, Lenin

P.S. Use your toughest people for this.

TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS: Lenin uses the derogative term kulach'e in reference to the class of prosperous peasants. A volost' was a territorial/administrative unit consisting of a few villages and surrounding land.

Preface

Unpredictable events continue to occur in the former Soviet Union, with untold consequences for the future of America and the rest of the world. It seems useful to issue a report on the Library's June 1992 exhibit, "Revelations from the Russian Archives," which presented some 300 hitherto secret high-level documents from the Soviet past. The documents shed new light on the heavy legacy left by the world's first and longest-lived totalitarian regime. The exhibit was much discussed. More than 40,000 Americans "tuned in" to an electronic on-line version, in what may be a harbinger of the electronic library of the future. The documents themselves remain available to scholars and the public in the Library of Congress' European Division. The Library hopes this report conveys the flavor of the exhibit, a "first," and the attendant discussion among Russian and American scholars.

*James H. Billington
Librarian of Congress*

Inventory of Stalin's personal effects found in his Moscow apartment, March 16, 1956, three years after his death. Included are: a photograph of his mother, white felt boots, a moth-damaged cap, smoking pipes, men's batiste underwear, chest badges, pencils, and men's field socks.

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Копия в УВД им. Кле

О П И С Ь

личных вещей СТАЛИНА, находящихся на квартире № 1, корп. № 1.

Спальня

1. Железный футляр от бинокля	- 1 шт.
2. Нагрудный значок	- 3 шт.
3. Депутатский значок "ВЦИК" № 120	- 1 шт.
4. Орден "Красного Знамени" старого образца № 400	- 1
5. Орден с изображением звезды и полумесяца бронзовый (1922г.)	- 1
6. Очки защитные	- 1
7. Белье нижнее мужское батистовое	- 4 пары.
8. Платки носовые	5
9. Носки фельдперсовые мужские	2
10. Костюм мужской шерстян. (куртка и брюки)	
11. Ночные туфли - тапочки лосевые	- 1 пара
12. " - " - кожан.коричневые	- 1 пара
13. Сапоги шевроные	- 1 пара.
14. Ключ от внутрен. замка (в шкафу)	- 1 шт.
15. Блок-нот без записей	- 1 шт.
13. Карандаши	- 2 шт.
17. Трубка курительная	- 1 шт.

Кабинет

1. Блок-нот делегату ХУИ с "зада ВКП(б) без записей и в нем 1 расческа.	
2. Фотокарточка кабинетная, матери Сталина	
3. Орденские планки	2 шт.
4. Авторучка в футляре	1 шт
5. Шпателька деревян. для папирос	1 шт
6. Шпателька с художествен. инкрустацией.	1 шт

Столовая

1. Трубки курительные	4 шт.
2. Зуралка (побита молью).	1 шт
3. Бокалы роговые	2 шт
4. Л у п и.	1 шт.

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- 105 -

Не переписана 1. Щетка головная 1 шт

Холодн.комната (в сумке)

1. Сапоги валеные фетровые белые	- 1 пара ✓
2. Галоши мужские	- 2 пары. ✓
3. Капюшон суконное голубое	- 1 шт. ✓
4. Куртка шерстян. (граждан.покроя) темно-серого цвета	- 1 шт. ✓
5. Брюки мужск.шерстян.под сапоги	- 1 пара ✓
6. Платки носовые	- 23 шт. ✓
7. Кальсоны мужские батистовые	- 17 пар. ✓
8. Рубашки мужские нижние батистов.	- 17 шт. ✓
9. Тапочки лосевые	- 1 пара. ✓
10. Туфли брезентовые	- 1 пара. ✓
11. Капюшон бежевого цвета	- 1 шт. ✓
12. Шерстяной вазан.рукав	- 1 шт. ✓
13. Тапочки кожан.	- 1 пара. ✓
14. Одеяло ватное шерстян.	- 1 шт. ✓

В комнате мужского

1. Костюм шерстян.мужские	- 3 шт.
2. Брюки " - " (отдельно)	- 3 "
3. Помочи	- 1 пара.

СДАЛ ПОЛКОВНИК - *М. Цветков* (ЦВЕТКОВ).

ПРИНЯЛ МАЙОР Т/СЛ. - *Куркин* (КУРКИН).

"16" марта 1956 года.

Личные вещи Сталина (всего) переданы на хранение в 1 отделение ОП
 1. Фотокарточка кабинетная матери Сталина, 2. Орденские планки, 3. Авторучка в футляре, 4. Шпателька деревян. для папирос, 5. Шпателька с художествен. инкрустацией.

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"21" марта 1956 года.

Introduction

This volume presents a sampling of the highlights of the Library of Congress' exhibit of previously secret Kremlin documents, "Revelations from the Russian Archives" (June 17-July 16, 1992) and includes the discussion of those documents by leading Russian and American scholars.

The exhibit at the Library was a path-breaking event. It represented a public effort by the Russian government, under its first popularly-elected president, Boris Yeltsin, to affirm the basic democratic principle of free access to information. Shortly after the defeat of the attempted coup by Kremlin hard-liners of August 1991, a group of victorious democrats led by the chief archivist of Russia, Rudolph Pikhov, took over the secret archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and began the process of gaining control over all Russia's archives, attempting to organize them for study by independent researchers. Dr. Pikhov asked for the cooperation of the Librarian of Congress, James H. Billington, a historian of Russian culture, in this endeavor and their collaboration led to the exhibit at the Library.


This exhibit was also remarkable for what it contained: a core sample of what may be the most important new source of primary materials essential to understanding the tumultuous history of the 20th Century. The 300 documents range in subject matter from the October

Revolution of 1917 to the failed coup of August 1991. They illuminate both domestic policy and foreign relations under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors. The papers are drawn from the Party's working files: the archives of the Central Committee and the Presidential archive, as well as the KGB.

The exhibit could not cover all aspects of Soviet history. The materials chosen focussed on two themes of likely interest to Americans: Soviet-American relations and the inner workings of the Soviet system over a 70-year period. The records vividly suggest, among other things, that terror and forced labor were employed by Communist leaders far earlier than many Western scholars once assumed. The ruthlessness and cynicism documented in these papers suggest a vast bureaucratic dictatorship cut off from the people — and provide many hints as to why Communist rule lasted so long and fell apart so fast.

This report encompasses only a few of the "revelations" and the main points of the attendant scholarly discussion at the Library in June 1992. But it conveys the essence of what tens of thousands of Library visitors saw last June and 40,000 other Americans accessed "on-line" via electronic networks across the country. The exhibit lifted a corner of the curtain on a great tragic drama long concealed by the Kremlin and long debated among analysts in the West. The discussion will continue; as more Soviet documents become available, there is likely to be more light and less heat.

Joseph Stalin, in background, and Lavrentii Beria, a Soviet political leader and head of the secret police during the Stalin era of leadership, enjoying a rest, holding Stalin's daughter at a *dacha*, a Russian country home. After Stalin's death in 1953, the loyal Beria was purged from the Communist Party and later executed.



Selected Documents from the Archives and Commentary

The Library of Congress chose for this exhibit over 300 documents from the 70 million that were available from the newly opened archives of the Communist Party. Knowing that it would be impossible to select materials comprehensively, the Library's curatorial team instead decided to choose core samples of the types of documents which are now accessible to researchers. The scholars looked for items which would shed light on the origins of the Soviet system; in particular for the earliest documents about the selected areas of focus. These selection criteria yielded a number of significant findings, ranging from heretofore unknown Lenin documents, to an early report (1979) about design flaws in the Chernobyl' nuclear plant. Some of these key documents are reproduced in full below. They represent exhibit sections focussing on the internal workings of the Party and the Soviet system: the secret police, anti-religious campaigns, the Gulag, collectivization and industrialization, and Chernobyl'; as well as those dealing with the USSR's bilateral relations with the USA: Soviet and American communist parties, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Other subjects covered in depth in the exhibit included: attacks on the intelligentsia; the Kirov assassination; the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of the 1940s; Stalin's deportations of nationalities during and after the Second World War; censorship and the suppression of

dissidents; perestroika; early cooperation with the USA, especially the American Relief Administration's famine relief efforts in the 1920s, and early economic relations between the two nations; the alliance between the USSR and the USA during World War II; the post-War estrangement and origins of the Cold War; and the fate of American POWs and MIAs.

In addition to documents, the Library of Congress displayed a large number of photographs and selected films from the Party archives. The film excerpts came from newsreels and propaganda films never before seen outside the USSR: rare footage of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin, weeks after the October coup; extended coverage of the Thirteenth Party Congress of 1924, convened four months after Lenin's death; churches and synagogues plundered and razed by the Red Army; forced collectivization; the building of the White Sea Canal; and extraordinary sound footage from the very first public show trial, held in 1928 to prosecute the so-called Industrial Party.

Historical Background

Having come to power in October 1917 by means of a coup d'état, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks spent the next few years struggling to maintain their rule against widespread popular opposition. They had overthrown the provisional democratic government, and in the name of the revolutionary cause, employed ruthless methods to suppress political enemies. The small, elite group of Bolshevik revolutionaries which formed the core of the Communist Party dictatorship ruled by decree and enforced with terror.

This tradition of tight centralization, with decision-making concentrated at the highest party levels, reached new dimensions under Joseph Stalin. As many of these archival documents show, there was little input from below in determining major policy directions. The Party elite determined the goals of the state, and the means of achieving them, in virtual isolation from the people. They believed that, at times, the interests of the individual had to be sacrificed to those of the state, for the state was advancing a sacred social task. Stalin's "revolution from above" sought to build socialism by means of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization, with

programs that entailed tremendous human suffering and loss of life while, at the same time, achieving staggering results in heavy industry, especially the production of military hardware.

During the Great Terror of the 1930s, Stalin attempted to subject all aspects of Soviet society to strict Party-state control, trying to suppress local initiative and political dissent. The Stalinist leadership felt especially threatened by the intelligentsia, by religious groups, and by non-Russian nationalities. These three groups suffered most under Stalin's long tenure.

Although Stalin's successors also persecuted writers and dissidents, they used political terror more sparingly to coerce the population, and sought to gain some popular support by relaxing police controls and introducing economic incentives. Nonetheless, strict centralization continued and eventually led to the economic decline, inefficiency, and apathy that characterized the 1970s and 1980s, and contributed to the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. Mikhail Gorbachev's program of perestroika was a reaction to this situation, but its success was limited by his reluctance to abolish the bastions of Soviet power—the Party, the police, and the centralized economic system—until he

was forced to do so after the attempted coup in August 1991. By that time, however, it was too late to hold either the Communist leadership or the Soviet Union together. After 74 years of existence, the Soviet system crumbled.

Secret Police

From the beginning of their regime, the Bolsheviks relied on a strong political police to buttress their rule. The first secret police, called the Cheka (Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage), was established in December 1917 as a temporary institution, to be abolished once Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power. The original Cheka, headed by Feliks Dzerzhinskii, was empowered only to investigate "counterrevolutionary crimes." But it soon acquired powers of summary justice and, following an attempt on Lenin's life, began a campaign of terror against the propertied classes and enemies of Bolshevism called the "Red Terror." Although many Bolsheviks viewed the Cheka with repugnance and spoke out against its excesses, its continued existence was seen as crucial to the survival of the new regime.



Joseph Stalin (circa 1927)



Meeting of the board of the Cheka, Moscow, 1923, from left to right: A.IA. Belen'kii, chief of protection for Lenin; F.E. Dzerzhinskii, director; V.R. Menzhinskii, assistant director; and G.I. Bokii.



Cheka director Feliks E. Dzerzhinskii (center) with board members. 1918-19, from left to right: I.D. Chugurin, Dzerzhinskii, I.K. Ksenofontov, G.S. Moroz.

Excerpts from the Cheka Weekly, September 1918

In response to the attempt on Comrade Lenin's life and the murder of Comrade Uritskii, the Extraordinary Commissions [Chekas] in many cities have issued warnings that if anyone makes the slightest attempt to encroach on the rule of workers and peasants, the iron dictatorship of the proletariat will discard its generosity to its enemies. Below we print one of these warnings, issued by the Torzhok Cheka.

DECLARATION

To all citizens of the city and district of Torzhok.

Capitalist mercenaries have targeted the leaders of the Russian proletariat. In Moscow, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Vladimir Lenin, has been wounded, and in Petrograd, Comrade Uritskii has been killed. The proletariat must not allow its leaders to die at the vile, filthy hands of counter-revolutionary mercenaries and must answer terror with terror. For the head and life of one of our leaders, hundreds of heads must roll from the bourgeoisie and all its accomplices. Putting the general citizenry of the city and district on notice, the Novotorzhok Cheka announces that it has arrested and imprisoned as hostages the following representatives of the bourgeoisie and their accomplices, the rightist SRs [Socialist Revolutionaries] and Mensheviks. These individuals will be shot immediately by the Cheka if there is the slightest counterrevolutionary incident directed against the Soviets, any attempt to assassinate the leaders of the working class.

List of hostages.

Grabinskii, Konstantin Vasil'evich — director of the "Koz'miny" factory. **Golovnin, Vasilii Petrovich** — director of the Golovnin factory. **Raevskii, Sergei Petrovich** — priest of the Ascension church. **Gorbylev, Ivan Ivanovich** — merchant. **Arkhimandrit, Simon** — prior of the men's monastery. **Novoselov, Vasilii Efremovich** — plant engineer. **Ganskii, Bruno Adol'fovich** — officer, rightist SR. **Petrov, Semen Filippovich** — officer, rightist SR. **TSvylev, Mikhail Stepanovich** — engineer, merchant...

Chairman, Novotorzhok Extraordinary Commission
M. Kliuev.

Members of the Commission: I. Shibaev.
TSvetkov.

Urgent Bulletin from the Extraordinary Commission on the Battle against Counterrevolution in the City and District of Morshansk

Comrades ... He who would fight for a better future must be merciless to his enemies. He who would strive to defend the poor, must temper his compassion and become cruel. Revolution is not a game and one must not toy with it. If they strike us on one cheek, we will repay it a hundred times over to their entire body. You who are oppressed, value yourselves

Do not believe the agent provocateurs

You know that a few days ago an attempt was made on the life of Comrade Lenin and Comrade Uritskii was killed; this was organized by rightist parties and the bourgeoisie, i.e., they are inflicting wounds to our head. It is obvious they are systematically eliminating the leaders of the revolution. Measures have been taken to forestall this vile enterprise, and antidotes have been devised to stop the contagion, i.e., **RED TERROR**, massed against the bourgeoisie, the former gendarmerie, the constables, sheriffs, and other police and officers guiding the counter-revolutionary elements. All of Russia has been vaccinated, especially in the city of Morshansk, where in retaliation for the murder of Comrade Uritskii and the wounding of Comrade Lenin, we have shot the former sheriff of Morshansk district, **Vasilii Zasukhin**; the former Morshansk city police chief, **Pavel Arkhipov**; the former constable of section 3, Morshansk uezd, **Mikhail Kurgaev**; the former constable of sections 5 and 6, **Viacheslav Lazov**; and if there is another attempt to assassinate the leaders of our revolution or workers in general holding responsible Communist posts, the cruelty of the workers and the poor people of the countryside will be revealed in even harsher form for the bourgeoisie, because they need to react against such vile actions as the implementation of "white terror...."

6-IX. Mozhaisk. At the direction of the Cheka, 6 persons have been shot, including the doctor Sazykin for hiding a wagon of weapons; the priest Tikhomirov for inciting the peasants to riot against the Soviets; Plokhovo, the former police inspector of Mozhaisk district; Rusanov, the former constable and large landowner; and Tikhomirov and Nikulin, agent provocateurs of the tsarist secret police, former civil servants.

Anti-Religious Campaigns

Workmen removing bells from a Moscow church, one of many destroyed in the 1920's.

Ruins of Moscow's Christ the Redeemer Church (1837-1883), built as a monument to the War of 1812, and destroyed in 1934.



The Soviet Union was the first state to have as an ideological objective the elimination of religion. Toward that end, the Communist regime confiscated church property, ridiculed religion, harassed believers, and propagated atheism in the schools. Actions against particular religions, however, were determined by state interests, and most organized religions were never outlawed.

The main target of the anti-religious campaign in the 1920s and 1930s was the Russian Orthodox Church, which had the largest number of faithful. Nearly all of its clergy, and many of its believers, were shot or sent to labor camps. Theological schools were closed, and church publications were prohibited. The Party charged the Red Army with the closing of churches, and most church property was confiscated by the state. The physical landscape of Old Russia was radically altered with the destruction of thousands of churches. By 1939 only about 500 of over 50,000 churches remained open.



Report of March 1922
about peasant resistance
to anti-religious campaign

Coded Telegram

From Ivanovo-Voznesensk

[...]

Received for decoding: March 18, 1922 at 11:30 A.M. Entry no. 523/sh
of the Encoding Section of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist
Party [TsKRKP]

Received by Balagurovskaia

MOSCOW TsKRKP

March 17, 1922. The Guberniia [Province] Committee reports that in Shuia on March 15, in connection with the removal of property of value from the churches, police and a Red Army platoon were attacked by a mob influenced by priests, monarchists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Some Red Army soldiers were disarmed by the demonstrators. The crowd was dispersed with machine guns and rifles by units of the Special Forces Units [ChON] and soldiers from the 146th regiment of the Red Army. As a result, 5 dead and 15 wounded were registered at the hospital. Among those killed was a soldier of the Relief Division of the Red Cavalry. At 11:30 A.M. on March 15, two factories rose up for this same reason. By evening, order was restored in the city. On the morning of the 16th, the factory workers returned to work as usual. The mood of the merchants and some of the factory workers is sullen, but not volatile. The Guberniia Executive Committee has appointed a special commission to investigate the events. Details in letter [to follow]. No. 4

SECRETARY of the GUBERNIIA COMMITTEE KOROTKOV
Encoded SOKOLOV

Lenin's response to the incident in Shuia.

Copy
To Comrade Molotov
For members of the Politburo

Top Secret

Please make no copies for any reason. Each member of the Politburo (incl. Comrade Kalinin) should comment directly on the document. Lenin.

In regard to the occurrence at Shuia, which is already slated for discussion by the Politburo, it is necessary right now to make a firm decision about a general plan of action in the present course. Because I doubt that I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting on March 20 in person, I will set down my thoughts in writing.

The event at Shuia should be connected with the announcement that the Russian News Agency [ROSTA] recently sent to the newspapers but that was not for publication, namely, the announcement that the Black Hundreds in Petrograd [Piter] were preparing to defy the decree on the removal of property of value from the churches. If this fact is compared with what the papers report about the attitude of the clergy to the decree on the removal of church property in addition to what we know about the illegal proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, then it becomes perfectly clear that the Black Hundreds clergy, headed by its leader, with full deliberation is carrying out a plan at this very moment to destroy us decisively.

It is obvious that the most influential group of the Black Hundreds clergy conceived this plan in secret meetings and that it was accepted with sufficient resolution. The events in Shuia are only one manifestation and actualization of this general plan.

I think that here our opponent is making a huge strategic error by attempting to draw us into a decisive struggle now when it is especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous to him. For us, on the other hand, precisely at the present moment we are presented with an exceptionally favorable, even unique, opportunity when we can 99 times out of 100 utterly defeat our enemy with complete success and guarantee for ourselves the position we require for decades. Now and only now, when people are being eaten in famine-stricken areas, and hundreds, if not thousands, of corpses lie on the roads, we can (and therefore must) pursue the removal of church property with the most frenzied and ruthless energy and not hesitate to put down the least opposition. Now and only now, the vast majority of peasants will either be on our side, or at least will not be in a position to support to any decisive degree this handful of Black Hundreds clergy and reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie, who are willing and able to attempt to oppose this Soviet decree with a policy of force.

We must pursue the removal of church property **by any means** necessary in order to secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles (do not forget the immense wealth of some monasteries and lavras [a large men's monastery directly subordinate to a synod]), Without this fund, any government work in general, any economic build-up in particular, and any upholding of our positions at Genoa especially, are completely unthinkable. In order to get our hands on this fund of several hundred million gold rubles (and perhaps even several hundred billion), we must do whatever is necessary. But to do this successfully is possible only now. All considerations indicate that later on we will fail to do this, for, no other time, besides that of desperate famine, will give us such a mood among the general mass of peasants that would ensure us the sympathy of this group, or, at least, would ensure us the neutralization of this group in **the sense that** victory in the struggle for the removal of church property unquestionably and completely will be on our side.

One clever writer on statecraft correctly said that if it is necessary for the realization of a well-known political goal to perform a series of brutal actions, then it is necessary to do them in the most energetic manner and in the shortest time, because masses of people will not tolerate the protracted use of brutality. This observation in particular is further strengthened because harsh measures against a reactionary clergy will be politically impractical, possibly even extremely dangerous as a result of the international situation in which we in Russia, in all probability, will find ourselves, or may find ourselves, after Genoa. Now victory over the reactionary clergy is assured us completely. In addition, it will be more difficult for the major part of our foreign adversaries among the Russian emigres abroad, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Milyukovites [Left Wing Cadet Party], to fight against us if we, precisely at this time, precisely in connection with the famine, suppress the reactionary clergy with utmost haste and ruthlessness.

Therefore, I come to the indisputable conclusion that we must precisely now smash the Black Hundreds clergy most decisively and ruthlessly and put down all resistance with such brutality that they will not forget it for several decades.

The campaign itself for carrying out this plan I envision in the following manner:

Only Comrade Kalinin should appear officially in regard to any measures taken—never and under no circumstance must Comrade Trotskii write anything for the press or in any other way appear before the public.

The telegram already issued in the name of the Politburo about the temporary suspension of removals must not be rescinded. It is useful for us because it gives our adversary the impression that we are vacillating, that he has succeeded in confusing us (our adversary, of course, will quickly find out about this secret telegram precisely because it is secret).

Send to Shuia one of the most energetic, clear-headed, and capable members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsIK] or some other representative of the central government (one is better than several), giving him verbal instructions through one of the members of the Politburo. The instructions must come down to this: that in Shuia he must arrest more if possible but not less than several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local petty bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie, on suspicion of direct or indirect participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of the VTsIK on the removal of property of value from churches. Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to Moscow and personally deliver a report to the full session of the Politburo or to two specially authorized members of the Politburo. On the basis of this report, the Politburo will give a detailed directive to the judicial authorities, also verbal, that the trial of the insurrectionists from Shuia, for opposing aid to the starving, should be carried out in utmost haste and should end not other than with the shooting of a very large number of the most influential and dangerous of the Black Hundreds in Shuia, and, if possible, not only in this city but even in Moscow and several other ecclesiastical centers.

I think that it is advisable for us not to touch Patriarch Tikhon himself, even though he undoubtedly headed this whole revolt of slave-holders. Concerning him, the State Political Administration [GPU] must be given a secret directive that precisely at this time, all communications of this personage must be monitored and their contents disclosed in all possible accuracy and detail. Require Dzerzhinskii and Unshlikht personally to report to the Politburo about this weekly.

At the party congress, arrange a secret meeting of all or almost all delegates to discuss this matter jointly with the chief workers of the GPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice [NKI], and the Revolutionary Tribunal. At this meeting, pass a secret resolution of the congress that the removal of property of value, especially from the very richest lavras, monasteries, and churches, must be carried out with ruthless resolution, leaving nothing in doubt, and in the very shortest time. The greater the number of representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie that we *succeed* in shooting on this occasion, the better because this "audience" must precisely now be taught a lesson in such a way that they will not dare to think about any resistance whatsoever for several decades.

To attend to the quickest and most successful carrying out of these measures, there at the congress, i.e., at the secret meeting, appoint a special commission, the participation of Comrade Trotskii and Comrade Kalinin being required, without giving any publicity to this commission, with the purpose that the subordination to it of all operations would be provided for and carried out **not in the** name of the commission but as an all-soviet and all-party order. Appoint those who are especially responsible from among the best workers to carry out these measures in the wealthiest lavras, monasteries, and churches.

Lenin.

March 19, 1922.

I request that Comrade Molotov attempt to circulate this letter to the members of the Politburo by evening today (not making copies) and ask them to return it to the secretary immediately after reading it, with a succinct note regarding whether each member of the Politburo agrees in principle or if the letter arouses any differences of opinion.

Lenin.

A note in the hand of Comrade Molotov:

"Agreed. However, I propose to extend the campaign not to all guberniias and cities, but to those where indeed there are considerable possessions of value, accordingly concentrating the forces and attention of the party.

March 19. Molotov."



Top photo:
A prison orchestra in an unidentified camp, 1927.

Bottom photo: Barracks in the concentration
camp at Ufa, capital of the Bashkirian Republic,
in the Urals, 1919-20.

The Gulag

The Soviet system of forced labor camps was first established in 1919 under the Cheka. From the very beginning, conditions in the camps were extremely harsh. Prisoners received inadequate food rations and insufficient clothing, which made it difficult to endure the severe weather and long working hours; sometimes the inmates were physically abused by camp guards. As a result, the death rate from exhaustion and disease in the camp was high. One of the earliest and subsequently most infamous of the prison camps was in the former monastery on the Solovki Islands in the White Sea. In the early 1920s the state closed the monastery, revered since the 15th century as a center of Orthodox spirituality, and reopened it as a concentration camp. In its mixture of political and criminal prisoners, its extremely harsh regime, and its exploitation of prison labor on large construction projects, this Leninist prison camp became the model for those that mushroomed under Stalin in the 1930s and which became known as the Gulag, or Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps.

Report to the Presidium, December 1926, by returning prisoners on
the conditions in the Solovki concentration camp

To the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

We appeal to you, asking you to pay a minimum of attention to our request.

We are prisoners who are returning from the Solovki concentration camp because of our poor health. We went there full of energy and good health, and now we are returning as invalids, broken and crippled emotionally and physically. We are asking you to draw your attention to the arbitrary use of power and the violence that reign at the Solovki concentration camp in Kemi and in all sections of the concentration camp. It is difficult for a human being even to imagine such terror, tyranny, violence, and lawlessness. When we went there, we could not conceive of such horror, and now we, crippled ourselves, together with several thousands who are still there, appeal to the ruling center of the Soviet state to curb the terror that reigns there. As though it weren't enough that the Unified State Political Directorate [OGPU] without oversight and due process sends workers and peasants there who are by and large innocent (we are not talking about criminals who deserve to be punished; the former tsarist penal servitude system in comparison to Solovki had 99% more humanity, fairness, and legality...)

People die like flies, i.e., they die a slow and painful death; we repeat that all this torment and suffering is placed only on the shoulders of the proletariat without money, i.e., on workers who, we repeat, were unfortunate to find themselves in the period of hunger and destruction accompanying the events of the October Revolution, and who committed crimes only to save themselves and their families from death by starvation; they have already borne the punishment for these crimes, and the vast majority of them subsequently chose the path of honest labor. Now because of their past, for whose crime they have already paid, they are fired from their jobs. Yet, the main thing is that the entire weight of this scandalous abuse of power, brute violence, and lawlessness that reign at Solovki and other sections of the OGPU concentration camp is placed on the shoulders of workers and peasants; others, such as counterrevolutionaries, profiteers and so on, have full wallets and have set themselves up and live in clover in the Soviet State, while next to them, in the literal meaning of the word, the penniless proletariat dies from hunger, cold, and back-breaking 14-16 hour days under the tyranny and lawlessness of inmates who are the agents and collaborators of the State Political Directorate [GPU].

If you complain or write anything ("Heaven forbid"), they will frame you for an attempted escape or for something else, and they will shoot you like a dog. They line us up naked and barefoot at 22 degrees below zero and keep us outside for up to an hour. It is difficult to describe all the chaos and terror that is going on in Kemi, Solovki, and the other sections of the concentration camp. All annual inspections uncover a lot of abuses. But what they discover in comparison to what actually exists is only a part of the horror and abuse of power, which the inspection accidentally uncovers. (One example is the following fact, one of a thousand, which is registered in GPU and for which the guilty have been punished: THEY FORCED THE INMATES TO EAT THEIR OWN FECES). "Comrades," if we

dare to use this phrase, verify that this is a fact from reality, about which, we repeat, OGPU has the official evidence, and judge for yourself the full extent of effrontery and humiliation in the supervision by those who want to make a career for themselves...

We are sure and we hope that in the All-Union Communist Party there are people, as we have been told, who are humane and sympathetic; it is possible, that you might think that it is our imagination, but we swear to you all, by everything that is sacred to us, that this is only one small part of the nightmarish truth, because it makes no sense to make this up. We repeat, and will repeat 100 times, that yes, indeed there are some guilty people, but the majority suffer innocently, as is described above. The word law, according to the law of the GPU concentration camps, does not exist; what does exist is only the autocratic power of petty tyrants, i.e., collaborators, serving time, who have power over life and death. Everything described above is the truth and we, ourselves, who are close to the grave after 3 years in Solovki and Kemi and other sections, are asking you to improve the pathetic, tortured existence of those who are there who languish under the yoke of the OGPU's tyranny, violence, and complete lawlessness. At the present time, we are dispatching [this statement], in the same spirit, to the International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters [MOPR], to the Workers and Peasants Inspection [RKI], and (we are even ashamed to say) we want to describe to the fraternal workers of other countries, this unheard-of abuse of power and lawlessness in Solovki concentration camps of the OGPU in the hope that justice will prevail.

To this we subscribe: G. Zhelenov, Vinogradov, F. Belinskii.

Dec. 14, 1926

Stalin in Control

During the second half of the 1920s, Joseph Stalin set the stage for gaining absolute power by employing police repression against opposition elements within the Communist Party. The machinery of coercion had previously been used only against opponents of Bolshevism, not against party members themselves.

The first victims were Politburo members Leon Trotskii, Grigorii Zinov'ev, and Lev Kamenev, who were defeated and expelled from the party in late 1927.

After the murder of the Leningrad Party chief, Sergei Kirov, in 1934, Stalin proceeded to purge Party rank and file. This purge, called the Great Terror, culmi-

nated in the notorious show trials of Stalin's former Bolshevik opponents in 1936-38. The most famous was that of Nikolai Bukharin, who was forced to confess to crimes he had never committed and to beg abjectly for his life. He was found guilty and executed.



A celebration of Joseph Stalin's 50th birthday in the Kremlin, December 21, 1929, with Party members Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Stalin, Kalinin, Kaganovich, and Kirov, as a statue of Lenin glares from behind.

Bukharin's forced confession to the Presidium, March 1938

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.

from N. BUKHARIN
sentenced to be shot

A PLEA

I beg the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for mercy. I consider the verdict of the court to be just punishment for my most grave transgressions against the socialist motherland, its people, party, and government. There is not a single word of protest in my soul. I should be shot ten times for my crimes. The proletarian court passed its judgment, which I deserved for my criminal activity, and I am ready to bear my deserved punishment and die, cloaked in the just indignation, hatred, and contempt of the great and heroic people of the USSR, whom I have so basely betrayed.

If I allow myself to petition the highest government organ in our land, before which I appear on my knees, it is only because I believe that through a pardon I can be of value to my country; I do not say — and I am not able to say — that I can expiate my guilt; the crimes I committed are so monstrous, so enormous, that I cannot atone for the guilt — no matter what I may do for the rest of my life. But I assure the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet that my stay of more than a year in prison has forced me to do a great deal of thinking and to reconsider much from my criminal past, which I myself regard with indignation and contempt, and now, none of that has remained in my mind. It is not from fear of the penalty I deserve, it is not from fear of death, on whose threshold I stand as before a just punishment, that I ask the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for charity and mercy. If anything inimical to the party and the government remained in my heart, I would not be petitioning you for charity and mercy. I have been inwardly disarmed and have reeducated myself for the new socialist order. I have rethought all questions — starting with my theoretical errors which lay for me personally at the foundation of my initial deviations and subsequent, increasingly terrible transgressions. Step by step, I have reexamined my past life. The former BUKHARIN has already died; he no longer lives on this earth. If physical life were to be granted me, it would go for the benefit of the socialist motherland, under whatever conditions I would have to work: in a solitary prison cell, in a concentration camp, at the North Pole, in Kolyma, wherever you like, in any environment and under any conditions. My knowledge and capabilities, all my mental faculties, whose activity had previously been directed toward the criminal, have been preserved. Now these mental faculties have been returned. I can work in the most diverse areas in any environment. In prison I wrote a series of works attesting to my complete reeducation. But I can work not only in the purely scholarly sphere. Thus I dare to call out to you, as the highest organ of government, for mercy, justifying this by my fitness for work and appealing to the cause of furthering the revolution. If I were no longer fit to serve, then this petition would not be occurring and I would only be awaiting the swiftest

execution of the death sentence, for then nothing would justify my petition. Disarmed, but a useless enemy, unfit for work, I would be good for one thing only — my death might serve as a lesson for others. But because I am able-bodied, I presume to petition the Presidium for charity and mercy. Our mighty country, party, and government have carried out a general purge. The counterrevolution has been crushed and neutralized. The motherland of socialism has set out on a heroic march into the arena of the greatest triumphant struggle in world history. Inside our country, a broad-based socialist democracy is emerging, founded on Stalin's constitution. A great creative and fruitful life is blossoming. Give me the chance, even behind prison bars, to participate in this life as much as I am able! Let me — I beg and implore you — contribute at least a tiny bit to this life! Let a new, second BUKHARIN grow — let him even be [called] PETROV — this new man will be the complete antithesis of the one who has died. He has already been born — give him the opportunity of any kind of work at all. I ask this of the Supreme Soviet. The old in me has died forever and irreversibly. I am happy that the power of the proletariat has totally obliterated all that was criminal which saw me as its leader and whose leader I, in fact, was. I am absolutely sure: the years will pass, great historical frontiers will be crossed under STALIN'S leadership, and you will not lament the act of charity and mercy that I ask of you: I shall strive to prove to you, with every fiber of my being, that this gesture of proletarian generosity was justified.

Nikolai BUKHARIN.

Moscow, March 13, 1938.
Internal NKVD prison.

Head, first department
Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR
Senior Lt. for State Security
(Kudriavtsev) [signed]

Collectivization and Industrialization



Registration of volunteers for work on collective or state farms, 1929.

In November 1927, Joseph Stalin launched his “revolution from above” by setting two extraordinary goals for Soviet domestic policy: rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. His aims were to erase all traces of the capitalism that had entered under the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the mid 1920s and to transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, without regard to cost, into an industrialized and completely socialist state.

Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan, adopted by the Party in 1928, called for rapid industrialization of the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry. It set goals that were unrealistic: a 250 percent increase in overall industrial development and a 330 percent expansion in heavy industry alone. All industry and services were nationalized, managers were given predetermined output quotas by central planners, and trade unions were converted into mechanisms for increasing worker productivity. Many new industrial centers were developed, particularly in the Ural Mountains, and thousands of new plants were built throughout the country. But because Stalin insisted on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon arose. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry, widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred.

The first Five-Year Plan also called for transforming Soviet agriculture from predominantly individual farms into a system of large state collective farms. The

Communist regime believed that collectivization would improve agricultural productivity and would produce grain reserves sufficiently large to feed the growing urban labor force. The anticipated surplus was to pay for industrialization. Collectivization was further expected to free many peasants for industrial work in the cities and to enable the party to extend its political dominance over the remaining peasantry.

Stalin focused particular attention on the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported to the Urals and Siberian wilderness; entire villages from the fertile black soil region were depopulated and disappeared from the map. Forced collectivization of the remaining peasants, which was often fiercely resisted, resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural productivity and a catastrophic famine in 1932-33. Although the first Five-Year Plan called for the collectivization of only 20 percent of peasant households, by 1940 approximately 97 percent of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of property almost entirely eliminated. Forced collectivization helped achieve Stalin’s goal of rapid industrialization, but the human costs were incalculable. The Soviet Union has long officially denied that there was a famine in the 1930s. The archives now can provide the first documentary evidence that there was, indeed, a devastating and fatal catastrophe induced by the policy decisions made in Moscow.

Dr. Kiselev's report, March 1932, on conditions on collective farms

TO THE HEAD OF THE WESTERN SIBERIA REGIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH, Comrade TRAKMAN.

Copy to POKROV REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks), REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEAGUE

MEMORANDUM

On the instructions of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued to Kiselev on 24 March 1932 on the subject of finding hunger-caused illness, several families of the Kartsovskii village soviet were observed and the following was found: as stated by soviet chairman Comrade Sukhanov and secretary of the First Party Organization Comrade Medvedev, a series of written and oral statements from the kolkhozniks of this village, that they and their families suffer from starvation, were received.

The statements were made by the following people: Gorokhova Mariia, Pautova Malan'ia, Rogozina Irina, Logacheva Ustin'ia, and others. The soviet chairman, the secretary of the First Party Organization and other communists substantiate the fact that the kolkhozniks use animals that have died as food.

Together with the soviet chairman and other citizens I visited the quarters of the above-mentioned kolkhozniks and also as per my wish I observed a series of homes besides the aforementioned in order to be convinced that the worst family cases were not chosen as an example.

From my observation of 20 homes in first and second Karpov, I found only in one home, that of a Red Army veteran, relative condition of nourishment, some flour and bread, but the rest subsist on food substitutes. Almost in every home either children or mothers were ill, undoubtably due to starvation, since their faces and entire bodies were swollen.

An especially horrible picture of the following families:

1) The family of Konstantin Sidel'nikov, who had gone to trade his wife's remaining shirts, skirts, and scarves for bread. The wife lay ill, having given birth five days earlier, and four very small children as pale as wax with swollen cheeks sat at the filthy table like marmots, and with spoons ate, from a common cup, hot water into which had been added from a bottle a white liquid of questionable taste and sour smell, which turned out to be skim milk (the result of passing milk through a separator). Konstantin Sidel'nikov and his wife are excellent kolkhozniks — prime workers, experienced kolkhozniks.

2) Iakov Sidel'nikov has two children and elderly parents, both 70, living in one room, but they eat separately; that is, the elderly obtain their own food substitutes with their savings; the son, Iakov Sidel'nikov, with his own; they hide their food substitutes from each other outside (I have attached examples of these food substitutes to this memorandum). The elderly

in tears ask: "Doctor, give us death!"

3) Filipp Borodin has earned 650 work-days, has a wife and five children ranging from one-and-a-half to nine years of age. The wife lies ill on the oven, three children sit on the oven, they are as pale as wax with swollen faces, the one-and-a-half year old sits pale by the window, swollen, the nine year old lies ill on the earthen floor covered with rags, and Filipp Borodin himself sits on a bench and continuously smokes cigarettes made of repulsively pungent tobacco, cries like a babe, asks death for his children. In tears he asks Comrade Sukhanov: "Give us at least one liter of milk, after all, I worked all summer and even now I work unceasingly (now he takes care of the bulls and in the summer he tends the grazing cows).

According to the statement by Comrade Sukhanov and the brigadier of the kolkhoz "Red Partisan," Borodin was a non-complaining worker.

Borodin does not even have food substitutes for nourishment; two days ago he and his family ate two sickly piglets thrown out of the common farmyard. In the Borodin home there is unbelievable filth, dampness, and stench, mixed with the smell of tobacco. Borodin swears at the children: "The devils don't die, I wish I didn't have to look at you!" Having objectively investigated the condition of Borodin himself I ascertain that he (Borodin) is starting to slip into psychosis due to starvation, which can lead to his eating his own children.

My inspection of the series of families took place at the dinner hour, where they use those same food substitutes which they eat with hot water, but in several homes (2) on the table there were gnawed bones from a sickly horse. According to the explanations of the kolkhozniks, they themselves prepare food in the following manner: they grind sunflower stems, flax and hemp seeds, chaff, dreg, colza, goosefoot, and dried potato peelings, and they bake flat cakes. Of the food substitutes listed above, the oily seeds are nutritious, which are healthy in combined foods since they contain vitamins, by themselves the vegetable oils do not contain vitamins and by not combining them with other food products of more equal nourishment and caloric value they are found to be toxic and will harm the body. Based on: General Course on Hygiene by Prof. G.V. Khotopin, p. 301-4—.

The homes are filthy, the area around the homes is polluted by human waste, by diarrhea caused by these substitutes. People walk around like shadows, silent, vacant; empty homes with boarded-up windows (about 500 homeowners have left their homes in Karpov village for destinations unknown); one rarely sees an animal on the street (apparently the last ones have been eaten).

In the entire village of 1000 yards I found only 2 chickens and a rooster. Occasionally one meets an emaciated dog.

The impression is that Karpov village seems to be hit by anbiosis (hibernation, a freeze, falling asleep).

The livestock is free to feed on thatched roofs of homes and barns.

In reporting the above-related to the Pokrov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Regional Executive Committee, Russian Communist League, and to you, as the regional health inspector and doctor of the Pokrov region, I beg of you to undertake immediate measures to help the starving and to notify me of the practical measures taken.

March 25, 1932 Regional health inspector — doctor — KISELEV

Soviet and American Communist Parties

The Soviet Communist Party evolved from the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party's Bolshevik wing, formed by Vladimir Lenin in 1903. Lenin believed that a well-disciplined, hierarchically organized party was necessary to lead the working class in overthrowing capitalism in Russia and the world. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in St. Petersburg (then called Petrograd) and shortly thereafter began using the term Communist to describe themselves. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks named their

party the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). The next year, they created the Communist International (Comintern) to foment revolution abroad and to control the Communist movement throughout the world. Documents in the archives reveal that even during the famine-stricken years of the Civil War (1918-21), the Party exported large amounts of gold and confiscated gemstones to support foreign Communists. It was a basic tenet of the Party that there could not be socialism in one country, that if other industrialized nations

such as Germany, Britain and America did not also have revolutions, then the Communist regime in Russia could not sustain political hegemony for long.

The American Party, a significant although never major political force in the United States, became demoralized when Boris Yeltsin outlawed the Communist party in Russia in August 1991 and opened up the archives, revealing the continued financial as well as ideological dependency of the American Communists on the Soviet party up until its dissolution.



E.M. Yaroslavskii and an American Young Pioneer, Gary Eisman (center), and other participants at the first gathering of Young Atheists in Moscow, 1931.

List of payments made by the Comintern,
 September 1919-June 20, 1920,
 including those to John Reed, who received 1,008,000 rubles.

Year	Month	Date	Released to	Doc. #	Denomination	Amount
1919	Sept.	1	Hungarian Comm. Govt. Rudnianok for Dige	1/7	value	250,000
	Dec.	6	" D. Zerlei	2	"	207,000
	"	15	" Brasler Kalush	3	"	194,000
1920	unknown	24	Bohemia lv. Sinekorn for Genglerzh and Mush	4	"	288,000
1919	Nov.	19	" [illeg.]	5	"	215,000
	May	30	Germany Reich for Thomas to him	1/2	"	300,500
			"	"	DM	100,000
			"	"	Sw. Kron.	3,000
			"	"	Finn. M	4,500
			"	"	Russ. Rub.	6,500
	Sept.	9	" Proletariat	1/8a	value it seems	250,000
	Oct.	28	" Rudolf Rothege	6	value	639,000
1920	Feb.	20	" Rozovski for Reich [all 3] for Thomas	7	"	275,000
1919	May	20	Italy Liubarskii —Carlo	1/2	DM	15,200
			"	"	Finn. M	331,800
			"	"	Sw. Kron.	13,000
			"	"	Russ. Rub.	300,000
"	Sept.	21	"via Berzin [illeg.]	8	value	487,000
"	July	16	America Kotliarov	1/4	"	209,000
"	Sept.	30	" Khavkin	1/9	"	500,000
1920	Jan.	31	" Anderson	9	"	1,011,000
"	Jan.	22	" John Reed	10	"	1,008,000
1919	July	5	England Levin	1/3	"	500,000

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro,
with Politiburo member A.I. Mikoian, 1960.



Cuban Missile Crisis

According to Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, in May 1962, he conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering the lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. He also presented the scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

After obtaining Fidel Castro's approval, the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, President John Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba. After seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States administration, during which Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba, President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military weapons from arriving there.

During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other communications, both formal and "back channel," many only recently made available to researchers. Khrushchev sent letters to

Kennedy on October 23 and 24, indicating the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long, rambling letter, seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it or its proxies would not invade Cuba. On October 27, another letter to Kennedy arrived from Khrushchev, suggesting that missile installations in Cuba would be dismantled if the United States dismantled its missile installations in Turkey. The American administration decided to ignore this second letter and to accept the offer outlined in the letter of October 26. Khrushchev then announced on October 28 that he would dismantle the installations and return them to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers also be removed from Cuba, and to specify the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba.

Excerpts from transcript of discussion between Mikoian and Castro, November 12, 1962, in which Mikoian tries to persuade Castro to accede to American demand to remove Ilyushin-28 bombers from Cuba

Top Secret

TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN A.I. MIKOIAN AND FIDEL CASTRO

November 12, 1962

Ambassador A.I. Alekseev
present at conversation

[conversation opens with Castro describing a new type of perennial bean being cultivated in Cuba ...]

A. I. MIKOIAN:

Comrade Fidel, I would like to discuss with you an important problem. We are interested in the earliest possible resolution of the existing conflict to the advantage of Cuba. Our country has fulfilled its obligations, but the Americans are continuing with their quarantine. They fear complications, look for snags, and try to find reasons to avoid keeping promises Kennedy made to N. S. Khrushchev. They promise that if the Soviet Union removes its offensive weapons, the US will not attack Cuba and will restrain its allies. Then the situation in the Caribbean should normalize. Kennedy is being criticized in the US for promising not to attack Cuba. This is happening because those in the US who favor a war have become more strident. A number of American activists advocate resolving the situation by force. They are unhappy that the problem is being resolved in a peaceful manner. In our view, Kennedy wants to strangle Cuba with an economic blockade. Such attempts have been made against our own country in the past. You must have read about the economic blockade instituted against the young Soviet republic by the imperialists and what hopes they placed on starving out Russia. By creating economic difficulties the Americans hope that Cuba will collapse from within. Kennedy openly stated that he will create conditions that will weaken Cuba economically. Then, the thinking goes, the Soviet Union lacks the resources to help her and the Cuban government will collapse.

The US military circles disagree with Kennedy and insist on resolving the Caribbean crisis by force ...

[p. 12.]

F. CASTRO: What will be the position of the Soviet Union if, despite removal of the bombers, the US insists on an inspection and, using the excuse that Cuba does not agree to an inspection, continues with the blockade?

A.I. MIKOIAN: We will only remove the bombers if the US adheres to its commitments. We will keep the bombers

in Cuba until the Americans agree to lift the blockade. The question of inspection was exhaustively discussed during my talk with McCloy in New York. We will be steadfast in defending your position. We feel that the procedure used to monitor removal of the airplanes from Cuba can be the same as that employed in removing the missiles. This can be conducted at sea in order not to compromise Cuba's interests. This is in accordance with the wishes of the revolutionary government and there is no question of inspecting Cuban territory.

F. CASTRO: I want to assert, comrade Mikoian, that we will never consent to the inspection. Please transmit to the Soviet government the fact that our decision is final and irrevocable.

A. I. MIKOIAN: I have already informed the Soviet government that the Cuban government will never allow its territory to be inspected. This is no longer an issue. By allowing a visual inspection of our vessels we have fulfilled all of our obligations. We will not yield, no matter how insistent the American side may become. We are in full agreement on this. We respect your sovereignty. I will transmit your views to my government.

F. CASTRO: I will meet with the other members of our government to discuss this, although I personally see no need to hurry.

A. I. MIKOIAN: I would like to add that removal of the missiles deprived you only of offensive weapons. The missiles were a means of holding the enemy at bay. However, Cuba has no intention of attacking the US. Consequently, you don't need the IL-28 bombers. They, as you know, have no such restraining value. All of the other military hardware are state-of-the-art defensive weapons.

Obviously, if the US were to attack you in force all of these powerful weapons would not be enough to protect you. But, if the governments of the Latin American countries decided to attack Cuba without direct US involvement, they would be badly defeated. The firepower of Cuba is very great. I think that no other socialist country, excluding the Soviet Union, has such powerful modern weapons as you have.

F. CASTRO: Right now I want to meet with my colleagues. I will remember all of your arguments. I am in the process of reaching a decision.

Confirmation of Mikoian's instruction to Russian military in Cuba,
November 18, 1962, not to fire on American planes

Secret

PRIORITY

HAVANA

Soviet Ambassador for Comrade A. I. Mikoian

I am relaying instructions from above.

If our Cuban friends approach you with regard to a decision about firing on American airplanes, you are to tell them:

Since the decision to fire on American airplanes was not coordinated with us, we consider it impossible to take part in it. Therefore, our forces have been instructed not to open fire on American airplanes.

Chernobyl'

In April 1986, a nuclear reactor in the city of Chernobyl' (Chornobyl' in Ukrainian) exploded and released 30 to 40 times the radioactivity of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world first learned of history's worst nuclear accident from Sweden, where abnormal radiation levels were registered at one of its nuclear facilities.

Chernobyl' has become a metaphor, not only for the horror of uncontrolled nuclear power, but also for the collapsing Soviet system and its reflexive secrecy and deception, disregard for the safety and welfare of workers and their families, and inability to deliver basic services such as health care and transportation, especially in crisis situations. New evidence from the archives reveals that top management in the Kremlin knew as early as 1979 that the power plant in Chernobyl' had grave design flaws but chose not to act on that knowledge. The subsequent catastrophe seven years later derailed what had been an ambitious nuclear power program and formed a fledgling environmental movement into a potent political force in Russia as well as a rallying point for achieving Ukrainian and Belorussian independence in 1991. Although still in operation, the Chernobyl' plant is scheduled for total shutdown in 1993.



An aerial view of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant, 80 miles north of Kiev, Ukraine, as it appeared in August 1986, following the catastrophic accident of April 26, 1986.

KGB memorandum from Andropov to Central Committee,
February 1979, on design flaws in Chernobyl' reactor

Not for publication
Secret

21 Feb. 79 05363
Return to the General
Section of the Central
Committee of the CPSU
Central Committee of the CPSU

USSR COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY [KGB]
February 21, 1979 No. 346-A
Moscow

Construction Flaws at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant [AES]

According to data in the possession of the KGB of the USSR, design deviations and violations of construction and assembly technology are occurring at various places in the construction of the second generating unit of the Chernobyl' AES, and these could lead to mishaps and accidents.

The structural pillars of the generator room were erected with a deviation of up to 100 mm from the reference axes, and horizontal connections between the pillars are absent in places. Wall panels have been installed with a deviation of up to 150 mm from the axes. The placement of roof plates does not conform to the designer's specifications. Crane tracks and stopways have vertical drops of up to 100 mm and in places a slope of up to 8 degrees.

Deputy head of the Construction Directorate, Comrade V.T. Gora, gave instructions for backfilling the foundation in many places where vertical waterproofing was damaged. Similar violations were permitted in other sections with the knowledge of Comrade V.T. Gora and the head of the Construction group, Comrade IU. L. Matveev. Damage to the waterproofing can lead to ground water seepage into the station and radioactive contamination of the environment.

The leadership of the Directorate is not devoting proper attention to the foundation, on which the quality of the construction largely depends. The cement plant operates erratically, and its output is of poor quality. Interruptions were permitted during the pouring of especially heavy concrete causing gaps and layering in the foundation. Access roads to the Chernobyl' AES are in urgent need of repair.

Construction of the third high-voltage transmission line is behind schedule, which could limit the capacity utilization of the second unit.

As a result of inadequate monitoring of the condition of safety equipment, in the first three quarters of 1978, 170 individuals suffered work-related injuries, with the loss of work time totalling 3,366 worker-days.

The KGB of Ukraine has informed the CPSU Central Committee of these violations. This is for your information.

Chairman of the Committee [KGB] [signed] IU. Andropov

Congressional leaders attend the Russian Archives Exhibit



Representative Robert Michel speaks before the opening day audience in Madison Hall.



Senators Richard Lugar and Paul Sarbanes examine a description of documents at the Russian Archives exhibit, as Librarian of Congress James H. Billington explains the content. Staff member Abby Smith assisted the Librarian during the visit of the senators.



Speaker of the House Thomas Foley addresses the opening day audience for the Archives exhibit.

Rudolph Pikhoia addressing the audience during the opening of the exhibit, assisted by a translator.



SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS

On June 18, 1992, Librarian of Congress James H. Billington convened a panel of distinguished historians and invited guests at the Library to discuss the impact the opening of the Soviet archives will have on our understanding of the twentieth century, and also the repercussions this unprecedented access will have on the profession of writing history. The panel members were: **Rudolph Pikhovia**, chairman of the Committee of Archival Affairs of the Russian Federation, archivist of the Russian Federation, and a scholar of pre-Revolutionary Russian history, previously professor of History and vice rector of the Ural State University; **Dmitrii Volkogonov**, senior military advisor to President Yeltsin and author of numerous historical works including a 10-volume history of World War II and a biography of Stalin, and formerly director of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy and director of the Institute of Military History; **Robert Tucker**, professor of politics emeritus of Princeton University, and a leading specialist on Stalinism and biographer of Stalin; **Paul Nitze**, formerly director of U. S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, secretary of the Navy, deputy secretary of Defense, and a prime mover in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s; and **Adam Ulam**, professor of political science and director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and author of numerous studies of

Soviet political history, foreign policy, and the Communist Party and its leaders.

DR. BILLINGTON: This is a particularly pleasant occasion for the Library of Congress and for me. Yesterday, this city did some celebrating with the summit visit. Today, we are going to try to do *cerebrating*. Our panelists will discuss how the opening of the archives is likely to affect historical assessments and re-assessments of the Soviet experience and of the entire course of the 20th century.

Our program this morning will open with remarks by Dr. Pikhovia followed by Gen. Volkogonov. After that, I will invite the members of our distinguished panel to engage in general discussion.

DR. PIKHOIA: I would like to thank Dr. Billington for his kind words, and for giving us the opportunity to meet here and for taking such an active part in setting up this exhibit in the Library of Congress.

The opening of our archives raises a number of issues in the discipline of history, and these issues I would like to divide into several categories. There has been a great deal of political pressure exerted on the study of Soviet society, and this ideological deformation, so to speak, resulted in a betrayal of the essence of our profession as historians. The first thing that we can assert is the politicization of scholarship.

The second problem which is characteristic of the situation in studying Soviet society today is the crisis in histori-

ography. The fact that the idea of progress and of the natural, orderly development of communism has totally broken down, is symptomatic of this. This in turn creates a whole series of problems. One of the most critical problems which we're trying to find an answer to is, first of all, the naturalness [zakonomernost'] of the Soviet system. How natural [zakomernaia] was it? And the conditions of its disintegration and the consequences of that—what does this

mean for Russian historiography, where the idea of progress has always been rather strong?

And the third aspect of this crisis is the human factor. One has only to look at the huge number of sources for studying history and just how these sources were selected, to see how that selection then affected the writing of history in the United States and in Russia. This [selection of sources] has always played a tre-

mendous role in the system of the very totalitarian ideology itself. It's not an accident that the head of the Party Archives was a true loyalist and defender of the system, Mikhail Pokrovskii. This was a very careful operation, the setting up and managing of the archives. Party members like Sergei Kirov, as well as the head of the secret police and the Party elite, all played a role in setting up these archives and choosing, very carefully and very selectively, the sources for history.



Dr. Billington addressing the national audience of ABC's "Good Morning America" program, part of the opening activities for the Russian Archives exhibit.



The panel of experts discussing the ramifications of the opening of the Russian Archives as it relates to history (from left to right): Dr. Billington, Rudolph Pikhov, Dmitrii Volkogonov, Robert Tucker, Paul Nitze, and Adam Ulam.

The series of Secrecy Acts that were set up in the 1930s and 40s was maintained until the very last few months before the coup. There existed several levels of classification for these documents, and you know very well that the way the sources of history are controlled will definitely have an effect on the results you have in your research.

The levels of censorship begin with a series of important archives being taken out of the state archives. People were simply not allowed to see them. The files of various agency and ministry archives—the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense—some of the archives of these key ministries were never included at all in the state archives.

The second level of secrecy involved placing a label of “secret” on the archives from the end of the 1940s, where there are not only a series of documents from European countries, which ended up in Russia, but also very important documents relating in particular to the history of the opposition movement, dating back to the Revolution; and the history of the emigration, and the tremendous number of documents of prisoners of war who were interviewed, and so forth.

The third level of secrecy consists of the multifarious non-governmental sources that are labeled “secret”.

And fourth, the so-called “special files,” [*osoby papki*], which, when we opened them up, revealed large numbers of items missing. They have simply been removed from the files.

The Russian Archival Commission has adopted certain [new] principles of access. First, we must balance the numbers of Russian and foreign students of history who use these archives. I think this approach was approved by the Division of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Re-

cently, I went there and spoke, and argued quite a bit, and the historical department of the academy supported me. Some people said, “Well, no, let’s just give Russians the opportunity to see these archives and not foreigners.” Well I kept telling them, when they said this, that we’ve already been down that path. The result of that approach is well known.

The second approach to increasing access is declassifying documents. Honestly speaking, working in this area as a chairman of the State Committee on

My personal opinion is that everything that had to do with the lifestyle of members of the Politburo, for instance--who gets a dacha, who gets a car, who gets what--was considered to be really top secret.

Archives in the Russian Federation and having received the Soviet Union Archives to work with, I thought I would have to declassify mostly Party documents. But it turned out that just within the framework of the Central Archives of the former Soviet Union itself, for the 20 million files that we had, about five million out of the 20 million are classified. That’s a huge amount of classified documentation! My predecessor, Vaganov, used to say that only about five percent of all the documents were classified. That may be true of the total number of documents, but when you talk about the Central Party Archives, it is not three or five percent, it’s probably a fourth or a fifth of the documents that are classified.

In addition, there are great numbers of Party documents which were classified by definition; in other words, any humble scrap of paper that ended up in the higher Party apparatus became classified. Anything that went into the central organs of the Party became extremely sensitive, and, therefore top secret. It’s true there are things that are very sensitive, but there are also a huge number of things—really, the majority of cases—which turn out to be just Party secrets that have nothing to do with national security. My personal opinion is that everything that had to do with the lifestyle of members of the Politburo, for instance—who gets a *dacha*, who gets a car, who gets what—was considered to be really top secret.

That is why we currently have to do the following thing. Just before I left to come here, it was decided to declassify, without any discussion, all of the documents that are older than 10 years that are in the hands of the Archival Commission. We are in favor of doing a 30-year scan, but if we start declassifying things normally and in an orderly fashion, judging by the huge number of documents, it will take us decades and decades. So, we have to use some shorthand methods and make some decisions about declassifying. For example, all of the documents having to do with mass repressions in the former Soviet Union will be declassified.

GENERAL VOLKOGONOV: My dear colleagues, history is a river which flows but in one direction. It is difficult to say by taking a look at what’s past...we can only take a look backwards perhaps and speculate what the future will bring. We only know that time flows and it cannot be reversed. We cannot cancel the Revolution, we cannot cancel those events that have happened. History is irreversible. The only thing that we focus on right now is—what is the truth? History honors only

The experience the Russian people have is not with democratic evolution of government, but one which is based on revolution and violent overturn. What really happened is still unknown to us.

the truth. Unfortunately, this truth has been hidden and sealed up in special archives, in closed containers behind vaulted doors.

That which we are observing today, the portions of those archives which have been sealed and now are exhibited here, constitute vivid proof that it is impossible to imprison the truth forever.

I must add that in 1924 all the archives in the territories of the Soviet government were placed under the immediate supervision and control of the secret police. From that point on, these archives have been used as a tool in the manipulation of the information flowing out to the population.

The ruling circles, the ruling powers, had control, and had direct supervision of the direction in which it wanted the society to go. This in itself constitutes an attempt on the life of freedom [*pokushenie na svobodu*]. The cardinal feature of that type of system, as Dr. Pikhoia has said, is the love for secrecy. I have looked at all the suppressed Lenin documents, over 3,700. I found that Lenin himself established a whole classification scheme, under which there were 15 degrees of secrecy—ultra secret, top secret, secret, confidential, single copy for eyes only, to be returned to sender, etc. The most frightening result of this whole system that we inherited from Lenin and which exists today, is that we have an entire generation of people possessing a new character without any initiative, without any power, who await some kind of a miracle, who expect that “somebody is going to tell me what to do,” and ask “how it is that all of a sudden I am called upon to exert some kind of personal initiative?”

So the reform, the transition period that we are experiencing at the present time is very difficult, because we don't have the capability of making civilized

changes. The experience the Russian people have is not with democratic evolution of government, but one which is based on revolution and violent overturn. What really happened to us is still unknown. By becoming familiar with the volumes of materials that are available in our archives, we will have a clearer picture as to how we have evolved, not only internally, but also in our relationship with the outside world.

An example: the development of Russia, the former Soviet Union, has been largely predetermined from the very beginning. The Revolution was not brought about by the Bolsheviks. The Revolution was accomplished by the Bolsheviks and by the Socialist Revolutionary Party. But the following year, the Bolsheviks forced their allies from power. I don't know what kind of a union would have been formed by these socialist parties, but if two parties had continued to co-exist, Stalin would have never been able to exist, and the course of events would have taken an entirely different route. But in 1918, when the soviet met, the decision had already been made that the Socialist Revolutionaries were not reliable allies, and so....

Another example—during the tsarist period, the structure of Russia was much more progressive. It had counties, it had provinces. The divisions were not based upon nationalities, they were political, economic, geographical, and administrative. In 1920, the Politburo eliminated the previous administrative divisions. Rather than have, for example, a Kazan Province, they created a separate republic. Instead of the Ufa Province, they made the Bashkir Republic, and so on and so forth.

On the other hand, when they created the Byelorussian Republic, Lenin looked at the map and said “What is this! This is such a tiny little republic!” So, as a solution, so that Byelorussia would look

Dr. Billington discusses the opening of the Russian Archives exhibit with Rudolph Pikhoia, as General Volkogonov and his wife look on.





Senator Edwin F. Ladd, R., North Dakota (second from left), and other unidentified congressmen, with M. I. Kalinin (second from right), S.M. Budennyi, and other Soviets, Moscow, 1923.

more imposing on a map, Lenin seized a pencil and moved whole regions of Russia into the Byelorussian Republic.

Eventually, when the Union started to fracture, and nations began to raise their voices, this history of the formation of the republics became an explosive force for an irrepressible movement, an irrepressible activity which ultimately tore up the Soviet Union. Nobody even stopped to think that this explosive had been set back in the 20s. I could give you a whole series of similar examples which would allow one to look anew at Russian history.

But in the area of foreign affairs, knowledge of what is in the archives will to a great extent correct what our conceptual understanding is of the development of events in the world at large. Several illustrations:

As you know, the Bolshevik leadership from the very beginning placed their bet on world revolution. And up until recently, this thinking, the Comintern men-

tal, was really the preeminent thinking among the totalitarian leadership. The principle in the Politburo was to support anybody who was against the United States of America and any movement, even terrorism. Support all of them! And very soon you will see in print a series of facts which will reveal the activities of all the leaders, up to and including Gorbachev as well.

The Comintern mentality. Now you know that world revolution was not impossible; strange as it may seem now, it could have happened. In 1918, in 1919, in 1920, the revolutionary movement was rising in India, Italy, China, Germany, Hungary and other countries, and the Bolshevik leaders used every means possible to initiate and stimulate these revolutionary processes. The tsarist gold fund—the valuables, the jewels—were all spent on fomenting world revolution. And very often [the Bolsheviks] just sent them abroad in huge suitcases and carrying cases.

They were given to people so they could move around the world, get established, stimulate these revolutionary movements. Many lengthy lists are available on who was to get what. Nobody even counted how many carats a certain jewel was. They just threw all of this stuff out, at large, to foster world revolution.

Such fantastic plans were, for instance, contemplated as in 1920, when the army of the White General Wrangel was pushed out toward Constantinople and points south by the Red Army. The Bolsheviks cooked up a fantastic plan to take these homeless, hungry people, to start an insurrection among them, so that world revolution would start in the Balkans. Then, at the most critical pass, they decided to forego those plans.

Many issues of international relationships can be viewed in a completely different light now, with these new documents. One of the most monumental decisions in mankind's history was made

Flyer published in 1921 by the American Trade Union National Committee for Russian Relief, to raise money for Russian famine victims.



Drawn by Cesare from a photograph

AMERICAN TRADE UNIONISTS!

This is not a imaginary picture. It was drawn from a photograph. These babies starved and froze to death. They died so fast they lay unburied in great mounds. Their clothes were taken from them to clothe living children. This happened all over Russia while European statesmen wrangled over famine relief.

While they die in Russia, American farmers burn corn for fuel. Idle ships crowd harbors.

If It Depended On You What Would You Do To Stop This?

You would go hungry. You would pile sacrifice on sacrifice. You cannot stop this by yourself alone.

The American Trade Union Movement

Can Stop the Famine If Every Organized Worker Gives \$2.00

GIVE \$2.00

Or COLLECT \$2.00 IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS

JOIN THE TWO DOLLAR CLUB

Millions of Workers Giving Save Millions of Workers Dying

Send all contributions to

THE TRADE UNION NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RUSSIAN RELIEF

41 EAST 42nd ST., NEW YORK CITY

From the Organized Workers of America to the Organized Workers of Russia.

Enclosed find \$2.00

Signature

Send Money or Pledge



I will collect \$2.00 before

(Date)

Signature

in 1962, about whether or not to drop the atomic bomb. If the United States of America had struck first and attacked the missiles in Cuba, they probably would have knocked out about 90 percent of the Soviet missiles. The remaining 10 percent would have been ordered for attack on the United States, and nuclear war would have begun. This was all predetermined, all preplanned, and you can see all of that very clearly from the archives.

Or, take the Korean War. I read a very curious stenographer's report of Stalin with Mao Tse Tung, Kim Il Sung, Walter Ulbricht, and Tito. These are such amazing documents, the stenographer's notes. Stalin was actually in charge during the Korean War, but he was the first to understand that Americans would not give in; they would not sustain a defeat. And when in Washington they began looking at making a nuclear strike on China in northern Korea, Stalin was the first one to send a telegram to Mao Tse

Some documents have recently been released in Moscow that give us, for example, the process by which certain decisions were reached having to do with the continuing supply of armaments to Afghanistan as late as 1990—who signed off on those documents, and who were the people involved in authorizing these matters?

Tung: “You cannot allow the Americans to be defeated there.” In other words, Stalin had already decided to call it a draw, and he immediately lost interest in that war. He said, “ You cannot let the Americans sustain a defeat because it could be a lot worse if this happened.”

The documents which now are open, allow one to understand better the development of Russia, the reasons for the stagnation of the communist system, and the ultimate defeat of the system, which was preordained in 1917. Lenin won, but his victory was equivalent to defeat. The collapse of the system was inevitable. The only question was, when?

I would like to say that the opening of archives will allow historians to see the past, not just as history of the development of nations, or the history of classes or of certain groups, but to look at it as the history of a people. My friend, Rudolf Pikhoia said that historians are not always good foretellers of events. I can't always say that that's true. I wouldn't agree. Vasilii Kliuchevskii, a marvelous Russian historian, once said that in each century Russia invariably lives through two or three huge, horrible upheavals. At the end of this century, I look back and see that in 1917, then during World War II, and now, even though it's a relatively peaceful upheaval, we are nevertheless living through an unprecedented change from a totalitarian system to a civilized, democratic system. How this struggle will come out is not quite clear yet.

I think that yesterday's appearance by the Russian President [before a joint session of Congress] clearly showed that Russia is not the only one that has to be interested in reform. If President Yeltsin and his reforms fail, the whole world will suffer defeat, especially the Americans, because you're going to have to deal with a totalitarian system again.

PROF. TUCKER: I listened with great interest to our Russian colleagues, and I've learned a lot from what they've said here. I'm in full agreement with Dr. Pikhoia that a new period of historiography of Russia in the 20th century is dawning, largely on account of the appearance and continuing flow of archival material that we will be able to study for this whole period. I so strongly feel this, that it has sadly occurred to me on various occasions in the very recent past that the first qualification for work in this area is, to be young, because it's going to take many, many years not only to gain access and to work through, but simply for the people on the Russian side to make all the materials available. It is indeed a new era.

On the other hand, I think it's important to ask ourselves, in what sense is this so? After all, what happened in the past has meaning, and to get at that meaning is the work of the interpretive minds of historians, which have been at work long before the opening of the archives came around.

For example, the period of the Stalinist 30s was probably the darkest period of all in terms of information. And yet, very dialectically, in a curious way, that works backward. *Pravda*, 365 days a year for 10 years, the 1930s, 3,650 issues of *Pravda*; and they are documents of extreme importance because they couldn't appear in public without Stalin's clearance. There was a whole system of people in the Party apparatus who saw to that. This means that these documents are of incalculable importance because they did not necessarily tell the truth at any one given point but, what they did tell was the truth about what that regime, the dictatorial regime of Stalin, wanted people and the world to think, and that in itself was a self-revelation of that regime. So, let us not imagine that a situation has existed in

Soviet General Zhukov (left) listens to the translator as Yugoslav President Tito speaks (circa 1946).



which we didn't have access to an archival level truth and now we do. It's not quite so.

What is it that the new material will help clear up? Well, there are certain matters that we have to deal with in the interpretation of major episodes of Soviet history, such as the famine of the early 1930s, the Gulag system as it developed from the 1920s, into the 1930s and the 1940s. We will learn much more about the concrete realities, the number of political prisoners there were, how many were exiled, how many prisoners died, and how many died in the famine of the 1930s. And yet, on the basis of what was known earlier, some important works have been published that are historically important, such as Robert Conquest's book on the famine, *A Harvest of Sorrow*.

Secondly, there are matters of interpretation of how the Soviet system worked. In this regard, I think the archival revelations are especially interesting. They show us the upper system actually in

operation. Some documents have recently been released in Moscow that give us, for example, the process by which certain decisions were reached having to do with the continuing supply of armaments to Afghanistan as late as 1990—who signed off on those documents, and who were the people involved in authorizing these matters.

Other materials have been published as well; in particular the Soviet assistance to terrorist groups in the Middle East in the early 80s—the amounts of money and how funds were transferred. These processes we didn't know, but I think not only in the intelligence services of various foreign governments, but simply in the minds of people who made it a practice to study these things, the fundamental facts were known. It was not a secret that arms continued to flow to Afghanistan. It was not a secret about the connections with terrorist groups in the Middle East. The exact way in which they

were worked out—who was involved, how, who asked, and so on—these very important historical facts are now becoming available to us as a result of the release of these archives. This might come under the heading, as I suggested, of interpretation of how the system worked.

Now, how about decisions by key historical figures? Well, Stalin, for a period of 25 years, was a key historical leader, and, indeed, an autocratic leader, for most of that period. How is it that materials from the archives can throw some light on history through the interpretation of Stalin? Well, a philosopher of history, R. G. Collingwood, in his book *The Idea of History*, tells us that the job of the historian is to reenact past thought. We should try to reenact the thought that went on in the minds of those who took historical actions, actions that were influential in history, in order to understand why they did it, and what they intended to achieve by it, and so on. So, insofar as we can reenact the

thoughts of Stalin, by means of materials that come to us from the archives, this can't help but improve our historical understanding and our ability to interpret actions that were taken. However, some of the most important materials of this kind were, for the very reason that I mentioned earlier, made available in published form.

For example, during the 1930s, after the establishment of the Fascist regime in Germany, Stalin followed a cautious policy of seeking to help along the formation of two antagonistic coalitions in Europe—Germany versus the Western democracies—with the idea that they would go to war, and then, if this could be preceded by an agreement with Hitler, whereby he would be able to take over a great deal of Eastern Europe, it would work out to his advantage, and then the two antagonistic parties would bleed each other white, and then his Russia could step in. Well, in 1947 or 1948, a speech was first published in Stalin's collected works, then being published, that had been given in secret in 1925 before a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in which he envisaged the future war as a replay of World War I. There would be two antagonistic forces in Europe, and Russia would remain neutral and, at a time of its choosing, would step in. This Stalin revealed. The pattern of his thought was revealed to us only after the war, but it helps clarify the very complex diplomacy that he waged through the

1930s that culminated in the pact with Hitler in August 1939.

Some historians have felt that the pact with Hitler was a necessary step Stalin took after Munich in September 1938, for it showed the Western powers were not interested in going to war with Hitler. Then Stalin reluctantly decided that he had better sign the pact to keep war away for two more years. The whole interpretation is refuted by the more careful interpretation that is based upon a document of 1925, published in 1947 in untold millions of copies.

However, the opening of the archives can result in extremely important *new* information. For example, in one of the Party archives in Moscow (one that used to be called the Central Party Archive, which was under the Institute of Marxism-Leninism associated with the Central Committee), within the Stalin collection there is a collection of 391 of his books that survived him, and which contained his own markings. He was an avid underliner and liked to write in the margins of books and said all sorts of interesting things.

In 1989, I asked, "Could I please see those books?" I think Stalin was a reader and not the anti-intellectual many people have thought. "No, that's not open." By 1991 everything had changed, and I was able to work on those books, and I found a lot of the things of which I spoke. For example, I found a number of books that Stalin was reading just as the war was

ending, in late 1944 and 1945, and they were about what? Russian history—Russian history in the 19th century—and there were very interesting sorts of things that especially interested him, as you could tell from the underlinings and from the comments. This helps me as a historian, now preparing to attempt a third volume on Stalin, which will deal with the period from 1941 to his death in 1953. It will help me to clarify many things and to trace the thinking of Stalin during those war and early post-war years, in the very way that Collingwood has suggested that we should do.

Therefore, the opening of that archive is of enormous value, and I know that Dr. Volkogonov has been working to help with the disclosure of other documents that will throw light, and I'm sure, very, very important light, on these matters.

One final point: What is the whole purpose of this enterprise? Not simply the specific matters of finding out how the internal system worked in the bureaucracy, how specific episodes occurred, how decisions were taken by a key leader. So, what is our purpose? Well, I think we want now, an interpretation of the Soviet era as a whole in Russian history, and I want to suggest that the archival records can be of very, very great assistance to this end. But fundamentally, the work does not turn on the specific bits of information, or even the collective upshot of all those specific bits of information, because

it involves ways of thinking.

For example, a very influential way of thinking is that the Soviet period, from 1917 on to its recent downfall, was really a deviation from the earlier history of Russia, from the monarchy, from tsarism, from everything that went before. It seems to me that, while in some ways the Soviet Era did indeed differ from what came before in Russian history, in certain ways it was a reversion to the Russian past.

It began, as Dr. Volkogonov just said in conclusion, with a *smuta*, and it ended with a *smuta*. The *smuta* was a time of troubles, and the so-called Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century was a period of total breakdown after Ivan the Terrible died without leaving an heir, then civil war, and foreign intervention, and then there followed in 1613 the appearance of a new dynasty, the Romanov Dynasty. It crashed in 1917. And for a period of four or five years, there was a new Russian *smuta*—and some people alive in Moscow writing their memoirs then called it a *smuta*—a new time of troubles. And then what happened?

Well, as I've come to see it in the course of a long life of trying to puzzle out Russia, what happened after that *smuta* was that a new dynasty appeared, the Bolsheviks. And this dynasty brought with it what the previous dynasty had had, a state religion. The old was called Orthodoxy, and the new one was called Marxism-Leninism. [This new creed] was dif-

ferent in many ways, and there are all kinds of differences that flow from this. A new administrative command system developed, but there had been an administrative command system before. Terror developed, but there had been terror before, though not on anything like that scale. And, therefore, as I see it, one of the things we have to do in our thinking about the Soviet period as a whole, is to see it as a *cycle*; not only that, but as a cycle of Russian history that somehow repeated itself in the 20th century.

AMB. NITZE: I want to emphasize the point that Dr. Tucker made, that I think the interpretation of these archives is a matter for young men. But his presentation of what the opportunities are, from studying these archives, fascinates me, and I hope I live long enough to get the benefit of that.

PROF. ULAM: Well, we are very grateful for the opening of the Archives. Needless to say, it creates complications for us who worked on the period—the stark necessity of revising our texts—so we might have wished for more selective revelations.

But, talking seriously, I think there are some basic questions on which I hope the opening of the Archives will throw some light. I don't disagree with Bob Tucker's idea, sort of repeating phases in Russian history, but certainly the 75 years—or 73 years if we decide to end in 1990—of the Communist period, is some-

thing unprecedented, not only in Russian history, but in world history as such. It began with the collapse of an empire, which has happened in history before, but it ended with the collapse, not only of an empire, but of a faith; and, as General Volkogonov said, with the revelation of the effect on human psychology which is also unprecedented.

If you look at the tsarist period, certainly from the 1860s on, you don't find society psychologically enslaved to the regime, certainly not the intelligentsia, the way that you had it, let's say, in the heyday of Stalinism. You do find positive features of the regime. You find the great reforms of Alexander II, the first version of glasnost, and judicial reforms. In many ways this verdict on the past 73 or 74 years, which the people of the former Soviet Union have been rendering, and which is accentuated by the revelations from the archives, is to my mind something epoch-making in the history of mankind. I cannot think of anything like it; this was sort of a religious crisis *and* a nationality *and* a crisis of sovereignty.

Let me now try to be more specific as to what kind of things we who toiled in the Soviet field would like to learn from the archives. As I said before, these archival revelations have terribly complicated our task. Before, say, 1986, 1987, if somebody gave me a title of an article in *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*, I could tell them, without reading it, its contents. Now, of course, each

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to the regime, certainly
not the intelligentsia, the
way that you had it,
let's say in the heyday
of Stalinism.

issue of *Izvestiia*, or some other paper, brings in those tantalizing tidbits from the past, from the present, and it's really sort of "embarras des richesses." But there are certain basic questions which we, until now, have attempted only tentative answers, and those questions, I think, I hope will be clarified and perhaps resolved by what we read and get from the archives.

One questions the whole nature of terror and the personality and psychology of the man who created it. Was this terror—which, again, occurred on a scale and in a character unprecedented in modern history, with which, even comparisons with Hitler's terror are to some extent inexact—was this terror the result of sort of a personal hysteria of Stalin, as historians love to use this term, paranoia—a term I don't like, because, to me, paranoia is sort of an occupational disease of all dictators, if not most politicians. Was this a personal feeling, that treason was everywhere, or was it really the feeling that this is the only way you could rule the country—to unleash waves of terror? Or, in more simplified terms, to preserve his power, wouldn't it have been enough for Stalin to kill thousands rather than to kill millions as he did? And, of course, you have this attitude of Stalin, displayed when a British delegation visited him. Lady Astor, who was a Member of Parliament at the time—this was in the early 30s before the Great Terror—shouted "When will you stop killing people?" To which Stalin, as probably many of you know, replied, "When it is no longer necessary."


Well, why was it necessary to kill all those millions? I mean, was the man really convinced that it was a system of government, or did he really think that there was treason everywhere? How much was it absorbed by the people? I heard a very progressive, recent Russian politician say privately—and he had a great

deal to do with perestroika—saying, "Well, people still believed in something under Stalin." Well, it's more than "believed." It really was sort of a hysteria, which a great part of the nation engaged in, while many of those people participating in it had members of family, if not their closest relatives, in the forced labor camps. So to what extent, again, was this shared or sort of judged cold-bloodedly by the population at large? And here, of course, the very mass of the documents we have, reports and other things—is extremely important.

To my mind, the key problem in the 1930s is a two-fold problem. One is, of course, the Seventeenth Party Congress, which has been often characterized as, under the veneer of servility to Stalin, exhibiting opposition to him. The statement that—what was it?—253 delegates to the Congress voted against Stalin for the Central Committee, or a figure something like that. I must say, when I was writing my biography of Stalin, that was simply incomprehensible and incredible. If you read the speeches of the Congress and this sort of deification of Stalin by other people, mostly by Kirov, how is it possible that those people, half frightened, half sharing in this hysteria of adulation, then sat down and one-fourth of them voted against Stalin for the Central Committee? I am willing to be convinced that I was wrong when I said it's unlikely, but I'd like to see this evidence in black and white.

Another matter of interest is the murder of Kirov, which commentators in both the Soviet Union and in the West were quite certain was directly or indirectly engineered by Stalin. Again, this is a problem which, if you worked on as I have, you don't find what was described in a similar situation—not similar but analogous—in this country as "the smoking gun" pointing to Stalin. Again, can the

The last Russian tsar, Nicholas II, and his family before the 1917 Revolution.





Russian newspapers (1990-91) under *glasnost*.

documents really determine those two issues, and those two issues, of course, are key issues for the knowledge of the 1930s.

There is a whole slew of other intriguing questions and issues. I agree that it would take a very young man to go through all those archives, but perhaps we oldsters still can ask questions about it, and then if exposed, sit down and painfully rewrite our works.

DR. BILLINGTON: I'm not the specialist in the Soviet period that the other gentlemen at this table are, but I have some familiarity with the materials. In reading the documents for the first time, I came away with two general ways in which it seems to me this collection rather fundamentally modifies or challenges Western conceptions that are widespread, also among what you might call the reform Communists in the Soviet Union.

First of all, it seems to me that the Lenin documents on display in the exhibit suggest that the essentials of the totalitarian state, whatever you want to call it, the finished Stalinist state, that the essentials of it were almost all present in Lenin. This has been a long debate among people, in both East and West, who have contended that there was a good revolution that somehow went astray. That document on the demonstrative effect of killing 100 kulaks, the use of the word "purge", the venom of the anti-religious campaign, and again, the carefully calculated instrumental use of public executions, all of these are the kinds of things that in traditional Leninist hagiography Lenin was exempted from, because the cleaned-up version of his complete works didn't present this kind of savage, extreme Jacobinism. It seems to me it began earlier. It also seems to me the documents indicate that it lasted longer.

One of the most interesting documents in the exhibit, and certainly the most chilling, was the one from the summer of

1979, a minute from a Politburo meeting which really discusses in very great detail not only calculated measures, but also rationalizes the Afghan intervention in terms very different from the way Western, as well as Eastern people were explaining it at the time. The people said "Well, it's all the great game. It's just a sort of little geo-political fling." Or [the Kremlin is] concerned about Muslim fundamentalism or something or other.

The thing that struck me at the time was that there was no explanation in the Soviet press for a few days, and then they began repeating the explanations that Westerners were volunteering for them. Well, the explanation that is given in the internal Politburo document is very ideological. There is a revolutionary process, there was an April Revolution; we have to sustain it. The whole thing was discussed in these terms as if it were a natural thing and international relations don't matter at all.

And that leads me to a third point. All of the reformers and practically everybody—even people who were defending the Old Order in the Soviet Union—used the word totalitarianism, and started using it about four or five years ago, at a time when the American political science establishment wouldn't let anybody use the term in public in discussions of the Soviet system. It was thought to be a very unsophisticated ideological term that was artificially introduced by prisoners of the Cold War mentality and so forth. But, you can't have a serious discussion in the Soviet Union without the automatic use of the term "totalitarianism", even among people who were involved in it.

So, how can it be that American political science, as an institutionalized form of structured discussion, put people on the defensive who publicly used the term at the very time when the people in

Russia are trying to dismantle the system were introducing the term as a vital term, necessary to use in order to get rid of it? In other words, the Russians have found it necessary to exorcise the demon of totalitarianism by naming the demon. The very use of the word "totalitarianism" has been an essential part of the reform process.

PROF. ULAM: It used to be the cardinal question put to everybody who taught Soviet history and Soviet politics: "Is the Soviet Union driven, are the rulers of Soviet Union, driven by national interest or by the ideology, by Marxism-Leninism?" I always tried, to say finally, that the objective of Soviet foreign policy ceased to be world revolution very early in the game. I think that Mr. Khrushchev's Freudian slip when he said, "Your grandchildren will live under Communism," meant that he did not propose to deal with a Communist America. He had enough trouble with Communist China. The object of the Soviet Union, and certainly in the post World War II period, was simply what Samuel Gompers said about what American labor wanted—"more of everything." And that explained, of course, the expansion, and that expansion in a way was a public relations campaign for Communism at home rather than a sort of world revolution.

So, I really don't think that the post-30s Communist leadership was really thinking in terms of world revolution, but that the ideology has become very much watered down in their own minds, whether by their own personal power, as is the case in Stalin, or by the concern for the preservation of the regime. The language remained ideological, but the motivations more and more took on the aspect of what might be called Communist *realpolitik*.

PROF. TUCKER: The question is, the relation between Lenin and his Bolshevik system, and later Stalinism—

aren't they really pretty much the same thing, or a developed form of the same thing? It seems to me that Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution that he led, were in every sense the precondition for what came later in the Stalin period. I do believe that there were alternatives for development in the 1920s. It wasn't inevitable that it should have gone the way it did. Much of the way it went, in fact, had to do with Stalin himself. If he had been shot or died of illness in the early 1920s, I think it's not at all clear that the system would have developed in the same way. The essence of terror is to victimize a certain group in such a horrifying way that another, much larger group responds in the way in which the terrorizer wants them to; and that, Lenin grasped and prescribed as an action to be taken.

But there was also a reformist Lenin who found expression during the period of the New Economic Policy in the 1920s, and the idea of a long-range process of changing the society in the direction of what was called socialism, but nobody quite knew what that meant. But, it seems to me that the crucial answer to this question, and I can only offer it without explaining it, is that to put it right down to the terms that I think Dr. Billington would feel were just.

Lenin was a radical of the Left, an extreme radical of the extreme Left. Stalin, masquerading as just that, was an extreme radical of the radical Right. This is my position; this is the position that I have attempted to argue. I won't try to go through it. But the essence of being a Bolshevik of the radical Right is that Stalin was aggressively nationalist. He was aggressively Russian nationalist in his Bolshevism, and that was one thing that Lenin never was. He was very much opposed to Russian, progressive nationalism.

The second question had to do with totalitarian, the word "totalitarian". I

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quite agree. It's widely used now, almost as a kind of a short-hand term to describe the system that is now coming to an end. I think if we understand it that way, I don't think any American political scientists need to be upset.

The classical interpretation of the meaning of totalitarianism was that put forward by Hannah Arendt in her book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, in 1951. It is the *locus classicus* of the point. The essence of her answer is that a terroristic dictatorship motivated by ideology is to go on terrorizing forever. She said there was something also called "dictatorial terror," which various regimes applied that one would not call "totalitarian terror".

As a result, in the post-Stalin period, some of us felt that the Stalin period and the Lenin period pointing toward it were a perfect example of just what Hannah Arendt meant by totalitarianism, and we continue to use that term for it. But in the post-1953 period, when it ceased to be a terroristic despotism in the way that it had been under Stalin, when terror was dictatorial terror, when it means the repressions of dissidents, all that kind of thing, which was awful for the people involved, yet a different phenomenon than the terrorism that had been pursued under Stalin. That no longer accorded with her concept, and, furthermore, all kinds of divisions began to appear within the regime that didn't accord with it, and it no longer seemed to be motivated ideologically in the same way. I remember, we invited Hannah Arendt to Princeton in 1966, and she admitted all these things in a colloquium talk she gave us, and in a preface to the new edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, she said it no longer applied to the post-Stalin period in the same way in which it had. I think that's a hugely important book, and I still subscribe to it, and I think

we must speak of the system, we may speak of the system quite consciously and conceptually as totalitarian up to that point—1953—and moving in that way ever since Lenin. He was a radical of the Left. But I do think that afterwards American political scientists, in one way or another were simply trying to take cognizance of these changes in calling it no longer totalitarian.

GEN. VOLKOGONOV: There is so much missing information about the twentieth century, and this is a result of the monopoly on information which the totalitarian system has had. The last 70 years of Russian history have constituted a great social experiment. This was not a trivial event; this was a great experiment and in many instances, a criminal experiment, and this too must be taken into account. It couldn't have happened in a democratic country. Did this Bolshevik experiment, over 70 years occur because there were no democratic traditions? There was an absence of political traditions and of political democratic institutions, and the social inertia and momentum of the masses really had a great effect on events.

One of the main methods of changing the world the Bolsheviks used was force. This was a criminal method, but they had a justification for it. They said this was necessary in order to change the world. And one of the aspects was totalitarianism. Another sign, another indication was that totalitarianism cannot use or take advantage. It just doesn't have the capability of taking advantage of historical chances that it is given. It has to be said that Russia was a totalitarian state, not only after the Bolsheviks; it was a totalitarian state even before that. In 1945, there was a chance [for change]. After the victory over fascism, it seemed that there was an opportunity here, as there always is after a major cataclysm. There was

Report to the Central Committee
by Yakovlev and Zamiatin,
September 25, 1985,
concerning quotes attributed to Lenin
by U.S. President Ronald Reagan
in his speeches.

Согласовано
В.И. Ленин
М. Горький
И. Сталин
Л. Брежнев
ЦК КПСС

Секретно
ЦК КПСС
2-й сектор
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ПОДЛЕЖИТ ВООБЩЕ
СЕРВИС ЦК КПСС

О враждебных выступлениях президента США

Без права публикации.

В последнее время президент США в своих официальных выступлениях все чаще прибегает к фальсифицированным цитатам, приписывая их В.И. Ленину.

Подобное делалось Рейганом и прежде, однако теперь это становится практикой. В одном из своих последних высказываний (18 сентября с.г.) Рейган приписал Ленину планы захвата Восточной Европы, Китая, Латинской Америки и Соединенных Штатов.

В советской печати не раз давался решительный отпор клеветническим наскокам Р.Рейгана - и тем не менее эта линия главы Белого дома продолжается.

Отделы пропаганды и внешнеполитической пропаганды ЦК КПСС считают целесообразным поручить МИД СССР через сопосольство в Вашингтоне сделать представление Государственному департаменту США, в котором заявить категорический протест против фальсификаций работ основоположника Коммунистической партии Советского Союза и Советского государства В.И. Ленина, подчеркнув, что такая практика является недопустимой, оскорбляет советский народ, вызывает справедливое возмущение советских людей. Потребовать от американской администрации прекращения враждебных выпадов против Советского Союза и грубой фальсификации ленинских работ.

Текст представления Госдепартаменту опубликовать в советской печати.

Проект указаний сопослуду в США прилагается.

Просим согласия.

Зав. Отделом пропаганды ЦК КПСС
А. Яковлев
(А. Яковлев)

Зав. Отделом внешнеполитической пропаганды ЦК КПСС
Л. Замiatин
(Л. Замiatин)

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always a feeling of being able to change society, but Stalin felt that history had confirmed his righteousness, that he was right. And instead of changing, he mothballed the whole system. It seems to me that totalitarianism is a synonym for doing everything the same way, of a monopoly on power and thought, an absolutist approach to using force to change society. All of this is on a side road. It is not the main path. It is not the main highway towards acquiring civilized human values, and this is really what caused the demise of that system.

DR. BILLINGTON: [to Amb. Nitze] I just wondered—as somebody who has lived through so much of this experience, as you have, as a subject of history rather than as an object of historians—what one question would you most like answered out of these archives?

AMB. NITZE: My first fundamental question would be whether the

progress from Leninism, to Stalinism, to everything we've seen pass, was really a feature of Russian history, or whether it was a feature of the imposition upon Russian history of an alien, really German-based, system of ideas that was not Russian at all, and was alien to Russia. Which one of those two is the correct view?

DR. PIKHOIA: I am convinced that there is a very close relationship between the events of the 19th and 20th centuries. For example, the German influence was a considerable factor, but it is not a leading one. But perhaps in the 19th century, the French influence was more significant. So, at the beginning of the 20th century, for example, the British influence on Russian history is most significant.

But, in spite of this, Russia has always remained Russia, and that is my understanding of the course of history.

GEN. VOLKOGONOV: I think

that in order to understand the issues and to give an answer in depth, my dear colleague, you must understand that Russia is not Europe. It is not Asia. It is Eurasia. This explains many things. The thing is that in Russia there had been many attempts to change the structure by revolution, cataclysms, but never has the issue been set up as a parliamentary system. So the role and the influence of Western ideas is great, but they are significant only to the degree that Lenin's version was, that transposition of Western Marxism into the Russian world was successful.

The Russian copy turned out to be much worse. Class battle, class struggle—that was the later Marx, [which so influenced Russian socialists]. It was essentially this [version of Marx which] determined the Jacobinism and Jacobin use of force and was adopted as the way of changing Russian society. Nonetheless, Leninism and the October Revolu-



Inmates at the Vorkuto-Pecherskii forced labor camp, 1945, one of the many camps run by the NKVD (Secret Police).

tion is a continuation of a Russian history. It's tragic because this was an extremely Russian version of Marxism. And to consider that this was something that was an influence brought from the outside is not correct. It was a Russian model of Marxism. And again, it was another horrible period in the long suffering history of the Russian people. That's the way I understand it.

As the chairman of the President's Commission, I ran up against an interesting problem [about declassification] in my Commission. The issue was, what to do with rehabilitated people, those who had been victims of the repressions and subsequently rehabilitated? It turned out that the rehabilitated subjects themselves object to the publication of the interviews that were held with them, and the answers which they gave, and the whole process in general. So we had a double problem. One is a moral issue, one is a legal issue. From a legalistic point of view, yes, we should publish everything and give everybody this information and let everybody read it, of course. But from the moral point of view, inadvertently, we can somehow become a force for a wrong interpretation of history. Very often these people unconsciously gave certain statements. Sometimes they acted in a way that they sincerely believed at *that time* would help progress, and did certain things which now, maybe they're sorry for. But, if you publish some things that people did, those people might now be ostracized by modern society. That's why the problem is a lot more complex and a lot more difficult than it seems.

PROF. ULAM: I'd like to comment on the question of whether this depressing picture of the past isn't really prejudicial to the mentality, the psychology, of the Russian people as they face the future.

My guess—and not being a member of the national community, I cannot be sure—but my guess would be that the initial effect, certainly, has been devastating, but, in the long run I think that the moral regeneration of a nation must depend on sort of a sober, realistic, and true vision of the past—the commonplace idea, that the truth eventually will make you free. And I think in this connection, this full glasnost, the openness about the past, benefits the Russian people and all of us, not only from the selfish point of view of historians who want facts.

PROF. TUCKER: A question was raised about what does all [that we are learning about the past] say about what might come in the future? If this cyclical idea has any merit at all, and this present period has been in some sense a new time of troubles, of breakdown, disintegration, chaos, let us simply say that I think there is hope that this Russia emerging from this new *smuta*, this new time of troubles, may not become a new dynasty with a new state religion and a new administrative command system, but may develop in a democratic way. At least we're seeing many signs of that. It's a terribly difficult period, and my thought that's with me is that in a way, I compare this now to World War II. And it seems to me that just as we had the profoundest national interest then in seeing that Russia came through militarily victorious, we have just as deep an interest, if not even deeper now, in helping her come through this one democratically victorious, and it's *possible*.

DR. BILLINGTON: I would say to you that there is light at the end of this dark tunnel, and it is precisely the candle that these gentlemen and others like them have lit. And to them we are very grateful, and to all of you for coming and being with us today.

Even as the exhibit was being mounted at the Library, archivists in Moscow continued to declassify documents for the show. When General Volkogonov arrived in Washington, D.C., with President Yeltsin, for the State visit and exhibit opening, he brought with him a series of documents about the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The following minutes of a meeting held in the Kremlin reveal in surprising detail the careful planning and attention to foreign opinion that characterized the deliberations of the Politburo.

To item IX, Min. No. 156

Top Secret

SPECIAL FOLDER

Ts K K P S S

The situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) is becoming more complicated. The actions of rebel tribes are growing more widespread and organized. The reactionary clergy is stepping up its anti-government and anti-Soviet agitation, promoting the idea of creating in the DRA an "independent Islamic republic" following the Iranian model.

The difficulties confronting the formation of the DRA are largely of an objective nature. They are associated with economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, and the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA). These difficulties also are exacerbated, however, by subjective factors: in the party and state there is absent a collegial leadership, all power is in reality concentrated in the hands of N. M. Taraki and Kh. Amin, who often allow mistakes and infractions of the law; there is no Popular Front in the country; local organs of revolutionary authority have not yet been set up. Our advisers' recommendations on these matters have not been practically implemented by the Afghan leadership.

The primary support for the Afghan government in its struggle with counterrevolution continues to be the army. Lately, security forces, border troops, and emerging self-defense detachments have been taking a more active part in this struggle. However, the attraction of a broad spectrum of social strata to this struggle against reaction has been inadequate, and, as a result, the measures undertaken by the DRA to stabilize the situation are not turning out to be very effective. In these conditions, the counterrevolution is concentrating most of its efforts on demoralizing the Afghan army. A variety of techniques are being used for this: religious fanaticism, bribery, and threats. They are using methods to work on officers individually and tempt them toward treason. Such activities by the reaction are becoming widespread and might have dangerous consequences for the revolution.

In connection with all this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the KGB, and Ministry of Defense, and the International Department of the TsK KPSS recommend the following course of action:

1. On behalf of the Politburo of the TsK KPSS, send to the Politburo of the TsK NDPA a letter, which in a comradely fashion frankly expresses the concern and unease of the Soviet leadership regarding the real danger of losing the gains of the April Revolution and spells out recommendations to step up the struggle with counterrevolution and consolidate popular rule. Note certain mistakes in the management of the party and state and recommend measures to correct them, paying particular attention to collegiality in the work of the TsK NDPA and the government of the DRA. Advise the political leadership of the DRA to create an effective system of local organs of popular rule in the form of revolutionary (people's) committees, and significantly improve the ideological and political/educational effort among the population and ranks of the armed forces.

2. Adopt measures to strengthen the office of the party adviser and expand the scope of his activities, and approve sending party advisers to provincial and municipal government agencies.

3. To assist the chief military adviser, send an experienced general and group of officers to Afghanistan to work directly with the troops (in divisions and regiments). The primary mission of this group will be to help the commanders

of the combined units [soedinenie] and units [chast'] organize combat operations against the insurgents, improve the command and control of units and sub-units [chast', podrazdelenie]. Additionally, detail to the DRA Soviet military advisers down to the battalion level, including the government-security brigade and tank brigades (40-50 men, including 20 political [propaganda] advisers), as well as military counterintelligence advisers to all DRA regiments.

4. To protect and defend airplanes of the Soviet air squadron at the "Bagram" airport, send to the DRA—with the concurrence of the Afghan side—a paratrooper battalion in the uniform (fatigues) of aircraft-technician personnel. To protect the Soviet embassy, send to Kabul a special KGB detachment (125-150 men) disguised as embassy service personnel. In early August of this year, after preparations are completed, send to the DRA ("Bagram" airpost) a special detachment of the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] of the General Staff to be used in case the situation sharply deteriorates to protect and defend particularly important government facilities.


5. Using the channels of the KGB and the GRU of the General Staff, bring to the attention of the Indian leadership the useful information about plans to incorporate Indian Kashmir along with Afghanistan in a "peaceful Islamic republic" in order to provoke the Indian government to take active steps to resist the anti-Afghan activities of Pakistan.

6. Using Soviet mass media resources, intensify propaganda against attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, Iran, China, and the U.S.A., using the slogan "Hands off Afghanistan." Facilitate the publication of similar material in the press of the Third World.

Request your review.

A. Gromyko IU. Andropov. D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev

June 28, 1979



At the Russian Archives exhibit, Dr. Billington introduces Rudolph Pikhoia to guest Cheryl Johnson as John Bass, staff director of the subcommittee on Libraries and Memorials, looks on.



Library staff member Harry Leich takes Dr. Billington and the Gorbachevs on a tour during the couple's visit to the Library in May 1992, prior to the Russian Archives exhibit.

The Online Exhibit

Dr. Billington announced on June 15 the unprecedented electronic dissemination of excerpts of formerly secret Soviet documents, from the "Revelations from the Russian Archives" exhibit. He said that "this [is] the first time any institution anywhere offers direct electronic access to the contents of an exhibit. It is a dramatic example of how new information technologies enable us to offer the American people a 'library without walls'."

Significant portions of 25 documents, with translations and commentary, were available as an "online exhibit" from three online services: America Online, Internet, Sovset. America Online is a leading independent provider of interactive services for personal computer users. It specially targets the home and K-12 educational community and offers subscribers a variety of features, including electronic mail, interactive forums, software files, computing support, online classes, news, stock quotes, and other information. New subscribers to America Online receive 5 hours of free access time. In the first four weeks of the exhibit, there were more than 20,000 sign-ons.

Internet is a non-profit super-network of networks, offering online mail, forum and document/data transfer services throughout the world. Sovset is an international computer network for specialists in Russian and East European Studies. It now has over 600 members in 20 countries and links major study cen-

ters for Russian and East European affairs in North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia.

Through these three services, an estimated 20 million people in 72 countries had direct access to sample documents from the exhibit. The Internet and America Online technology allowed users to download the "electronic exhibit," complete with images of the original Russian manuscripts, onto their personal computers. Users downloaded to their home computers more than 1300 copies of such documents. Most of the files America Online users downloaded contained the image of Russian language documents, making this number of downloads remarkable.

On America Online, users additionally were able to participate in live discussions of the exhibit. On Thursday, June 18, from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. (EDST), Dr. Billington and Dr. Pikhov, chairman of the Committee on Archival Affairs of the Russian Federation, participated in an electronic dialogue with America Online subscribers. Scholars, teachers and school children from as far away as Nome, Alaska submitted questions to, and received immediate responses from, the two scholars.

Visitors to the Library could view the "electronic exhibit" in either the National Demonstration Laboratory for Interactive Information Technologies in the atrium of the Library's Madison Building, or in the Machine Readable Collections Reading Room in the Jefferson Building.

Bob Dierker, senior adviser for multimedia activities at the Library, observed, "This technology not only places these documents immediately into the hands of the scholars, it also allows online discussion. Research, publication, and peer review will all be happening simultaneously. This effort demonstrates the art of the possible. In all likelihood, such technologies will revolutionize the way in which museums and libraries present exhibitions in the future."



Matrioshka dolls,
a favorite Russian handicraft.

Consulting the Documents

A complete copy of each document in the exhibition may be examined at the European Reference Desk in the Main Reading Room, Thomas Jefferson Building. A free list of all items in the exhibition may be obtained at the European Reference Desk or from the European Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540, telephone (202) 707-5414.

Acknowledgments

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Credits

Abby Smith edited the proceedings of the symposium, taking some minor liberties with the translations for clarity's sake, reorganized the text and documents into a more readable chronological format, and was responsible for the overall selection of material. Special assistance was necessary from some 50 Library staff members for translating the documents and preparing written text for the exhibit, including Ronald D. Bachman, translation coordinator, Raymond E. Zickel, Gerald Wager, Jurij Dobczansky, Sarah Despres, Vera De Buchananne, Boris Boguslavsky, Helen Fedor, and Stephanie Marcus. Bob Zich contributed the On-Line material. Jim Higgins provided the photographs from the opening of the exhibit. Kimberly Lord was responsible for the design concept and layout of the publication. Also involved were Kay Eisinger, Larisa Pastuchiv, Tom Beecher, Edward Ohnemus and Barbara Bryant. The printing was produced by the Library's Printing unit. John Sullivan did the photographic research and edited the publication.

