[Against the proposed change.]Feb. 18,52d, 1stChandler. Wm E.Vol. 23, pp. 794,2 parts.1892New Hampshire.1270, 1271Apr. 12,52d, 1stdoVol. 23, pp.3191, 3195,3201, 3203.Apr. 6, 7,53d, 1st.Hoar, George F.Vol. 25, pp.1893Massachusetts67, 97, 101,Senate110.Special.Feb. 12,53d. 3dGray, GeorgeVol. 27, p.1895Delaware2062916, minority,June 5,54th, 1stChandler, Wm E., Vol. 28, pp.530,2 parts1896New Hampshire.6157-61569.6160.Do54th, 1stHawley Joseph R. Vol. 28, p.Connectient6161May 29,56th, 1stChandler, Wm. E. Vol. 33, p.1900New Hampshire.6189.Mar. 11,57th, 1stHoar, G.F.Vol. 35, pp.1902Massachusetts2776, 2777Do57th, 1stStewart, Wm. M.. Vol. 35. pp.Nevada2777, 2778.Mar. 14,57th, 1stPenrose, Boies,Vol. 35, p.1902Pennsylvania2915.Apr. 10,57th, 1stDepew, C.M., New Vol. 35, pp.1902York4179, 4180..Apr. 11,57th, 1stdoVol. 35, pp.4233, 4234,4240, 4241.May 9, 1902 57th, 1stdoVol. 35, pp.5574, 5577Do57th, 1stSpooner, John C., Vol. 35, pp,Wisconsin5574, 5575,5577,Do57th, 1stHoar, G.F.,Vol. 35, pp.Massachusetts5574, 5576.5578.Do57th, 1stForaker, J.B.Vol. 35, pp.Ohio5577, 5578..Do57th, 1stPettus, E.W.,Vol. 35, pp.Alabama5578, 5579Do57th, 1stHoar, Geo, FVol. 35, pp.Massachusetts7077, 7080Do57th, 1stPlatt, O.H.Vol. 35, p.Connecticut7081.Do57th, 1stForaker, J.B.Vol. 35, p.Ohio7081Do57th, 1stMcComas, L.E.,Vol. 35, p.Maryland7081Do57th, 1stVest, George G., Vol. 35, pp.Missouri7081, 7082,7083.

The convention which framed our national constitution was about equally divided between the advocates of a national and the advocates of a confederate government. The great battle between these parties was fought over the question of representation in the national legislature. The details of that struggle and the compromise in which it ended have an unfailing interest for the student of political history. They have a fresh interest, at the present time, from the attempt 00066recently made in Congress to change the method of electing Senators, and from certain misstatements made in a recent biographical work as to the authorship of that compromise.

The misstatements to which I refer are found in Dr. Stille's very interesting life of John Dickenson. Dr. Stille claims for Mr. Dickenson the honor of introducing and securing the adaptation in the Federal Convention of 1787 of the provision giving the States an equal representation in the Senate. In proof of this claim, Dr. Stille states that the convention "decided unanimously, on the 7th of June, on the motion of Mr. Dickinson, that the members of that body [the Senate] should be chosen, two for each State, by its legislature."

An examination of Madison's report of the Debates in the Federal Convention shows that every part of this statement is incorrect. Mr. Dickinson did not make the motion attributed to him, on the 7th of June related simply to the manner in which Senators should be chosen, and had no reference whatever to the number of Senators from each State.

Mr. Dickinson's motion was "that the members of the second branch [the Senate] ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures." He said he "had two reasons for this motion," first, because the sense of the States would be better collected through their governments than immediately from the people at large;; secondly, because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State legislatures than in any other mode. In reply to Mr. Pinckney's objection that "if the small States should be allowed one Senator only the number will be too great, there will be eighty at least," Mr. Dickinson said the greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would be eighty and twice eighty of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body.

The proposition to give the States an equal vote in the Senate was not made till June 11, and then it was made, not by Mr. Dickinson, but by Roger Sherman. It was at first voted down, and not until after a long and severe controversy was the proposition adopted. It was adapted at last, by a vote of 5 to 4, on the 16th of July. The number of Senators from each State was fixed at two on the 23d of July, and at the same time it was decided that the Senators should vote per capita.

In the debate on this subject Mr. Dickinson took no part. On every occasion, from first to last, Mr. Sherman was the champion of the equal representation of the States in the Senate. The only occasion on which Mr. Dickinson spoke on this subject in the convention was on June 2, when, the executive being under discussion, he incidentally remarked, as to the point of representation in the National Legislature, as it might affect States of different sizes, that it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice, at least in one branch of the National Legislature. But two days before this, on the 31st of May, when the method of choosing Senators was under discussion, Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State legislatures.

The position taken by Mr. Sherman on this subject was not a new one with him. Eleven years before, as a member of the Continental Congress, he advocated a representation in Congress of both population and States. On the 12th of July, 1776, Mr. Dickinson, on behalf of the Committee on Articles of Confederation, reported a plan in which it was provided that "in determining questions each colony shall have one vote." This clause being under debate, on August 1, 1776, it was strongly opposed by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and others, as unjust to the larger States. Representation they insisted, should be in proportion to taxation. As a compromise of the conflicting claims of the large and small States, Roger Sherman proposed that there should be a representation both of States and of population. His position is thus stated in the account of the debates in John Adams's diary (2 Adams's Works, 499):

Sherman thinks we ought not to vote according to numbers. We are representatives of States, not individuals. States of Holland. The consent of every one is necessary. Three colonies would govern the whole, but would not have a majority of strength to carry their votes into execution. The vote should be taken two ways; call the colonies and call the individuals, and have a majority of both.

Here we have in substance the great compromise of the Constitution between the large and the small States. This was the first expression of this plan, and the merit of originating it belongs to Roger Sherman. As Mr. Sherman in the Federal Convention represented a State intermediate in population between the largest and the smallest States, he stood in a position to be influential with both. Although he and his associates from Connecticut were disposed to preserve to the States as much of their sovereignty as possible, he was always amenable to reason, and was fruitful in resources to harmonize conflicting views. This can not be better illustrated than by a review of the debates in the Federal Convention on representation in the National Legislature.

The debates in the Federal Convention divide themselves into three distinct periods:

First. The debates in the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, which extended from May 30 to June 19.

From May 30 to June 13 the committee had under consideration the fifteen resolutions of Randolph, containing the leading principles which he thought should prevail in a National Constitution.

On June 13 the committee reported in favor of the Randolph resolutions as they had been amended in debate. This may be called the national plan.

On June 15 Mr. Patterson presented the resolutions known as the New Jersey or confederate plan. This plan was referred to the Committee of the Whole and the national plan recommitted. These plans were debated till June 19, when the committee voted to rise and report in favor of the national plan.

Second. The second period consisted of the debates in the convention on the national plan, which extended from June 19 to July 26, when a committee of detail of five members was appointed to prepare and report a Constitution conformable to the twenty-three resolutions adopted by the convention.

Third. The debates in the convention on the detailed plan, which extended from August 6 to September 16, when the Constitution was adopted. On September 17 a few changes were made, the Constitution signed, and the convention adjourned.

In the first period, which lasted only twenty days, the debates were brief and comparatively calm.

In the second period, which lasted thirty-seven days, the great struggle between the national and confederate parties took place, which ended in the adoption of the compromise plan.

In the third period, which lasted forty-two days, the debate on details, which exhibited great diversity of opinion, was conducted without asperity. The slavery question excited a momentary feeling, but was soon disposed of.

I have spoken of the numbers of the convention as divided into two opposite parties--those who favored a strong and those who favored a weak general government, or, as we may for convenience call them, nationalist and confederates. But these parties were not organized like modern political parties. They did not vote solidly according to a scheme prearranged by a caucus. Indeed, they had no organization at all. More independent men never met together. Each man spoke and voted according to his individual convictions. Those who agreed on one point were often at variance on others equally important. There were all shades of nationalists and all shades of confederates, and some were partly the one and partly the other.

The leaders of the nationalists were Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, and Governeur Morris. The leaders of the confederates were Patterson, Lansing, and Luther Martin. Those most active in affecting compromises between the contending parties were Sherman, Franklin, Dickinson, and Gerry.

The point on which there was the bitterest and most prolonged controversy was, as I have stated, the rule of suffrage in the legislature. The resolution on this subject was the second on Mr. Randolph's list. But when it was reached, at the request of Mr. Read, of Delaware, the consideration of it was postponed, "as the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change in the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on it might become their duty to retire from the convention."

Accordingly the second resolution was not taken up till the other resolution had been acted upon. This second resolution provided "that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases." On the 9th of June the debate on the second resolution began. Mr. Briarly and Mr. Patterson, of New Jersey, spoke in opposition and Mr. Wilson in favor of it. On June 11 the debate was resumed.

Mr. Sherman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the first branch (the House of Representatives) should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants: and that in the second branch, or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. He said, as the States would remain possessed of certain individuals rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England, he observed, had certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.

This was the first presentation of that plan of compromise by which the conflicting claims of the large and the small States were finally adjusted. It was modified in some of its details, as we shall hereafter 00099see, but the compromise, as finally adopted, was, in substance, representation of the population in the House of Representatives, and equal representation of the States in the Senate. Roger Sherman was thus the first to propose this important compromise, and his merit consists in this, that while the advocates of a strong general government were in favor of a representation in both houses of the legislature based on population, and the advocates of a weak general government were in favor of an equal representation of the States in both houses, Sherman, though sympathizing with the latter class, saw, at this early day, that it would be impossible to form a general government unless each side yielded a portion of its claims. The national principle must prevail in one house and the confederate principle in the other. To Roger Sherman belongs the credit, not only of introducing this compromise in the convention, but also of bearing the brunt of the contest in its favor, through a long and severe struggle, till it was finally adopted.

After a brief discussion, it was decided by a vote of 9 to 2 that representation in the House should be in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants and three-fifths of the slaves. New Jersey and Delaware were the only States voting in the negative.

Mr. Sherman then moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have one vote in the second branch. Everything, he said, depended on this. The smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than an equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr. Ellsworth seconded the motion, and the vote was 5 yeas to 6 days.

Mr. Wilson then moved that the right of suffrage in the Senate ought to be according to the same rule as in the first branch. On this motion, the vote was 6 yeas to 5 nays.

In the resolutions reported to the convention by the committee of the whole, the national principle prevailed, except in the provision for electing the Senators by the State legislatures. The debate on those resolutions began June 20, and then the advocates of the confederate plan returned to the contest with renewed vigor. In the committee of the whole the resolution in favor of two houses of the legislature was adopted without debate. But when that resolution came up in the convention, Lansing, Luther Martin, Sherman, and W. S. Johnson made elaborate speeches against it. The keynote of the opposition to a legislature of two houses was struck in the opening remark of Mr. Lansing, "that the true question here was whether the convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present confederacy."

Mr. Sherman, in his speech, said that "he admitted two branches to be be necessary in the State legislatures, but saw no necessity in a confederacy of States." He closed his speech with the following remarks:

If the difficulty on the subject of representation can not be otherwise got over, I would agree to have two branches, and a proportional representation in one of them, provided each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States, otherwise three or four of the large States would rule the others as they pleased. Each State, like each individual, had its peculiar habits, usages, and manners, which constituted its happiness. It would not, therefore, give to others a power over this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.

Mr. Mason. Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Madison very ably supported the resolution; and the vote stood, yeas 7, nays 3. Maryland divided. The vote of Connecticut was in the affirmative.

The debate on the rules of suffrage in the two branches began on June 27 and was continued till July 16, when the compromise plan was adopted by a vote of 5 to 4. When the debate had lasted two days, and the prospect of harmonious action seemed to be diminishing rather than increasing. Dr. Franklin moved that the convention be opened each day with prayer. This motion was seconded by Mr. Sherman. It did not come to a vote, apparently from fear that it might excite alarm among the people.

On the 29th of June it was decided by a vote of 6 to 4 that the rule of suffrage in the first branch (the House of Representatives) ought not to be according to that established by the Articles of Confederation. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware voted in the negative, and Maryland was divided.

After this vote was taken, Mr. Ellsworth moved that the rule of suffrage in the second branch (the Senate) be the same with that established by the Articles of Confederation. Mr. Baldwin, of Georgia, "Thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property, and that in forming it, therefore, some reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which the senate of Massachusetts was constituted."

The debate on Mr. Ellsworth's motion was resumed on the 30th of June. In the course of this debate. Mr. Madison said that the difference in interest between the States depended not upon their size, but upon their being slave-holding or nonslave-holding States. The remedy for this difference which had occurred to him was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States, in both branches, to their respective number, of inhabitants, computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the other, according to the whole number, counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern scale (States) would have the advantage in one house and the Northern in the other.

Mr. Wilson proposed one Senator for every 100,000 souls; the States not having that number to be allowed one.

Dr. Franklin proposed an equal number of Senators from each State; that in all questions touching the sovereignty of the States, or whereby the authority of the States over their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the States increased, and in the appointment of civil officers, each State should have equal suffrage: that in money bills the delegates of the several States to the Treasury. The debate on this day was very heated, Mr. Bedford, of Delaware, stating that the small States, rather than agree to the national plan, would prefer a foreign alliance.

On July 2 the vote on Mr. Ellsworth's motion was taken, and it was lost by an equal division, 5 to 5. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, nay; Georgia, divided.

Mr. C. Pinckney proposed that the representation of the States in the Senate should vary according to population, but that the larger States should not have their full proportion.

Gen. C. C. Pinckney proposed a committee of one from each State to report a plan of compromise. This seemed to be felt by most to be a necessity.

Mr. Randolph said he would agree that, in the choice of an Executive, each State should have an equal vote. Vote for the committee: years, 9; days, 2.

On July 5 the committee of 11 reported two propositions:

1. That in the House of Representatives there be one representative for every 40,000 inhabitants; each State to have at least one; all money bills to originate in the House, and not be amended in the Senate; no money to be drawn from the Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations originated in the House.

2. In the Senate each State to have an equal vote.

Mr. Madison in a note (5 Elliot, 274) says that this compromise was proposed by Dr. Franklin; that Mr. Sherman, who took the place of Mr. Ellsworth, proposed that each State should have an equal vote in the Senate, provided that no decision thereon should prevail unless the majority of States concurring should also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States, but it was not much deliberated on or approved in the committee. Mr. Madison says a similar provision was proposed in the debates on the Articles of Confederation. I can find no confirmation of this last statement. Probably Mr. Madison had in mind the proposition reported by Mr. Adams, to which reference had been made.

The debate which followed on this day and the next related principally to the question whether the giving to the House the sole right to originate money bills was really any concession to the large States. It was finally voted, 5 to 3, that the clause relating to money bills should stand as a part of the report.

On July 7 the question was taken up, Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the second branch (the Senate) stand as a part of the report?

Mr. Sherman supposed it was the wish of every one that some general government should be established. An equal vote in the second branch would, he thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. "The small States have more vigor in their government than the large ones; the more influence, therefore, the large ones have the weaker will be the government. In the large States it will be most difficult to collect the real and fair sense of the people; fallacy and undue influence will be practiced with the most success, and improper men will most easily get into office. If they vote by States in the second branch and each State has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of States as well as a majority of the people on the side of public measures, and the Government will have decision and efficacy. If this be not he case in the second branch there may be a majority of States against public measures, and the difficulty of compelling them to abide by the public determination will render the Government feebler than it has ever yet been." The vote on his question stood, yeas 6, nays 3. Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, nay; Massachusetts and Georgia, divided.

From the 9th to the 14th of July the debate was on a variety of question growing out of the provision relating to the number of members in the House of Representatives, such as slave representation, census, and representation of new States.

On the 14th of July, Mr. Rutledge proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the originating of money bills in the first, and the equality of votes in the second branch.

Mr. Gerry favored the reconsideration, with a view, not of destroying the equality of votes, but of providing that the States should vote per capita, which, he said, would prevent the delays and inconveniences that had been experienced in Congress, and would give a national aspect and spirit to the management of business.

This proposition of Mr. Gerry's that the Senators vote per capita, though not acted upon at this time, was renewed by Governor Morris and Mr. King on July 23, and was then adopted. This was the last step in this controversy and one of the most important. It must have seemed to the Nationalists a much greater concession than the giving to the House of Representatives the exclusive right to originate money bills. It removed from the proceedings of the Senate all appearances of State action, and, as Mr. Gerry said, it gave a national aspect and spirit to the management of business. Only the extreme State rights men, like Luther Martin, opposed it, and on the final vote Maryland was the only State voting in the negative. For this suggestion Mr. Gerry is entitled to no small share of credit.

The reconsideration proposed by Mr. Rutledge having been agreed to, Mr. Pinckney moved that, instead of an equality of votes, the States should be represented in the Senate as follows: New Hampshire, 2: Massachusetts, 4: Rhode Island, 1: Connecticut, 3: New York, 3: New York, 3: New Jersey, 2: Pennsylvania, 4; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 3: Virginia, 5; North Carolina, 2: South Carolina, 3; Georgia, 2. Total 36. This was second by Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Sherman urged the equality of votes, not so much as a security for the small States, as for the State governments, which could not be preserved unless they were represented and had a negative in the General Government. He had no objection to the members in the second branch voting per capita, as had been suggested by Mr. Gerry.

Strong speeches were made by King, Madison, and Wilson, against giving to the States an equality of votes in the Senate. Vote on Mr. Pinckney's motion: Yeas, 4; nays, 6.

On the 16th of July the vote was taken on the whole report as amended, including equality votes in the Senate, and resulted in 5 yeas and 4 nays. Massachusetts divided.

On July 23, Gouverneur Morris and Mr. King moved that the Senators vote per capita. Mr. Ellsworth said he had always approved of voting in that mode. It was agreed to that the number of Senators be two from each State.

Mr. L. Martin was opposed to voting per capita, as departing from the idea of the States being represented in the second branch. Mr. Carroll was not struck with any particular objection against the mode; but he did not wish so hastily to make so material an innovation.

The vote on the whole motion, viz, "The second branch to consist of two members from each State, and to vote per capita," was, yeas, 9; nay, 1 (Maryland).

From this review of the proceedings in the Federal convention on the rule of suffrage in the two Houses of the National Legislature, we perceive:

(1) That the first motion that the States have an equal vote in the Senate was made in the Committee of the Whole, on June 9, by Roger Sherman, and was seconded by Oliver Ellsworth, and that this motion was negatived by a vote of 5 yeas to 6 nays.

(2) That immediately after this vote was taken, James Wilson moved that the right of suffrage in the Senate be the same as in the House of Representatives (that is, according to population), and that this motion prevailed by a vote of 6 yeas, to 5 nays.

(3) That on June 13 the national plan was reported by the Committee of the Whole, which provided that the rule of suffrage, in both Houses, should be according to population.

(4) That in the debate in the convention, on this national plan, on June 29, Oliver Ellsworth moved that the rule of suffrage in the Senate be the same with that established by the Articles of Confederation. After a long debate, the vote was taken on this motion on July 2, and resulted in an equal division of the convention, 5 yeas and 5 nays, and Georgia divided.

(5) That to break this deadlock, a committee of eleven, one from each State, was appointed to see if they could not agree on a compromise plan.

On July 5 the committee of eleven reported a plan, which was, in substance, that in the House of Representatives representation be according to population; that money bills originate in the House, which shall not be altered or amended in the Senate: and that in the Senate each State shall have an equal vote. After a long debate and various amendments, which only affected the representation in the House of Representatives, the compromise plan, giving the States an equal vote in the Senate, was, on July 16, adopted by a vote of 5 yeas to 4 nays, Massachusetts being divided.

(6) That the final action on this subject was taken on the 23d of July, when it was decided, by a vote of 9 yeas to 1 nay, that there be two Senators from each State, and that they vote per capita.

Beside the three main plans for representation in the two Houses, which I have called the national, the confederate, and the compromise plans; by the first of which, representation in both Houses was to be according to population; by the second, the States were to have an equal vote in both Houses; by the third, the States were to be represented according to population in the House, and to be equally represented in the Senate; besides these three main plans, a variety of other plans were suggested in the course of debate. They were, as we have seen, the plans of Mr. Baldwin, of Mr. Madison, of Mr. Wilson, of Dr. Franklin, of Mr. C. Pinckney, and of Mr. Sherman, in the committee of eleven.

This plan of a double representation in our National Legislature, of population in one House and of States in the other, has generally been spoken of as a master stroke of statesmanship. We have seen that it was simply the result of a compromise. It originated in a groundless fear that the larger States would combine to oppress the smaller ones. It was in vain that Madison, and Wilson, and Hamilton pointed out that States would be led to act together, not from similarity in size, but from unity in interest, and that there was no such unity of interest in what were then the large States (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) as to lead them to oppress the smaller States. As we read the debates we can not help feeling that a man of such strong sense as Roger Sherman must have felt the force of these arguments. That he did so seems apparent from the fact that toward the close of the debate he defended the equal representation of the States in the Senate on the 001414ground that it was necessary to preserve the rights, not of the small States against the large States, but of all the States against the General Government.

Experience has shown that there never was the slightest danger that the large States would combine to oppress the small ones; and that there was more danger to the National Government from the State governments than to the State governments from the National Government. But while these fears of the early advocates of States rights were groundless, Sherman and his associates were doubtless right in their belief that the majority of the people were in favor of an amendment of the Articles of Confederation rather than of a purely National Government, and that there was danger that they would reject a constitution which did not give to the States an equal representation in at least one House of the National Legislature. And so they insisted on a compromise which gave us not an ideally perfect National Government, but the best perhaps which the people were willing to bear.

Madison and his associates were right in pointing out that the danger to the nation was from the State-rights sentiment rather than from the national sentiment. Accordingly we find that the first mutterings of discontent were in the Kentucky nullification resolutions and in the Hartford Convention. Disloyalty took a more serious form, in Jackson's time, in the nullification proceedings in South Carolina. It culminated, in our own day, in secession and civil war.

The constitution of the Senate as the representation of the States did not produce the good anticipated, as the large States were never hostile to the small States, and the negative of the Senate was never invoked to guard the States against injurious legislature by the House of Representatives. Neither did it produce the evil feared, as the action of the Senate was never antinational. It did, however, produce what the advocates of a strong national government most desired, a small body of picked men, whose intelligence, character, and length of service have made them a fit check on the popular branch of the legislature, and a safe depository of the treaty-making power. We never think of the Senate as the guardian of State rights, but as the noblest embodiment of the legislative wisdom of the nation.

Throughout the debates in the convention, Roger Sherman showed himself in favor of amending the Articles of Confederation rather than of forming a strong national government. He expressed himself to this effect on the first day he took his seat in the convention. Luther Martin said in his report to the Maryland legislature that the members of the convention who prepared the resolutions for amending the Articles of Confederation, presented by Patterson, were principally of the Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland delegations.

Sherman favored the election of both Representatives and Senators by the State legislatures rather than by the people, though he finally acquiesced in the election of Representatives by the people. He thought the President should be elected by the National Legislature and should be absolutely dependent on it and removable by it at pleasure. He thought Representatives and Senators should be paid by the State and not by the National Legislature, but finally proposed that they be paid $5 a day out of the National Treasury, and that any further emoluments be added by the States.

He thought the judges should be removed by the President, on the 001515application of the Senate and the House. He opposed inferior courts as a needless expense, as the State courts would answer the same purpose. Finally, he was willing the legislature should create them, but wished the State courts to be used when it could be done with safety to the general interest. He, however, expressed more confidence in the national judiciary than some did, and believed it a better tribunal for determining controversies between the States than the old method under the Confederation.

He favored the ratification of the Constitution by the State legislatures rather than by conventions of the people. To the clause relating to amendments, he moved to add that "no amendments shall be binding unless consented to by the several States." On the last day of debate he moved a proviso to the article on amendments, "that no State shall, without its consent, be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." The part relating to equal suffrage in the Senate was adopted.

In the plan for choosing a President by electors, it was provided that in case of a failure to choose, the Senate should choose a President out of the five highest candidates. It was thought this would strengthen the aristocratic influence of the Senate too much; so it was proposed that the choice should be by the legislature. Mr. Sherman then suggested that in that case the vote should be by States--"in favor of the small States, as the large States would have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates." Finally he suggested the plan which was adopted, of a vote by the House of Representatives, the members from each State having one vote.

When the proposition for the election of Representatives by the people was first under discussion (May 31) Mr. Sherman opposed election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State legislatures. "The people," he said, "immediately should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled."

When this matter was brought up the second time (June 6) Mr. Sherman said:

If it were in view to abolish the State governments the elections ought to be by the people. If the State governments are to be continued it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony between the National and State governments, that the elections to the former should be made by the latter. The right of participating in the National Government would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State legislatures.

When the clause that the President should be chosen by the National Legislature was under discussion (July 17) Mr. Sherman thought that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the legislature than by the people at large. "The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the legislature, a majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election."

In the speech above referred to, made on June 6, Mr. Sherman took a very limited view of the powers of the General Government. "The objects of the Union," he thought, "were few--first, defense against foreign danger: secondly, against internal disputes and a resort to force; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations; fourthly, regulating foreign 001616commerce and deriving revenue from it. These and perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a confederation of the States necessary. All other matter civil and criminal, would be much better in the hands of the State. The people are more happy in small than in large States. States may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, and thereby be too subject to faction. Some others were perhaps too large the power of government not being able to pervade them." He was for giving the General Government power to legislate and execute within a definite province.

He was opposed to the appointment by the General Government of general officers of the militia. He was opposed to a tax on exports.

In view of the part which slavery has played in our national history, it strikes one as strange at first that it should have played so small a part in the Federal Convention. But at that time slavery was not confined to the Southern States and antislavery sentiments were not confined to the Northern States. Gouverneur Morris made a speech denouncing slavery which would have done credit to Wendell Phillips. But he was ably supported by Mason and Madison. Georgia and South Carolina were the only State that upheld it. Some years before Virginia had abolished the slave trade. It was natural, therefore, that the members of the convention should suppose that in a few years slavery would come to an end in most, if all, the States. Mr. Ellsworth undoubtedly expressed the general belief when he said, "Slavery, in time, will not be a speak in our country."

The view which Mr. Sherman took of the matter was thus expressed by him: He disapproved of the slave trade: yet as the States were now possessed of the right to import slaves as the public good did not require it to be taken from them and as it was expedient to have as few objections as possible to the proposed scheme of government, he thought it best to leave the matter as we find it. He observed that the abolition of slavery seemed to be going on in the United States, and that the good sense of the several States would probably by degrees complete it. He urged on the convention the necessity of dispatching its business.

One of the most surprising things in these debates is the hostility shown by some of the members to new States and the absurd attempt to restrict their representation in the National Legislature. That so clear-headed and farsighted a man as Gouverneur Morris should have committed such a blunder is a most striking illustration of the proverb that "great men are not always wise."

This hostility found its formal expression in the motion made by Mr. Gerry, on 14th of July, "that in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of representatives in the first branch of the States which shall hereafter be established shall never exceed in number the representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this confederation."

Mr. Sherman made the only speech in opposition to this motion. He thought there was no probability that the number of future States would exceed that of the existing States. "If the event should ever happen, it is too remote to be taken into consideration at this time. Besides, we are providing for our posterity, for our children and our grandchildren, who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States as of the old States. On this consideration alone we ought to make no such discrimination as is proposed by the motion."

And yet four States--Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland--voted in favor of Mr. Gerry's motion; Pennsylvania was divided, and only five States voted against the motion.

If we were to judge of the members of the Federal Convention by their mistakes and erroneous opinions, we should not form the highest estimate of their ability. But, judging them as men should always be judged--by their best work--they are deserving of the rare honor which belongs to the founders of empires. It is no detraction from that honor that they builded better than they knew. Judged by this test, Roger Sherman will ever be conspicuous as the statesman to whose wise and conciliatory spirit it was largely due that the Federal Convention was not held in vain. [Senate Mis. Doc. No 1, Fifty-third Congress, third session. In the Senate of the United States. December 3, 1891, laid on table and ordered to be printed.] Mr. Turpie presented the following resolution: "Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate the time has come in the history of the country when one branch of the government, the legislative department, should be placed more directly under the control of the people of the several States; that the choice of the members of the senate branch in the legislature of the States by the direct vote of the people has for a very long time now obtained with the best results, civil and political; that likeness is the basis of agreement and of unity; that political analogy justly followed should conform the method of choosing Senators, as to the element of electors, to that so long prevailing in the States of the Union; that the present methods of choosing United States Senators tends to mar and mutilate the system of popular representative government; that the choice of them by the direct vote of the whole body of electors in a State would be more in consonance with our scheme of government, more conducive to the dignity and sovereignty of the State, and to the influence and authority of this body."

[Senate Doc. No. 26, Fifty-fourth Congress, second session.]

The word "Senate" comes from the Latin word senex. It meant, at first, an assembly of old men. People used to believe that only old men were fit to make laws. This is shown by the titles of the chief lawmaking assemblies of different countries, some of which are still in use. The Latin senatus or patres conscripti (conscript fathers), the Greek gerousia (from geron, old man), the Saxon olderman or elderman, the French seigneur, preserve the traces of this early usage.

In some cases where the name is kept, mature age is no longer required for the office. The Constitution of the United States provides that "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of 30 years and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."

But the State legislatures, in the appointment of Senators, have adhered much more closely to the theory from which the body derives it it name than the Constitution itself requires. The average age of the persons who now compose the Senate is 60 years. It has but eight members who are less than 50 years old and not one less than 45.

The Government established by the Constitution of the United States differs from those of other countries in many things, but especially in five essential particulars:

First. There is a large domain from which government is altogether excluded. Wherever in America the people have created a State or nation, they have said to it, "Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther. There are some things which, under no circumstances, shall any government be permitted to do."

Second. The powers of sovereignty are divided between the nation and the States. The nation exercises those sovereign powers which affect our dealings with other countries, including the powers of war, peace, treaties, and the regulation of foreign commerce; those which affect the dealings of the people of the different States with each other, including the establishment of post-offices, a bankruptcy system, currency, and the government of the Territories, which are the common property of all the people.

To the National Government is committed also the duty of guaranty to each State of a republican form of government, and preventing the State from infringing the new constitutional provisions which secure personal freedom, equality before the law, equality of political power, to all men born or naturalized within the United States.

For all purposes of commerce and foreign intercourse we are a Republic, a unit, speaking with one voice; for all purposes of domestic government we are forty-four republics, various, diverse, each free to seek its own welfare, to make its own laws, to regulate its own institutions in its own way, only by an irresistible central power prohibited from doing wrong and constrained to do right in those things which are essential to republican liberty.

Third. These forces of State and nation are kept by the authority of the Supreme Court from exceeding their appointment bounds, either by invading each other's province or by entering the domain which the Constitution prohibits to the lawmaking power.

The Supreme Court can pronounce null and void statute which violates the Constitution, whether passed by Congress or by a State legislature. The mandates or prohibitions of this august tribunal must be obeyed by every executive officer.

Fourth. In the National Government itself the character of a nation composed of the whole people of the United States and that of a Confederacy of distinct States are inextricably blended.

The Executive is chosen by electoral colleges in which each State, in addition to a number of electors proportioned to its population, is entitled to two, corresponding to the number of its Senators. The manner of choosing electors is determined by the States. If these colleges fail to elect, the choice is made by the House of Representatives by an election in which every State has an equal vote.

One of the two Houses of the National Legislature is chosen by direct vote of the people in districts of equal population. The other is chosen by the State legislatures, each State being entitled to an equal number.

This conception, Dr. Lieber thinks, "is the chief American contribution to the common treasures of political civilization. It is that by which America will influence other parts of the world more than by any other political institution or principle."

Fifth. The fifth essential peculiarity of the Government of the United States, perhaps the most essential of all, is that with which we are now to deal, the constitution of the Senate.

The men who framed the Constitution had studied thoroughly all attempts at republican government. History was strewn with the wrecks of unsuccessful democracies. Sometimes the usurpation of the executive power, sometimes the fickleness and unbridled license of the people, had brought popular governments to destruction. To guard against these two dangers they placed their chief hope in the Senate.

In the first place they made it a perpetual body. The President lays down his office at the end of four years. If any obstacle prevent the election or induction of his successor, the executive power itself is in abeyance. The House of Representatives has but a short life. A new one must be organized every two years, and a large part of its term is often consumed in the process of organization.

But the Senate is indestructible. The Senate Which was organized in 1789 at the inauguration of the Government abides and will continue to abide, one and the same body, until the Republic itself shall overthrown or until time shall be no more.

The individual Senator has a fixed term of six years. One-third of the body go out of office every two years. But the body remains in sufficient numbers to pass upon the title of new claimants to their seats and empowered to perform all its constitutional functions. The term of office of the Senator is six years, longer than that of any other officer under the Constitution, save only the judges, who are appointed to hold office for life.

The Senate also, alone of all the departments of Government, is unchangeable and indestructible by any constitutional process. In any other respect the Constitution may be changed, if both Houses of Congress, by a two-thirds vote, or a convention asked for by two-thirds of the States States, propose them and three-fourth of the States ratify them; but no State, without its consent, can be deprived of its equal vote in the Senate.

While members of the other House are elected by a direct popular vote, and under the established practice the electors of the President and Vice-President are chosen by a direct popular vote to perform a function in which they exercise no discretion, but merely execute the will of the bodies bodies by whom they were nominated, the Senator is appointed, or, as we usually say in referring to the process, elected, by the legislature of the State.

This method of choice, by persons who themselves are chosen men, of weight in the community, and also hold an important public office, discharging in the public view a duty for which they are responsible to the their constituents, secures care, deliberation, and discretion in the selection. It also preserves the equal power of the States in national legislation, since no law can pass which is not a approved both by a majority of the representatives of the people and by a majority of the representatives of the States.

The great advantage of two branches of a legislature is secured not 002020only by having all laws passed upon by two houses, but by having those two houses represent different constituents and interest.

The Senate also differs from the House of Representatives and I believe from all other legislative bodies in this country, in that the "previous question" and every other device for putting an end to debate, except that of unanimous agreement, is unknown to its proceedings.

The "previous question," according to the practice of parliamentary bodies here, is introduced by a motion "that the main question be now put." In the House of representatives it is put without debate. In some assemblies a debate is allowed, which, however, is confined strictly to the question whether or not the vote shall be taken at once. Without permitting any discussion of the merits of the pending measure.

If the "previous question" is ordered, there can be no further debate, and, what is commonly of quite as much importance, there can be no further amendment. The measure must be adopted or rejected as it is; so that members are put in the awkward position of being compelled to vote against a measure containing some things which they approve or for a measure containing some things which they dislike, without a chance to perfect it or to record their opinion on particular parts or clauses. Measures are passed or defeated without giving opportunity to the members of the body either to instruct their associates by discussion or to perfect the measure by suggesting amendments.

There are also in other legislative bodies limitations on the time of debate, either by general rules or by special orders passed by the majority in particular cases. But in the Senate there can be no limit upon debate except by unanimous consent. In this assembly speech is absolutely unfettered. Every measure can be discussed fully without restraint and amended without limit. This is of immense importance, not only to the perfection of legislation, but also to the dignity of the Senate, and in my opinion, to civil liberty itself.

An attempt was made by Mr. Clay, during the presidency of John Tyler to introduce the hour rule and the "previous question" into the Senate. The Democratic minority threatened forcible resistance. Some of Mr. Clay's political friends flinched from his support, and the plan was given up.

It will be readily seen how great conservative force is exerted body so constituted, in which the discussion and amendment are unrestricted, even in the matter of ordinary legislation. But the House of Representatives has voluntarily placed itself at a disadvantage through a provision of the Constitution which was intended to secure for it a special dignity and privilege. In the convention which framed the Constitution there was an earnest controversy between the large States. which insisted that the representation in both Houses of Congress should be according to population, and the smaller States, which urged that the representation of the States should be equal.

It seemed for a good while this difference could not be reconciled and that the convention must break up without accomplishing anything. The difference was reconciled by what is known as the Connecticut compromise, by which the States are to be equally represented in the Senate, but as an equivalent all bills for raising revenue must originate in the popular branch; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills. The House of Representatives 002121claims, and the Senate for a long time has yielded the claim, that this gives the House the exclusive power of originating all the great appropriation bills by which the Government is carried on.

I have not space here to explain what I have fully explained elsewhere, how this provision, coupled with the "previous question" in the House, gives the power of fullest discussion and amendment of these great bills in the Senate, while as they are finally shaped the House commonly passes them not only without discussion and amendment, but even in ignorance of what they contain.

The passage of measures also under suspension of the rules, by which so many important bills are carried through the House without debate or consideration, is unknown to the practice of the Senate.

In England the use of the veto power is now unknown. The chief executive officers of the State represent the majority of the House of Commons, and change when that majority changes. The House of Lords have a concurrent share in legislation, but they do not venture long to maintain an opposition to the public will as represented by the Commons. If they should undertake to do so, the creation of new peers in sympathy with the Commons would soon overcome their resistance. So, notwithstanding their hereditary monarchy and hereditary legislative chamber, when England changes her mind the will of her people finds prompt expression in her laws.

But in the United States the process of change is slow, and is meant to be slow.

To any new law there must go the assent of the President, whose term of office is four years, and of the Senate, where the votes of Delaware, Rhode Island, and Nevada equal those of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Indeed, it may well be expected that instances will happen where the majority of the House will be of one Political opinion for a generation and the majority of the Senate of another. That has been the case during twelve of the last fourteen years.

If any citizens be disposed to be impatient under this restraint upon the will of the majority, let them remember that it was in this way that our fathers laid the foundation of their Government below the frost.

They meant that it should declare the will of the people. But the will so declared was to be mature, deliberate, well-considered--its sober second thought.

They were building for centuries, not for hours. They were prescribing the laws of health and growth for a mighty national life, compared with whose duration years, terms of Presidential office, generations of men, are but as the pulsation of an artery.

The Senate also shares with the President the great power of making treaties. This is expressly declared by the Constitution to be part of the lawmaking power. Treaties duly ratified become the law of the land. They r peal all former laws with which they are inconsistent. They can be repealed themselves by new treaties or by later laws, to which, of course, the consent of the Senate is essential.

Such is our great constitutional barrier against popular error or caprice.

The Senate is a shield equally impenetrable against the usurpation of Executive power. Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the heads of the Department, or in the courts of law. But ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, all officers not inferior, and all other 002222officers whose appointment as above is not vested in the President, heads of departments, or courts, can be appointed only by the advice and consent of the Senate. This includes also, it should be noted, all officers of the Army and Navy.

The Executive can act only through these instruments. It is unlikely that he would ever find many servants in any attempts upon the liberties of the people among public officers whose appointment has received the approval of a majority of a body representing all the States of the Union.

But there is another security. That is the jurisdiction of the Senate as a high court of impeachment. The House of Representatives can place every national officer, including the President, upon his trial before the Senate for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Judgment upon conviction may extend to removal from office and perpetual disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. The pardoning power of the President does not extend to cases of conviction upon impeachment.

We have had, fortunately, during our first century, little occasion to resort to this power. But James Monroe declares that "The right of impeachment and of trial by the legislature is the mainspring of the great machine of government. It is the pivot on which it turns. If preserved in full vigor and exercised with perfect integrity every branch will perform its duty."

Every executive officer who shall seek to usurp power, or who shall in any way commit high crime or misdemeanor in office, may be impeached by the House of Representatives and tried before the Senate, and, on conviction, removed from office and adjudged incapable of holding office forever thereafter. It has been doubted whether an officer can be impeached after he has left office, either by resignation or the expiration of his term. But the Senate has held that he is still subject to impeachment.

Over every public officer, whether he be tempted to abuse or usurp power or to gain wealth by corrupt means in office, hangs during his whole life the dread of what the Federalist calls the "awful discretion" of the Senate to try him in the presence of the whole American people, and to visit him with the perpetual infamy of its sentence.

The limit upon the number of the Senate is an added security for its performing its conservative functions. Experience has shown that however calm and dignified and wise individual men may be, they become easily subject to passion and excitement when assembled in large bodies. James Madison said that "had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."

Mr. Pinckney, according to notice, moved to reconsider the clause respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow fixed for the purpose.

The clause providing for the appointment of the second branch of the national legislature having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the first branch Mr. DICKINSON now moved, "that the members of the second branch ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures."

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion, observing that the particular States would thus become interested in supporting the national government and that a due harmony between the governments would be maintained He admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.

Mr. Pinckney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the number will be too great; there will be eighty, at least.

Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion--first, because the sense of the States would be better collected through their governments 002727than immediately from the people at large; secondly, because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State legislatures than in any other mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would be eighty, and twice eighty, of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body.

Mr. Williamson preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient number. The different modes of representation in the different branches will serve as a mutual check.

Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he gave an opinion.

Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a national government, that government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the legislatures and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different foundations and dissensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people, as well as the other branch. The people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose; and he moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson in order to take up one of that import.

Mr. Morris seconded him.

Mr. Read proposed "that the Senate should be appointed by the executive magistrate, out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen, he hoped, would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing short of this approach toward a proper model of government would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the point at once. His proposition was not seconded nor supported.

Mr. Madison. If the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation, or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number, and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed from Mr. Dickinson, who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body.

On the contrary, it appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their numbers. The example of the Roman tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence and power in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious. They were appointed to take care of the popular interests and pretensions at Rome, because the people, by reason of their numbers, could not act in concert and were liable to fall into factions among themselves and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people, therefore, were multiplied the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents; the more liable they became to be divided among themselves, either from 002828their own indiscretions orthe articles of the opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters, the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political authority lodged in them, the smaller the number the greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended State, but the latter was the material one.

Mr. Gerry. Four modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. First, by the first branch of the National Legislature. This would create a dependence contrary to the end proposed. Secondly, by the National Executive. This is a stride toward monarch that few will think of. Thirdly, by the people. The people have two great interests--the landed interest and the commercial including the stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest, the people being chiefly composed of the landed interest and erroneously supposing that the other interest are adverse to it. Fourthly, by the individual legislatures. The elections being carried through, this refinement will be most like to provide some check in favor of the commercial interest against the landed, without which oppression will take place; and no free government can last long where that is the case. He was therefore in favor of this last.

Mr. Dickinson. (It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States and dreaded by the small ones; namely, that of a proportional representation in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body too numerous, as the smallest State must elect one member at least). The preservation of the State in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether would degrade the councils of our country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed national system to the solar system, in which the States were the planets and ought to be left to more freely in their proper orbits. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson) wished, he said, to extinguish these planets.

If the State governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence would be that the National Government would move in the same direction as the State governments now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the thirteen small streams into one great current, pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large number, and that their influence, from family weight and other causes, would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the tributes lost their weight in proportion as their number was augmented, and gave an historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was good, it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced below ten, the highest number of the tribunitial corps.

Mr. Wilson. The subject, it must be owned, is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Government can not be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and primogeniture, 002929the wholegenius of the people, are the opposed to do it. He did not see the danger of the State being devoured by the National Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the National Government. He was not, however, for extinguishing these planets, as was supposed by Mr. Dickinson: neither did he on the other hand believe that they would warn or enlighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they must still suffered to act, for subordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essential by the great extend of our country. He could not comprehended in what manner the the landed interest would be rendered less predominant in the Senate by an election through the medium of the legislatures than by the people themselves.

If the legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views? He was for an election by the people in large districts, which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence and uprightness, subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters.

Mr. Madison could as little comprehended in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr. Dickinson, would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State legislatures than in some other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice would be made. If an election by the people or through any other channel than the State legislatures promised as uncorrupt and impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment of those legislatures. Nor was it apparent than a more useful check would be derived through that channel than from the people through some other. The great evils complained of were that the State legislatures ran into schemes of paper money, etc., whenever solicited by the people, and sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their influence, then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say that the National Legislature, without a proper check, will follow example of the State legislatures, and in the same breath that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.

Mr. Sherman opposed elections by the people in districts not likely to produce such fit men as elections by the State legislatures.

Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial and moneyed interest would be more secure in the hands of the State legislatures than of the people at large. The former have more sense of character and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the legislatures are against it. In Massachusetts the county conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that would sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two branches in the legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There would, therefore, be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought, to be three powerful objections against elections by districts.

First, It is impracticable; the people can not be brought to one place for the purpose, and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds would be unavoidable.

Secondly. Small States, forming part of the same district with a large one, or a large part of a large one, would have no chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit.

Thirdly. A new source of discord would be opened between different parts of the same district.

Mr. Pinckney thought the second branch ought to be permanent and independent, and that the members of it would be rendered more so by receiving their appointments from the State legislatures. This mode would avoid the rivalships and discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the States in three classes according to their respective sizes, and for allowing to the first class three members; to the second, two, and to the third, one.

On the question for postponing Mr. DICKINSON'S motion, referring the appointment of the Senate to the State legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's for referring it to the people,

Pennsylvania--aye, 1.

Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia--no. 10.

Colonel Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the National Government, a certain portion must necessarily be left with the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the United States so as to carry equal justice to them. The State legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the National Government. In every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defense. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or, rather, to make them a constituent part of, the national establishment? There is danger on both sides, no doubt, but we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State governments. Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Congress does not apply. Congress had no power to carry their acts into execution as the National Government will have.

On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State legislatures,

Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia--aye, 10.

Mr. Randolph then opened the main business. * * *

He proposed, as conformable to his ideas, the following resolutions, which he explained one by one:

5. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of--years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service, and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service and for the space of--after the expiration thereof. * * *

Mr. Charles Pinckney laid before the House a draft of a federal government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and independent States of America:

Art IV. The Senate shall be elected and chosen by the House of Delegates; which House, immediately after their meeting, shall choose by ballot--Senators from among the citizens and residents of New Hampshire;--from among those of Massachusetts;--from among those of Rhode Island;--from among those of Connecticut;--from among those of New York;--from among those of New Jersey;--from among those of Pennsylvania;--from among those of Delaware;--from among those of Maryland;--from among those of Virginia;--from among those of North Carolina;--from among those of South Carolina;--and--from among those of Georgia. The Senators chosen from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut shall form one class; those from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, one class; those from Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, one class. The House of Delegates shall number these classes, 1, 2, and 3; and fix the times of their service by lot. The first class shall serve for--years; the second for--years; and the third for--years.

As their times of service expire the House of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for--years, and they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation for the time of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning. Each Senator shall be--years of age at least, and shall have been a citizen of the United States for four years before his election, and shall be a resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own officers.

Art. X. Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States the House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each State, out of the citizens resident therein, one Senator for every--members each State shall have in the House of Delegates. Each State shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate. * * *

The committee rose, and Mr. Gorham made report, which was postponed till to-morrow to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report was in the words following:

4. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of 30 years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independence, namely, seven years; to received fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch), during the term of service, and under the National Government for the space of one year after its expiration. * * *

On the propositions of Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph:

On motion of Mr. Dickinson, to pospone the first resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following, viz--

That the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the Government of the United States adequate to the exigencies the preservation, and the prosperity of the Union--

The postponement was agreed to by ten States; Pennsylvania divided.

Mr. Hamilton * reads his sketch in the words following, to wit:

III. The Senate to consist of person elected to serve during good behavior; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. In order to do this, the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal, or resignation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of the district from which he came. * * *

The proceedings since Monday last were unanimously referred to the committee of detail; and the convention then unanimously adjourned till Monday, August 6, that the committee of detail might have time to prepare and report the Constitution. The whole resolutions, as referred, are as follows:

4. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of 30 years at least; to hold their offices for six years, one-third to go out biennially; to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any office under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter. * * *

Mr. John Francis Mercer, from Maryland, took his seat.

Mr. Rutledge delivered in the report of the committee of detail, as follows--a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member: Article V.

Sec. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the legislatures of the several States. Each legislature shall choose two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next meeting of the legislature. Each member shall have one vote.