TFR 37 Information relating to the Korean War Period

[TFR 37-1]

INFORMATION relating to the Korean War period

1. A KGB report on the capture of the Commander of the 24th Infantry Division, Major General Dean, on 25 Aug 50.

2. Report from 6 Dec 51 on the shootdown of 569 American planes over North Korean territory.

3. Information on 5 camps for American prisoners of war on the territory of North Korea and the number of prisoners of war confined in them (2257 Americans in all).

4. Information from an interrogation of an American prisoner of war on 26 Jun 52 about the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostock.

5. Data on an American prisoner of war in Korea, Harding Djeck Ehrving, dated 25 Jun 52.

6. Cover letter to the record of the meeting between Stalin and Chou En-lai dated 19 Sep 52.

7. Record of the meeting between Stalin and Chou En-lai on 19 Sep 52.

8. Special report on the arrest of two American intelligence agents by state security agencies of Northeastern China on 3 Dec 52.

9. Report on the capture of 9 aircrew members of an American Strategic Aviation aircraft of the 91st Intelligence Detachment shot down on 12 Jan 53.

10. Stalin's correspondence with Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung on the exchange of prisoners of war.

11. Correspondence and a report of the GRU regarding the operation of the Residency in North Korea (containing instructions from the GSh VS USSR, forbidding use of GRU personnel in work with American prisoners of war).

12. Information on the capture of two American citizens - Captain Ben Uikli Statts and Captain Karlton Volts on 17 May 63 by authorities of the KNDR.

13. Information regarding 71 American prisoners of war confined on North Korean territory (including interrogation material from 49 of the 71).

[TFR 37-2]

[handwritten "No. 1"]

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR

to Comrade I.V. STALIN

to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

to Comrade L.P. BERIA

to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

to Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

TsK VKP(b)

17 Sep 50

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR

No. 7134/0

Regarding the detention on Korean territory of the former Commander of the American 24th Infantry Division, Major General DEAN

I am reporting that, according to a report of the MGB USSR advisor attached to organs of State Security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [white-out, possible name], the former Commander of the American 24th Infantry Division, Major General (Infantry) William Frichi DEAN, was detained on 25 Aug 50.

General DEAN was detained under the following circumstances:

The 24th Infantry Division Headquarters was routed on 21 Jul 50 during a breakthrough in the front line near Tehzhon by forces of the People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In connection with this, the Americans initially reported in the press and by radio that the 24th Infantry Division Commander, General DEAN, was missing in action during this operation, then later reported that he was killed.

Since DEAN's body was not found, an intensive search for it was undertaken by the MVD Border Troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

On 25 Aug 50, while the mountainous area was being thoroughly searched, a disheveled American army soldier came out from the hills, stopped an elderly peasant on the road and demanded at gunpoint that the peasant take him to the front line.

The elderly peasant, realizing that a fugitive American stood before him, took him to a Korean Border Detachment, where DEAN

[TFR 37-3]

was detained.

The identity of the detainee was established as American General DEAN.

During capture, DEAN attempted to use a weapon.

From the moment of capture until 8 Sep 50, DEAN was not interrogated because he was seriously ill.

While being interrogated from 8-10 Sep 50 by organs of the MVD Korea, DEAN testified that he was born in 1899 in Illinois (USA) into the family of a private doctor. He entered the Army in 1922 after completing a degree in literature and has served continuously since then. During his period of service, he has completed three military schools and also the military industrial and the military infantry academies. He served in the US and on the Hawaiian Islands until 1944. In 1944, first as second-in-command and then as an infantry division commander, he participated in allied airborne operations in France, where he remained until the end of the war. In July 1945, he returned with his division to the US. In 1947, he was appointed chief of the American military administration in Korea. From August 1948 to January 1949, he commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Seoul. In January 1949, he was transferred with his division to Japan, and from there arrived in Korea on 2 July and took command of the 24th Infantry Division.

During the interrogations, DEAN at first attempted to resist giving any testimony. But, after he was told that the American Government considers him dead and that he is completely in the hands of the Korean People's Army Command, he began to testify. So far, only insignificant testimony, in particular, the number of personnel and armaments of the 24th Division, which he commanded, was given.

The interrogation of General DEAN continues.

Further results of Dean's interrogation will be reported to you.

Typed 7 copies

- addressees

- Secretary, MGB USSR

- 1st Directorate, MGB USSR

DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY

USSR

(S. OGOL'TSOV)

[TFR 37-4]

[handwritten "No. 2"]

to Comrade A. N. POSKREBYSHEV

At your request, I am reporting that during all the battles for the period from 1 Nov 50 through 6 Dec 51, our air forces and anti-aircraft artillery in Korea shot down 569 enemy aircraft.

Our fighter aviation has shot down 510 aircraft:

B-29 - 40





B-26 -  1





B-45 -  2





F-94 -  8





F-86 - 172





F-84 - 132





F-80 - 101





F-51 - 22





Meteor 4 - 32

Our anti-aircraft artillery has shot down 59 aircraft.

Our losses were 63 MiG-15 and MiG-15bis, and 30 fliers. In anti-aircraft units there were 29 men killed and 53 wounded.

SHTEMENKO

9 Dec 51

2-p

[TFR 37-5]

[handwritten "No. 3"]

[handwritten "Document given by the Chinese side in 1951"]

TABLE

on the number of prisoners of war in North Korean camps

Name of Camp Nationality Number of POWs





           Officers  Sergeants Enlisted  Total





-----------------------------------------------------------------





     American  108   819   811    1738





1. Khekiseki   Negroes     5   236   148     389





     British     -     2     2       4





     Turkish     2    27    86     115





-----------------------------------------------------------------





       American    -     -   369     369





2. Ts'kotsin   British     -     -     7       7





     French      -     -    12      12






-----------------------------------------------------------------





     American    8     -     116     124





3. Sukan   British     5     -   125     130






-----------------------------------------------------------------





     American    -     -     1       1





4. Kinka   Negroes     -     -     1       1






-----------------------------------------------------------------





     American   13     6     6      25





5. Pyongyang   Negroes     -     -     5       5





     British     -     1     4       5






-----------------------------------------------------------------





     American  119   825     1303     2257





  Total    Negroes     5   236     154       395





     British     5     3     138       146





     Turkish     2    27      86       115





       French      -     -      12        12





OVERALL TOTAL      141      1091      1693          2925

[TFR 37-6]

[handwritten "No. 4"]

from MAKAROV's enciphered telegram addressed to KRYMOV

dated 25 Jun 52 No. 20850/1844

MAKAROV reports that he received from our Chinese friends the following information:

The American prisoner of war [handwritten in English "Harding Djeck Erving"] was interrogated by our Chinese comrades. He testified that, in 1950, he served in the intelligence section of the Headquarters of the Commander-In-Chief of the American Army in the Far East. As an intelligence officer, he knew of the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostok. The group consisted of four persons: two Americans and two Russians. The prisoner remembers that one Russian had the last name PROVOZNIK: 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches tall, thin, and had blond hair. This agent often traveled to Vladivostok and had direct contact with the Commander-In-Chief's intelligence section. The others operated from Manchurian territory.

In the opinion of our Chinese comrades, they cannot fully believe [handwritten in English "Harding"], although they have obtained much additional information from him.

MAKAROV reports that this information was not received in a special meeting, but rather in a general conversation about the work with prisoners of war.

True Copy: [signature] B. ZANEGIN

"26" Jun 52

see reverse

[There is nothing on the reverse of this copy.]

[TFR 37-7]

[handwritten "No. 5"]

[handwritten "Comrade Zanegin, acquaint the workers[?] [cut-off] of Comrade Konovalov's[?] department [cut-off] 14 Jul 52 [illeg. signature]"]

[handwritten in left-hand margin "Konovalov? 15 Feb 52"]

INFORMATION ON AN AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR IN KOREA

First Lieutenant, USAF, GARDING, Dzhek Ehrving [handwritten in English "HARDING, Djeck Erving"], 34 years old, white American, member of the American Legion. He has 12 years of schooling. His father is a locomotive engineer, presently not working, retired. His mother is 58 years old and divorced from his father. His father is remarried and his step-mother is 52 years old. He has several sisters.

In 1937, he raped a girl, who became pregnant. He joined the service in order to avoid culpability. Fearing discipline, he resigned a short time later. He lived some time with his parents. Then, he again committed a crime: an automobile accident in which he was at fault. The result of the accident was that a woman who was riding with him became maimed (she lost an arm). Fearing culpability, he again joined the service and served until 1945, primarily in aerial reconnaissance. He participated in the war against Germany as a flier in a reconnaissance aircraft under the 4th Tank Division. He ended the war in Czechoslovakia

[TFR 37-8]

- 2 -

as a First Lieutenant.

In 1945, he was discharged and worked at various jobs - flight instructor and secretary to the Chairman of the Lejkdaun [Lakedown?] Chapter of the American Legion.

In 1946-47, he again began service in military aviation. Then, under the protection of his uncle, a member of the American Congress and well-known police commissar[sic], he entered the CID intelligence school, followed by the intelligence school of a Washington military academy, where he studied for several months. In 1948-49, he was sent to Japan, where he served in special security detachments (apparently military counter-intelligence), then as chief of the secret clerical information-administration group of the intelligence section of the Commander in Chief, American forces in the Far East.

In 1950, he was again transferred to reconnaissance aviation and sent to Korea, where his aircraft was shot down in Apr 52, and he was taken prisoner.

Our Chinese comrades consider him very cunning and treacherous, however he has weaknesses: he is a coward, he likes to drink wine and when drunk he may disclose everything. Using these weaknesses, our Chinese comrades obtained significant material from him: mainly on organization, personnel, operations of headquarters of the Commander in Chief

[TFR 37-9]

- 3 -

of American forces in the Far East, and especially on the intelligence section headquarters. In addition, he gave some factual material on American intelligence in Korea, Hong Kong, Burma, Indonesia, and other countries.

He also told about how American intelligence is interested in our Far East. According to him, a secret service intelligence group (in Chinese - intelligence station) was created in Vladivostok to conduct reconnaissance against the USSR. The group consists of four people directly subordinate to the headquarters intelligence section. The group has agent informers. Two of the four are American, the other two are White Guardsmen. One of the group is often in Vladivostok and maintains communications with the headquarters intelligence section, the other three operate from Manchurian territory. The prisoner personally saw one of the four, and knows that his name is PROVOZNIK - 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches, blue eyes, light hair. This person at one time worked in the headquarters intelligence section.

Our Chinese comrades have not yet decided how to use this prisoner. They are not sure that the information which he gave them is factual. On our advice, they have taken all possible measures to cross-check the information he gave them. If his information is confirmed as accurate, they believe that he will submit to recruitment out of fear of being exposed.

[signature] (MAKAROV)

"25" June 1952

[TFR 37-10]

[handwritten "No. 6"]

Top Secret

Copy No.

Comrade A.N. POSKREBYSHEV

I am sending two copies of the minutes of the

meeting between Comrade Stalin and Chou En-lai of 19

Sep 52.

[signature]

"30" Sep 52

[handwritten "1061-VK"]

[TFR 37-11]

[handwritten "No. 7"]

MINUTES OF THE MEETING

BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN with CHOU EN-LAI

19 Sep 52

Attending: Comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Beria

Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskij

Li Fu-Chun', Chzhan Behn'-Tyan',

Su Yuj, Shi Chzheh.

STALIN, beginning the meeting with the Mexican proposal on the exchange of prisoners of war, says that we agree with Mao Tse-tung that the Mexican proposal is unacceptable because it reflects the US position in the Korean negotiations. If the Mexicans bring up their proposal in the UN, then the Soviet delegation will veto the proposal, as it is not in accordance with the interests of ending the war in Korea. The Soviet delegation will then add the following:

"1. Immediate cessation of hostilities in the air, on the land, and on the sea.

2. Return of all prisoners of war to their homelands in accordance with international standards.

3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, to include the Chinese volunteer units, over the course of 2-3 months; and peaceful settlement of the Korean matter in the spirit of Korean unification conducted by the Koreans under the observation of a commission consisting of directly interested parties and other governments, to include governments not participating in the Korean War."

He adds that which and how many governments should participate in this commission can be discussed and decided as well.

Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not

[TFR 37-12]

touch this proposal and it remains in reserve for Mao Tse-tung.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what we think about the possibility of the Chinese Government concluding a nonaggression pact with India and Burma. Mao Tse-tung believes that concluding such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN replies that we adhere to the opinion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It goes without saying that there cannot and will not be any obstacles.

CHOU EN-LAI asks if it is possible to delay proposal of the second position, to wait 2-3 weeks.

STALIN answers that this is a matter for Mao Tse-tung. If Mao Tse-tung desires, then at the Assembly we can introduce a discussion of the second position on the percentage to be withheld.

CHOU EN-LAI raises a question regarding the third position, about the possibility of handing over prisoners of war to neutral countries in order that their fates be decided independently. He says that this is being discussed in international circles. He asks if Comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.

STALIN replies that we want a return of all prisoners of war. This corresponds with the Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be reached on the basis of this, then prisoners of war cannot be handed over to the UN because the UN is a combatant.

[TFR 37-13]

3.

He asks to which country the prisoners of war should be sent, based on the opinion of our Chinese comrades.

CHOU EN-LAI answers, Mao Tse-tung instructed me to say here that he has in mind India.

STALIN asks at whose expense will the prisoners of war be maintained. Apparently, at the expense of each of the appropriate parties?

CHOU EN-LAI answers that it is understood that if prisoners of war are to be handed over to India, then after some time they will be transferred through India to China. Then the Chinese and Korean sides will pay for the maintenance of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war.

STALIN says that the proposal could be accepted, but one must keep in mind that the Americans do not want to hand over all the prisoners of war. The Americans will keep some of them, intending to recruit them. It was like this with our prisoners of war: every day now we catch several [former] prisoners of war whom the Americans send to our country. They detain prisoners of war not because, as the Americans often claim, the prisoners say that they do not want to return, but in order to use the prisoners for espionage.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that this is exactly how it is.

He raises a question about the next point: to cease fire, and then discuss the issue of prisoners of war altogether later. He reminds us that Comrade Stalin has agreed to such a position if no proposal can be reached regarding the percentage of prisoners to be withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this proposal can be interpreted as one of several possible positions, however the Americans are not likely to agree.

[TFR 37-14]

4.

CHOU EN-LAI says that the Americans may propose this at the Assembly.

STALIN: That would be fine.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in the previous meeting, Comrade Stalin mentioned that China should take the initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks if there will be any further guidance on this matter.

STALIN answers that he has not changed his point of view. He adds that in addition to the existing UN, there should be an Asian UN, a European UN and so forth. This is not to replace the UN, but to operate parallel to the UN. Let the Americans create an American organization, the Europeans - a European, the Asians - an Asian; but parallel with the UN and not against it.

CHOU EN-LAI says that China has no personal interest in the UN. To the Chinese it is clear: the initiative in creating a continental organization must be taken.

STALIN emphasizes that the UN is an American organization, and that it must be destroyed, but under the guise of respect for the UN. We do not say that it must be undermined, that this organization must be weakened; but in reality we weaken the organization.

He reminds us that during the war Churchill proposed the creation of a continental UN, but he met resistance from the Americans. We kept silent while listening to this argument, but then the British abandoned their position; and we supported the proposal for the creation of the UN.

[TFR 37-15]

5.

CHOU EN-LAI asks if there will be a letter from Comrade Stalin to Mao Tse-tung on this issue.

STALIN explains that it is better to manage without a letter; that he sees that Chou En-lai is taking notes and that he trusts him fully.

CHOU EN-LAI touches on the Peace Congress in Peking, set to begin at the end of September, saying that the Congress must be moved to the beginning of October. He adds that China is fighting for Japanese and Indian participation at the Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will be there.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that Pakistan should also take part and that the Pakistanis have been invited; however, the Pakistani government is not issuing passports. As regards India, some members of the Indian delegation have already departed for the Congress. The Japanese are arriving via Hong Kong.

STALIN further says that a policy in which the main role belongs to the KNR must now be pursued, because:

1) initiative in convoking the Congress belongs to China;

2) it would be better, since the USSR is only partially in Asia, but China is entirely in Asia, that China have the main role.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what concrete measures will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers, "peace."

CHOU EN-LAI talks about Nehru's proposal on convoking a conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and the US.

MOLOTOV explains that it was the proposal of the Party Committee of the National Congress.

[TFR 37-16]

STALIN says that this proposal must be supported.

CHOU EN-LAI emphasizes that at such a conference, India without a doubt will be on England's side; however, it appears that it would be expedient to use this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in light of the note published on the Port Arthur position, which the KNR must take in relation to Japan, it is completely clear. The KNR must show that Japan does not want to conclude a peace treaty with China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds, "and is preparing for aggression." He emphasizes that our position is not directed against the Japanese people.

CHOU EN-LAI raises the question on Formosa. He says that since the Japanese government has concluded an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, it has thus confirmed that it ignores the interests of the Chinese people. This prohibits the possibility of concluding a peace treaty. As long as a treaty exists with Formosa, a peace treaty between Japan and the KNR is not possible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note on Port Arthur is directed against America, and not against the Japanese people. America maintains a fleet in Taiwan and exploits Taiwan. He supports the correctness of Chou En-lai's point of view on the impossibility of a peace treaty between the KNR and Japan, as long as Japan keeps a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. He indicates that the fact that the treaty was signed between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek only worsens Japan's position.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what will be the further development of events on the matter of Germany.

[TFR 36-17]

7.

STALIN says that it is difficult to predict. Evidently, the Americans will not agree to a unification of Germany. They were plundering Germany; if the West and East Germans unify, then it will not be possible to plunder Germany. Therefore the Americans do not want a unified Germany.

CHOU EN-LAI expresses the opinion that although the Americans are rebuilding the armed forces of West Germany and Japan, in hopes of using them, the weapons may be turned against them.

STALIN says that this is absolutely possible, even if Germany will be headed by nationalists and Hitlerists.

CHOU EN-LAI turns to the situation in Sin'tszyan [Sinkiang?]. He says that the work in Sin'tszyan is going well overall and that agricultural reforms are being realized in Sin'tszyan. Leftist excesses, however, are taking place in the illegal confiscation of livestock, in the area of religion, and in the area of lowering interest on loans and land rents. In an effort to do away with these excesses, a TsK plenum was convened. At the plenum, Van Chzhen was removed from the duties of secretary of the Sin'tszyan Podburo[sic] of the TsK KPK, and a number of TsK members were sent to liquidate excesses on the spot. In general, the dissatisfaction, which had a place here, has been liquidated; the instances of defection, to include those to the USSR, have been put to an end.

STALIN says that the excesses are a result of attempts to quickly obtain land and livestock which had been confiscated from the wealthy.

CHOU EN-LAI remarks that, as soon as the rumour of reform spread, hostile elements immediately began to slaughter livestock.

[TFR 37-18]

STALIN remarks that similar incidents even took place in the corresponding period of our experience. Reform must be speeded up. If agrarian reform is not carried out, then such looting will continue into the future.

CHOU EN-LAI clarifies that agrarian reform is being carried out in agricultural regions; however, distribution and its accompanying excesses are done in other, livestock-rearing regions. Since shepherds participate in the distribution, the Chinese leadership has adopted the decision to improve the shepherds' condition, which should improve the general condition.

STALIN says that you [the Chinese], of course, know best.

CHOU EN-LAI says that according to Lyu Shao-tsi's report, two Indonesian Communist Party representatives should come to the XIX Congress. He asks whether it will be timely to discuss party matters with them in Moscow.

STALIN says that for now, it is difficult to say. It depends on whether they turn to the TsK for advice. He points out that when the Indian Communist Party representatives came, they asked us to help them in the matter of determining a Party program; this had to be done, despite our heavy workload.

CHOU EN-LAI reports that our Japanese comrades should also come, and more than likely will also want to discuss party affairs.

STALIN answers that big brothers cannot refuse their little brothers in such a case. He says that this will need to be talked over with Lyu Shao-tsi because he has much experience, and we will need to clarify how our Chinese friends feel about this.

CHOU EN-LAI points out that Lyu Shao-tsi intends

[TFR 37-19]

[handwritten "99"]

9.

to take appropriate materials with him in order to discuss a number of matters.

STALIN remarks that if our Chinese comrades want to discuss these matters, then of course there will be no objections from our side; and if they do not want to, then there will be no need to talk.

CHOU EN-LAI says that the Chinese comrades, without a doubt, will want to talk.

STALIN answers that in that case, time will be found.

CHOU EN-LAI says that it cannot be excluded that our Vietnamese friends will also come.

STALIN remarks the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our guests.

CHOU EN-LAI, concluding the meeting, says that these are all the matters on which they would like instruction.

STALIN asks, "instruction or advice?"

CHOU EN-LAI answers that from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, this is perhaps advice, but in its presentation it is instruction.

STALIN remarks to this that we only give advice, we lay out our opinion. Our Chinese comrades can take it or not. Instruction carries with it an obligatory character.

CHOU EN-LAI repeats that from the Chinese point of view, it is instruction, and most valuable instruction at that. He remarks that they do not blindly accept these instructions, but consider it necessary to understand and consciously accept these instructions.

STALIN emphasizes that we know little about the Chinese and therefore are careful about giving instructions.

[TFR 37-20]

CHOU EN-LAI says that they are basing this on the fact that without a doubt, Comrade Stalin is quite familiar with precisely those matters which we are addressing. He again asks whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: one must remember that the British and Americans will be trying to supply the Chinese government apparatus with their own people, their own agents. It is all the same whether they are Americans or French. They will carry out subversive work, attempt to corrupt from within, and may even resort to criminal action, such as poisonings. Therefore, caution is required. He says that this must be kept in mind. These are the only instructions.

CHOU EN-LAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only may the Americans, British and French resort to vile deeds, but they may also incite the Chinese to such deeds.

STALIN adds, "and their own agents from the national bourgeoisie."

MOLOTOV returns to the matter of military credit, concerning payment of the cost of arming 60 Chinese divisions. He asks whether he correctly understood Chou En-lai the last time in that the cost of the delivery for 60 divisions does not apply to the military credit given by the Soviet Government to China under the agreement of 1 Feb 51. The delivery of arms for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full by credit being given under special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

CHOU EN-LAI answers that Comrade Molotov correctly understood him, and once again acknowledges that the calculations

[TFR 37-21]

[handwritten "101"]

11.

relating to arming the 60 Chinese divisions should be carried out with a complete payment, and not with a half payment, as it was not established for China.

STALIN says that in that situation it is necessary to sign a special agreement.

Further, he touches on the gifts from the Chinese Government to representatives of the Soviet Union, and points out that there are very many gifts.

CHOU EN-LAI explains that they were unable to present gifts to Comrade Stalin in time for his 70th birthday. They were in the gift museum, saw the gifts sent from other countries, and decided that they had to make up for what they could not do on time.

STALIN says that we would also like to present the Chinese Government delegation with automobiles of Soviet make. He says that we have "ZIM" automobiles, which are smaller than the "ZIS", but are very attractive, and we would like to present these "ZIMs".

Then the matter of relations with Sun Tsin-lin was touched upon.

CHOU EN-LAI says that she is working on becoming more in touch with herself; that she gradually is switching from bourgeois ideology to their camp; [that she] makes good speeches based on our ideology. He says that Sun Tsin-lin is proud that she is a Laureate of the International Stalin Peace Prize.

The Meeting began at 1030 and ended at 1230.

Recorded by: [signature] (A. Vyshinskij)

[signature] (N. Fedorenko)

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Presidenta RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, l. 90-101"]

[TFR 37-22]

[handwritten "No. 8"]

December 1952 [handwritten "Copy<"]

3/[handwritten "5/36712"] [handwritten "Top Secret"]

[in a typeface different from the rest of text

"SPECIAL ADVISORY"]

on the detention of two American intelligence officers

by state security organs

of Northeast China.

On 5 Dec of this year, LI-NAN', Head of the Directorate for State Security, Chinese People's Republic, Port Arthur Region, informed the Department Head of the Counterintelligence Department, MGB, 39th[?] Army that on 3 Dec of this year in the province of Girin, as a result of a game [literal translation of original "igra" - in this case connoting ploy or subterfuge] conducted by the Department of State Security, Northeast China (city of Mukden), an American aircraft was allowed to land.

Among the aircraft crew members were two intelligence officers, Lieutenant Colonels of the American Army, who arrived to brief agent-saboteurs that were earlier airdropped into Northeast China.

The above-mentioned American intelligence officers are in Mukden.

DEPARTMENT HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE

OF THE MGB, USSR

Printed 5 copies:

1st - [handwritten "Comrade Goglidze"]

2nd -

3rd -

4th -

5th -

[handwritten "to Goglidze and Comrade Ogol'tsov"]

[There appears to be some missing handwritten instructions below this heading]

[TFR 37-23]

[handwritten "No. 9"]

[handwritten "Copy"]

[handwritten "Top Secret"]

to: Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

Comrade L.P. BERIA

Comrade H.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting that, according to the report from the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crewmembers of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An'dun on 12 Jan 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT, and the staff officer of operational reconnaissance service, 91st Detachment, Major BAUL (last names were given in Chinese transcription), were also on the aircraft. On the instructions of the TsK Communist Party of China, they will be sent to Peking and subjected to interrogation.

The Minister of Public Security of China, having reported on 27 Jan 53 to our advisor on this decision of the TsK KPK, requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and check their work.

The MGB USSR advisor was ordered by us to render such help.

S. IGNAT'EV

"29" Jan 53

No. 333/I

[TFR 37-24]

[handwritten "No. 10"]

[handwritten "28"]

[handwritten initials "DS"]

Top Secret

(Special Folder)

[handwritten "60"]

Subject to return within 24 hours to the

Special Sector, Directorate of Affairs

of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR DECREE

dated "19" Mar 53 No. 858-372ss

Moscow, The Kremlin

The MID Issue.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR DECREES:

1. Approve the attached draft of the letter from the Government of the USSR addressed to Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

Transmit this letter to Comrade Mao Tse-tung through Comrade Chou En-Lai and Comrade V.V. Kuznetsov, and to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will be sent immediately to P'yongyang.

2. Approve the Soviet delegation directive at the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

[Circular seal for "DIRECTORATE OF AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR - PROTOCOL SECTION"]

Chairman

Council of Ministers, USSR

G. Malenkov

Director of Affairs

Council of Ministers, USSR

M. Pomaznev

[along left edge of page "Note: It is categorically forbidden to make copies or extracts of this Decree. The comrade to whom the document is addressed is to personally sign and date each document."]

Copy No. 2

[TFR 37-25]

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly examined the Korean War issue in the context of the present situation while taking into account the entire course of events of the previous period. As a result, the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that it would be wrong to continue the policy which has been pursued until recently without incorporating into that policy those changes which apply to the current political situation and proceed from the deep interests of our peoples - the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in securing peace for the entire world and have always searched for acceptable means to the quickest possible end to the war in Korea.

There is no need to dwell at great length on what the aggressor has committed during the war in Korea. In the eyes of honorable people from all over the world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American block in Korea - especially the aggressive US forces - more and more expose this block as an international factor which carries out the politics of preparing a new war and is ready to move to the politics of spreading war for the sake of dictating to the people its aggressive imperialistic will that expresses a striving for world domination and for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic goals.

The Soviet Government believes that we must henceforth deal with all these important circumstances of international order, just as we have dealt with them up to now. This does not mean, however, that under the conditions of the current

[TFR 37-26]

[Second page is missing]

- 3 -

4. We also believe it expedient that the speech of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, which accordingly fully supports the Peking and P'yongyang speeches, should take place in Moscow immediately after the speeches stipulated above in Peking and in P'yongyang.

5. In accordance with the four measures listed above, the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York must do everything necessary to appropriately support and advance this new political aim which has been stated above.

We consider it necessary to give the following clarification of the above statement:

First. On the response to General Clark. We feel that in Kim Il Sung's and Pyn De-khueh's letter in answer to General Clark, it is necessary to express complete approval with Clark's proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with added instructions that a favorable resolution of this matter in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be kept in mind.

Point out in the reponse to Clark that the issue of exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war is of very important significance for the successful resolution of the overall prisoner of war issue, and hence, for the successful resolution of the issue regarding ceasing the war and concluding a truce. With this in mind, suggest renewing the negotiations between the chief representatives of both parties on the armistice talks in Panmunjom.

Propose that liaison officers from both parties establish the date of these negotiations.

[TFR 37-27]

- 4 -

During these negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention which stipulates that "not one sick or wounded prisoner of war will be repatriated against his will during a time of military action," obtain a guarantee from the American Command Staff that, as regards the stated prisoners of war, under no circumstances will coercion be employed with the aim of hindering their return to their homelands.

Also propose establishing a commission of representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners of war to their homelands.

In the negotiations on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from the fact that the task is not only to achieve a positive resolution of the matter mentioned above, but also to achieve a positive resolution of the entire prisoner of war issue, and hence, to remove obstacles to achieving an agreement on ceasing military action and concluding an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be used for this, and especially the second paragraph of the Article stipulating for the conclusion of an "agreement on the repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent long periods in captivity."

During the negotiations, propose that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately

[TFR 37-28]

[handwritten "65"]

- 5 -

repatriated, while the remainder are to be transferred to a neutral country in order to secure an equitable resolution of the matter of their repatriation.

As regards these prisoners of war, strive to achieve a classification by nationality and by place of residence, as was proposed in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Pyn De-khueh of 16 Oct 52 to General Clark (this also corresponds to the Indian draft on Korea).

After classificat receive ttwe facilitated by the assistance of all interested parties.

Second. On the statement in Peking. In this statement, it would be expedient to say that the KNR Government discussed the issue posed by General Clark with the KNDR Government. Both the KNR Government and the KNDR Government came to the same conclusion on the necessity to give their representatives in Panmunjom instructions to enter into negotiations with General Clark on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, while bearing in mind the attainment of a positive resolution on the prisoner of war issue as a whole. Point out in the statement that during the negotiations between both sides in Kason and Panmunjom, both parties reached an agreement on all matters except on the matter of prisoners of war.

Thus, an agreement was reached that the commanders of the armed forces of both parties "will issue an order on the

[TFR 37-29]

- 6 -

complete cessation of all types of military action in Korea by all armed forces under their commands, to include all units and personnel of ground, air and naval forces. [The order] will enter into force twelve (12) hours after the signing of the armistice agreement. The fulfillment of the aforesaid order is to be ensured".

The following important conditions of the armistice were also agreed upon:

1) On the establishment of a military demarcation line which is to run along the line of contact of forces fighting on the day the armistice enters into force, that is the front line, and from which "forces of both parties will withdraw 2 kilometers in order to form a demilitarized zone..." (paragraph one of the draft agreeement on the armistice).

2) On the establishment of a military armistice committee made up of 10 senior officers, five of which will be appointed by the commander-in-chief of UN forces, and five will be appointed by the command staff of the Korean People's Army and the command staff of the Chinese volunteers (paragraph 19). The commission is to oversee that the armistice agreement is observed, to include overseeing the committee's work on prisoner of war repatriation and to regulate, by means of negotiation, possible armistice agreement violations (paragraphs 24 and 25).

3) On creating a commission of neutral countries to oversee the armistice. [The commission] is to consist of representatives of Sweden and Switzerland, appointed by the commander-in-chief of UN forces

[TFR 37-30]

[seventh page is missing]

- 8 -

... The KNR Government (KNDR Government), for its part, is prepared to take measures to eliminate disagreements on this matter, which presently are the only obstacles to concluding the cease fire and armistice agreement. To this end, the KNR Government proposes that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately repatriated, and the remaining prisoners of war be sent to a neutral country in order to ensure a fair resolution on the matter on their repatriation.

It is also necesary to talk about the following in the Peking statement:

Our new step, directed towards ending the war in Korea, must also serve towards the positive resolution of a number of important and pressing international matters and, above all else, towards the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statment in P'yongyang. We believe that Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate in this statement that the above mentioned statement of the KNR representative was mutually worked out by the KNR and KNDR governments and is in complete agreement with the evaluation of the political situation and the specific conclusions and proposals contained in the Peking statement. Moreover, emphasize not only the full support but also the fairness of the statement by the KNR representative.

Fourth. On the statement in Moscow. We believe it expedient that the statement of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow should follow immediately after these speeches in Peking and P'yongyang. We see the purport of the Moscow statement as being to stress before the whole world the complete

[TFR 37-31]

- 9 -

solidarity and coordination of actions between the USSR, KNR and KNDR on the Korean War issue.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York. It is incumbent on the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to act in conformity with the entire political plan stated above as regards the war in Korea. In this connection, it is imperative that, as soon as discussion arises at the General Assembly on the Polish draft of the resolution "on averting the threat of a new world war," the Soviet delegation provide the inclusion of corresponding changes to the draft in the part that concerns Korea. The speeches from the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia are also necessary.

Sixth. Additional remarks. It goes without saying that we are unable to foresee at this time all the steps and measures which must be taken by representatives of the USSR, KNR and KNDR. However, if full coordination is achieved between our representatives in pursuing a general policy on the given matter, and we fully hope for this, then everything else can be agreed upon as this affair progresses.

5-p

[TFR 37-32]

Attachment No. 2

DIRECTIVES FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Instruct the USSR delegation (Comrade Vyshinskij) to speak in strong support of the recent KNR and KNDR proposals and statements at the forthcoming discussion of the Polish delegation's proposals, especially those concerning the Korean issue, at the General Assembly.

After expounding the Soviet Union's position on the exchange of prisoners of war as being a position which fully conforms to universally recognized principles of human rights and to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention that require the repatriation of all prisoners of war, the USSR representative should point out the following: the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed recommending to the warring parties in Korea to immediately and completely cease hostilities on the ground, on the sea, and in the air.

At the Soviet Union's initiative, in June of 1951 in Kaesong, negotiations were started between the warring parties regarding the cease fire and an armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to an agreement by the parties on all issues, except on the issue regarding repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to believe that the position taken by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is fair and fully meets the principles of international rights and international practices, and also meets the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union completely supports this position.

[TFR 37-33]

- 2 -

The only unresolved issue in the negotiations between the warring parties in Korea is the exchange of prisoners of war. The KNR and KNDR Governments have stated their willingness to take measures towards settling this matter in order to remove the last obstacle to the cessation of war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in this matter. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal to resume negotiations in Korea aimed at achieving an agreement on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and also on settling the entire prisoner of war issue and, consequently, on ceasing the war in Korea and concluding an armistice.

Instruct the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to come to an agreement with the Polish delegation on including the following changes to the draft of the Polish resolution on averting the threat of a new world war in the section concerning the Korean issue: In place of the old text paragraph "b)" (on the return of all prisoners of war to their homeland) include the following text: "b) the immediate resumption of armistice negotiations with the concurrent intent that the parties will exert maximum effort to achieve an agreement both on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and on the entire prisoner of war issue; thus, they will exert efforts to remove the obstacles hindering the cessation of the war in Korea.

5-p

[TFR 37-34]

[handwritten cut-off no.]

Workers of the world, unite!

TOP SECRET

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P14/I

9 Jul 53

Extract from Protocol No.14 Presidium TsK Session on 4 Jul 53

On the draft of Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khuaj's response to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

Instruct Comrades Malenkov and Molotov to answer our Chinese comrades on the Soviet Union's agreement with their evaluation and their projected measures for the armistice negotiations in Korea in regard to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

SECRETARY of the TsK

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS within 7 days"]

4-p [handwritten "Response - look at the file for outgoing cipher from Molotov to Peking No. 13464 dated 4 Jul 53]

[TFR 37-35]

       Cipher Telegram     Top Secret





                   DO NOT COPY

Copy No. 1-t Lay out    No. 10-t Pervukhin    No. 19-t File





  "  No. 2-t Malenkov    No. 11-t Vyshinskij   No. 20-t





  "  No. 3-t Molotov   No. 12-t Gromyko    No. 21-t





  "  No. 4-t Voroshilov  No. 13-t Zorin      No. 22-t





  "  No. 5-t Krushchev No. 14-t Pushkin    No. 23-t





  "  No. 6-t Bulganin  No. 15-t Podtserob    No. 24-t





  "  No. 7-t Kaganovich  No. 16-t Grigor'yan   No. 25-t





  "  No. 8-t Mikoyan   No. 17-t Copy     No. 26-t





  "  No. 9-t Saburov   No. 18-t 10th Department  No. 27-t

from PEKING   No. 17286   23 hrs 40 min   3 Jul 53   copy No. 21

 
      17281 17289 17306





     17287 17307 17309





     17315 17308 17313

Special Nos. 1211-1220

EXTRAORDINARY

On 3 Jul at 0330 hrs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs U Syu-shchoan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, arrived at the Embassy and delivered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khua's draft response to Clark's letter of 29 Jun (it is proposed to send the response to Clark on 5 Jul).

Syu-schoan' also delivered a note which expounds the KNR Government's evaluation of the current status of armistice negotiations and states the measures planned in regard to Clark's letter.

The full text of these documents is produced below.

"The present status of the armistice negotiations and the measures in regard to Clark's letter.

Status of negotiations. During the last 12 days, while Syngman Rhee has freed prisoners of war and has been spreading

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the 10th Department of the MID USSR within 18 hours from receipt"]

[TFR 37-36]

17286 - 2 - copy No. 2

a campaign against the armistice, the US, after having reached a deadlock in the Korean war, is on the whole exhorting Syngman Rhee to lessen his campaign against the armistice and to come to a compromise.

In order to placate Syngman Rhee, the Americans are attempting to conclude a temporary agreement with him. This would afford the opportunity to sign an armistice agreement and would permit the US a way out of this current difficult situation. However, Syngman Rhee is seriously endeavoring to involve the Americans in his plans. He cannot content himself with the signing of a temporary agreement. He continues to put forth demands that the political conference be limited to three months, after the expiry of which hostilities would resume. He also demands the right to veto at the conference. These demands run contrary to US resolve to cease the war. Moreover, the two-day negotiations between the US and Syngman Rhee on this matter have reached an impasse. The Americans are now leaning towards putting pressure on Syngman Rhee.

Given the situation stated above, Clark suddenly on 29 Jun answered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khua's letter. The aim of his letter was as follows: First, to show Syngman Rhee that concessions have limits and that the US cannot concede any further; and to attempt to sign the armistice agreement without paying attention to Syngman Rhee's opposition. Second, to show us which limitations

[TFR 37-37]

[handwritten "138"]

17286 - 3 - copy No. 2

he (Clark) has in his guarantees; to strengthen his position, he hopes, in negotiations with Syngman Rhee by signing the armistice agreement (after the armistice it will be easier to limit arms shipments to Syngman Rhee); and to drop the issue of 27,000 prisoners of war. Third, to show the entire world that the US wants to end the war.

It can be presumed that Syngman Rhee, fully understanding the US's weak points, will not compromise. However, the US plays the leading role in the Korean War and, for the sake of their own personal interests, they may increase pressure on Syngman Rhee at a critical moment. Therefore, despite the great disagreements between the US and Syngman Rhee over the armistice, it is still possible to speak about the potential of achieving an armistice in Korea and, in light of this, it can be contended that Syngman Rhee will continue minor provocations after the realization of an armistice.

Counter-measures.

Proceeding from the situation given above, and also taking into account the vacillation in US politics brought about by the complicated internal and external differences in relations with South Korea, we intend to adhere to the following line:

Maintain the initiative in achieving an armistice; secure a united position with the US as regards the armistice in order to isolate Syngman Rhee and deliver a blow to him, and also to force the US to exert pressure on Syngman Rhee;

[TFR 37-38]

17286 - 4 - copy No. 2

deepen the external and internal differences of the Americans. In accordance with this line, it is presupposed that the following steps be taken:

1. Prepare and send an answer to Clark from Kim Il Sung and Pyn Deh-khua on 5 Jul. In the reply, agree to resuming negotiations, subject the American side to criticism and also point out the possible consequences to the political connivance carried out by the US.

The text of the response letter is attached.

2. Prepare and deliver a strike against Syngman Rhee's puppet forces before the signing of the agreement in order to move the front line south. After resumption of the meetings, point out to the opposing side that through the fault of Syngman Rhee the signing of the agreement has been protracted and therefore the situation has changed. Proceeding from the understanding that the settlement must be brought about based on the actual situation, propose readjusting the demarcation line.

One can suppose that the opposing side will agree with this proposal as a consequence of the present, difficult mutual relations with Syngman Rhee. However, it is also highly important that the opposing side not make concessions and resort to propagandistic subterfuge. In this event, we are prepared to select the appropriate moment and finally compromise, determining the demarcation line

[handwritten "X" marks in the left margin next to the last three paragraphs}

[TFR 37-39]

17286 - 5 - copy No. 2

as was agreed on 17 Jun 53.

3. Prepare for the resumption of the delegation meetings after 5 July. At the meetings, the following questions will be put to the opposing side concerning the realization of the armistice agreement:

1) Adjusting the demarcation line;

2) Whether Syngman Rhee will take part in the armistice and, in this connection, the matter of a timely evacuation of forces from the demilitarized zone in accordance with the armistice agreement;

3) Will the Syngman Rhee cabal take part in the joint inspection team of the military armistice commission;

4) Laying responsibility on the American side for the return of 27,000 prisoners of war; if the American side refuses to take responsibility, then we reserve the right to raise this question for discussion at a political conference;

5) Guaranteeing security to joint teams of the Red Cross while they are questioning prisoners of war and to representatives conducting fact-finding work.

6) Ensuring that prisoners of war insisting on repatriation are not subjected to forced detention;

7) How to ensure the realization of "the rights of the commission of neutral governments for repatriation" during its resolution of the matter on the immediate repatriation

[handwritten "X" in the left margin next to the third paragraph]

[TFR 37-40]

17286 - 6 - copy No. 2

of prisoners of war and how to guarantee security to the personnel and forces of this commission;

8) On the starting time for the work of the observation commission composed of neutral governements;

9) On the armistice entering into force.

4. With the start of the delegation meetings, staff officers and translators will begin preparing for the signing of the armistice agreement. Construction of the building where the signing of the agreement will take place will also resume.

5. It can be assumed that the signing of the agreement may be projected for approximately 15 Jul. It must be announced that the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives and their deputies in the observation committee composed of neutral governments, the members of approximately 20 inspection groups, and also the minimum number of working personnel necessary for the initial period will be arriving in Peking approximately 10 Jul. Prepare to announce this to the opposing side at the delegation meetings."

"To the Commander in Chief, United Nations Armed Forces General Clark.

In your letter of 29 Jun 59 you admitted that the Syngman Rhee cabal's compulsory release of Korean National Army prisoners of war from prisoner of war camps and the forced detention of these prisoners of war is a serious and grievous incident. This is true.

[TFR 37-41]

[Pages 7 and 8 are missing]

17286 - 9 - copy No. 2

...to abandon the prisoner of war camp and thus conclusively frustrate the agreement on prisoners of war which was already achieved by both sides. We believe that, as regards this incident, your side must assume total responsibility and guarantee that such incidents will no longer arise.

A guarantee is contained in your letter that UN forces will at necessary points undertake feasible military measures of a preventive nature in order to ensure the realization of the armistice agreement. We consider this imperative. However, your side is declaring that it cannot reliably guarantee that the South Korean Government and Forces will observe the armistice agreement achieved by the delegations of both parties. Along with this, the Syngman Rhee cabal still continues to clamor that it "will unite Korea by military means." This statement alone is enough to testify as to who it was that initiated the aggression three years ago. If the UN forces presently continue to pander to the Syngman Rhee cabal and permit it to engage in all sorts of criminal activities in order to undermine the potential for a peaceful solution to the Korean matter, then, after the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea, just as before, this will lead to flareups of armed agression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at any moment. Therefore, we believe that your side must employ effective measures in order that the South Korean Government and Forces

[TFR 37-42]

17286 - 10 - copy No. 2

observe the armistice agreement and all other agreements relating to it. Only then will it be possible to guarantee that the armistice in Korea will not be violated.

Proceeding from the above, although your answer cannot be considered completely satisfactory, however, considering that your side expressed a desire to apply force for a quick attainment of a truce and also focusing attention on your positive statements, we agree that delegations of both sides should establish a time to meet and agree on the practical realization of the issues relating to the armistice agreement and on the various preparatory measures preceding the signing of this agreement. The date of the meeting should be set by the heads of both delegations through liason officers.

The Supreme Commander, Korean National Army

Marshall Kim Il Sung

Commander in Chief, Chinese National Volunteers

Pyn Deh-khuaj

5 July 1953."

After having delivered these documents, U Syu-tsyuan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, orally reported the following:

In the opinion of the KNR government, Syngman Rhee's recent provocative actions can be explained, on one hand, by his attempts to bargain for more US aid and, on the other hand, by his fear of the Chinese volunteers in Korea and his fear of China in general. Syngman Rhee so doggedly insists

[TFR 37-43]

17286 - 11 - copy No. 2

on concluding a "mutual defense" pact with the US precisely for this reason.

Syngman Rhee's statements that if the US does not meet his demands halfway, then he will issue an order to the South Korean forces to fight to the end are mere words.

The KNR Government believes that the US will render Syngman Rhee only limited help. The US fears that if Syngman Rhee receives help on a large scale, then he may plunge into perilous, risky ventures and draw the US in also. However, it does not suit the Americans to be drawn into some kind of grand risky venture in the Far East right now. In this respect, the Americans have [illegible, perhaps an entire line missing].

There are also differences between Syngman Rhee and the US regarding the policy at the next political conference. Syngman Rhee believes that if the conference does not accept his (Syngman Rhee's) demands, then he should abandon the conference and resume a broad offensive against North Korea right up to the Yalutszyan River, or in other words up to the Korean-Chinese border. The Americans for their part think that the negotiations at the political conference should be ended only if it becomes obvious that the Korean/Chinese representatives at this conference achieve what North Korea and China could not achieve through armed means. Taking into account all of the above, the KNR Government believes it necessary in the interests of peace to sign the armistice agreement. "In this instance, - jokingly...

[Remainder of this document not available]

[TFR 37-44]

MEMORANDUM

from the enciphered telegram of Lieutenant General SHALIN addressed to Lieutenant General RAZUVAEV dated 17 Jan 51

No. 382

In telegram No. 77/sh to Comrade RAZUVAEV, an order is given that our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate American and British POWs, or prisoners of any other nationalities.

True Copy [signature]

(B. ZANEGIN)

"20" Jan 51

Printed 1 copy

Originator: Major Zanegin

17 Jan 51

[handwritten "opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 7"]

[TFR 37-45]

MEMORANDUM

from the enciphered telegram of Lieutenant General Razuvaev addressed to Lieutenant General Shalin

No. 500077/sh-77sh

Comrade RAZUVAEV raises the question on reinforcing the group of advisors attached to the Intelligence Directorate of the KNA General Staff with advisors (at the expense of regular advisory group positions in Korea) and with English language translators.

In view of the lack of qualified English translators in the KNA, Comrade RAZUVAEV is petitioning to enlist the services of our translators for the interrogation of American prisoners.

NOTE: General of the Army Comrade SHTMENKO has written instructions on this telegram which forbids interrogation of American and British prisoners by our translators.

True Copy: [signature]

(B. ZANEGIN)

"31" Jan 51

[handwritten "Opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 6"]

[TFR 37-46]

[handwritten "34"]

From a list of particular informational issues subject to examination in the first quarter of 1951. Dated 6 February 1951.

[The above type is different from the original portion of this document below.]

- 2 -

5. Size of the aircraft fleet, and also number of tanks and artillery guns in the Kuomintang forces.

6. Determine air fields capable of basing jet-engined aircraft and aircraft with a take-off weight of 60[?] tons or more.

ON KOREA

1. Ascertain the latest measures of the South Korean command towards building up the armed forces.

2. Ascertain the latest organizational changes in tactical formations and units of the South Korean army; verify data concerning the presence of tank and anti-tank battalions in infantry divisions.

3. Determine the organization of the higher military administration (ministry of defense, general staff, and others).

4. Ascertain the number and organization of personnel in the American advisory apparatus of the South Korean Army.

5. Ascertain the number and types of tanks in tactical formations and in units of US ground forces.

6. Ascertain air raid bombing routes and American air losses, separately by anti-aircraft fire, fighter planes, etc.

7. Through interrogation of prisoner pilots, ascertain the morale of flight personnel, intensity of aircraft flights by type (heavy and medium bombers, fighters), personnel, deployment, turn-around time and the tactical nature of the 6002ND, 6140TH, 6131ST, 6138TH, 6147TH tactical support wings, quantity of B-45 jet-engined bombers and F-84 jet fighters, and to which units they are attached and deployed.

8. Through interrogation of prisoners and by other means, ascertain which American forces are in Japan, and whether or not combat training for Koreans against the KNA and Chinese volunteers in Korea takes place in Japan.

NOTE: Interrogation of POWs is to be conducted within the capabilities of KNR intelligence. Participation in the interrogations by officers of the advisory group is categorically forbidden.

[handwritten check mark next to the above note]

[handwritten "Opis' 22571, delo 3, l. 94"]

[TFR 37-47]

Originator, our entry No. 282

To Comrade S.R. SAVCHENKO

In response to No. 1218/s from 7 Mar 51

Concerning those POWs which you have indicated by nationality who are being detained in camps of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea: the 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army is not conducting secret operational intelligence.

Original Signed M. SHALIN

"10" Mar 51

True Copy: [signature] Zamtsov

No. 998787

[handwritten "opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 12"]

[TRF 37-48]

[illegible handwritten instructions to Comrade Ivanov]

REPORT

of the senior advisor on the status of intelligence in the KDNR.

Colonel SEREGIN reports: I presented myself to the Senior Military Adviser, Comrade Lieutenant General RAZUVAEV, on 3 Jan 53. I received instructions to become familiar with working conditions by 15 Jan 53 and not to undertake any measures. In the course of becoming acquainted with the work, I am able to report the following preliminary findings:

1. The Korean Peoples' Army is operating in the secondary sector of the front and is fully subordinate to the Combined Staff. It does not have the right to independent planning and conducting of operations.

2. The intelligence directorate, and intelligence forces in general, do not receive due attention from the military command. The primary leadership staff changes often. The intelligence directorate is extremely poorly supported with materials, in particular with transportation vehicles and communications equipment. Reconnaissance missions are not assigned by the commanders of tactical formations, but by intelligence officers who, not having proper authority, do not always have at their disposal the means for organizing effective reconaissance. Signals intelligence is extremely poorly organized. Air reconnaissance does not exist. The intelligence directorate does not have communications with partisan detachments operating in the enemy's rear. In view of the lack of communications and the difficulties of sending agents across enemy lines, covert intelligence does not have the necessary effect. The largest percentage of prisoners and captured enemy equipment goes to the Combined Staff; very little goes to our Korean comrades.

[handwritten text in margin "Instruct Comrade Seregin through the office of the Senior Military Adviser to present a detailed report on working conditions of the subadvisory organ with concrete suggestions for a fundamental improvement of the work in the intelligence directorate by 15 Mar 53.

Study the possibility of the intelligence advisory command group attached to the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers in KNDR to render assistance in organizing and conducting intelligence operations and of the use of Chinese military intelligence in KNDR in order to obtain ..." document ends in middle of a word. Possible completion of the word: 'information' or 'foreign'.]

[handwritten "Opis' 23481, delo 3, l. 8" 1-2 crossed out]

[TFR 37-49]

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P104/24

To Comrades Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko

Extract from protocol No. 104 of the session of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS dated 28 Jun 63 _________________________________________________________________

On the US Government's appeal for assistance in returning crew members of the American military helicopter that landed on KNDR territory 17 May 63.

1. Inform the KNDR Government about US Government's appeal to the Soviet Government for assistance in returning two crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter that landed on KNDR territory 17 May 63 (a draft of instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in P'yongyang is attached).

2. Leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans bring this issue up again, inform them that their appeal has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government.

SECRETARY OF THE TsK

Subject to return within a 7-day period to the TsK KPSS (General Department, 1st Sector)

10-mm

ap

[TFR 37-50]

Reference: para. 24 of protocol No. 104

Secret

P'YONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit the Minister of Foreign Affairs or his deputy and, after citing your mission, inform him of the following:

"The US Government through the American Embassy in Moscow has appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and render assistance in the return of American citizens - Captain Ben Uikli Statts and Captain Karelton Volts, crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter which on 17 May 63 allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

I have been tasked with informing you about this appeal from the US Government and to let you know that for our part, it goes without saying, no promises whatsoever were given to the Americans.

We have left the American appeal unanswered. If they bring up this matter again, we intend to answer that their request has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government."

Telegraph completion of assignment.

504-ae

ap

[TFR 37-51]

Secret. Copy No. 2

TsK KPSS

The US Government, through the American Embassy in Moscow, appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and render assistance in the return of two crew members of a US Armed Forces helicopter which made a "forced landing" on the territory of KNDR on 17 May 63.

According to available information, the helicopter was forced down by the Armed Forces of KNDR after it had violated the demarcation line and appeared over KNDR territory.

In a verbal report on this matter by the US Embassy it was noted that attempts by American representatives to obtain the return of the helicopter and its crew through the military armistice commission in Korea were unsuccessful; however, the American side was expecting a positive solution to the matter, especially since "UN Command Forces in Korea" on 27 May 63 transferred several North Korean fishermen who had been detained earlier to KNDR authorities.

We are unaware of the details of the incident with the American helicopter and also the intentions of our Korean comrades in connection with the incident.

MID USSR suggests it would be expedient to inform our Korean comrades about this appeal by the US Government, emphasizing during this that the Soviet side of course did not make any promises to the Americans.

It is expedient to leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans raise this matter again, then it may be reported to them that the KNDR Government was informed of their appeal.

The draft of the Resolution is attached.

Please review.

Original Signed A. GROMYKO

" 25 " Jun 63

No. 1957 /GS

6-tb/VK

No.795ossha True Copy: [signature]

18 Jun 63

[signature]

[handwritten "[1 illegible] 1?3-46, TsK-22515"]

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Presidenta RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 372, l. 18-20"]

[TFR 37-52]

[stamp "DECLASSIFIED

3 Jul 92"]

SECRET Copy No. 15

16 "Feb 68

No. 73 /dv

[handwritten "Zinchuk, Fedoseev, Sol'nov, Porshakov, [illegible signature], 19 Feb"]

[stamp "MID USSR

USA Department

SECRET

Entry No. 219

"16" Feb 68"]

ON THE DETENTION BY KNDR AUTHORITIES

OF TWO AMERICAN PILOTS IN 1963

(Brief Summary)

On 17 May 63, KNDR authorities detained two American

citizens - Captain Ben Uilki Statts and Captain Karelton Vol'tts, US Armed Forces helicopter crew members who allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

On 28 Jun 63, MID KNDR reported through our Embassy in Peking that the US Government approached the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and assist in the return of these American citizens. It was reported also that no promises were made to the Americans from our side and that we have left their request unanswered. If the Americans bring this matter up again, then we intend to respond that the KNDR Government has been informed of their request.

KNDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kho Dam stated that the American helicopter intentionally, with intelligence-gathering aims, violated KNDR air space and therefore the American pilots, as criminals, will answer in accordance with KNDR laws. He also said that the USSR Government should not assume the role of intermediary and receive such requests from the Americans, and that this matter pertains solely to the KNDR sphere of authority.

Neither the US nor the KNDR made any further appeals to Soviet representatives concerning this matter.

dv

[TFR 37-53]

2.

On 3 Dec 63, the US representative delivered to UN Secretary-General U. Tan a letter of protest against the seven month detention of the indicated American pilots in North Korea. It said in the letter that the flight of the American helicopter over the demilitarized zone was the result of an error.

On 17 Feb 64, the Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, responding to the letter dated 6 Nov 63 from the "UN Forces" Commander in South Korea, American General Khauz, stated his willingness to favorably review the matter concerning the pilots if the "UN Forces" Command Staff admits to the violation of the Korean armistice agreement and makes a promise not to allow such actions in the future.

On 5 Mar 64, General Khauz sent a letter to the KNA Commander which noted in particular:

"In view of your demand, the UN Forces Command Staff confesses to the intrusion by the two stated servicemembers in the area of the demilitarized zone on 17 May 63. Moreover, we guarantee that the UN Forces Command, while taking all necessary measures in accordance with our desire to strictly adhere to the conditions of the cease fire agreement, is making every effort in order to avoid the reoccurance of a similar situation in the future."

On 23 March 1964, the leaders of the KNA stated in their response that the head of the Korean-Chinese side of the military commission is fully authorized to conclusively resolve the matter regarding the transfer of the pilots.

A year after their detention, in May 64, the pilots were returned to the American side in Panmunjom.

FAR EAST DEPARTMENT

MID USSR

[TFR 37-54]

MEMORANDUM

from MAKAROV's enciphered telegram addressed to KRYMOV

dated 26 Jun 52 No. 20850/1844

MAKAROV reports that he received from our Chinese friends the following information:

The American prisoner of war [handwritten in English "Harding Djeck Erving"] was interrogated by our Chinese comrades. He testified that, in 1950, he served in the intelligence section of the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the American Army in the Far East. As an intelligence officer, he knew of the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostok. The group consisted of four persons, two Americans and two Russians. The prisoner remembers that one Russian had the last name PROVOZNIK: 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches tall, thin, and had blond hair. This agent often traveled to Vladivostok and had direct contact with the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence section. The others operated from Manchurian territory.

In the opinion of our Chinese comrades, they cannot fully believe [handwritten in English "Harding"], although they have obtained much additional information from him.

MAKAROV reports that this information was not received in a special meeting, but in a general conversation about the work with prisoners of war.

True Copy: [signature] B. ZANEGIN

"26" Jun 52

see reverse

[There is nothing on the reverse of this copy.]

[TFR 37 55-65]

LIST

of USAF aircrew members participating in combat in North Korea, 1950 - 1953, information about whom is found in documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps

Major [signature] A. Lebelev

"2" Jun 92

[TFR 37-66]

[handwritten "No. 13"]

SECRET

Copy No.___

REPORT

THE INTERROGATION OF A CAPTURED F-86-F-30 PILOT OF THE 12TH AIR SQUADRON, 18TH FIGHTER-BOMBER GROUP, CPT ROBERT A. KOVRI, DOWNED BY AAA FIRE 20 June 1953: SERVICE NUMBER AO 687678

1. Biographical data

Born 22 Jan 23

Nationality - American, white.

Student before joining the army.

Religion - Protestant.

Married. Drafted 20 Oct 42.

Family: Wife - 26, housewife

Daughter - 7

Son - 4.

                Career profile:





----------------------------------------------------------------





             Flight





Date       Location         Unit            Acft Hrs    Rank





----------------------------------------------------------------





  1    2   3   4  5  6





----------------------------------------------------------------





20 Oct 42  San Antonio,  Cadet Aviation      --      --  Cadet





           Texas         Center. Ground





       School  






Dec 42     Victory AFB   Pre-Flt School  RT-19    60    Cadet





           Vernon, TX






Feb 43     Enid AFB      Basic Flt BT-13    60    Cadet





           Enid, OK    School






May 43     Redick AFB,   Adv. Flight   AT-17    60    Cadet





           OK    School






[TFR 37-67]







Jul 43   Kornay AFB,   B-17 Tng Unit        B-17     80      2LT





           Nebraska






Dec 43   Poddington,   92nd Bomber Group    B-17     200     1LT





           England                                         Flier






Jul 44   Bryan AFB,    Instructor Tng       AT-6     60      1LT





           Texas       & Instrument                       Student





        Flight 






Sep 44   Lokebauriv AFB  Instructor Tng     B-17     90      1LT





           Ohio          on the B-17                      Student






Feb 45   Boca Rotan AFB     -"-             B-17     350     1LT





           Florida                                      Instruct.





                                                           Flier






Aug 45   Homestead AFB,  Transport Aviat.   C-54     80   Student





            Florida      Schl, C-54






Sep 45   Fairfield AFB   Transport Aviat.   C-54    250     Flier
    California  Command Base






Feb 46     -"-           -"-                C-54     50     Instr





                                            C-47    150     Link                                
                                    Trainer





Sep 46   Palm Bch AFB   Continental Division --      --   Student





                        Staff School                      Admin.





                                                          Officer






Oct 46   Gen Hospital,       --             --            Patient
    Letterman






Feb 47   Fairfield,     1500-3 Detachment.  C-47    100   OIC of
      California    Training Unit                  Personnel,




                                                       Admin Off.






Jun 48   Scott AFB,     Communication       C-47    100   -"-





         Illinois       School              T-6      50






[TFR 37-68]


     1      2   3   4    5    6





Jul 49   Wiesbaden,     333rd Transport      C-54    200       1LT,





         Germany        Squadron                               Flier,





                                                               Berlin                               
                                        Airlift






Sep 49   Landsberg      20th Comms Sq.   C-47    300     CPT,
      Germany    Staff 2nd Air  T-6     50    Admin.                  Division                   
                    officer






Aug 52   Moody AFB,     Jet Tng School      F-30     15     CPT,





         California                         T-33      5     Flier






Sep 52   Nellis AFB     Jet Fighter School  F-86     80     CPT,
      Nevada              
                                        Flier






Feb 53   K-55           18th Wing           F-86    100     CPT,





                                                            Flier

On arrival in Korea he started flying the F-86-F-30.

LAST COMBAT SORTIE

The preparatory brief was given by the Operations Officer, of the South African Military Forces, Major GOBARD EHBERSOL. Mission Number 02.

The targets were two rows of 9-10 buildings, 15 miles

north of Papazan Mountain (eastern sector of the central front).

The sortie consisted of 12 fighter-bombers from the 12th Squadron. Engine start at 1635 hrs, take-off at 1640 hrs. We were over the target at 1700. The leader of the sortie was Major EHBERSOL. I flew number three in the sortie leader's Flight.

Our check (reading) during the flight was done by a control station with callsign "Wildfire" (central sector of the front). The flight route was directly from the airfield to Papazan, then west to the lake not far from the target. Above the lake we made a 180 degree turn and started dropping bombs, diving at intervals of 5 seconds. Every aircraft dropped two 500-pound bombs.

[TFR 37-69]

My aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft artillery immediately after I dropped my bombs. The aircraft's tail end caught fire. I made a 180 degree turn in an attempt to cross the front lines.

Within a minute and a half, control of the plane was lost, probably because of the loss of thrust and control surfaces. I ejected and landed 5 miles north of Papazan. I contacted the lead plane by radio (type IRS-4) and asked for help and a helicopter. There was one plane remaining in my area but he could not help me. Within 2-3 minutes after touching down, I was captured by Chinese soldiers.

Unit information






The organization of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing.





[Hand-drawn organizational chart]






Wing Commander





COL Perigo -------- Post Office





           :     Surgeon





           :     Chaplain





         Deputy Commander





         LTC Biter





           :





                     sections                           :           :             :        :  
      :        :





Operations Intelligence       :   Personnel  Adjutant  Supply &





                              :                        repair





                              :





                   groups                                      :                 :      
        :           :





         Fighter-          Supply &         Base      Medical





         Bomber            Repair         services





            :                 :               :





  squadrons:       squadrons:             :squadrons   :       :    :    :         :      
:     :      :      :





Planes  Same Same Repair & Trans-   Supply Food   Police Airport





  25              supply   portation       Supply        & Bldg





Fliers            off.-8   off.-6     -8   -6     -6     Security





  36              enl.-80  enl.-300   -80  -80    -70    off.-6





                                                         enl.-70






[TFR 37-70]






Wing totals:





 officers  100





 fliers    140





 enlisted 1600





 planes     75 F-86





             2 T-33





             2 C-47





             1 T-6





 vehicles  300






Wing Headquarters:






Post                              Officers      Enlisted






Commander                             1





Deputy-Commander                      1





Operations section                    4              6





Personnel section                     3              8           Adjutant                       
      1              6





Intelligence section                  3              8





Supply and repair section             4              12





Chaplain                              1              1





Post office detachment                1              3





Surgeon                               1              1






                         Group Headquarters  





[hand drawn organization chart]






                               Group          Colonel Martin





                             Commander






                               Deputy         LT Colonel Stell





                           Group Commander






                               T.O.E.






MAJ              CPT         CPT      CPT           MAJ






Operations    Personnel    Adjutant  Intelligence   Supply/repair






CPT Kharper   LT Uinsship  LT Krist   LT Dyuk       LT Marrou







[TFR 37-71]






Group totals:






Operations         3 officers   6 enlisted





Personnel          2   -"-      5   -"-





Adjutant           1            4





Intelligence       2            6





Supply & repair    3            8






 A Group could allocate a maximum of 48 planes for one sortie.  It could make 4 sorties in
one day.






           Organizational chart of the 12th Air Squadron






                       Commander AEh






                    Deputy-Commander AEh






                         Sections






Personnel/admin  Operations    Repair/services  Supply    Weapons






LT Khoftizer     MAJ Ebersoul  CPT Iton         LT Murrej





                               CPT Lyuis






   Intelligence   Flight     Flight     Flight     Flight





        section





                     LT          LT        CPT         LT                         
Kehmpotorn  Rozheri     Mejn      Kheller





                      





[TFR 37-72]






Section totals:





                                              Officers   Enlisted





Personnel & administration                        1         6





Operations                                        1         3





Supply                                            1         8





Repair & services                                 2         80     Weapons                      
                    1         35





Intelligence                                      1         1





In a Flight                                       9         --






Total in air squadron:






Planes      25





Fliers      36





Enlisted   160






Details on the flight personnel of the 18th Group






a) Total flight hours






 10 fliers with 3000-5000 hours    





 40 fliers with 1000-3000 hours





100 fliers with less than 1000 hours






b) Details on officer personnel






   Colonel PERIGO - Wing Commander, age 42, has 10 combat sorties.






   LT Colonel EHVANS - Air Squadron Commander, age 33, 3500 hours logged, approximately 40
combat sorties.






   Colonel MARTIN - Group Commander, age 37, has approximately 20 combat sorties.






Fliers          Age        Hrs. Logged   Number of sorties






MAJ EHBERSOUL  31          2100          90






CPT NIL        30           450          25






LT DILLON      25           450          15






LT BARTOLAMA   25           500          22






[TFR 37-73]







LT KHARRISON   25           500          22






LT BARBER      24           500          24






LT BAUSER    23         500          24






LT KRISTANSON  24           400          5






LT PATTI       23           400          5






LT FORBES      25           500          25






LT MEJS        25           500          25






LT ALKSTON     25           400          10






LT BIVER       24           400          10






LT BRENCH      24           500          25






LT VAN KHELLEN 30          1800          70






LT RODZHERS    28          1900          70






LT STOTIS      26          1000          70






LT KHUK        24          450           20






LT KHELLER     25           500          25






LT BELLOUS     25           500          25






LT ROSSEL      26           700          40






LT SVORTS      27          1000          10






LT DOSON       27           500          25






LT DORRIS      25           500          25






LT SMIT        27           600          40






LT KROKKER     25           500          25






LT SHATTOK     24           450          20






LT VESTKOT     23           400          15






LT MEJER       24           400          5






LT BAURN       23           400          5





[TFR 37-74]






LT BEJTS       26           500          25






LT HAJD        26           500          25






LT TAJNIOS     26           450          15






LT KHEJMEJKER  24           400          15






LT KHASKING    24           400          15






LT DEGNER      26           800          90

Our group received the F-86-F-30 at the end of January and beginning of February 1953.

Other than my aircraft, I know nothing else about other F-86 and F-30 losses.

                     Training of new arrivals






Flights on the T-33 - 1 hour flight to the front line.





                      (Familiarization flight)





                    - 3 hour flight on instrumentation.






Flights on the F-86-F-30   - 2 solo flights





                           - 3 flights in formation





                           - 2 flights with fire (camera-gun)





                           - 3 flights with instrumentation





                           - dive bombing until the flier





                               shows satisfactory results.






                  Ground preparation (10 days)






  - familiarization with the area of operations;





  - rescue and escape measures;





  - aircraft electronic equipment.






[TFR 37-75]






Characteristics of the K-55 Airfield (Usan)






 1.  The runway:






   a) Orientation - 90-270 degrees






   b) Surface - concrete






   c) Width - 150 feet






   d) Length - 9000 feet







 2.  Taxiways:






   a) Surface - concrete






   b) Width - 50 feet






 3.  Aircraft hardstands:






   a) Type: open concrete covered pads with an earthen embankment on one side.  Purpose of this
embankment - protection from accidental gunfire while taxiing.  Height of the embankment is 10
feet.  Dimensions of the pads are 100 x 50 feet.  






[Drawing of an aircraft hardstand]






   embankment        embankment






 Anti-aircraft batteries are situated around the airfield.  The guns are 20mm and 12.7mm
machine guns.






Navigational facilities:






 a).  "Homing" type - low frequency radio beacons






 b).  Location:






 1.  "ZX" (frequency 392 KHz) 7 miles to the west of the runway.





 2.  "NV" (frequency 1675 KHz and power 50) at the airfield.






 b). Radar.





 There is no direction finder on the airfield






[TFR 37-76]





- 11 -






 IY. INFORMATION ABOUT BASE K-55 USAN






[Hand-drawn diagram follows]






1.  Hospital                [Depicts a hill- reads "300 feet"]





2.  Church                  [On hill- reads "searchlight"]





3.  Officer's Club





4.  Officer's Mess





5.  Group Headquarters





6.  Wing Headquarters





7.  Fighter Wing Headquarters





8.  Finance





9.  Post Office





10. Base Exchange





11. Hanger





12. Base Operations





13. 2nd Squadron South African AF Operations





14. 10th Squadron Operations





15. 67th Squadron Operations





16. Hanger





17. Ground troops area





18. Ground troops area





19. Enlisted quarters





20. Officers quarters





21. Warehouse






                               [Depicts a hill- reads "500 feet"]






       *





radio direction-finder





[TFR 37-77]






- 12 -






Tactical-technical data on the F-86-F-30






 The F-86-F-30 was sent to the 18th Wing at the end of January 1953 and F-51s were turned
over in November-December 1952.





 At first the Wing was armed with F-86-F-25s, and later they received F-86-F-30s.





 In my opinion, the use of F-86-F-30s as attack planes was the result of a desire to have a
single type of plane for tactical aviation.






 - The F-86-F-25 has leading-edge flaps in the wings.





 - The F-86-F-30 does not have leading-edge flaps.





 - The engine type is [in English "J-47-GE-27"] with 6000 pounds of thrust.





 - It does not have water injection.





 - There are no modifications for increasing the engine's thrust.





 - [in English "ARC-3"] radio.





 - [in English "ARP-7"] radio compass.





 - A-4 sight.





 - Sight range is 6000 feet.





 - The mobile antenna slew angle is 15 [degrees].






 Distinctive features of the F-86-E and F-86-F-30:






 F-86-E           F-86-F-30






- no air cleaner       - has air cleaner (filter)





- no anti-icing modifications      - has anti-icing modifications





- has leading edge flaps     - no leading edge flaps





- one hard point for fuel    - two hard points for fuel





  tanks              tanks or bombs





- slower speeds at sea level     - the climb rate is better





  than the F-86-F-30       than the F-86-E.  More





               maneuverable.

[TFR 37-78]

- 13 -

25000 feet is the best height for combat -

- better maneuverability at - also at 14500 feet.

12000 feet.

Reserve fuel for the F-86-F-30

The main tanks hold 470 gallons. External tanks: 2 with 120 gallons and 2 with 200 gallons.

Fuel type - JP-4.

Fuel weight - one gallon weighs 6.5 pounds.

Location of fuel tanks:

[Hand-drawn diagram of a plane]

The engine type is a [in English "J-47-GE-27"]. Axial air flow. 6000 pounds of thrust. The air in the intake is cleaned by the air filter. There is an anti-icing modification in the air intake. 11 stage compressor.

At 100% engine revolutions the temperature of the expelled gases is 690 degrees.

The length of the plane is 37 feet, the wing span is 35 feet, height 14 feet. The area of the wing is approximately 184 square feet.

[TFR 37-79]

- 14 -

Horizonal stabilizer with a slew of +/- 20 degrees, area of 18 sq. ft. Vertical stabilizer with an area of 18 sq. ft. (3x6).

Rudder - +/- 30 degrees, approximately 3 square feet area (6 inches x 6 feet).

Ailerons - +/- 45 degrees, 10.5 sq. ft. area (18 inches x 7 feet).

Flaps with a slew of 70 degrees with a 14 sq. ft. area (20 inches x 7 feet).

Airbrake panel deploys to a 45 degree angle, with an area of 4 square feet (24 x 24 inches).

Trimmer rudder with a size of 3 x 12 inches.

4. The unloaded weight is 14500 pounds. The take-off weight is 19000-20000 pounds.

Equipment:

Radio - an 8 channel, line-of-sight, UHF [in English "ARC 3"].

Radar - A-4 sight, operational radius 6000 feet, effective radius 1900 feet.

Transponder - IFF.

It has these positions:

Position "normal".

Position "2" - 1 signal.

Position "3" - 2 signals.

Emergency position - 3 signals.

Armor plating - behind the flier.

Six 12.77 caliber machine guns.

350 rounds of ammunition per machine gun.

Camera gun - mounted in the nose under the screen or in the cabin next to the aiming sight.

Bombs: 2x500 pound bombs with instantaneous and delayed fuses, and also 2x1000 pound bombs with instantaneous fuses were used.

[TFR 37-80]

- 15 -

Rockets were never hung on the plane.

The oxygen system with a 450 pound tank works automatically. A fixed pressure is maintained in the cabin:

 Altitude:       Pressure in the cabin





                        corresponds to the altitude:






 40000 feet        22000 feet






 30000 feet        16000 feet






 20000 feet        12000 feet






 10000 feet         9000 feet






Personal emergency equipment:






 - Radio IRS-4, works in UHF or ultra UHF.





 - One-man life raft.





 - 10 minute tank of oxygen.





 - Signal mirror.





 - Signal flare.





 - Maps.





 - Compass.





 - Rations.






Stability and maneuverability






 The plane is particularly stable under 30000 feet.  A weak shudder is felt when the speed
of the plane is decreased to the point of entering into a spin.  The plane breaks out of the
spin by itself.





 Bombs and tanks are not taken above 30000 feet.






 Take-off occurs at 96% of maximum engine power, at a speed of 350 knots per hour.  This
RPM is maintained up to 20000 feet.





[TFR 37-81]






- 16 -






At 25000 feet - Mach .73





   30000 feet - Mach .77





   35000 feet - Mach .81





   40000 feet - Mach .85






Altitude   Negative G-Forces





  5000 feet      12 G





 10000 feet      10 G





 15000 feet      8.5G





 20000 feet      6.5G





 25000 feet      4.5G





 30000 feet      3.0G





 35000 feet      2.0G





 40000 feet      1.5G






 Critical Mach number is .95 below 15000 feet.





 Above 15000 feet critical Mach does not exist.






 The F-86-F-30 is not allowed to fly inverted for more than 10 seconds.






 Ceiling - maximum 50000 feet.  The most effective working ceiling is 25000 feet.






Maximum diving speeds.






 - without tanks or bombs      - Mach 1.2





 - with tanks          - Mach 0.85





 - with 500 pound bombs      - Mach 0.85





 - with 1000 pound bombs     - Mach 0.75 (with a                                     
             square vertical                                                    stabilizer)





[TFR 37-82]






- 17 -






Cruising speed






Altitude in feet       Engine performance     Instrument speed






  5000       82%       260 knots






 10000       83%       220 knots






 15000       84%       .64 Mach






 20000       86%       .63 Mach






 25000       87%       .72 Mach






 30000       89%       .77 Mach






 35000       91%       .83 Mach






 40000       92%       .87 Mach






   9.  Ascent speed at 100% engine power:






Altitude in feet        Rate of ascent        Required time





                      feet per minute                    for ascent






  5000       6000         1 min






 10000       5300         2 min






 15000       4700         3 min






 20000       4000         5 min






 25000       3400         7 min






 30000       2900        11 min






 35000       2500        14 min






 40000       2000        20 min





[TFR 37-83]






With 96% engine power






  5000     5800      1 min






 10000     5100      2 min






 15000     4500      3.5 min






 20000     3600      6 min






 25000     3000      8.5 min






 30000     2400      13 min






 35000     1900      18 min






 40000     1600      25 min






Altitude/distance ascension chart:






[Hand-drawn diagram with altitude on top and distance below]






10.Speed






 Speed    Engine power     Instrument speed






  5000 feet    100%      500 knots per hour





 10000 feet     "      .82 Mach





 15000 feet     "      .83 Mach





 20000 feet     "      .84 Mach





 25000 feet     "      .85 Mach





 30000 feet     "      .86 Mach





 35000 feet     "      .88 Mach





 40000 feet     "      .9  Mach





[TFR 37-84]






Fuel usage






 with tanks and without tanks with two 500 pound bombs.






                                                             





  Cruising speed  during ascent      Horizonal   Diving





                      97%RPM 100%RPM     100%RPM     80%RPM





Altit. RPM With W/out With W/O With W/O  With W/O  With W/O





in ft.  %  tanks  "    "    "    "    "   "    "    "    "   






Sea level






 5000  76  2600       3400     3600                2700






10000  77  2350       2850     3000                2400






15000  79  2100       2400     2600                2150






20000  81  1900       2100     2150                1950






25000  83  1700       1850     1900                1650






30000  85  1500       1600     1700                1400






35000  87  1350       1450     1550                1200






40000  89  1200       1300     1400                1000






45000  92  1000       1200     1300                 850





                                                             






Ascending speed with varied engine power.






                                                             





                  Time       Distance on the    Ascension speed





Altitude      100%  97%      ground in miles    feet per minute





                              100%     97%       100%    97%  






Sea level





with tanks    20 sec 20 sec    4        4        3000    2800






without tanks 20 sec 20 sec    4        4        3100    2900





[TFR 37-85]






- 20 -





________________________________________________________________






  1        2          3           4       5   6    7      8





________________________________________________________________






 5000 with tanks 1 m. 30 sec 1 m. 35 sec  10  11  4500   4300





 5000 w/o  tanks 1 m. 20 sec 1 m. 30 sec  9.5 10  4800   4500






10000 with tanks 3 m. 30 sec 3 m. 50 sec  32  35  3900   3600





      w/o  tanks 3 m. 20 sec 3 m. 40 sec  22  24  4200   3900






15000 with tanks 6 m. 30 sec 7.00         56  60  3400   3000





      w/o  tanks 6           6.30         36  42  3600   3100






20000 with tanks 9           10           84  90  2800   2400





      w/o  tanks 8            9           75  82  3000   2600






25000 with tanks 12.30       14          112 120  2100   1600





      w/o  tanks 11          12.30       100 108  2500   2100






30000 with tanks 17          20          145 155  1700   1100





      w/o  tanks 15          17.00       120 130  2100   1800






35000 with tanks





      w/o tanks  20          22.30       145 160  1800   1600






40000 with tanks





      w/o  tanks 25          28.00       190 210  1500   1300






45000 with tanks





      w/o  tanks 30          33.30       240 265  1300   1000





[TFR 37-86]






- 21 -






Speed






                                                             





         with or w/o   Flight at     Ascend     Cruising 





         tanks and 2-  100% engine  100%     97%   with diff.





Altitude 500lbs bombs  power                       ratings   Mach






Sea level with tanks   450 knots   300 knots 300 knots  -      -





          w/o  tanks   450 "       350 "     350 "      -      -






 5000    with tanks    400 "       300 "     300 "   76% 240knots





         w/o  tanks    440 "       350 "     350 "   76% 280 "






10000    with tanks    375 "       300 "     300 "   77% 220 "





         w/o  tanks    425 "       350 "     350 "   77% 260 "






15000    with tanks    .72 Mach    .7 Mach   .7 Mach 79% 200 "





         w/o  tanks    .72  "      .7  "     .7  "   79% .69 Mach






20000    with tanks    .73  "      .7  "     .7  "   81% .70  "





         w/o  tanks    .76  "      .7  "     .7  "   81% .71  "






25000    with tanks    .74  "      .7  "     .7  "   83% .72  "





         w/o  tanks    .79  "      .74 "     .74 "   83% .73  "






30000    with tanks    .76  "      .7  "     .7  "   85% .74  "





         w/o  tanks    .82  "      .77 "     .76 "   85% .76  "






35000    with tanks





         w/o  tanks    .85  "      .85 "     .8  "   87% .79  "






40000    with tanks





         w/o  tanks    .86  "      .84 "     .82 "   89% .80  "






45000    with tanks





         w/o  tanks    .88  "      .85 "     .84 "   92% .82  "

[TFR 37-87]

- 22 -

Tactical operations

Receiving and planning order of

combat missions

A combat mission is planned by the joint operations center. Before receiving the combat orders, the OOTs sends a warning order to the units. The wing commander, having received the order, informs squadron headquarters.

The aircraft roster, the type of bombs, the amount of fuel, the mission number, and the take-off time are usually included in the warning order.

Wing headquarters organizes the preparations for the next day's sorties and gives orders on the necessary preparations for the sorties to the wing department chiefs. For example:

The intelligence section prepares the maps, gives information about enemy anti-aircraft battery locations and emergency measures in case of a shoot down.

The munitions supply chief determines the type of bombs and fuses, gives information to the munitions officers on the provisions of the combat sortie.

The weather service prepares information about weather conditions.

At 1900 the order is brought to the attention of the squadron operations chief, who assigns flights to missions. The flights are assigned so that each flight completes the same number of sorties per month. The take-off time is announced and the mission briefing is given at approximately 1930 hrs.

During the briefing, course altitude, initial point of departure, orientation points on the route, take-off time, speed, mission objectives, and the direction for the run on the target are defined for the flight leaders and the formation commanders.

As a rule, the briefing ends 2 to 2 1/2 hours before take-off.

Typical sorties to target areas in North Korea

(variations)

A) SUPUN Reservoir power station.





   Aircraft roster:





- ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)





- interceptors           - 96 (F-86)

[TFR 37-88]

- 23 -

- flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with a one minute interval between squadrons.

- flight time of interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes





                                0820 hrs for the remaining 48 planes.






 - initial point of departure - Sakusyu.






 Assembly point - 5 miles south of Namsan-ni.






 The K-55 flight route, salt plants (south of Khejdzhu), the mouth of the Tsinnampo River,
a protruding section of coastline (toward the southeast of Tehsyu), the starting point of the
bombing run.






 - the return route: assembly point, the protruding section of coastline to the southeast
of Tehsyu, the mouth of Tsinnampo, salt plants, then K-55.






 - Ground attack aircraft's combat formation: usual flight combat formation.






 Altitude on the flight route is 30000 feet, from Tehsyu we descend to 18000 feet and at
that altitude we approach the target.  From this altitude we begin to dive the target and drop
bombs at an altitude of 2500-3000 meters.  The flight speed on the route is Mach .7, during the
dive - Mach .8.






 B) Singisyu (bridge)






- Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)






- Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)






- flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with a one minute interval between
squadrons.






- Flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs for 48 planes





                                        - 0820 hrs for remaining 48 planes






 - Initial point - island near the mouth of the Yalu River.






 - Assembly point - the mountain southeast of Singisyu.





[TFR 37-88a]






 - The flight route - K-55, salt plants (south of Khejdzhu) Seki-to island, the initial
point (the island at the mouth of the Yalu River).





[TFR 37-89]






- 24 -






SKETCH






 Routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the Supun area (power station).






[hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]






       Yalu River





   target






     initial





assembly       point





point





         *





         K-14





         *





         K-13  *Seoul





         *[illeg]






- - -  Ground attack aircraft      *K-55 USAN





-.-.-  Interceptors

[TFR 37-90]

- 25 -

- Return route - assembly point, Tan-to Island (second assembly point), Seki-to Island, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.

- Ground attack aircraft combat formation - the usual combat formation of columnar flights.

- Flight altitude on the route is 30000 feet from (Tetsuzan Peninsula) "Appendicitis" to the target descending to 18000 feet and from that altitude we dive on the target. All the remaining elements are the same as the flight to the Supun hydroelectric power plant.

Routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the Singisyu area (bridge).

[Hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

         Yalu River






     *target





 initial         assembly





 point           point






     *Khejdzhu






         *K-14





           *K-13





       *[illeg]






____ Ground attack aircraft      *K-55  Usan






==== Interceptors

[TFR 37-91]







   C) "Appendicitis" (Tetsuzan Peninsula)






 - Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)






 - Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)






 - Flight time for ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with one minute interval between
squadrons.






 - Flight time for interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes





                                    - 0820 hrs for remaining





                                      48 planes






 - Initial point - Sinmi-to.






 - Assembly point - Tejge-to (see diagram below).






 - Route to the target K-55, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, the mouth of Tsinnampo, Sinmi-to.






 - Return route - Tejge-to, the mouth of Tsinnampo, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.






 - Combat formation of ground attack aircraft - columnar flights.

 The flight altitude remains as before.  Leaving 40 km. from Tsinnampo, we begin the
descent to 18000 feet.  At that altitude we approach Cholson, we turn to the left 90 degrees,
and dive for the target.






 We return to our base by this same route.  Altitude is about 30000-35000 feet.





[TFR 37-92]






 Sketch of routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the Tetsuzan area during
fighter-bomber runs






[hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

     target





      *    *





 Tejzan






     Sin-bi-to






   Chodo





       Kehson





       area






         *K-14





           *K-13





       *Che[illeg]l'po






____ Ground attack aircraft      *K-55  Usan






==== Interceptors

[TFR 37-93]






- 28 -






D) Railway junction in Kuson (Kudzjo)






- Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)






- Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)






- Flight time for ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with one minute interval between squadrons.






- Flight time for interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes - 0820 hrs for remaining 48 planes






- Initial point - the point between the two islands northwest of Kuson.






- Assembly point - the island northwest of Kuson.






- Route to the target - K-55, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, a point 10 miles east of
Tsinnampo, the mouth of Chen-Chen, initial point.






- Return route - assembly point, the mouth of Chen-Chen, a point 10 miles east of Tsinnampo,
salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.






- Ground attack aircraft's combat formation: usual combat formation - columnar flights.






The flight altitude is 30000 feet, north of Tsinnampo we begin the descent to 18000 feet and
from the initial point we conduct the bombing.






In all the mission variations, the dive is conducted under a 60-65 degree angle at a speed of
Mach .8.





[TFR 37-94]







Sketch of routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors in the Kuson (Kidzjo) area during
fighter-bomber runs






[Hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

         Kidzjo





     *target






   Chodo






       *Khejdzhu Kehson





           area






             *K-14





             *K-13





       *Chemul'po






____ Ground attack aircraft      K-55*  Usan






==== Interceptors

[TFR 37-95]






- 30 -






During the run on the target the interval between the flights is 30 seconds to 1 minute.  This
interval stays constant, regardless of how many flights are in the ground attack force.






It is considered normal weather when the cloud cover is not below 20000 feet.






Flights go on bombing runs in columns.





Sometimes it seems that flights fly in another kind of formation, but this is done when a
flight does not maintain the needed interval and breaks formation.






Other times the leader will order to increase speed, but not all the fliers do this
immediately, since some fliers at this time are searching for targets, and have to either
decrease or increase speed, in order to correct the interval.






Why these routes are chosen:






The Kaesong area is not crossed.






They are almost straight and at the same time do not go over large cities.






There are good orientation points along the route.






An escort patrols around the area on the south shore of the Yalu River, in the target area or
at a range of 50 miles in any direction from the target area.  Direct escort is not sent out,
since the North Korean AF rarely appears south of the Chen-Chen river.  The speed of the patrol
is Mach .8-.88.






The planes on duty in the group






1.  "Alarm OOTs" - planes ready to take-off for direct support.






2.  "Alarm for vehicles" - planes ready to take-off for bombing of vehicles.






3.  "Alarm on the runway" - planes ready to take-off to intercept enemy planes.






4.  "Alarm Chodo" - planes planning to patrol over the island of Chodo.





[TFR 37-96]






- 31 -






Planes that are dispatched for patrolling (to combat MiGs) have the same formation as during a
sortie to an assault, but the second pair flies alternately at the same level with the lead
pair, then higher by 2000 feet.






In pairs the planes fly at one altitude.  Usually the second pair flies 1000-1200 feet higher
than the lead pair.  The flight commanders usually decide between themselves who will patrol in
which area.






The flights leave on a direct course to the patrol areas and separate accordingly to the patrol
areas.






Experienced fliers with 200 gallon drop tanks.






The goal of this sortie was to establish flying data of a plane with two 200 gallon drop tanks,
namely: altitude, speed, range, leftover fuel, flight duration.






Bomb loads consisted of two 500 pound bombs.  The route: climbing to 30000 feet, they went
toward the airfield located approximately 20 miles southeast of Vonsan, then straight to the
protrusion of land north of P'engneng - before that area, we began the descent and went on a
course to Sarivon, where we had an altitude of 18000 feet.  From Sarivon we went to the target
area, which is approximately 15 miles east of Sarivon.  Again we climbed to 30000 feet.  We
climbed at a speed of 300 knots until the plane achieved Mach .7, at 30000 feet the speed
worked out to approximately 165 miles per hour.  The plane climbed to 30000 feet in about 21
minutes after take-off.






We were in the air a total of 1 hour 50 minutes.  Drop tanks were used up after about 5 minutes
from when we had begun the climb after the bombing raid.  The flight landed, having on average
900 pounds of fuel.






Engine start checklist:






- The external power supply is connected.






- The main switch is turned on.






- The battery starter is turned on for 3 seconds.





[TFR 37-97]






- 32 -






- at 6% revolutions the throttle is pumped slightly.






- at 10% revolutions the throttle is moved forward, until the fuel pressure reaches 35-40
pounds.






- Until the engine reaches 35% revolutions it is necessary to maintain the exhaust temperature
at 600 degrees.






Upon reaching 35% revolutions the throttle is set to idle.






The external power supply is disconnected at 22% revolutions.






Differences between the A-4, A-1s and A-1st sights.






A-4 sight





[Hand-drawn diagram]

         Reflector     turn off





         plate




                 turn on






Wing   1





  




span       Distance 2





               3





         *     *





         light   [illeg]

1.  Indicate the wing span of the enemy plane.






2.  Indicate the distance to the target.






3.  The switch to the left - the sight is fixed , to the right - the sight calculates.






4.  When the radar is in contact with the target the light is illuminated.






5.  The brightness of the scale controls the firing.





[TFR 37-98]






- 33 -






Control panel of the A-4 sight





[hand-drawn diagram follows]

       1 2   3  4






         5       7






         6     8





               9





       10      11






  1.  Bomb knob - for wind corrections.






  2.  Rocket knob - for various types of rockets.






  3.  Sight on/off button.






  4.  Machine gun heating switch - for pre-heating machine guns.






  5.  Bomb switch - for dropping bombs.






  6.  Rocket switch - for dropping rockets.






  7.  Sight scale switch - primary and reserve lamps.






  8.  Gyroscope on.






  9.  Machine gun filling switch - loads the machine guns.






 10.  Cabin light rheostat - lights the cabin.






 11.  Converter switch - chooses the converter.

My first acquaintance with the A-4 sight was upon arrival in Korea.  Since it works identically
to the A-1sm, there is no need for any kind of special instructions for working with it.






The main difference of this sight, as far as I know, is the redistribution and rearrangement of
parts of the sight so that its maintenance is lowered.






I heard that the bomb and rocket switches were improved, but I do not know how.  I never heard
about the difference between  the A-1s and A-1sm sights.





[TFR 37-99]






- 34 -






The F-86f is equipped with the A-4 sight.






The [in English "APG-30"] range finder is used in the A-4 sight.






The APG-33 is the other range finder that I know.  This range finder gives information about
range on the operator screen.  The APG-30 range finder has information about range sent to the
computer and from there to the flier's scale.






As far as I know, the advantages of the A-4 sight over the A-1s and A-1sm are the A-4's
maintenance and repair work is less.  I do not know the rest of the information, since I never
bombed or fired rockets with the aid of the A-4 sight.






The A-4 sight is not a new invention.  This is an improved modification of the A-1sm.






Location of the A-4 sight in the plane






Location of the A-4 sight in the plane





[hand-drawn diagram of a plane]

   sight






         switch





 antenna





   computer





   and power unit






[hand-drawn diagram follows]





 Reflector plate






 Wind





 shield






 head of





 the sight






 Sight





 panel

An image of the enemy plane is projected on the reflector screen.





[TFR 37-100]






- 35 -






Personally I have not found any deficiencies in the A-4 sight.






The A-1s, A-1sm and A-4, in comparison with the K-14 and Mark-18, are better in the sense of
firing, since they give better information about distance, but in the sense of maintenance and
repair these sights (A-1s, A-1sm, A-4) are more complex and difficult.






A pilot prefers to use the A-4 sight, since this is the latest sight model and it breaks down
less on the job.






The job of the A-4 sight during firing is similar to the job of the A-1cm sight: to acquire the
target with the sight and hold it until the light blinks.  When the range indicator shows that
you have achieved the desired distance, open fire.






Firing on ground targets with the A-4 sight is the same as with the A-1cm.  The sight is
located in a fixed position.






A pilot aims the sight at the target and opens fire, if he thinks that he is at the required
distance.






[2 hand-drawn diagrams follow - side by side]






firing on an aerial target  firing on a ground target






CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FIELD POST NUMBER 54892






Lieutenant Colonel: [signature] (SAN'KOV)






[handwritten on reverse: TsA MO, f. 64 IAP, op. 174045 ss, d. 143, l. 135-169.]